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Why have citizens become increasingly polarised? One answer is that there is increasing identification with political parties – a process known as partisanship. This chapter focuses on the role that social identity and partisanship play in contemporary politics. Partisan identities influence political preferences, such that partisans are more likely to agree with policies that were endorsed by their political party, regardless of the policy content, and, in some cases, their own ideological beliefs. We will describe how partisanship mirrors other forms of social identity, both behaviourally and in the brain. However, partisanship also has distinct biological origins, and consequences in political domains such as fake news sharing, conspiracy theory beliefs, and voting behaviour. Our chapter focuses on the psychology and neuroscience of partisanship within broader sociopolitical contexts.
This Element provides a comprehensive introduction to philosophy of neuroscience. It covers such topics as how neuroscientists procure knowledge, including not just research techniques but the use of various model organisms. It presents examples of knowledge acquired in neuroscience that are then employed to discuss more philosophical topics such as the nature of explanations developed in neuroscience, the different conception of levels employed in discussions of neuroscience, and the invocation of representations in neuroscience explanations. The text emphasizes the importance of brain processes beyond those in the neocortex and then explores what makes processing in neocortex different. It consider the view that the nervous system consists of control mechanisms and considers arguments for hierarchical vs. heterarchical organization of control mechanisms. It concludes by considering implications of findings in neuroscience for how humans conceive of themselves and practices such as embracing norms.
In the past decade, international actors have launched “brain projects” or “brain initiatives.” One of the emerging technologies enabled by these publicly funded programs is brain-computer interfaces (BCIs), which are devices that allow communication between the brain and external devices like a prosthetic arm or a keyboard. BCIs are poised to have significant impacts on public health, society, and national security. This research presents the first analytical framework that attempts to predict the dissemination of neurotechnologies to both the commercial and military sectors in the United States and China. While China started its project later with less funding, we find that it has other advantages that make earlier adoption more likely. We also articulate national security risks implicit in later adoption, including the inability to set international ethical and legal norms for BCI use, especially in wartime operating environments, and data privacy risks for citizens who use technology developed by foreign actors.
Substrate independence and mind-body functionalism claim that thinking does not depend on any particular kind of physical implementation. But real-world information processing depends on energy, and energy depends on material substrates. Biological evidence for these claims comes from ecology and neuroscience, while computational evidence comes from neuromorphic computing and deep learning. Attention to energy requirements undermines the use of substrate independence to support claims about the feasibility of artificial intelligence, the moral standing of robots, the possibility that we may be living in a computer simulation, the plausibility of transferring minds into computers, and the autonomy of psychology from neuroscience.
Trust and reciprocity are two closely linked concepts that are ubiquitous within cooperative exchange. To distinguish the two, we first review potential motivations that drive trusting and reciprocal behavior. Economic theories suggest that both preferences over monetary distributions (outcome-based) as well as considerations about others’ intentions (belief-based) may contribute to decisions to trust and reciprocate. Outcome-based theories suggest that individuals’ internal preferences over monetary distribution influence decision-making. In comparison, belief-based theories assume that individuals’ expectations about themselves and others generate emotions that influence decision-making. Turning to the neuroscience of trust and reciprocity with the trust game, we find that neural activations in insula, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and anterior cingulate cortex are common to belief-based motivations, while neural responses in caudate and amygdala reflect outcome-based motivations. Integrating economic theory with neuroscientific findings, we suggest that reciprocal behavior is primarily driven by belief-based motivations while trust behavior is associated with outcome-based preferences. We propose that future research should examine the potential context-dependent nature of behavioral motivations, investigate both positive and negative reciprocity, and leverage the trust game and related paradigms to parse potential sources of social dysfunction in mental illness.
Wilder Penfield was appointed as Chair of McGill University’s newly created Department of Neurology and Neurosurgery in 1930 and Director of the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) in 1933. The departmental structure allowed Penfield to develop his own research priorities, and the MNI’s clinics and laboratories allowed residents to train in neurosurgery and in basic science under one roof. This paper reviews the research performed by neurosurgical residents under Penfield’s direction from 1934 to 1945 and argues that their initiation to laboratory research contributed to the emergence of neuroscience following the Second World War.
Chapter 1 looks at how historically the concept of economic agent developed within mainstream economics, and how the concept of artificial agent emerged while cognitive science became the successor of behaviorism. Then, considering that artificial economics tries to build realistic models of artificial agents, it introduces the main models of mental architectures that derive from cognitive science, and some recent advances in neuroscience (specially within neuroeconomics, social neuroscience, and neurosociology) that relate directly to the economic and social behavior of individuals. Finally, it reviews some models and approaches that try to capture the cognitive, neurological, emotional, and social aspects of agents in an integrated way.
