Several papers have challenged the robustness of loss aversion, claiming that it is context-dependent and disappears for small stakes. These papers use a behavioral definition of loss aversion that may be confounded by diminishing sensitivity and probability/event weighting under the new version of prospect theory (PT). We perform a new theory-based test of loss aversion that controls for these confounds. We found significant loss aversion for both small stakes and high stakes. The overall loss aversion coefficient varied between 1.25 and 1.45, less than commonly observed. Loss aversion decreased slightly for small stakes, but the effect was small and usually insignificant. Overall, our results indicate that, under PT, loss aversion is robust to stake size.

Individuals are generally reluctant to trade goods—a phenomenon identified as the endowment effect. This paper focuses on consumers’ puzzling reluctance to exchange gambles, and in particular lottery tickets with identical distribution (i.e., same odds of winning), and identifies the ticket’s vividness as an important moderator. Three studies demonstrate that individuals are more willing to exchange less vivid lottery tickets (e.g., tickets concealed in envelopes, or tickets with an unknown number) compared to more vivid tickets (e.g., tickets not concealed in envelopes, or tickets with a known number) when offered an incentive to exchange. Moreover, this effect is mediated by anticipated regret, such that less regret is anticipated when exchanging less vivid tickets, thus increasing individuals’ willingness to exchange tickets.

Work on procedural utility suggests that decision makers derive more value from outcomes earned with freedom of choice. We experimentally tested tradeoffs between procedural and outcome utility, examining financial losses as an important boundary condition. Participants completed a simulated consumer sales task (Exp. 1) or card task (Exp. 2) with or without choice. Participants reported their satisfaction with monetary outcomes. When given choice, participants reported greater self-determination. Participants also reported higher outcome satisfaction, but only for gains. Choice did not influence satisfaction for losses. In Experiment 2, Participants also preferred choice when selecting between financial gains. However, when choice was costly (large disparity in pay) or posed losses, most participants sacrificed choice for better payoffs. Results are consistent with a cognitive model in which participants shift their attention from procedural utilities to financial outcomes when faced with losses. Financial outcomes may take precedence over choice when financial outcomes are threatened.

We employed simple gambles to investigate information processing in relation to the compatibility effect. Subjects should be more likely to engage in a deliberative thinking strategy when completing a pricing task rather than a rating task. We used eye-tracking methodology to measure information acquisition and processing in order to test the above hypothesis as well as to show that losses and alternatives with uncertain outcomes are more likely than gains and alternatives with sure outcomes to be processed through a deliberative thinking process. Results showed that pupil dilations, fixation duration and number of fixations increased when subjects evaluated the gambles with a pricing task. Additionally, the number of fixations increased as the gamble outcome became increasingly negative and when the outcome was uncertain (vs. sure). Fixations were also predictive of subjects’ final evaluations of the gambles. We discuss our results in light of the cognitive processes underlying different response modes in economic preferences.

This study employs a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) in the health-care sector to test the loss aversion theory that is derived from reference-dependent preferences: The absolute subjective value of a deviation from a reference point is generally greater when the deviation represents a loss than when the same-sized change is perceived as a gain. As far as is known, this paper is the first to use a DCE to test the loss aversion theory. A DCE is a highly suitable tool for such testing because it estimates the marginal valuations of attributes, based on deviations from a reference point (a constant scenario). Moreover, loss aversion can be examined for each attribute separately. Another advantage of a DCE is that is can be applied to non-traded goods with non-tangible attributes. A health-care event is used for empirical illustration: The loss aversion theory is tested within the context of preference structures for maternity-ward attributes, estimated using data gathered from 3850 observations made by a sample of 542 women who had recently given birth. Seven hypotheses are presented and tested. Overall, significant support for behavioral loss aversion theories was found.

The impact of default options on choice is a reliable, well-established behavioral finding. However, several different effects may lend to choosing defaults in an often indistinguishable manner, including loss aversion, inattention, information leakage, and transaction costs associated with switching. We introduce the notion of the “default pull” as the effect that even subtle default options have on decision makers’ uncertainty about their own preferences. The default pull shapes what a decision maker prefers by causing her to consider whether she prefers the default. We demonstrate default pull effects using a simple decision making task that strips away many of the usual reasons that defaults could affect choices, and we show that defaults can have substantial effects on choice, even when the default itself was not chosen.

In two studies, people were reluctant to trade items they own, but glad to accept upgrades with identical end states. The framing of the transaction makes a difference. A mediational analysis suggests that the relationship between the frame of the transaction and measures of value (willingness to accept, WTA) depends on perceived losses. Losses are perceived as greater when the transaction is a trade than as an upgrade. We manipulated perceptions of loss across descriptions of transactions and found that, when the difference in perceptions of losses with trades versus upgrades was large, framing effects were strong. But when the difference was small, framing effects disappeared. These framing effects with identical end states influence WTA because trades are associated with perceived losses, while upgrades are associated with perceived costs.

