Substitutes for the soul included the self, personality, and the brain. “Self” kept the older issues alive without metaphysical baggage. Calkins’ “self-psychology” held that the self was the basal concept in psychology, and that soul was unnecessary. Allport found that “personality” enabled psychology to address topics vital to soul. The brain is the most significant substitute for the soul. Lashley sought to translate introspective findings into a physicalist language. Lashley retained terms such as meaning and self-consciousness, but articulated them in terms of stimuli and responses of the nervous system. Hebb dismissed introspection altogether. His “cell assembly” theory proposed neural networks as organized patterns of responses to stimuli. Thought is the organized activity of the nervous system. Given the emphasis on organization of neural firing, therein is the brain a substitute for the soul, since in the older psychologies, soul was a principle of form or organization.

This chapter surveys and discusses research methods and research designs commonly and saliently adhered to within the field of intercultural pragmatics. A particular focus will be on data collection methods and qualitative analytical approaches to empirical data, with the guiding question of this chapter being: What are the most saliently trending research methods employed in current and recent research in intercultural pragmatics? As such, this chapter represents a hub among the contributions assembled in this handbook in that it intertwines with or at least closes contingent spaces between topics and issues discussed across the five strands covered. Thus, this chapter not only falls back on what has been established concerning the underlying theoretical foundations of the field and its methodologies as a whole, but also sets reference points to key issues in “doing” research in intercultural pragmatics. Sections included offer an extensive review of the massive body of literature on conventional and relevant terminology as well as salient aspects of data collection and data analysis in (intercultural) pragmatics overall. The core sections present research designs ranging from introspective, observational, and extracted data to (non- )experimental data elicitation techniques and tasks.

This chapter considers the emotional interiorities and intersubjectivities of Romantic surgery. It challenges the well-established stereotype of the pre-anaesthetic surgeon as dispassionate butcher by demonstrating the ways in which surgical identities and subjectivities were shaped by a culture of emotional expression and reflection. The emotional ‘authenticity’ of pre-anaesthetic surgery was rooted in the embodied experience of operative practice, and the huge challenges that came from dealing with death, disease, and disfigurement on a daily basis. But as well as encouraging emotional introspection, the experience of pre-anaesthetic surgery also demanded that the surgeon manage his patients’ emotions. After all, in this period, fear, despondency, and other states of mind were regarded as an immediate cause of death. For this reason, surgeons needed to monitor their patients’ moods and imagine themselves into their position in order to regulate their own conduct and promote optimal operative outcomes. These relations between surgeons and patients were structured by a range of factors, notably gender. For that reason, this chapter concludes with a consideration of Romantic surgical intersubjectivity in practice, utilising Astley Cooper’s casebooks to explore the ‘emotion work’ of womanhood in the elaboration and understanding of breast cancer.

Chapter 4 begins with a discussion of consciousness, then summarizes and critiques the computer metaphor for thinking. It summarizes the role of perceptual and motor simulation in thinking and communication, along with some of the key research on simulation. It shows how simulations, semantic connections, and metaphors may be merged into a unified account of thinking and language use.

This chapter sets out the methodology of the approach to behavioral economics developed in this book, emphasizing its rejection of the static “as if” approach of conventional economics and the latter’s view of rationality. It introduced the idea of a decision cycle (problem recognition, search, evaluation, choice, implementation and hindsight review), while emphasizing that how decisions are taken depends on their context. This leads to a pluralistic analysis where alternative perspectives share the idea that everything we do is based upon systems of operating rules and routines. The chapter explores the research methods of behavioral economics, including the roles of anecdotes, introspection, textual sources, questionnaires, experiments and computer simulations. Before closing by outlining the rest of the book, it introduces the evolutionary economics and evolutionary psychology perspectives that are closely related to the pre-1980 approaches to behavioral economics and kept building upon them after 1980 when behavioral economics was refashioned by Thaler with a focus on “heuristics and biases” that took the conventional approach to economic rationality as its reference point.

We suggest studying how using social media affects adolescent identity development to understand the mechanism of the impact of social media on adolescent mental health. We present a model of the dual aspect of adolescent identity development – the progression towards the formation of self-evaluated commitments and values and construction of a coherent life story – and discuss how using social media facilitates or hinders processes involved, namely introspection, storytelling, and dialogue. Social media topics include dialogue with a diverse group of people, censorship, the permanence of social media data, potent social norms and values, and emphasis on appearance. Future research should develop methods for studying narratives on social media and establish the adolescent development of a narrative identity. We also suggest examining the affordances of social media platforms and how they affect processes of identity development. The chapter calls for media developers to design social media environments that support identity development.