Responses to brain injury sit in the intersection between neuroscience and an ethic of care, and require sensitive and dynamic indicators of how an individual with brain injury can learn how to live in the context of a changing environment and multiple timescales. Therapeutic relationships and rhythms underpinning such a dynamic approach are currently obscured by existing models of brain function. Something older is required and we put forward narrative types articulating outcomes of brain injury over various periods and starting points in time. Such storytelling challenges a static neuropsychological paradigm and moves from an ethics that focuses on patient autonomy into one that is reflective of the cognitive supports and therapeutic relationships that underpin ways that the patient can re-find the beat that proves the music is not over.
In this chapter, working with scientific evidence, I build up a picture of the psychopathic personality which can be applied to my preferred account of moral responsibility. After sketching an introduction to the history of psychopathy as a clinical construct, I consider some disputes and controversies surrounding its diagnosis. I distinguish psychopathy from Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD), a rival construct commonly used in clinical settings. I also sketch the implications of evidence for a distinction between ‘successful’ and ‘unsuccessful’ psychopaths for the overall construct. I conclude that the Hare Psychopathy Checklist is the most robust measure available, a measure which describes psychopathy as a condition characterised primarily by emotional deficiencies. I then review neuroscientific evidence for structural and functional correlates and causes of psychopathy. I also review evidence for the treatability of the condition, concluding based on the current psychological and psychiatric evidence that psychopathy appears to be highly recalcitrant to the treatment methods that have been tried so far, and that some of these methods may even be counter-productive.
Porencephaly is a neurological condition that can develop before or after birth, characterized by cysts located in any place inside the brain parenchyma, which generally are covered by plain walls and encircled by an atrophic crust. It generates a very variable clinic appearance, with severe cases of high disability and slight cases with a light neurological involvement, which also can go unnoticed until adulthood. The prevalence is unknow and the inheritance is autosomal dominant Male patient of 45 years diagnosed with porencephaly with cerebral palsy that affects left half and cognitive disability. His father reports an emerging defiant behavior, mutism and decrease of appetite from a week ago. No triggering stress factors are reported.
Show the importance of include in the differential diagnose hypoactive confusional syndrome.
On urgent medical visit, male comes with ataxic gates which wasn’t shown before. Inhibited attitude, semiflexed staring at floor, with sparing and monosyllabic speech answers, verbalizing discomfort and personal concern. Sleep-wake rhythm disruptions.
Blood tests and drug screening shows no abnormalities Cranial CT: Without acute lesion Urinary infection observed.
It is important to make complementary test to exclude organic frames which could justify acute-subacute psychopathology. In this case, diagnosis was acute confusional syndrome, however, most known presentation is the hyperactive one which include motor hyperactivity, inappropriate behavior or disorganization and alterations of sensory perception. Hypoactive must always be considered, which is the concluding diagnosis in this case.
This chapter looks at the future of people assessment. Like many other areas of business there have been many, and rapid, technology-led changes. There are questions about who are or should be assessed; when and how they are assessed; the cost and legal changes in assessment; and how data is stored. The quiet world of academic-led assessment and testing has been ‘invaded’ by people in business eager to sell psychological testing and assessment to a much larger market. Inevitably there are enthusiasts and sceptics: the former claiming how AI computer and neuro-science technology will revolutionise the ease, cost and accuracy of assessment, while the sceptics argue there is still very little evidence for these claims. It certainly is a ‘good time to be alive’ for those interested in people assessment.
Over the last decade or so, the instantiation of ethics as a form of governance within scientific practice – via, for instance, research ethics committees (RECs) – has been extensively interrogated. Social scientists have demonstrated the reciprocally constitutive nature of science and ethics, which renders problematic any assumption that ethics simply follows (or stifles) science in any straightforward way. This chapter draws on and contributes to such discussion through analysing the relationship between neuroscience and research ethics. I draw on data from six focus groups with scientists in the UK to reflect on how ethical questions and the requirements of RECs as a form of regulation are experienced within (neuro)science. In what follows, I explore issues that the neuroscientists I spoke with deem to be raised by their work, and characterise how both informal ideas about ethics and formal ethical governance (e.g. RECs) are experienced and linked to their research. In doing so, I demonstrate some of the lived realities of scientists who must necessarily grapple with the heterogenous forms of health-related research regulation the editors of this volume highlight in their introduction, while seeking to conduct research with epistemic and social value.