This study examined framing effects in decisions concerning public health. Tversky and Kahneman’s famous Asian Disease Problem served as experimental paradigm. Subjects chose between a sure and a risky option either presented as gains (saving lives) or as losses (dying). The amount of risk varied in terms of different probabilities. The number of affected people was either small (low need) or large (high need). Additionally, the decisions were linked to three different types of diseases (unusual infection, AIDS, leukemia). We also implemented two different time constraints during which the subjects had to give a response. Finally, we tested a within-subject design. The data analysis assuming a linear mixed effects model revealed significant effects of framing, probabilities, and need. Furthermore, the type of disease and time constraints were moderating the framing effect. Across the different diseases, framing effects were amplified when decision time was short.

The principle of loss aversion is thought to explain a wide range of anomalous phenomena involving tradeoffs between losses and gains. In this article, I show that the anomalies loss aversion was introduced to explain - the risky bet premium, the endowment effect, and the status-quo bias - are characterized not only by a loss/gain tradeoff, but by a tradeoff between the status-quo and change; and, that a propensity towards the status-quo in the latter tradeoff is sufficient to explain these phenomena. Moreover, I show that two basic psychological principles - (1) that motives drive behavior; and (2) that preferences tend to be fuzzy and ill-defined - imply the existence of a robust and fundamental propensity of this sort. Thus, a loss aversion principle is rendered superfluous to an account of the phenomena it was introduced to explain.

Behavioural economics research has pointed to the importance of market inefficiencies, framing, heuristics and hyperbolic discounting. Empirically, behavioural economics has been shown to predict patterns of consumer behaviour, exercise patterns and substance addiction. In this article, I discuss the ways in which our growing understanding of behavioural economics has shaped the development of public policies. I conclude with six pieces of advice for behavioural policymakers.

In applied sciences large-scale surveys are a popular means to acquire insights in the choices that people make in different contexts. In transportation research, for example, tens of thousands stated their choices between alternatives characterized by cost and time attributes. In this study I explore the extent to which the data acquired in such studies may exhibit the co-occurrence of different choice algorithms within such survey populations. For that purpose I propose a novel version of the outcome-oriented approach. It is applied to the outcomes of two Dutch value-of-time surveys. If the recorded choice patterns are viewed apart, most could be the result of several different algorithms, in line with the main criticism of the outcome-oriented approach. The novel version considers the causal relationships between an individual’s personal circumstances, his use of a particular algorithm and the resulting choice pattern. It employs inferential statistics for analyses of the frequencies of the expected and actually recorded choice patterns within groups of respondents. Applied to the Dutch survey results this allowed disentangling, at the aggregate level, the overlap in explaining compensatory and non-compensatory algorithms to a large extent. It revealed that weighted additive (WADD) algorithms incorporating different degrees of loss aversion could explain most recorded choice behaviour while none of the many non-compensatory algorithms that were considered yielded a more than marginal explanation. Replications of this study, preferably by re-analysing other large-scale surveys with more complicated choice sets, is recommended to find out whether or not these findings are incidental.

Loss aversion, the argument that losses are given more weight than gains, has been recently shown to be absent in small losses. However, a series of studies by Mrkva et al. (2020) appear to demonstrate the existence of loss aversion even for smaller losses. We re-ran Mrkva et al.’s decision tasks after removing features of the task that differentiated losses from the gains, particularly asymmetries in sizes of gains and losses, an increasing order of losses, and status quo effects. The results show that we replicate Mrkva et al.’s (2020) findings in their original paradigm with online participants, yet in five studies where gains and losses were symmetrically presented in random order (n = 2,001), we find no loss aversion for small amounts, with loss aversion surfacing very weakly only for average losses of $40 (mean λ = 1.16). We do find loss aversion for higher amounts such as $100 (mean λ = 1.54) though it is not as extreme as previously reported. Furthermore, we find weak correlation between the endowment effect and loss aversion, with the former effect existing simultaneously with no loss aversion. Thus, when items are presented symmetrically, significant loss aversion emerges only for large losses, suggesting that it cannot be argued that (all) “losses loom larger than gains.”

Research has identified loss aversion as a strong and robust phenomenon, but has also revealed some moderators affecting the magnitude of its effect on decision making. In the current article, we draw attention to the fact that even the measurement of loss aversion itself may affect its magnitude by inducing a focus on either losses or gains. In three studies, we provide empirical evidence for such a measurement-induced focus. In all studies we used coin-toss gambles—in which there is a 50/50 chance to win or to lose—to assess gain/loss ratios as a measure of loss aversion. Participants either filled out the loss side or the gain side of this gain/loss ratio. The studies consistently showed that—using within- and between-subject designs and anticipated and real coin-toss gambles—the strength of loss aversion depended on the measurement format (fill-in-the-loss versus fill-in-the-gain); filling in the loss side increased loss aversion. Moreover, loss aversion was more affected by the stakes of the gamble in the fill-in-the-loss format than in the fill-in-the-gain format.

