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Ocean governance must be based on a sound scientific understanding of the marine environment. Thus, it may be argued that the freedom of marine scientific research is a prerequisite of ocean governance. However, marine scientific research or other survey activities in the offshore areas may affect economic and security interests of coastal States. In particular, military survey activities in the EEZ of another State have raised highly sensitive issues between surveying and coastal States. Hence, there is a need to achieve a balance between the freedom of marine scientific research and the protection of interests of coastal States. Against that background, this chapter will address particularly the following issues: (1) definition of marine scientific research, (2) reconciliation between the freedom of marine scientific research with the protection of interests of coastal States, (3) hydrographic and military survey activities in the EEZ another State, (4) international cooperation in marine scientific research, and (5) the transfer of technology.
Long examined by the academic literature as a challenging technical-legal fiction with a strong geopolitical impact, border carbon adjustment is on its way to becoming a European reality. This Article provides an overview of the European legislative process with a comparison of the initial Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (‘CBAM’) project presented by the Commission in July 2021 with the positions formalised by the European Parliament and the Council in 2022. With a detour through the doctrine of international law and building upon the work of Professor Thomas Cottier on the concept of Common Concern of Humankind (‘CCH’) in international law, the Article examines the European CBAM, and more broadly, the recent multiplication of unilateral environmental initiatives with extraterritorial impacts, as a contextual transition from a logic of coexistence to a logic of cooperation in the field of environmental policies. It concludes on the necessity to design the European CBAM accordingly, by redistributing its direct revenues and developing open and inclusive cooperation frameworks, to accelerate this transition in the field of industrial decarbonisation.
This chapter argues for a revised theory of moderate vaccine cosmopolitanism, grounded in a Thomistic natural law interpretation of the principle of solidarity, tempered by the principle of subsidiarity. Solidarity does call for love of neighbour, and therefore for global responsibilities of mutual care among nations. However, love of neighbour does not necessitate equality of treatment and resources, or equality of care and concern. Instead, it necessitates equity: love requires shared yet differentiated duties to care for those in need, according to their needs and our relationships to the most vulnerable. So, love tolerates – and even justifies – some partiality in taking care first of those in one’s own community, without abandoning outsiders to their own luck. This understanding of solidarity is predicated on the idea of equality of dignity – meaning, equal respectful consideration and loving regard among persons and nations. Equality of dignity is consistent with treating, caring, and being concerned with different people in different ways, according to their different needs and their different relationships to us, like the principle of subsidiarity suggests.
Climate litigation in the Global South is a novel and increasingly prominent phenomenon that prompted a first wave of scholarly work examining and systematizing its main features. Despite the rigour that these academic accounts apply to assessing the main legal arguments of both litigants and courts, they fail to address the possible tensions between climate justice and the consequences of a domestic court decision in developing nations that did not substantially contribute to the climate crisis. This piece aims to fill that gap by using case law from the Global South to examine challenges around remedies, which will underscore the tensions between climate justice and litigation. Thereafter, this piece, drawing from international norms, advocates for the recognition of a duty of international cooperation, which can inform future courts’ orders in climate cases in both the Global North and the Global South. This normative exercise provides the basis to reconcile climate litigation in the Global South with climate justice, two reputed allies.
Japan is emerging as a more prominent global and regional military power, defying traditional categorisations of a minimalist contribution to the US-Japan alliance, maintaining anti-militarism, seeking an internationalist role, or carving out more strategic autonomy. Instead, this Element argues that Japan has fundamentally shifted its military posture over the last three decades and traversed into a new categorisation of a more capable military power and integrated US ally. This results from Japan's recognition of its fundamentally changing strategic environment that requires a new grand strategy and military doctrines. The shift is traced across the national security strategy components of Japan Self-Defence Forces' capabilities, US-Japan alliance integration, and international security cooperation. The Element argues that all these components are subordinated inevitably to the objectives of homeland security and re-strengthening the US-Japan alliance, and thus Japan's development as international security partner outside the ambit of the bilateral alliance remains stunted. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
The establishment of health technology assessment (HTA) has been an important topic in Europe for many years. There have been a series of activities starting with first projects in 1994 leading to joint actions from the European Network of HTA (EUnetHTA) ending in 2021. This long interval of engagement with HTA structures, methodology, and processes by all member states led to a reliable basis for European collaboration in HTA. This article shows milestones and developments from EUR-ASSESS in 1994 through the progress of EUnetHTA and the accompanying EU-HTA-Network up to the recent elaboration of the EU-HTA-Regulation. With the EU-HTA-Regulation HTA collaboration is taken out of the trial phase of more than 15 years. Through the previous EU HTA collaboration, the appreciation and understanding of the differences and complexities behind the HTA processes in the EU healthcare systems have improved. It is now necessary to make the final steps toward a sustainable European Network for HTA.
