Chapter 1 begins with the story of the 2015 La Línea customs fraud scandal and its connections to the criminal structures mounted by military intelligence at the height of the 36-year civil war. Drawing on this illustrative example, the chapter reframes debates on post-conflict statebuilding and puts forward a novel argument about how counterinsurgent elites introduce institutional innovations that undermine core state activities. It further lays out the key theoretical contributions of the book, specifically as they relate to war and state formation and post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction. The chapter also introduces the Central American context and explains why it is a fruitful setting in which to explore the institutional legacies of civil war. It then discusses the book’s methodology and the unique archival and interview sources of data.

Chapter 2 presents the book’s theory of wartime institutional change, which accounts for why civil war is a site of institutional transformation, conceptualizes different wartime institutional logics, and elaborates the causal process through which undermining rules evolve amid conflict. It argues that the perceived escalation of the insurgent threat within civil war unsettles prevailing institutional arrangements and empowers political and military elites who, as the architects of counterinsurgency, possess high levels of decision-making discretion. Under the pretext of combatting the “internal enemy,” this counterinsurgent elite introduces alternative rules of the game, which correspond to its narrow interests. The latter half of the chapter tackles why undermining rules persist within and beyond conflict. Where counterinsurgent leaders can knit together a broader set of interests with a stake in the wartime procedures and successfully co-opt new peacetime political and economic spaces, the undermining rules are more likely to survive. By contrast, shifting postwar elite alignments generate chronic instability, disrupting the institutional status quo.

Chapter 7 investigates how bureaucratic norms change, analyzing recent institutional reforms in Uttar Pradesh (UP) and Bihar. I first examine Mahila Samakhya in UP, a women’s empowerment program initiated by the central government. Challenging legalistic bureaucratic norms, Mahila Samakhya fostered a subculture of deliberation that inspired frontline worker commitment to institutional activism. Frontline workers countered village caste and patriarchal structures to mobilize Dalit women's associations, a process rife with social conflict. Deliberation with target households supported the integration of disadvantaged girls into school. In Bihar, by contrast, committed state leadership worked to strengthen law and order, encouraging a broad shift toward legalism. Bureaucratic commitment to rules supported the growth of school enrollment and infrastructure provision. However, state initiatives to improve education quality through innovative teaching practices faltered, as they conflicted with administrative rule-following. The findings suggest the difficulties of securing frontline worker commitment to quality reforms on the back of legalistic bureaucracy.

Chapter 3 sets the stage for the book's study of implementation. It explores the policy and institutional terrain of primary education in India, examining the political currents beneath India's sluggish expansion of primary education policy. It also presents the legal and administrative architecture for policy implementation. Based on interviews and archival materials, I find that the adoption of universal primary education policies was driven by elite politics inside the state. Committed state officials gradually expanded their authority, using administrative levers to institutionally layer reforms on top of the existing education system. As the Indian economy liberalized in the 1990s, reformers drew on World Bank fiscal and technical assistance to scale up reforms across the country. The argument builds on theories of gradual institutional change, highlighting the agency of committed state elite. The findings also suggest the limitations of institutional layering in India's education system, which failed to address weak administrative capacity and problems of local accountability.

This chapter compares the differences between the UK and China in their regulations and practices of bankers’ remuneration and analyses the institutional reasons for the differences. The problem of bankers’ remuneration in the UK was the distorted market practice. The purpose of the regulation is to correct market failures. Nevertheless, the regulators also intend to keep the balance between regulatory intervention and bank autonomy. In China, the practice of bankers’ remuneration was based on the administrative and politicised approach. The regulation is to guide banks to modernise their remuneration systems. However, it is not effectively implemented, as the state maintains its decisive role. The differences between the two countries are due to the different institutional traditions of their financial systems, as the current regulation and practice of bankers’ remuneration have been profoundly influenced by the traditional model of state–market interaction.

This chapter concludes the key findings and arguments with respect to the practices and regulations of bankers’ remuneration in the UK and China. The reforms in the UK and China are in opposite directions. In the UK, the state needs to move forward to enhance its regulatory power over the practice of bankers’ remuneration; conversely, in China, the state should retreat from the practice and give more leeway to banks. However, influenced by the traditional institutions of the financial system, in either country, the regulation of bankers’ remuneration will not thoroughly change the allocation of power between the state and the market; nevertheless, incremental reforms can be devised to gradually improve the practice of bankers’ remuneration.