When given a desirable item, people have a tendency to value this owned item more than an equally-desirable, unowned item. Conversely, when the endowed item is undesirable, in some circumstances people have a tendency to swap it for an equally undesirable item, a phenomenon known as the reversed endowment effect. The fact that the endowment effect can reverse for undesirable items has been taken as evidence against loss aversion being the underlying cause of the endowment effect. This study represents the first time that the reversed endowment effect has been observed for choices with real consequences. However, we find that the reversed endowment effect occurs only when participants’ ability to compare the available choice options is limited. We further show that these endowment reversals can also be induced for choices between desirable options and removed for choices between undesirable options by manipulating the expectations participants have when making a choice. Finally, we show that our data, including endowment reversals, can in principle be explained by loss aversion.

When decisions involve opting in or out of competition many decision makers will opt-in even when doing so leads to losses on average. In the current paper, we examine the generality of this effect in risky choices not involving competition. We found that re-framing a sure (certain) zero option as an option to observe the results of the other options without choosing would lead to increased consequential choice (i.e., increased selection of risky options rather than the zero option). Specifically, in two studies we compared the rate of consequential choice in a novel paradigm where decision makers decide to observe or to choose with consequence from a set of risky options (decisions-to-engage) to a full-feedback decisions-from-feedback paradigm where the choice set included a labeled sure zero option. Compared to decisions-from-feedback, participants were more likely to choose from mixed (risky) gambles with consequence (over a zero outcome) in decisions-to-engage. This occurred irrespective of whether doing so was advantageous (i.e., when choice led to monetary gains on average) or disadvantageous (i.e., when choice led to monetary losses on average), and when descriptions of the options outcomes and probabilities were provided (Study 2). These findings provide an important boundary condition for the positive effects of experience on the quality of choice, and suggest that decision makers’ preference for agency can sometimes induce poorer choices.

Many decisions in everyday life involve a choice between exploring options that are currently unknown and exploiting options that are already known to be rewarding. Previous work has suggested that humans solve such “explore-exploit” dilemmas using a mixture of two strategies: directed exploration, in which information seeking drives exploration by choice, and random exploration, in which behavioral variability drives exploration by chance. One limitation of this previous work was that, like most studies on explore-exploit decision making, it focused exclusively on the domain of gains, where the goal was to maximize reward. In many real-world decisions, however, the goal is to minimize losses and it is well known from Prospect Theory that behavior can be quite different in this domain. In this study, we compared explore-exploit behavior of human subjects under conditions of gain and loss. We found that people use both directed and random exploration regardless of whether they are exploring to maximize gains or minimize losses and that there is quantitative agreement between the exploration parameters across domains. Our results also revealed an overall bias towards the more uncertain option in the domain of losses. While this bias towards uncertainty was qualitatively consistent with the predictions of Prospect Theory, quantitatively we found that the bias was better described by a Bayesian account, in which subjects had a prior that was optimistic for losses and pessimistic for gains. Taken together, our results suggest that explore-exploit decisions are driven by three independent processes: directed and random exploration, and a baseline uncertainty seeking that is driven by a prior.

We study an optimal investment problem under a joint limited expected relative loss and portfolio insurance constraint with a general random benchmark. By making use of a static Lagrangian method in a complete market setting, the optimal wealth and investment strategy can be fully determined along with the existence and uniqueness of the Lagrangian multipliers. Our numerical demonstration for various commonly used random benchmarks shows a trade-off between the portfolio outperformance and underperformance relative to the benchmark, which may not be captured by the widely used Omega ratio and its utility-transformed version, reflecting the impact of the benchmarking loss constraint. Furthermore, we develop a new portfolio performance measurement indicator that incorporates the agent’s utility loss aversion relative to the benchmark via solving an equivalent optimal asset allocation problem with a benchmark-reference-based preference. We show that the expected utility performance is well depicted by looking at this new portfolio performance ratio, suggesting a more suitable portfolio performance measurement under a limited loss constraint relative to a possibly random benchmark.

One of Friedrich Hayek's most important arguments pointed to the epistemic advantages of the price system, regarded as an institution. As Hayek showed, the price system incorporates the information held by numerous, dispersed people. Like John Stuart Mill, Hayek also offered an epistemic argument on behalf of freedom of choice. A contemporary challenge to that epistemic argument comes from behavioral economics, which has uncovered an assortment of reasons why choosers err, and also pointed to possible distortions in the price system. But, even if those findings are accepted, what should public institutions do? How should they proceed? A neo-Hayekian approach would seek to reduce the knowledge problem by asking what individual choosers actually do under epistemically favorable conditions. In practice, that question can be disciplined by asking five subsidiary questions: (1) What do consistent choosers, unaffected by self-evidently irrelevant factors, end up choosing? (2) What do informed choosers choose? (3) What do active choosers choose? (4) When people are free of behavioral biases, including (say) present bias or unrealistic optimism, what do they choose? (5) What do people choose when their viewscreen is broad, and they do not suffer from limited attention? These questions are illustrated with reference to the intense controversy over fuel economy standards.