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In this chapter we present our recommendations for how the policy landscape in the U.S. and other liberal democracies should respond to the opportunities and challenges brought on by quantum information science. These recommendations are informed by the four scenarios of quantum futures combined with the understanding of technology capabilities we discussed in Part I. We begin this chapter by putting our cards on the table and presenting our policy goals. We then explore how to achieve these goals using traditional policy levers: direct investments, education, and law. We conclude with a discussion of national security issues.
The chapter introduces State-owned entities (SOEs) and frames the reminder of the monograph. This chapter also provides the necessary definitions and carves out the monograph's sphere of applications to entities such as state-owned multinational enterprises, state-owned enterprises, national oil companies, sovereign wealth funds, export credit agencies and other types of entities that are State-owned. A short history of the State as an economic actor follows next then the focus turns to some of the traditional concerns associated with SOEs such as unfair competition, national security and resource security. The discussion then moves on to address the human rights dimension of State corporate ownership. Several case studies demonstrate concretely how SOEs become involved in human rights violations. The last section of this chapter provides an overview of human rights in international law, the most fundamental human rights instruments, a general introduction to the 'respect, protect and fulfil' framework, the nature of State's obligations to 'respect, protect and fulfil' human rights and the relationship between international law, human rights and State ownership.
There are limits to this constitutional convergence in East Asia. The three courts in Taiwan, South Korea and Hong Kong will not converge on electoral reform and matters impacting national security. While Taiwan and South Korea are dynamic democracies where competing political parties take turn in office, Hong Kong is a sub-unit of communist China. Therefore, the pursuit of major electoral systemic changes, personnel changes adverse to China’s core interests or challenges that are perceived to undermine national security or sovereignty are simply off-limits to the Hong Kong judiciary.
Artificial intelligence technologies have brought to humanity benefits and challenges. Some AI products can be used to threaten non-trade values including fundamental rights and national security. “Data-sharing policies”, through which governments “feed” data into their AI industry, further raise fair competition concerns. At present, economic sanctions taken by trade powers play an important role in deterring the controversial use of AI policies. In this chapter, it is argued that the WTO law can offer some aid in disciplining AI policies. First, some “data-sharing” mechanisms may be challenged as actionable subsidies under the WTO law. Second, sanctions against AI policies that undermine fundamental rights or national security may not be found inconsistent with WTO law due to, inter alia, the “public morals” exception, the security exception and the “maintenance of international peace and security” exception. Accordingly, it is argued that WTO law can provide some assistance in the disciplining of “data-sharing” mechanisms and AI policies that undermine fundamental rights or national security.
This chapter provides a foundation for the case made for ecological security by exploring the contours and limitations of existing discourses of climate security. After first examining the evolution of debates linking environmental change – and more directly climate change – to security, the chapter goes on to outline the contours and limitations of three key discourses of climate security: national security, international security and human security. These discourses emphasize the preservation of the nation state from external threat (national security), the preservation of the norms and rules of an international society (international security) and the protection of vulnerable human communities (human security). In the case of outlining the contours of each discourse, the chapter notes how the referent object is defined, who constitutes an agent of security, what means are envisaged to advance or protect security and the nature of the threat posed by climate change itself. In noting their respective limitations, the book provides a foundation for the elaboration and defence of ecological security.
The COVID-19 pandemic is broadly impacting global supply chains with enterprises being prevented from producing and shipping raw inputs, semi-finished articles and end products, and governments adopting and maintain exporting restrictions on ventilators, masks, gloves, personal protective equipment and relevant inputs. The pandemic amplifies and accelerates the decoupling of US–China economic relations, reflecting US President Trump’s maxim 'economic security is national security' and delivered by a US–China trade war with numerous trade measures, including sanctions against Huawei. The attachment to economic security reflects a reversal of economic globalisation which used to posit economic interdependence as a safeguard for national security, but there is now a theory that overdependence is a threat to national security. In this context, there is a need for fresh look at the law and politics on export restrictions and sombre thought on the restructure of the global supply chain. Three key elements will be of critical importance in the post-COVID-19 world: ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’, economic security and the decoupling of the US–China economy.
