This paper investigates the relationship between growth and quality of pension funds. It measures growth in terms of changes in the number of participants and cash flow transfers and appreciates the quality of the funds through the set of information on past results and costs published in the official prospectuses. The results show that growth rewards the best performing funds in the long term, while annual performance and costs have no relevance. Nevertheless, other factors, such as market power and commercial pressure, appear to be more powerful. The existence of conditions of market power capable of attracting investors beyond the actual quality of pension products is undesirable as it harms future pensioners. These results have implications for the Authority, as mandatory information should be suitable to induce investors to identify the best products and direct individual choices toward the public objective of a more efficient market.

Surprisingly, the strategic management literature has had little to say of an explicit nature on the topic of capitalism. However, the discourse on capitalism is vast in economics and many would say the writings of some economists on the topic of capitalism have been inordinately influential. Bearing this in mind, the differences between three world renowned economists on the topic of capitalism are examined with the intention of identifying where scope exists for strategic management to contribute to the discourse on capitalism. The paper concludes that strategic management is well placed to develop its own organization-centric discourse on the subject.

We develop the concept of stakeholder salience to account for stakeholders who should matter to the firm, even when managers do not perceive them as important. While managers are responsible for attributing salience to stakeholders, they can overlook or ignore stakeholder importance because of market frictions that affect managerial perceptions or induce opportunism. When this happens, corporate financial and social performance can suffer. Thus, we propose that the perceptions of organizational and societal stakeholders should also codetermine the salience of the focal stakeholder to the firm. We also propose that stakeholder dialogue can reduce the impacts that market frictions can have on managerial perceptions of stakeholder interests that should matter to the firm. Finally, we discuss how the refined conceptualization of stakeholder salience might have better predictive validity, be more normative, and make instrumental and normative stakeholder theory more convergent.

We examine a decision theoretic model of portfolio choice in which investors face income risk that is not directly insurable. We consider the sensitivity of savings and portfolio allocation rules to different assumptions about utility, the stochastic process for income and asset returns, and market frictions (transactions costs and short-sale constraints). Under CRRA time additive utility, habit persistence utility, and for a broad range of parameterizations, the model predicts that investors wish to borrow and invest all of their savings in stocks. This qualitative implication is robust to the introduction of significant transaction costs in the stock market, and contrasts sharply with portfolio allocation models in which there is no labor income.