A growing literature investigates how historical state repression affects later political outcomes, but little attention has been given to whether violence during foreign occupation affects support for international cooperation. This article investigates this issue by analyzing the 1972 Danish referendum on membership in the European Economic Community (eec)—an organization seen at the time as being dominated by Germany. The analysis shows that municipalities that experienced more German-inflicted violence during the German occupation of Denmark (1940–1945) in World War II had a higher rate of no votes in this referendum. This effect seems to have worked through increased support for Danish far-left parties that were associated with the Danish resistance movement and that actively used anti-German sentiment in their campaigns against eec membership. The results suggest that foreign-inflicted violence can be a substantial hindrance for popular support for international cooperation and that political parties play an important role in translating historical grievances into mass political behavior.
The frayed links of the WTO must be made into the lasting links of what the WTO was originally intended to be. The international cooperation essential to making these lasting links can only be achieved if countries see their enlightened self-interest in taking the broader and longer view. This is a prerequisite to trade action, climate action, and all the other global actions necessary for achieving human flourishing through sustainable development.
To make the new rules needed for the new pandemic world, there must be international cooperation. Optimism is essential to creating cooperation. So too is trust. Trust is not possible without equity and inclusion. Inequality must be addressed if trade liberalization is to advance. Thus, the question of global justice must likewise be addressed. To attain justice, there must be inclusion. Particular emphasis must be given everywhere to the need for gender equity, inclusion of Indigenous peoples, and an end to all forms of racial discrimination. For all everywhere, there must be an emphasis on human flourishing through human development and sustainable freedom.
The European Network for Health Technology Assessment (EUnetHTA) was established in 2006. During its final project phase (joint action 3 [JA3]), it undertook an activity to define the scientific and technical principles of a model of health technology assessment (HTA) cooperation in Europe. This policy article presents the key learnings from JA3 partners about developing a model of HTA cooperation.
There were two phases to the activity: (i) A descriptive phase to describe the elements of HTA cooperation that were already in place in EUnetHTA JA3 and to identify which elements could be improved or were missing. (ii) An analytic phase synthesizing the data collected to identify learnings from the JA3 and to define the scientific and technical principles for a future model of HTA cooperation.
Learnings for developing HTA cooperation were identified in regard to the framework used to support the cooperation, the HTA activities undertaken, the involvement of internal and external actors, managing decision making and the required human resources and support services needed to undertake HTA activities and to coordinate collaboration.
These learnings coming from the experiences of the EUnetHTA JA3 are useful to inform discussions on a European Union regulation for HTA cooperation as well as subsequent work to set up the structures that will be defined in the regulation. The findings also have broader applicability and are relevant to individuals, groups, and organizations setting up HTA programs or establishing their own international collaborations.
Chapter 1 begins by discussing the nineteenth century as the age of internationalism, forms of which developed in various realms. International relations underwent a significant degree of legalisation and a law-based international order emerged along the lines of supposed European ‘civilisational standards’, enshrining clear hierarchies of ‘civilised’ and ‘uncivilised’ states and thereby preparing the further course of European colonialism and imperialism. In the realm of civil society, social and political reform movements began to form cross-border networks and to explore new means of exerting influence in the transnational sphere, making deliberate use of the ‘public sphere’ as a resource to rally support for their causes. Yet at the state level, too, the period following the Congress of Vienna (1814–15) saw a tremendous increase in international cooperation between the European great powers. In intense diplomatic consultation at regular conferences and meetings of ambassadors and in special committees, the ‘Concert of Europe’ tried to find joint solutions to international conflicts, civil wars and humanitarian crises. This form of cooperation and collective crisis management is often regarded as one of the first forms of international governance.
This form of international cooperation offered completely new possibilities for the suppression of a system of human trafficking that operated across oceans and continents, but at the same time it conflicted with the interests of particular states and their own mutual rivalries and on several occasions threatened to founder on the limitations imposed by national sovereign rights. Alongside the viability of the agreed measure, then, Chapter 6 looks at the diplomatic wrangling by which the British government tried to secure treaty obligations from as many states as possible and to overcome massive political resistance, notably from Spain, Portugal, Brazil, France and the United States. Yet this decades-long process of negotiation produced a mounting international consensus, particularly from the mid-1840s onwards, condemning slavery as a ‘crime against humanity’. One telling sign of this new moral climate was the emergence of one of the first international treaty regimes, which extended from Europe across North and South America and the Arab World to East and West Africa. Its foundational idea was to enforce an agreed humanitarian norms by military means if necessary. The fight against the slave trade, it is argued, gave rise to a new conception of intervention, and abolitionism became established as a key international guiding norm for ‘civilisational’ action in the long nineteenth century.
