Talk of decentralization in Iraq is usually dominated by attempts to define the extent and geographical reach of Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq, including the question of natural resources. The primary challenge for the state has been how to accommodate a nationalistic ethnic group that has throughout its existence expressed a stalwart desire for self-rule if not independence. This chapter examines Iraq’s decentralization “moments” in 1970, between 1991 and 2003, and in the 2005 Constitution. It then explores the challenges of implementing Kurdish regional autonomy after 2005, focusing on governance and natural resources. It argues that despite a brief experience with independence, self-rule or enhanced autonomy has been held hostage to several variables, namely: Kurdish disunity, the strength of the central government, and concerns in Turkey and Iran about the potential impact of Kurdish self-government in Iraq on their own Kurdish minority populations.

The EU has been reluctant to engage in the negotiations for a UN treaty on business and human rights because such a treaty would have an impact on the competitiveness of EU-based corporations in the global marketplace, in particular, vis-à-vis competitors from developing and emerging states. Bearing in mind these observations relating to the EU’s position in the ongoing treaty process, this chapter aims to assess whether the EU has been able to mitigate the effects on the competitiveness of EU-based corporations in its unilateral ‘business and human rights’ legislative initiatives. After assessing which initiatives have been prioritised by the European Commission, this chapter investigates to what extent competition from non-EU corporations – and, in particular, corporations from developing and emerging states – has been taken into account during the drafting process of these initiatives, and to what extent they have a regulatory impact on such corporations. This chapter also discusses private international law issues.

This chapter argues that animals, as part of the environment, benefit from the protection afforded by the direct and indirect environmental safeguards offered by principles and rules of international humanitarian law. However, it also reveals that the pertinent norms are weak and largely unclear, especially in the context of non-international armed conflicts. For this reason, the chapter contends that the said rules need to be read in conjunction with the growing body of international norms, standards and mechanisms that seek to prevent and redress environmental harm during peacetime. Indeed, international environmental law has the potential to protect animals from suffering from the general deterioration of natural habitats and ecosystems caused by humans. However, the protection offered by the relevant instruments and unwritten principles is severely constrained by their narrow substantive, personal and territorial scope of application.

This chapter explores the international legal protection offered to animals in occupied territory. Some rules of international humanitarian law protecting private and public property apply to animals as well. The legal framework is complemented by the domestic law in force prior to the occupation, and by international conventions on animal conservation that remain applicable during armed conflict. Nonetheless, animals in occupied territory are insufficiently protected. In order to strengthen legal protection, occupying powers should properly fulfil their duty to observe and apply local legislation such as animal welfare statutes. A non-anthropocentric approach based on animals’ needs, rather than on animals as property or as parts of the environment, would help to enhance the protection of animals in occupied territory.

This chapter provides an institutional variant of the model studied in the previous chapter, where the key variable driving the economy's latent dynamics is the quality of institutions. This chapter also analyses, using that framework, the interactions between economic development, institutional changes and inequalities.

Several prominent debates on causes of democratization or democratic decline, concern different features of the economy. Yet, many of these debates lack in robust, conclusive evidence. We revisit the links between various economic factors and (electoral) democracy, drawing on global data extending from 1789 to 2018. First, we consider how economic development influences democracy, and democratic upturns and downturns more specifically. Second, we consider structural features of the economy related to types of production and assets as potential determinants of democracy. Third, we assess indicators of short-term economic performance. Fourth, we consider different economic inequalities. Our analysis shows several null-results or non-robust results, for instance, between income inequality and democracy (both upturns and downturns), or between (various aspects of) economic development and democratic upturns. We also find several robust relationships. For example, a high share of agricultural production in the economy mitigates democratization, whereas strong short-term economic performance and high income levels hinders democratic decline.

This chapter covers Germany’s view on international environmental law and international watercourses. In doing so, it deals with Germany’s position on decommissioning oil platforms in the context of Shell’s activities in the North Sea.

Taking up Lynn White, Jr.’s argument that Christianity is largely responsible for contemporary ecological crises, this chapter develops an environmental historical reading of the Christian just war tradition’s transition from its late medieval into its early modern forms. That reading reveals not only the flaws in White’s argument but the many ways that the nonhuman natural world was understood by late medieval just war thinkers, including as resource, brake, enemy, and collection of signs. Attending to the environmental conditions and human interactions with the nonhuman natural world that shaped late medieval Europe and gave rise to early modern projects of colonialization and conquest helps to clarify the range of forces at work in shaping just war thinking and modernity. Among the implications of an environmental historical reading of the history of Christian just war, thinking is not only a recognition of the ways that the natural and the political interact but the need for a richer vocabulary to express those interactions in a time of growing climate-shaped violence.

