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Rescue has long been a defense for the removal of cultural property. Since the explosion of iconoclasm in West Asia, North Africa, and West Africa, there has been a growing demand for cultural property in danger zones to be “rescued” by being purchased and given “asylum” in “safe zones” (typically, in the market countries of Western Europe and North America). This article reviews evidence from natural experiments with the “rescue” of looted antiquities and stolen artifacts from across Asia and Europe. Unsurprisingly, the evidence reaffirms that “rescue” incentivizes looting, smuggling, and corruption, as well as forgery, and the accompanying destruction of knowledge. More significantly, “rescue” facilitates the laundering of “ordinary” illicit assets and may contribute to revenue streams of criminal organizations and violent political organizations; it may even weaken international support for insecure democracies. Ultimately, “rescue” by purchase appears incoherent, counter-productive, and dangerous for the victimized communities that it purports to support.
This article analyzes the relationship between corruption offenses and money laundering with reference to the Spanish Penal Code. These two criminal categories lack a certain definition, as there is no such univocal concept of “political corruption” and “money laundering.” The reasons for the denaturation of these criminal figures will be addressed. Then, the paper will expose how these criminal figures relate to each other. We argue that a real concurrence between both figures is possible, although it may lead, in certain cases, to double incrimination and its consequent punitive excess. Therefore, we will propose some criteria for a restrictive interpretation of “money laundering” to avoid confusion with other legal figures such as “confiscation.” The paper will end with reference to the Spanish Criminal Code’s regulation on “confiscation” and a brief review of the main critics.
Social norms pervade society and when they conflict with legal norms, the former undermine the latter making them ineffective. In this study, we propose that the extortion racket in Sicily has turned into a social norm and this is why recent top-down interventions have failed in stalling this socially undesirable activity. One exception is represented by Addiopizzo, a grass root movement that uses non-legal means to fight the racket phenomenon in Sicily. During the last 15 years, Addiopizzo was able to produce an effective reduction in the payment of protection money in the Sicilian city of Palermo by triggering, we suggest, among other things, a process of change in social norms. Acknowledging the importance of a change in social norms to achieve social change allows us to link the theory of institutions as ‘rules’ with the theory of institutions as ‘equilibria’.
This chapter discusses the implications of our findings for a new understanding of the drivers of large-scale criminal violence in Mexico, the social scientific study of criminal violence, and the design of security policies in new democracies. The focus on state–criminal collusion in the gray zone of criminality and political-electoral mechanisms as triggers of criminal wars and violence offers a new interpretation of drug wars in Mexico (1990–2012) and provides a tentative interpretation of the exponential growth of violence in the 2012–2018 period. Violence increased because Mexico continued to have intense electoral competition but no rule of law; collusion of state agents with crime expanded; presidents politicized law enforcement for electoral gains; and the administration of President Enrique Peña Nieto retained the same policies that originally caused the escalation of violence. Beyond Mexico, we discuss how our theoretical reformulation and our empirical findings contribute to the development of a political science of organized crime and violence. We conclude by considering how this political approach can shape a new understanding of security policies in new democracies.
This chapter develops a new theoretical framework that explains the role played by state agents in the constitution of organized criminal groups (OCGs) and why electoral politics can become a decisive factor for peace and violence in the criminal underworld. The gray zone of criminality is introduced as the ecological space where the state and crime intersect and corrupt members of state security forces and criminals give rise to OCGs.The gray zone often emerges in authoritarian regimes, where autocrats allow state specialists in violence to regulate, protect, and profit from the criminal underworld in exchange for their loyalty. When countries transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, and postauthoritarian elites fail to reform the military and the police and to dismantle state–criminal networks, democratic mechanisms become intertwined with criminal violence. Electoral competition, party alternation, and the decentralization and fragmentation of political power introduce uncertainty in the gray zone, stimulating criminal rivalry, wars, and large-scale violence. We use these definitions and propositions to explain the outbreak and escalation of inter-cartel wars in Mexico.
One of the most surprising developments in Mexico's transition to democracy is the outbreak of criminal wars and large-scale criminal violence. Why did Mexican drug cartels go to war as the country transitioned away from one-party rule? And why have criminal wars proliferated as democracy has consolidated and elections have become more competitive subnationally? In Votes, Drugs, and Violence, Guillermo Trejo and Sandra Ley develop a political theory of criminal violence in weak democracies that elucidates how democratic politics and the fragmentation of power fundamentally shape cartels' incentives for war and peace. Drawing on in-depth case studies and statistical analysis spanning more than two decades and multiple levels of government, Trejo and Ley show that electoral competition and partisan conflict were key drivers of the outbreak of Mexico's crime wars, the intensification of violence, and the expansion of war and violence to the spheres of local politics and civil society.
