On 9 January 2024, the president of the Republic of Ecuador decreed a state of exception in which he recognized the existence of a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) involving twenty-two criminal groups. By July 2024, the president had declared four additional states of exception. The Constitutional Court examined the decrees and ruled against the existence of a NIAC. In this context, the objective of this article is to present, contrast and analyze the positions of the president and the Constitutional Court and highlight the most notable jurisprudential developments. This case study is relevant to exploring some of the challenges of classifying armed conflicts involving organized crime. In respect of the position of the president, inconsistencies were identified between the recognition of the armed conflict and the actions taken to confront it. As to the Court's jurisprudence, some notable developments identified include the incorporation of international humanitarian law treaties into the block of constitutionality and the ruling on challenges of contemporary armed conflicts such as spillovers, coalition formation and the participation of criminal groups in armed conflicts.

Estas notas de investigación son el resultado de un proceso etnográfico accidental e involuntario realizado a lo largo de 2023 en el estado de Durango, en el norte de México. Son un análisis preliminar de la información recolectada sobre la evidente presencia del crimen organizado y sus efectos en la vida cotidiana de los ciudadanos. La mayoría de los estudios sobre violencia en México —y América Latina— tienden a tratar situaciones de violencia extrema; o se enfocan en la población pobre y marginada, que sufre distintos tipos de opresión. Estas notas retratan una situación distinta en dos sentidos. Primero, surgen del trabajo de campo realizado en un entorno de aparente tranquilidad: Durango es actualmente uno de los estados más pacíficos del país, si se mide la paz por número de homicidios. Solo un centenar de personas son asesinadas anualmente, lo que es una anomalía en un país cruento, que reporta más de treinta mil muertes violentas cada año. Segundo, las notas emergen, principalmente, del testimonio de las clases medias y altas, segmentos de la población que también sufren las consecuencias de la violencia, pero que han sido largamente ignorados por la literatura. La investigación evidencia que el crimen organizado condiciona significativamente la vida cotidiana de los ciudadanos que viven en paz, pero con miedo. Los grupos criminales perturban el trabajo y el ocio de los ciudadanos, así como su relación con el gobierno. Este estudio también reflexiona sobre cómo el crimen organizado repercute en el funcionamiento normal del Estado y la democracia liberal.

The war in the former Yugoslavia produced many highly trained and experienced combatants, some of whom engaged not only in a variety of organized criminal activities such as the illicit trade of natural resources, trafficking and corruption, but also war crimes. In the post-war environment various criminal groups took advantage of post-conflict transition conditions which enabled them to be transformed into legitimate legal entities. The failure to investigate and hold to account those involved in criminal activity meant that demobilized soldiers turned to highly profitable, legally constituted private military and security companies (PMSCs). This is coupled with poorly designed security sector reforms that often fail to enhance effective and accountable security that is respectful of human rights. In recent years, similar transformations of many former combatants and criminal groups into legitimate PMSCs around the globe have raised new concerns about their growing activities across different sectors. This article uses the former Yugoslavia as an example from which to highlight some of the increasingly common problems posed by the creation of private military and security providers globally, as a result of the current uncoordinated processes to prevent armed conflicts. The article reflects on the need to avoid smart sanctions and use other foreign policy tools, while calling for an integrated approach to security sector reform and transitional justice that is necessary for sustainable peace.

Crime groups are drawn to stealing heritage and cultural property because the thefts can be less dangerous than other illicit activities and there can be a lower chance of detection. In addition, there are financial opportunities such as selling the objects, using them as currency and collateral in illicit markets, and through rewards and ransoms. While these factors remain, crime groups operating as criminal entrepreneurs will continue to be attracted to this type of theft even if situational crime prevention strategies are implemented at locations. Unique and irreplaceable heritage and cultural property will be stolen, and societies will lose in artistic, cultural, heritage, historical, and financial terms. This article argues that, while people tasked with the policing and security of heritage and cultural property should focus on the potential thefts, policing agencies also need to focus on the crime groups, especially as heritage and cultural property thefts can be crime groups’ “Achilles’ heel.”

The idea that Rio de Janeiro has been plunged into an actual “war” against organized crime is widely discussed and is supported by an ever-increasing number of people in Brazil. Not surprisingly, such discourse has led to less protection for the civilian population, particularly in the so-called favelas, while allowing security forces to carry out operations with even greater relative impunity. This article argues that although urban violence in Rio de Janeiro is indeed a serious problem, it does not reach the threshold required to be considered a non-international armed conflict.

The article uses archival sources to critique the currently dominant etymological approach to the history of the word ’ndrangheta as used to refer to the Calabrian mafia. Scholars such as Paolo Martino and John Trumper have latched onto the word's ancient Greek origins to argue that the mafia organisation that we today call ’Ndrangheta has origins dating back many centuries. Moreover, according to Martino in particular, the flattering connotations of the word ’ndrangheta (courage, martial prowess, manliness) indicate that the ’Ndrangheta as a social phenomenon was rooted in the same positive values, and that it only later degenerated into criminality. This article proposes that the work of Martino and Trumper represents a largely evidence-free extension of etymology into the field of history. Analysing the latest archival evidence about the word from criminal trials conducted in the 1920s and early 1930s, and setting it in the context of current historiography and criminology on the ’Ndrangheta, the article argues that two conclusions about the history of the word are likely: that the use of ’ndrangheta as a name for the Calabrian mafia began at around the time it first appeared in the documentary sources; that the first to adopt it were mafiosi themselves.

Criminal violence in Latin American cities is increasing. Meanwhile, with urbanization, greater numbers of people are moving to cities and into the crossfire. What self-protection strategies do residents adopt to keep safe in violent cities? Drawing on qualitative data from Medellín, Colombia, and Monterrey, Mexico, we document the strategies residents use to stay safe. We synthesize insights from studies of civil war, criminal governance, and urban violence to construct an analytical framework to systematically catalog and name these strategies. We posit that the type of violence residents face—indiscriminate or targeted—influences the strategies they pursue. Responding to either the indiscriminate or targeted form, residents employ survival strategies to avoid, withstand, or confront violence. Our research underscores the centrality of agency for residents’ “staying power” amid urban violence.

Fifty-two years ago, in 1971, President Nixon declared the “War on Drugs”, identifying drug abuse as a public enemy in the United States. Since then, US drug policy has been militarized and, more recently, privatized. Every year, the US government increasingly contracts private military and security companies to provide intelligence, logistical support and training to armed forces in drug-producing or drug-transit States. In Latin America, this militarization and privatization has increased the intensity of violence and has complexified domestic situations, to the extent that the existing international legal regimes now seem inappropriate to respond to the challenges posed by the War on Drugs. On the one hand, human rights law does not adequately address situations where the State faces organized crime groups that are able to control territory. On the other hand, international humanitarian law (IHL) was not created to address law enforcement situations, which the War on Drugs and the fight against organized crime ostensibly are.

This article examines the situation in Latin America, looking at examples of different types of situations through the lens of intensity and organization of the group involved and, in some cases, the group's control over territory. It discusses the application of IHL and human rights law (focusing on the inter-American system of human rights) in these situations and their complementarity, and debates how these bodies of law are adapting or may need to be adapted.

Ghada Waly is the Director-General of the United Nations Office at Vienna and the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. She holds the rank of Undersecretary-General of the United Nations. She previously served as Minister of Social Solidarity of Egypt and chaired the Executive Council of Arab Ministers of Social Affairs. She has also served as Assistant Resident Representative at the United Nations Development Program. Ms Waly holds an MA and a BA in humanities from Colorado State University.