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Chapter 7 explains rules on the duration of safeguard measures and the system of incentives for the establishment of safeguards with relatively short duration. Chapter 7 also explains the process of review for extension of safeguards and the requirements to that effect. It further explains the gradual liberalization process that is envisaged during the period of application of a safeguard measure and the concept of a mid-term review. Chapter 7 also explains the complex rules foreseen to avoid the reintroduction of safeguard measures that have been applied in the past.
Chapters 11 is about modality in Q’eqchi’-Maya – various resources speakers have for referring to entities and events that are nonactual, and hence notions like possibility, permission, necessity, and obligation. It focuses on the forms naru and tento, which are similar in function to the modal auxiliary verbs in English: naru doing work akin to English ‘may’ and ‘can’ (or deontic, dynamic, and circumstantial possibility), and tento doing work akin to English ‘must’. It offers a detailed examination of how speakers use such forms to represent and regiment what counts as obligatory, forbidden, permissible, and possible courses of action.
Here I explicate two methodological burdens for the kind of eliminativist views about free will and moral responsibility that might threaten a prescriptive preservationist view of reactive blame. The first burden is that eliminativists must fix the skeptical spotlight, and offer at least some comparative support for their claim that the error they identify for free will and moral responsibility that threatens blame cannot be resolved by abandoning some other assumption, belief, or feature of our concept. Second, eliminativists must explicitly motivate elimination over some variety of revisionist preservation. I call this second burden the motivational challenge, and examine two possible eliminativist strategies for meeting it. The first involves appeals to gains and losses intended to directly motivate elimination, and the second involves explicit appeal to some claim about the essence of free will and moral responsibility. What both of these strategies reveal is that their success ultimately depends on thorny issues about reference and essence.
In his Eleutheriology or On Freedom and Necessity (1788), Ulrich is concerned with the prospect of the concept of transcendental freedom carving out conceptual space between necessity and chance. He notes the ingenuity of Kant’s restriction of natural necessity to appearances and his attempt to locate freedom in a sphere independent of temporal conditions. However, the denial of natural necessity to things in themselves does not entail that the intelligible character is not necessarily determined in a way independent of temporal conditions. Ulrich presses this issue with respect to those instances in which pure reason does not effectively determine the will, i.e. with respect to immoral action. He asserts that there either is a ground sufficient for the exercise or omission of reason’s efficacy, or not. If there is such a ground, then reason is necessarily determined and Kant is ultimately a determinist even with respect to the intelligible character. If there is not, then whether we act morally or immorally is the result of chance, which is irrational.
“Tragic Implication” looks at the links between the first and last essays in Must We Mean What We Say? Cavell’s concept of acknowledgment as it emerges in the last two essays in this collection has received a fair amount of attention. This essay, by contrast, looks at his work on and in ordinary language philosophy as it emerges in this first extension and radicalization of Austin’s work in the title essay, and shows the latency of tragedy in that early work, even as Cavell goes on to find Austin’s work unable to accommodate tragedy. It thus links Cavell’s earliest work on Austin, with his latest work in A Pitch of Philosophy, and returns to Cavell’s reading of Lear to show that it is King Lear that teaches him his differences with Austin.
This article introduces and clarifies a neglected sense of the word ἤ (‘or’) employed by Aristotle and other authors. In this sense, called ‘indifferent’, ἤ signifies ‘one or the other, regardless of which’. It is shown how attention to this use makes it possible to explain the source of the ambiguity of certain sentences, most obviously, though not exclusively, sentences that make a necessity claim about an embedded disjunction, for example ‘It is necessary that A or B’. Why this sense cannot be explained, as some scholars have suggested, by the distinction between exclusive and inclusive ἤ is also discussed. Finally, it is shown how awareness of this sense might rescue Aristotle from a gross inconsistency.
In this article I contrast two opposing forms of essentialism, definitional and transcendental versus productivist and historical, and trace both forms back to Kripke's Naming and Necessity (1980). Definitional essentialism, as developed by Fine, centers on kind-membership. Historical essentialism, as anticipated by Prior and developed by Almog, puts origin at its center. The article focuses on the fundamentally distinct manners in which these two views handle the necessity of origin thesis. In the final section of the article, inspired by a Nietzschean genealogical methodology, I pursue a naturalization strategy and conclude that rather than origin being necessary, it is essentialist necessity that reduces to origin.