There remains a gap between needs, aspirations and delivery in psychiatry and mental health. To close this gap there is a need to attend more intensely to social science and mad studies, as well as neuroscience, in professional formation in psychiatry and mental health. Further strengthening of the nursing profession and greater engagement of action therapies will also help close the gap in practice. To be effective, such efforts must be underpinned by a commitment to pluralism.
This article casts a critical eye over the development of American psychiatry from 1980 to the present. It notes the rapid decline of psychoanalysis that followed the publication of DSM III; the rising influence of genetics and neuroscience; the re-emphasis on the biology of mental illness; and the collapse of public psychiatry that accompanied deinstitutionalization. It argues that while genetics and neuroscience have made scientific progress, the clinical utility of their findings to date has been very limited. The fifth edition of the DSM was supposed to base itself on this new science but that proved impossible. Diagnosis remains purely phenomenological and controversial. One of the ironies of research on psychiatric genetics is that has failed to find either a Mendelian origin of schizophrenia and depression or to validate the importance of hypothesized candidate genes. Genome-wide association studies have instead uncovered risk factors for major mental illnesses, but these overlap considerably, and the genetic associations are not dispositive. Most of those who carry these genetic variants do not develop mental illness. The status of psychopharmacology since the mid-1950s is scrutinized, as is the influence of the pharmaceutical industry on contemporary psychiatry, and the implications of its recent decision to abandon work in this arena. The paper concludes with an assessment of the crisis that it contends confronts contemporary American psychiatry: its overemphasis on biology; the urgent questions that persist about diagnosis and therapeutics; concerns about the directions of future research; and its inability to reduce the excess mortality that plagues the mentally ill.
The expert witness practice of psychiatrists is under constant scrutiny by the courts and, in the UK, the General Medical Council, as well as within appraisal and revalidation as part of a doctor's overall practice. Regulation and appraisal of expert witness practice must address not only technical competence, including demonstration of a real understanding of the interface between medicine and law, but also ethical probity, including in respect of bias, which is the most challenging appraisal focus. In psychiatry, there is much room for ‘values expression’, and therefore bias, in the offering of expert opinion. This article first describes various legal and psychological definitions of bias; then addresses the sources and routes to expression of bias within expert witness practice, viewed legally, psychologically and neuroscientifically. Finally, it proposes ways in which inevitable bias can be minimised by the individual practitioner.
Research on international norms has yet to answer satisfactorily some of our own most important questions about the origins of norms and the conditions under which some norms win out over others. The authors argue that international relations (IR) theorists should engage more with research in moral psychology and neuroscience to advance theories of norm emergence and resonance. This Element first provides an overview of six areas of research in neuroscience and moral psychology that hold particular promise for norms theorists and international relations theory more generally. It next surveys existing literature in IR to see how literature from moral psychology is already being put to use, and then recommends a research agenda for norms researchers engaging with this literature. The authors do not believe that this exchange should be a one-way street, however, and they discuss various ways in which the IR literature on norms may be of interest and of use to moral psychologists, and of use to advocacy communities.
The State has been a mythological entity through its history, from its sovereign phase to its present dispersed, nodal, regulatory phase. This dispersal raises important questions about gradual disappearance of public accountability. It also points to such other key issues as the dilution of personal responsibility, especially when considered in the context of the determinative implications of neuroscientific research. These trends are further emphasised by the increasingly avaricious, non-consensual digitisation of the State and the threat to democratic values posed by such trends as data brokering and algorithmic friendliness. The consequential move to a non-mythological State can be produced by the reimagining of agencies as purpose-based and which operate on existential, fiduciary principles in a manner that avoids Pettit’s republicanism. How this transition can take place is evidenced by the difference between mythological and non-mythological criminal justice, a model for which is presented.
This work will address the problems of contemporary accounts of privacy by placing them in a new context of the mythological social dynamic that has constrained the West. This dynamic has driven a trajectory of failed mythological magnitudes – Deity, State, Market and now Technology – by which we have tried to avoid existential reality rather than embrace it. This avoidance is why privacy is vulnerable to the imminent impact of the latest form of that dynamic, neuroscience: while ‘privacy’ comes from early forms of this dynamic, neuroscience is now its most powerful form and will overwhelm that sense of privacy. Privacy needs to be removed from this dynamic, reconceiving it through existential, respectful self-responsibility. It will then survive this challenge and will, counterintuitively, embrace neuroscientific benefits, including their promotion of this new privacy through the technological control of the citizen. We will examine the dynamic, how it produced present notions of privacy through a singular form of normalisation, and how it is being re-formed by the mythological algorithms of neuroscience. To disengage privacy, we will need new ethical principles and reimagined social infrastructure – law, State and Market, these best understood by reconceiving regulation. That will provide the necessary support for self-responsibility.