This chapter overviews those contexts in which in theoretical linguistics the problem of inconsistency has been touched on. After the problem has been raised in , summarises the main tenets of the standard view of linguistic data (SVLD), which will serve as a reference point in delineating recent trends related to the emergence and the treatment of inconsistencies in linguistic theorising. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 will be devoted to two case studies each of which analyses a particular controversy focusing on the acceptability of introspective and corpus data. We will try to reveal the close relationship between (SVLD) and the standard view of inconsistency (SVI) as presented in and show how giving up elements of (SVLD) leads to an at least partial break with (SVI) in these two controversies. In , we will discuss approaches to the nature of ‘exceptions’, which are commonly thought to be the most frequent manifestations of inconsistencies in linguistic theorising. Then, will summarise the tendencies thus revealed.

Metacognition, or thinking about thinking, can adaptively modulate cognitive processing. For example, a student preparing for an exam may introspectively evaluate what she knows well already so that she can allocate more time to studying material she does not know as well. Such metacognition involves feedback between metacognitive monitoring, which assesses the current state of cognition, and metacognitive control that effects changes in cognitive processing. Some interesting and complex forms of cognition likely involve metacognition. Metacognition is also linked to explicit memory, executive control, theory of mind, consciousness, and other phenomena central to cognitive science. Like learning, memory, and cognition, metacognition is likely present in at least rudimentary forms in some animals other than humans. Information about the extent to which metacognition occurs in animals other than humans informs our understanding about the evolution of cognition. Metacognitive monitoring likely evolved because it supports effective metacognitive control.

Whitman, of course, was the evangelist for first-person subjective experience. In Chapter 3, I argued that understanding should be seen as including a subjective feeling, an emotion, and an objective achievement. Feelings and emotions are characterized as having such properties as valence, strength, and “content.” That content is conferred by an appraisal of the current situation in the light of prior experience; thus, different appraisals evoke different feelings. I will refer to the content of a feeling state as an intuition with “identity conditions” that may be quite different from those for concepts and beliefs.

In the first chapter of this book, I contrasted the first-order subjective experience of understanding, the “A ha!” experience of making sense, with the objective valid ascription of understanding that had long been the concern of analytical philosophers. I sought to bring the first-person experience and the third-person ascription together into one account of understanding.

Wendell Willis excavates from within the New Testament the meanings of what is termed “conscience” in the English language today. Upon surveying all the books of the NT, Willis concludes that suneidesis (the word most-often translated in the NT as conscience) does not have a fixed meaning for NT writers. Willis’s key contribution is to cleave the reader’s understanding of suneidesis into two main categories, while also identifying additional shades of meaning across NT texts. For example, in the Pauline corpus, especially in 1 and 2 Corinthians, suneidesis seems most often to refer to a person’s self-knowledge or internal understandings about himself and his past actions. Here, suneidesis should be understood as “consciousness” rather than “conscience”. In this sense, suneidesis in Corinthians is fundamentally retrospective in nature, while in Romans, suneidesis is more often a guide for the believers’ future moral choices. Other usages of suneidesis in the NT are a variation on the theme first established by Paul: consciousness of past actions or an inner model for one’s future actions.

This chapter examines the process of introspection and examining our own minds. It looks at different types of introspection. it examines the philosophical process and discipline of phenomenology, particularly the work of Husserl. We look at psychological methods of examining the contents of our thoughts, particularly using experience sampling. We then look at the reliability of our own beliefs, and how we can be misled by illusions and delusions. The chapter looks at examples such as schizophrenia, mass hysteria, confabulation and the neurological disorder denial, all of which make us question the reliability of our beliefs. We ask to what extent we could be wrong about the nature of our experience. The chapter moves on to consider what is outside consciousness, and the Freudian concept of the unconscious, and the Jungian concept of the collective unconscious and its contents. The chapter concludes by examining subliminal processing.

Burton highlights the complexity of Buddhist attitudes to religious experience, thus challenging a western overemphasis on the role of personal experience and subjective factors in Buddhist religious experience, to the neglect of such social factors as rituals and scriptural components. He considers whether the Buddhist doctrine of no enduring, unchanging self can be justified by introspective experience, and he observes that this is a matter of controversy among Buddhist scholars.