Chapter 6 considers the long tail of wartime 419, using a variety of sources to understand why wartime practices of deception and subterfuge continued long after the war was over. It analyzes the ways in which 419 has been explained and concludes with a coda on the question of how "organized" Nigerian organized crime is.
Forestry crimes include illegal logging, which is a contributing factor to deforestation across the globe. An estimated 189 to 565 million cubic metres of timber are cut illegally in some form. Forestry crimes are estimated by INTERPOL and the United Nations to be valued at US$51–152 billion annually. Much of this harvest is used for wood fuel and charcoal, and the proceeds from illegal logging are sometimes used to fund terrorist groups. Globally, (excluding illegal logging for wood fuel and charcoal). To date, the only effective interventions have been the efforts by the Brazilian government using targeted law enforcement efforts to combat illegal logging, the result of which was a 76% reduction in deforestation.
The chapter examines the evolution over the past twenty years of a complex transnational legal order or TLO around the 2000 Palermo Protocol on Trafficking. It elaborates on why despite the Protocol’s high rates of ratification, the anti-trafficking TLO is poorly institutionalized attributing it to the various phases of the TLO’s development, the discursive and ideological issues that are at its core, the factors for its institutionalization relating to concordance and issue alignment, and the varied regulatory fields that it has implicated. Paradoxically however, the criminal justice approach to trafficking inherent in the Palermo Protocol remains hegemonic. This hegemony however cannot be simply attributed to the unidirectional influence and dissemination of transnational (and Western) ideas about how to address the problem. Rather, using the example of the India, the chapter shows how national legal contexts are crucial to when and how the logic of criminalization is pursued. The recursive nature of the trafficking TLO is therefore significant and helps explain the normative basis for the authority of transnational law.
Why is there variation in how violent nonstate groups interact in armed conflict? Where armed conflict and organized crime converge in unstable regions worldwide, these groups sometimes enter cooperative arrangements with opposing groups. Within the same unstable setting, violent nonstate groups forge stable, long-term relations with each other in some regions, engage in unstable, short-term arrangements in others, and dispute each other elsewhere. Even though such paradoxical arrangements have intensified and perpetuated war, extant theories on group interactions that focus on territory and motivations overlook their concurrent character. Challenging the literature that focuses on conflict dynamics alone, the author argues that the spatial distribution of illicit flows influences how these interactions vary. By mapping cocaine supply chain networks, the author shows that long-term arrangements prevail at production sites, whereas short-term arrangements cluster at trafficking nodes. The article demonstrates through process tracing how the logic of illicit flows produces variation in the groups’ cooperative arrangements. This multiyear, multisited study includes over six hundred interviews in and about Colombia’s remote, war-torn borderlands.
This chapter deals with homicide and serious interpersonal violence in modern Europe, comparing this with the rest of the world for as much as the evidence allows. It focuses, but not exclusively, on male-on-male violence. This is discussed for three subperiods: 1800-1914, 1920-1970, 1970-present. More is known about the global context as we approach the present. In Europe homicide ceased to be a day-to-day affair in urban and rural communities, so that the remaining acts of murder assumed the character of sinister or sensational exceptions. In this connection, the phenomena of serial murder and the underworld are discussed. For the non-Western world, the evidence remains patchy and fragmented up to 1970. Traditional male honor remained important and affected interpersonal violence in independent Latin America as well as Colonial India and Indonesia. Dueling was rather prevalent among European men in colonial societies. The chapter concludes with a tentative thesis that we can speak of a world history of violence since about 1970, under the influence of globalization. International organized crime was a major factor in this.
This chapter first provides a broad definition of corruption and discusses why it is so toxic to effective governance. We then address how corruption has emerged as a key issue in the development process after being ignored for many decades. We explore the ways in which, without proper vigilance, government and corruption can become intertwined and feed off each other, destroying the foundations of human prosperity and the very purpose of governance. Existing efforts to tackle corruption at the national, regional and global levels are reviewed, and additional ways forward, particularly as regards the role of economic policies in developing the right sorts of incentives and institutions to reduce the incidence of corruption, are presented. Finally, proposals are put forth for the establishment of an International Anticorruption Court (IACC) to greatly strengthen and better implement a range of legal instruments that are already in place, but that have had limited success in checking the growth of multiple forms of corruption across the planet – affecting developing and developed countries alike. The setting up of an IACC is seen as a necessary adjunct to existing tools to check the spread of what many now regard as a global epidemic.
