Chapter 12 describes the multiple notification requirements contained in the Agreement on Safeguards on domestic regulations on safeguard measures as well as on key aspects of specific safeguard actions. The chapter explains the consequences of these notifications and the specific actions that other Members may take to defend their commercial interest. It also discusses the question of the adequate opportunity to hold consultations under Article 12.3 of the agreement, and the question of cross-notifications to be made by third Members. The Chapter presents statistics on the use of safeguard investigations, safeguard measures and rebalancing actions in the light of the notifications made by WTO Members between 1995 and 2020.

Chapter 13 provides an overview of the institutional framework provided by the Committee on Safeguards, and a description of its multiple functions. Some of these functions ensure that Members exert real surveillance over safeguard actions, and others provide a rather adjudicating function to the Committee, which may collide with the exclusive jurisdiction of the WTO dispute settlement system to adjudicate safeguard-related claims of infringement.

Except as provided for in paragraph 6, an investigation to determine the existence, degree and effect of any alleged dumping shall be initiated upon a written application by or on behalf of the domestic industry.

Chapter 9 examines the consequences of subjecting children to SORN laws. It argues that registration and notification laws are uniquely ineffective and harmful when applied to children. The chapter begins with a history of how SORN laws came to regulate juvenile sexual misconduct. In response to moral panics around “sexual predators” and “juvenile super-predators,” policymakers explicitly expanded the scope of SORN laws to cover children adjudicated delinquent of sex offenses. The chapter next evaluates the effects of these laws on juvenile offending, particularly recidivism. Contrary to the myths underlying their enactment, children found to have engaged in sexual misconduct very rarely reoffend. Further, the evidence is unanimous that SORN laws do not reduce recidivism. The chapter then compiles evidence on the many deleterious effects SORN laws produce when they are applied to children. Studies of providers and children who are registrants demonstrate that SORN laws increase substantially the risk of suicide and sexual victimization. Furthermore, SORN laws are associated with high rates of plea bargaining among children. In light of these failures and dangerous effects, the application of SORN to children should be abandoned.

Chapter 3 analyzes the demographic makeup and composition of state sex offender registries. The data reject the popular narratives of incomplete registries filled with dangerous individuals. The chapter begins by investigating the widely reported counts of registered individuals from the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC). While NCMEC reports that there are nearly one million registrants nationwide, no true national registry exists to confirm this claim. Further, independent studies indicate that many registrants simply do not live in their listed community – they may be incarcerated, committed, deported, or deceased. Additionally, the data refute common arguments that registries are systematically incomplete with regard to “missing” registrants. The chapter next examines how registries reflect broader racial dynamics. The typical registrant is middle-aged and white. However, registries are disproportionately black, and black registrants are overclassified with respect to recidivism risk. Finally, the chapter dissects the technical and data challenges affecting registries. While intra-registry duplicates plague few jurisdictions, many registries contain individuals present on other states’ registries. This chapter contends that policymakers should account for these deficiencies when considering sex offender policy.

This part presents the uses made by WTO Members of the SPS and TBT Transparency tools, to demonstrate that transparency can – and does – substitute the dispute settlement procedure. To do so, it gives an overview of both the ‘supply side’ of information, i.e. the volume of information that is shared by WTO Members, and the ‘demand side’ of information, i.e. the information sought by WTO Members that raise concerns about other WTO Members’ measures. The part shows that despite active sharing of information about domestic measures by WTO Members, there is still much higher demand than supply of information. The possibility to raise Specific Trade Concerns (STCs) in SPS and TBT Committees allows to bridge this gap and obtain information, contributes to Members regulatory process and addresses practical impediments to trade. As a result, STCs play an important role in addressing trade conflicts and preventing them from being raised as formal disputes.

Chapter 4 shows the information that is made available to WTO Members through transparency in the SPS and TBT context – the ‘supply side’ of information. In this regard it presents information made available through notifications, bilateral and multilateral regulatory dialogue, through dialogue with the private sector. The SPS and TBT Agreements enable Members to obtain a considerable volume of information on each others’ domestic measures. The high volume of information about SPS and TBT measures shows that the transparency tools are made use of substantively. Information, however, remains limited on whether this information matches the information needs. The main indication in this regard, i.e. the STC discussions, suggests that Members still have a high demand for further information including about measures that have not been notified, and therefore the overall level of disclosure of SPS and TBT measures remains insufficient.

The SPS and TBT Agreements set obligations to rationalise the development of behind-the-border measures in WTO Members. Because of the myriad of domestic measures that may fall under these disciplines, a detailed understanding of domestic measures and their rationale is essential to ensure effective implementation of the two Agreements. The SPS and TBT transparency frameworks allow all WTO Members to gain the necessary information and reach such an understanding. This chapter makes an in-depth presentation of the transparency requirements of the SPS and TBT Agreements and the potential role they may play in both informing Members and allowing them to exchange on their policies at an early level of the regulatory process. It defines the purpose, scope of application and typology of transparency mechanisms that exist under the frameworks of the two Agreements.

Safety of medical treatments implies all their side and long-term effects on patients. With reference to ART, subjects involved are mothers and their children.Since the early application of IVF, operators have agreed on the importance of monitoring these new techniques in order to build and maintain trust towards them.Collecting data regarding assisted reproduction techniques worldwide is of the utmost usefulness to ensure safety and quality of treatments provided, to detect potential problems, as well as to implement practices aimed at reducing risks and improving outcomes.

Nowadays, well-functioning registries have been set up in most countries. Regulations and guidelines for the monitoring of all clinical and laboratory aspects of assisted reproduction techniques have been issued, also based on data collected so far.

Currently available evidence should be the basis for a further improvement of medical and laboratory practices.