With the internationalisation of production processes and multiplication of jurisdictions involved in these processes, global supply chains can be easily interrupted through weakest links. The fragmentation of production processes and internationalisation of supply chains complicate coordination and risk management, which necessitate a fresh look of the governance mechanism. Competition law plays a critical role in ensuring supply is not disrupted through anti-competitive practices, such as export-cartel and abuse of dominant power in horizontal and vertical agreements. In linking export restrictions to investment law and policies, two types of investment are most relevant: resource-seeking and strategic asset-seeking investments. The interaction of export restrictions and investment law and policies can be observed from two perspectives: producers v. consumers; outbound v. inbound. A country imposing export restrictions on resources or strategic assets, such as critical components, may use trade and investment measuresm) simultaneously to prevent foreign countries or enterprises from accessing them.
International law does not address intelligence activities explicitly, and many scholars assume that international law has no effect on the practice of intelligence. Yet, international courts and bodies have recently started to hold states to account for internationally wrongful acts resulting from intelligence cooperation. This chapter analyses the effects of recent instances of state accountability on state decision-making, using a modified rational choice model accounting for the boundedness of state rationality. It shows that these instances of state accountability have changed the payoffs and costs of intelligence cooperation. States must now take into account the risk of accountability, and considerations of international legality may now outweigh domestic considerations. The chapter therefore argues that recent instances of state accountability before international courts and bodies have constrained states’ freedom in intelligence cooperation, thereby serving their national security interests. Existing research shows that respect for the rule of law is necessary to an effective fight against national security threats, and that measures violating human rights or undermining the rule of law are counter-productive. Hence, the chapter further argues that these recent instances of state accountability increase states’ respect for the international rule of law, leading them to protect their national security more effectively.
This paper reviews the World Trade Organization (WTO) Panel Report Russia – Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit of April 2019. It constitutes the first attempt to disentangle the legal and political aspects related to the invoked essential security interests from the economic considerations underlying the measures imposed on the transit through Russia of goods exported from Ukraine to the Republic of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. One the one hand, the panel's interpretation of Article XXI of the GATT denies Members unilateral determination over security exceptions. It further enables a pathway for future WTO panels to review possible abuses of security exceptions – a growing concern due to the rising complexity of transnational economic relations. On the other hand, our economic analysis suggests a stricter assessment of Russia's transit restrictions was necessary. In particular, it argues that the panel adopted a circular assessment when considering the plausibility of whether Russia implemented its measures for the protection of its essential security interests at a time of emergency in international relations. Ultimately, although the panel's focus on finding a diplomatic and legal path forward failed economic scrutiny a legal assessment argues that the panel's findings fit the legal design of Article XXI:b of the GATT.
How powerful are national security bureaucrats? In the United States, they seem to be more than mere administrators, while remaining subordinate to elected politicians. However, despite a rich literature in American political development on bureaucratic autonomy across a variety of policy areas, national security remains undertheorized. Although the origins and evolution of the national security bureaucracy have received substantial scholarly attention, the individuals within this bureaucracy have not. In this article, I examine a case study of how one of these individuals bluntly ran up against the limits of his power. After the Second World War, J. Edgar Hoover's plans for a “World-Wide Intelligence Service” were swiftly shot down by the Truman administration, which adopted a sharp distinction between domestic and global intelligence instead. I pin this abject defeat on three interrelated factors: the resistance of President Truman, the array of bureaucratic competitors emerging from the Second World War, and deep aversion among key decision makers to the prospect of an “American gestapo.” While tracing this historical narrative, I also challenge accounts of Hoover as a near-omnipotent Washington operator, question the extent to which war empowers national security bureaucrats, and foreground the role of analogies in shaping the national security state.