Criminal groups often avoid the limelight, shunning publicity. However, in some instances, they overtly communicate, such as with banners or signs. This article explains the competition dynamics behind public criminal communication and provides theory and evidence of the conditions under which it emerges. Relying on a new dataset of approximately 1,800 banners publicly deployed by Mexican criminal groups from 2007 to 2010, the study identifies the conditions behind such messaging. The findings suggest that criminal groups “go public” in the presence of interorganizational contestation, violence from authorities, antagonism toward the local media, local demand for drugs, and local drug production. Some of these factors are associated only with communication toward particular audiences: rivals, the state, or the public. An interesting finding is that the correlates of criminal propaganda are sometimes distinct from those of criminal violence, suggesting that these phenomena are explained by separate dynamics.
As I show in this chapter, the broader developments in interpersonal and intersubjective relations that have taken place over the twentieth century have impacted on the way in which criminal responsibility organises relations of responsibility between individuals. I make two main arguments in this chapter. First, I argue that consorting laws fall into two generations. The first generation of laws, which appeared around the turn of the twentieth century, had a distinctive orientation, mode (which denotes the way in which criminal responsibility is expressed) and form. The second main argument made in this chapter is that these generations of consorting laws correspond to different relations of responsibility between individuals or ‘others’.
From the 1950s through the 1970s, American policymakers engaged in an extensive campaign against illegal gambling in an effort to turn the tide in the government’s crusade against organized crime. At the grassroots, however, voters endorsed a different form of state expansion to beat back the mob menace. Between 1963 and 1977, fourteen northeastern and Rust Belt states enacted the first government-run lotteries in the twentieth-century United States on the belief that legalized gambling would undercut the mob’s gambling profits. While gambling opponents pointed to Las Vegas as proof that organized crime would flourish following legalization, supporters argued that illegal gambling was already pervasive, so the state may as well profit from this irrepressible activity. The history of gambling legalization challenges narratives on the popularity of law-and-order politics and offers a new perspective on crime policy in the post–World War II period.
The historiography of the Greek civil war has made significant progress during the past decade, but the origins, role and activities of paramilitaries remain under-researched. Most studies have focused on the period of the ‘white terror’ and explored the collusion between the state and the paramilitary groups. Although such studies have advanced our understanding of this turbulent period, they have not discussed important issues such as the motivation of the rank and file members, the sociopolitical networks used to recruit and mobilize support and the diverse conditions under which militias emerge. The article will address this lacuna and provide new insights into the origins, development and legacies of paramilitarism.
The objective of this chapter is to explore the potential of the partial-organization concept as applied to the analysis of inter-firm networks as a form of economic governance that is created, reproduced or transformed with the help of network management practices. Key insights that the partial-organization perspective can provide into the process and the outcome of organizing and managing inter-firm networks are discussed. Inter-firm networks are conceived as partial organization of more or less complete formal organizations. Under specific circumstances, inter-firm networks could even be considered, at least in some aspects, as being even more organized than organizations. With regard to insights into the dynamics of this organizational form the chapter argues that the concept of partial organization helps to understand the development of this form from initial market relationships as well as from hierarchical organizations
In this chapter, we explore the usefulness of applying the idea of partial organization as one way of mitigating the confusion surrounding the notion of organized crime. We examine three types of collectivities that are usually seen as examples of organized crime: outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMCs), street gangs, and mafias. When we examine the occurrence of organizational elements, we find substantial differences among these three cases not only in the amount of their organization, but also in the ways in which they are organized. A few multinational outlaw motorcycle gangs have gradually been able to form strong formal organizations containing all organizational elements. For a mafia, the situation is quite the opposite. Because its embeddedness in kinship relationships provides cohesion and protection, it needs little organization. Through its strong kinship ties, a mafia has access to several functional equivalents to the organizational elements one can find in OMCs. In street gangs the appearance of organizational elements varies among the gangs, and they rarely have more than a few elements at any one time. One obstacle for the organization of street gangs is their local embeddedness and limited duration, which loosen the boundaries of the gang.
The book explores how various social settings are partially organized even when they do not form part of a formal organization. It also shows how even formal organizations may be only partially organized. Professors Göran Ahrne and Nils Brunsson first established the concept of partial organization in 2011 and in doing so opened up a ground-breaking new field of organizational analysis. An academic community has since developed around the concept, and Ahrne and Brunsson have edited this collection to reflect the current state of inquiry in this burgeoning subject and to set an agenda for future research. Its chapters explain how organization is a salient feature in many social settings, including markets, interfirm networks, social movements, criminal gangs, internet communication and family life. Organization theory is much more relevant for the understanding of social processes than previously assumed. This book provides a new understanding of many social phenomena and opens up new fields for organizational analysis.