In this chapter, we use the new data to investigate which factors influence the allocation of Chinese development finance across countries, and how these motivations compare to those of traditional donors and creditors such as the World Bank. We specifically test the claim that Beijing is primarily using its economic largesse to cement alliances with political leaders, secure access to natural re- sources, and create exclusive commercial opportunities for Chinese firms. We run statistical models to examine the cross-country allocation of Chinese aid and debt, arguing that these two flows are motivated by different strategic objectives. Our results show that Chinese aid and debt are means to different ends. Like Western donors, Beijing allocates aid in response to levels of poverty and uses aid to reward countries that adopt its foreign policy positions and punish those that do not. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, Beijing is no more likely than major Western donors to provide aid to corrupt or authoritarian regimes. None of these findings are consistent with the notion that China is a “rogue donor” compared to its Western peers. However, Beijing’s loans issued at or near market rates are more likely to go to corrupt and authoritarian countries. The conflation of aid and credit seems to be at the heart of the confusion: Western politicians and journalists use “rogue donor” as a shorthand term for all of China’s overseas development projects, but many of these projects are not aid.

Climate change has a significant impact on ecosystems, agriculture, natural resources, environment and infrastructure development. Natural resources, including water resources, are particularly vulnerable to climate change. Climate change is expected to affect future water demand and the availability of water resources. Besides, the demand for clean water supplies is increasing worldwide due to population growth. Sustainable water management is required to satisfy the increasing water demand and the uncertainty of the availability and quality of water under climate change. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 2007, in its fourth assessment report, has listed rainwater harvesting among the specific adaptation measures to cope with future climate change. Rainwater harvesting systems meet current and future water demands and improve water resources management in many countries across the world. This chapter provides critical and comprehensive reviews of studies about the history, methods and environmental benefits of rainwater harvesting and identifies its potential and limitations and its role in developing a more sustainable water resource management under climate change. This review may contribute to improving adaptation strategies of rainwater harvesting for sustainable water resources management under changing climate.

Access to natural resources and the allocation of revenue generated by resource exploitation is at the core of many conflicts and plays an important role in many others. Yet natural resources can also be a key factor in promoting a durable peace. This chapter explores the puzzle of whether and how to address natural resource ownership, management, and revenue allocation in a manner that promotes durable peace. This chapter reviews the peace processes related to conflicts in Papua New Guinea and Bougainville, Indonesia and Aceh, Iraq and Kurdistan, the Philippines and Bangsamoro, Sierra Leone, Sudan and South Sudan, Sudan and Darfur, and Yemen to understand if and when parties broach the subject of natural resources in the peace process, and how they then decide upon matters such as the ownership, management, and revenue allocation.

Chapter 5 uses the pan-Indian 2016 anti-pipeline protests at Standing Rock as a launching off point for discussing the complicated relationship between Indians and the environment. It shows why stereotypes about Indians as environmental stewards are misleading while also affirming the special connection that Indians often have to their land. As the chapter shows, tribal sovereignty provides a way of dealing with both tribal environmental justice concerns and tribal decisions to pursue development that harms the environment. Included in the chapter are discussions of everything from coal-fired power plants to large solar energy facilities.

Chapter 1 serves as an introduction to the book. It sets the scene by providing fundamental background information on the issues explored in the book. It then situates the present study within the existing literature. In so doing, it identifies the novel research questions, methodology, and contribution to debates in international law and beyond. It introduces key concepts that will be further discussed in the book, notably the idea of ‘new wars’ and its relationship to the environment. Further, it outlines two theories that provide the foundations and inform the critique developed in the book. The first is Rob Nixon’s concept of slow violence and the second is the notion of structural violence, taken from Johan Galtung and adapted to the present issues. Lastly, it offers an overview of arguments made in subsequent chapters.

In 2002, the UN Panel of Experts on Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo issued its final report.2 In it, the Panel included a list it had compiled of companies involved in the war economy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The Panel, which had been mandated by the Security Council to examine the DRC war economy and make recommendations about sanctions and other measures, stated that ‘[b]y contributing to the revenues of the elite networks, directly or indirectly, those companies and individuals contribute to the ongoing conflict and to human rights abuses’.3 The Panel appended to its report several lists: one identified ‘companies on which the panel recommends placing financial restrictions’ and a second consisted of names of ‘persons for whom the Panel recommends travel and financial restrictions’. A third list identified businesses alleged to be ‘in violation of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’.4