The United States Constitution requires the government “to provide for the common defense.” As a prime topic featured prominently throughout the legislative blueprint of American society, the “common defense” is conspicuously uncommon in today’s policy scholarship and education. Ironically, the policy discipline largely ignores defense issues despite defense serving as the catalyst for establishing policy studies as an academic field in the 1940s. Through decades of military conflict since and obvious relevance to practitioner behavior, defense issues remain ironically absent the public policy scholarly landscape and are instead hosted primarily within strategic and security studies mediums. This article offers an historical examination of the evolution, development, and scholarly shifts in defense policy over time. It also presents perceived reasons for the lack of defense policy dialogue, recommends approaches to reintegrate the topic back into the scholarly discourse, and concludes arguing defense policy warrants greater attention in academic scholarship and teaching.
The book opens with a puzzle: What would compel members of one group to stand in solidarity with an outgroup in their fight for justice and equality, even when that act carries great personal risk and material sacrifice? We think a central piece of this puzzle is what we call group empathy: the ability and motivation to take another group’s perspective, feel emotionally connected to their struggles, and care about their welfare even when the individual’s interests, or those of his or her group, are at risk. We continue the discussion of this puzzle in two contemporary threat contexts: terrorism and immigration. Specifically, we ask why African Americans – who perceive a greater risk of terrorism on average – are less willing to support punitive homeland security policies that profile Arabs. Or, why are Latinos more supportive of foreign aid and more welcoming of refugees even if this means greater competition for jobs and social welfare? Once again, we think the answer lies in group empathy. We review the empirical studies used to test our theoretical expectations, followed by an outline of the book that provides a brief summary of each chapter.
The fourth chapter deals with the complicated history of public land in Brazil. Weak federal control of public land before the 1960s allowed the illegal settlement of hundreds of families inside the Brazilian Iguaçu National Park. In the 1970s, however, Brazilian park officials had decided to evict all the 2,500 settlers. The shift was partly a reaction to the same international discourse that had influenced Argentine park authorities, as discussed in Chapter 3. However, in Brazil, the early 1970s eviction coincided with the harshest years of the military dictatorship that ruled the country for two decades. The generals were obsessed with suppressing political dissent and feared the settlers living inside the Iguaçu national park could fall prey to left-wing radicalism. The Iguaçu evictions anticipated the authoritarian agrarian reform and population resettlement programs later implemented further north in Amazonia, designed by the military to remedy peasant unrest.
In the summer of 2003, around 500,000 people marched on the streets in Hong Kong in protest against the government’s attempt to introduce legislation relating to national security under Article 23 of the Basic Law. As many commentators observed at the time, the protest was also a process of identity formation: Since the demonstration presented itself as a fight to protect the city from the intrusion of repressive Chinese legal norms, it created a bond among the protestors and their supporters and fostered a sense of what it means to be a “Hong Konger.” Tammy Cheung, an independent documentary filmmaker, attempted to capture the event on film, and the result was July (2004; 七月). Her challenge was to make a cinematic record that only presents the factual unfolding of the protest, but communicates the sensation of being in the midst of its charged atmosphere and enables viewers to share the sense of community that it created. I explore what it might mean to create a record of this constitutional controversy through an analysis of the themes, structures, and cinematography of Cheung’s film.
Research within security studies has struggled to determine whether infectious disease (ID) represents an existential threat to national and international security. With the emergence of SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19), it is imperative to reexamine the relationship between ID and global security. This article addresses the specific threat to security from COVID-19, asking, “Is COVID-19 a threat to national and international security?” To investigate this question, this article uses two theoretical approaches: human security and biosecurity. It argues that COVID-19 is a threat to global security by the ontological crisis posed to individuals through human security theory and through high politics, as evidenced by biosecurity. By viewing security threats through the lens of the individual and the state, it becomes clear that ID should be considered an international security threat. This article examines the relevant literature and applies the theoretical framework to a case study analysis focused on the United States.