This chapter starts from the proposition that legal substance may be inherently connected to legal form. In particular, consideration is given to the claim that individualistic norms tend to be manifested in highly administrable rules while altruistic norms lend themselves to expression as standards in the legal system. An examination of specific standards in the international legal order that provide a regulatory space for altruism ensues. In doing so, the chapter builds on the insights offered in the previous chapters on substantive international law and reveals that there are certain common legal vehicles through which altruism is compelled or promoted by the law. In a context where the altruistic behaviour of individual states waxes and wanes, the chapter concludes by making a call for greater institutionalisation of altruism.
The Covid-19 pandemic highlights the pressing need to address common challenges faced by all countries and, in particular, provide special support to developing countries through international cooperation. Taxation, in particular Value Added Tax (VAT), is a key area for strengthening international cooperation because of its critical role in financing the Covid-19 crisis and supporting global recovery. This paper proposes the adoption of VAT treaties based on two considerations. First, there exist, in the interplay between states’ VAT laws, over-taxation and under-taxation that can be more effectively addressed by treaties than by unilateral state actions. Secondly, unlike income tax treaties, VAT treaties would distribute more benefits from cooperation to developing countries than to developed countries, leading to normatively attractive distributional consequences. The proposed model offers a new approach to taxing cross-border transactions under VAT and could form part of a coordinated response to a sustainable post-pandemic recovery.
China has begun to take a more active and assertive role in international public goods provision and the results of this are more varied than the duality of revisionism versus status quo orientations would have it. As a goods supplier, China is increasingly identifying gaps in the existing international order and filling them without necessarily challenging the USA directly. In this chapter, Julia Bader shows how China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) became a successful example of asset substitution. The AIIB was initiated as a counter-hegemonic attempt, targeted at the architecture of international finance and at US dominance therein. Yet, as ever more European democracies somewhat unexpectedly joined the Bank – against the wishes of the USA – the institution gradually transformed into an integrated part of the existing international financial architecture. The case of the AIIB illustrates how opportunistic hedging and uncoordinated herding by third states may inadvertently undermine the existing order. Bader shows how the framework of international goods provision, involving producers and consumers alike, directs our attention to non-hegemonic actors as crucial but overlooked players.
In this chapter, Cooley and Nexon argue that instead of operating with a continuum from “revisionist” to “status quo” powers, we should rather focus on the broader strategic environment in which power political maneuvers take place. This is an international goods ecology, comprising types of goods and their distribution. The key advantage of studying power politics as operating within such an asset ecology is how order itself then becomes something different from polarity or hegemony. This makes it possible to distinguish between challenges to the power position of the hegemon and challenges to the architecture of the international order itself. Cooley and Nexon therefore develop an alternate typology of how international orders are challenged to show how acts of substitution are themselves potentially order transforming. They argue that US-led hegemonic order may be undermined before any overt challenge to the power position of the United States emerges. The main benefit of studying the logic of asset substitution is that it gives us a tool to assess how seemingly unimportant acts of substitution, bit by bit and regardless of a lack of revisionist intent, can shape and transform the international order.
By examining the forgotten history of refugee relief in the French zone, this book reveals that ‘caring’ for DPs became a political and moral project, overseen by the French state, international organisations, and occupation authorities. It demonstrates that French practices towards DPs were deeply implicated in the mixed record of the French zone: DP camps were both sites of violent discipline, but also spaces of valuable educational opportunities and exchange across cultures. Not only were French occupation officials and relief workers concerned about the image of France circulating in DP camps, but they also drew a number of DP artists into the orbit of French cultural diplomacy in Germany. For French occupiers and relief workers, exhibiting French cultural richness and selling the ‘French way of life’ was considered as a tool to express and project French political power. Fundamentally, this book nuances the view that the Second World War was a radically ‘modernising’ and ‘internationalising’ moment in the history of humanitarianism. French approaches to relief work were underpinned by gendered assumptions, racial prejudices and the received wisdom of the superiority of certain ethnic groups over others.
The growth of cybercrime, social media misuse and online intellectual property infringement discussed in the preceding three chapters presents new and significant challenges for regulating these aspects of technology law. Conducting investigations, determining jurisdictional scope and prosecuting offences all require a degree of adaptation, as compared to traditional areas of the law. The contrast between investigating a robbery from a bricks-and-mortar store on the one hand and the hacking of an e-commerce company’s trade secrets is vast.
Inconsistent efforts at international cooperation often undermined global efforts to mitigate the COVID-19 health pandemic. Pundits and scholars alike laid much of the blame for this lack of cooperation on domestic political factors, especially populist leaders. Could international relations theories have predicted this behavior? I argue that there are no off-the-shelf theories that engage populism with traditional mechanisms of international cooperation, especially cooperation facilitated by international institutions. I explore how populist sentiment, whether stemming from the public or leaders, can pose barriers to cooperation. I argue that populists are especially likely to resist cues from foreign actors; are especially reticent to delegate national sovereignty; and are especially resistant to policies that result in gains for elites and, when coupled with nationalism, foreigners. The essay concludes with suggestions for further theoretical and empirical research.