This chapter examines Nature's ultimatum at On the Nature of Things 3.931-962 as a contribution to the much-discussed problem of “deprivation”. This is the problem that death may be bad after all, despite the elimination of sensation, because it deprives us of the opportunity to complete projects that are worthwhile. As I try to show, Lucretius personifies Nature in order to have her argue, in her own words, for a message that Lucretius develops throughout his entire poem: this is the necessity of accepting the natural conditions of our existence. Nature underscores this necessity with the harshness of her words. At the same time, she shows that the conditions themselves are not harsh. Instead, she has provided us with ample opportunity to achieve happiness within a finite lifetime. In sum, she does not deprive us; for she has made it possible for us to flourish fully within the limits she has placed on us.
This essay examines Duns Scotus’s celebrated modal argument for the existence of a first cause in the light of his most extensive discussion of modality: namely, the account of the senses of ‘potency’ in his questions on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, book IX, qq. 1–2. The author holds that it is possible to give two alternative reconstructions of Duns Scotus’s argument for the existence of a first cause depending on which of two alternative interpretations is given to the term ‘potency’. First, ‘potency’ can be taken as what is metaphysically possible. In this interpretation, the potential is co-extensive with ‘being’. Second, ‘potency’ can be taken to mean what is opposed to the actual. In this second interpretation, being in potency is a kind of non-being. The conclusion is that, contrary to what might first appear, it is the second interpretation of ‘potency’ that should be preferred if we want Duns Scotus’s argument for the existence of a first cause to work.
This article analyses the fraught relationship between host States’ obligations under investment agreements and their regulatory powers in the field of public health. First, tribunals addressing the merits of health measures have exercised considerable deference to States under existing treaties. Second, the recent generation of treaties spells out health considerations to encourage respondents or tribunals to adopt broad interpretations of the right to regulate, general exceptions, or article-specific carve-outs. Clauses modelled on GATT exceptions may prove difficult to invoke due to the ‘necessity’ threshold. Finally, the Kyoto Protocol may serve as a model of incentivising private investment in the public health sector.
Chapter Four charts the emergence of human dignity in the context of international humanitarian law, providing the setting for its first constitutive stage. It begins in the second half of the nineteenth century, with human dignity’s symbolic entrance into the fabric of international law with the adoption and entry into force of the Hague Law (Martens Clause, 1899 and 1907 Conventions). The process to impose legal restraints on the conduct of hostilities preceded the Martens Clause and the actual consolidation of this stage was only completed in the aftermath of the Second World War with the watershed represented by the adoption of the Four Geneva Conventions in 1949 and, subsequently, the two Additional Protocols of 1977. Thus, this historical process extends over more than a century, with a range of different legal manifestations which can singled out as the key milestones.
This chapter considers how we determine the final obligations of a corporation where its actions or policies infringe upon fundamental rights. Since there are competing factors, there is a need to balance different interests. I argue that the proportionality test can be applied successfully to balance the fundamental interests of individuals against the interests of the corporation and thus can provide a structured process of reasoning for determining the final negative obligations of corporations. In making this case, I consider the justification for and challenges to applying the proportionality test to conflicts between non-state actors and individuals with a specific focus upon the corporation. I then consider how each stage of the proportionality analysis – purpose, suitability, necessity and balancing - can apply to corporations and the complexities involved in doing so. In doing so, I will show where each factor – identified in the last chapter - fits into the overall analysis.
This chapter examines J. S. Mill’s writings on universal history, beginning with his reviews of Jules Michelet, François Guizot, and Henry Buckle, and ending with Alexis de Tocqueville’s prophetic account of democracy and Mill’s timely socialism. Barrell argues that we must take seriously the two historical perspectives from which Mill theorised politics: the first looked to the special causes which determined the timeliness or untimeliness of a given doctrine, reform, or phenomenon, while the latter looked to general causes and the region of ultimate aims. The first depended logically on the second. Any attempt to historicise the study of politics – by making laws relative to time and place, for example – must reckon with civilisation’s provisional trends. The debate surrounding Mill’s universalism and relativism, Barrell concludes, can be helpfully understood in these terms. While Mill’s argument is difficult to credulously follow, his intentions were clear: general and special circumstances always coexisted, and because they coexisted the past was both irreducibly distinct and uniform in its development. One consequence of this intellectual remapping might be to re-establish continuities between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in keeping with Mill’s self-professed eclecticism.