Chapter 10 describes the curious case of the social science of war, which shed its social problem framing in the early postwar era. From the interwar years through to the late 1940s, war was a public-facing problem whose solution-the eradication of armed conflict-seemed within reach for many social scientists and their internationalist allies. Quincy Wright's magisterial and multi-disciplinary 1942 A Study of War exemplified the social-scientific ambition to foster peace through an expert-guided world order. The Cold War, however, abruptly stalled war's brief career as a social problem. The Soviet threat, and the national security state erected in response, helped to reframe the social science of war in management terms. For the next two decades most social scientists of war-though split on methodology and approach-hitched their study to the Cold War struggle. By the late 1960s the Vietnam debacle had implicated Defense-sponsored work on counter-insurgency and psychological warfare, leading to a public backslash against military entanglements. Many social scientists abandoned the study of war in Vietnam's wake, ceding the domain to political science in general and international relations in particular. The result was a social science of war that remained, into the 1980s, centered on statecraft and security.
This chapter discusses the Court's free expression jurisprudence. This supports a liberal democratic conception of democracy but there are other concepts discussed also. A substantive conception comes across in some of the earlier case law on obscenity and blasphemy and more recently a substantive commitment to pluralism, tolerance and broad-mindedness is emphasised. The case law on free expression during elections and political advertising suggests a more deliberative conception of democracy, while recently there is a stronger commitment to freedom of information, essential for a participatory democracy.
This chapter examines the historical and normative contribution of Latin American theologians and religious actors attentive to the neoliberal underside of the human rights breakthrough associated with the Carter administration and the Trilateral Commission. By tilting the axis to the global South, this chapter charts the emergence of an alternative liberationist discourse and praxis of human rights for the Catholic Church in Latin America centered on the concrete struggles of oppressed peoples and the preferential option for the poor. In contrast to the global human rights politics of the 1970s, the liberationist praxis of human rights critically analyzed socioeconomic inequalities as part of the Church’s effort to resist the overreaching powers of the national security state and the global market. The chapter turns to the case of El Salvador from the 1970s to the 1990s and the examples of Archbishop Óscar Romero and theologian Ignacio Ellacuría to illustrate this alternative liberationist praxis of human rights. Their life-giving opposition to structural violence embedded in old and new forms of colonialism injuring poor campesinos brought them into direct conflict with the moral doctrine of human rights from the global North linked to US interventionism supportive of national securitization and later neoliberal policies.
On Jan 2, 2018, President Trump tweeted a taunt to Kim Jong-un of North Korea: “I too have a Nuclear Button, but it is a much bigger & more powerful one than his, and my Button works!” This chapter connects Trump’s nuclear saber-rattling to broader patterns of militaristic language use among nuclear weapons scientists and strategists, as well as among past presidents. Professional and political discourse about nuclear weapons tends to be far removed from the human realities behind the weapons. Such dispassionate language is characterized by stunningly abstract and euphemistic language – and in part by a set of lively and misogynistic sexual metaphors. This linguistic framework seems to shape what can be said, or even thought, within the confines of these male-dominated discussions of war. Those who urge restraint in responding to a provocation or attack, for instance, are quickly impugned as sissies, and expressions of empathy denigrated as feminine. In this respect, Mr. Trump is not an exception. His fear of being perceived as unmanly may be closer to the surface, but gendered language that constrains our understanding of reality has long distorted the ways we think about international politics and national security.
In the mid-1970s, Congress and the judiciary moved to regulate the National Security Agency (NSA) at a moment when such regulation might have restricted the growth of electronic surveillance. The Ford administration played a crucial role in preventing that from happening. It did so by controlling the flow of intelligence information to Congress and by establishing a flexible new legal framework for intelligence based on broad executive orders, narrow legislation, and legal opinions written by executive branch lawyers. This framework fostered a perception of legality that headed off calls for comprehensive legislation governing intelligence. The Ford administration’s actions protected NSA from meaningful regulation, preserved the growth of electronic surveillance, and sustained executive branch preeminence in national security affairs. The episode proved formative for the Ford administration officials involved—including Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Antonin Scalia—and solidified the central role of executive branch lawyers in national security policymaking.