This first comprehensive account of the utilitarians' historical thought intellectually resituates their conceptions of philosophy and politics, at a time when the past acquired new significances as both a means and object of study. Drawing on published and unpublished writings - and set against the intellectual backdrops of Scottish philosophical history, German and French historicism, romanticism, positivism, and the rise of social science and scientific history - Callum Barrell recovers the depth with which Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, George Grote, and John Stuart Mill thought about history as a site of philosophy and politics. He argues that the utilitarians, contrary to their reputations as ahistorical and even antihistorical thinkers, developed complex frameworks in which to learn from and negotiate the past, inviting us to rethink the foundations of their ideas, as well as their place in - and relationship to - nineteenth-century philosophy and political thought.
Excessive use of force by the police or other law enforcement officials may have lethal outcomes. This chapter describes the core law enforcement principles of necessity and proportionality which govern all use of force in law enforcement. Specific consideration is given to the restrictions imposed on the use of firearms and related ammunition and firing modes. Consideration of less-lethal weapons in law enforcement benefits from the expertise of Dr Abi Dymond of Exeter University. The human rights principles of legality, precaution, and accountability for the use of force are also addressed.
To expound the law relating to war was a primary purpose of Hugo Grotius in the writing of his famous treatise, De jure belli ac pacis (1625). In Grotius’ opinion, a ‘very serious error’ had taken hold of the popular mind, to the effect that there was no law regulating the manner in which the combatants went about their deadly business. The events of the Thirty Years War, raging in central Europe at the time the book was written, could easily have given rise to such a notion. Be that as it may, one of Grotius’ central concerns was to refute this pernicious misconception. Even in time of war, he insisted, the opposing sides remain part of a common moral community, governed by the general law of nature, and also by the body of customary and contractual law known as the law of nations.
Grotius’s theory of property was meant to yield practical results. The principle of the freedom of the seas, for instance, was based on the idea of seizure as a constituent element of property and exclusivity. This focus on practical results enables a secularized reading of his theory of property. However, some essential aspects of his property theory are not entirely comprehensible without taking into account Grotius’s wider theological framework. Therefore, in this article I will focus on Grotius’s idea of consent to the principle of first occupation as the foundation of his property theory, and link it with his theologically loaded conceptions of man’s freedom and equality, or the universal fellowship of humankind.
In this chapter, I argue that rather than echoing a perception of fundamental rights as principles, and of law as practical reasoning, as the Alexyan theory would want it, the force of proportionality in French public law lies in its aura of value-proof objectivity and scientific correctness. The spread of proportionality thus expresses the mystery surrounding political moral choices in French legal thought. At the same time, it expresses domestic lawyers’ search for a legal science, exempt from subjective moral or ideological evaluations, which could rationalise such choices. Proportionality in French public law has not served so much as a tool for legal change, as the transplant account of its spread would suggest, but rather as a conceptual tool in the hands of the doctrine for systematising and justifying evolutions in domestic judicial review.
Maimonides’ definition of prophecy is a sophisticated hybrid engineered from the materials of Jewish theology and medieval Arabic philosophy. This essay opens with a brief exploration of the theology, epistemology and cognitive psychology shaping PM, which, together, informs Maimonides’ view that prophecy is a cognitive feat that will naturally be experienced by certain people as a dream or vision. The remainder of the essay seeks to determine the precise point in which Maimonides’ prophet formed the propositional attitude of central importance to epistemologists, namely belief. In so doing, it shall become apparent that in no way can the epistemology of prophecy be reduced to the epistemology of divine testimony, which demonstrates that prophecy, at least in Maimonides’ hands, is fallible and that the distinction between Mosaic and non-Mosaic prophecy is problematic.
The activities undergone by living things are paradigmatically end-directed, and so this chapter examines Aristotle’s invocation of teleological notions (as well as their contrast with non-teleological notions) in his scientific investigation of life. In particular, the chapter looks at how Aristotle explains why various processes occur, why some kinds of organisms have (or lack) certain parts or features, and why those parts or features vary in their sizes and shapes. Aristotle’s biological explanations are complex and rich in detail, thus providing valuable resources for making headway into some of the interpretive challenges facing our understanding of his distinctive form of natural teleology – one that countenances purposes in the absence of intentions and volitions, and one that finds the occurrence of necessity compatible with goal-directedness.