This chapter complements previous ones by providing microeconomic foundations for the transition from the stagnation regime to the growth regime. These microeconomic foundations consist of a simple model of individuals choosing an education investment, subject to some budget constraints. It is shown that there exists a critical threshold for the stock of knowledge below which the individual does not invest in education, and above which the investment takes place. We then examine relations between individual decisions and the long-run dynamics of knowledge accumulation and economic development.

The conquest of Egypt and Asia, leading to new urban and fiscal infrastructures and new forms and levels of elite consumption, increased the scale of trade and exchange in the Hellenistic economy. Complex institutional changes that were spurred by both fiscal-military demand and local responses to this demand changed agrarian and commercial patterns, with likely positive effects on local markets. This chapter argues that the Hellenistic period was one of moderate economic growth both in the Greek poleis of the Aegean and in the core regions of Hellenistic Asia and Egypt. The greater presence of Roman traders in the Hellenistic East from the second century onwards is also likely to have had positive effects on market exchange and monetary circulation. Yet there is reason to assume that in the final decades of the Hellenistic period, all Hellenistic regions to some extent, but particularly the Aegean and Asia Minor, suffered from the destructive forces of the Roman military presence and subsequent tributary exploitation. Only after the Roman civil wars came to an end and fiscal practices were better regulated did the economies of the East begin to recover and to expand along the pathways that had developed in the Hellenistic period.

This chapter focuses on the environmental diplomacy surrounding the World Commission on Environment and Development, popularly known as the “Brundtland Commission.” This process popularized the concept of sustainable development. The chapter begins by detailing the substantial changes seen in international environmental conditions through the mid-1980s, brought about largely by the Third World Debt crisis. These shifts created a rapidly deteriorating global environmental context and necessitated significant changes in institutional arrangements. The need for institutional change was a central finding of the important 1987 “Brundtland report,” titled Our Common Future. The Brundtland Commission highlighted a rapid deterioration in the world environment and underlined the need for major institutional change. Some actors sought to realize such change at the United Nations General Assembly in 1987, when the report and its call for action were presented to world leaders. Coordination was hindered, however, by divergent expectations and the absence of a Temporal Focal Point. While states were incentivized to cooperate rapidly to address problems in global environmental governance, the institutional status quo prevailed.

The conclusion summarizes and discusses the principal findings of the book, highlighting the role of temporal coordination dilemmas and Temporal Focal Points in patterns of continuity and change in international institutions. After relating these findings to other theoretical approaches, the chapter discusses the theoretical implications of the analysis contained in this book for the study of change in international institutions. The chapter provides an extended discussion of policy implications, including how international actors can employ the logic of temporal coordination in modernizing global institutions in the current international setting. It concludes with an analysis of the current context in global environmental and sustainable development politics, analyzing progress in combatting global challenges, such as climate change and the loss of biodiversity, and implementing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It argues that the international community has incentives to realize institutional change and that a Temporal Focal Point could soon emerge.

This chapter focuses on the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), the Rio “Earth Summit.” It shows how, despite incentives to address institutional dysfunction and mounting global environmental problems by institutionalizing sustainable development within the United Nations system, divergent expectations persisted until momentum built toward UNCED. The Rio conference, which marked the twentieth anniversary of the 1972 Stockholm conference, emerged as a Temporal Focal Point in United Nations environmental politics. Convergent expectations triggered a significant increase in political and analytical investments in change processes from state and non-state actors, leading to a transformation of the informational and political context. These investments produced significant institutional change, including the creation of the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) and the institutionalization of the World Bank-operated Global Environment Facility. States also launched the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on Biological Diversity, a set of Forest Principles, and the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification.

This chapter analyzes United Nations environmental politics from 1993 to 2021, focusing heavily on the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), or the “Johannesburg summit,” and the 2012 “Rio+20” United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD). The chapter examines the institutional ambiguities created by the 1992 Rio “Earth Summit” and international efforts to address them. It analyzes in detail failed institutional bargaining surrounding WSSD and carries the empirical investigation forward to the Rio+20 summit. The second Rio Earth Summit constituted a Temporal Focal Point in the history of United Nations environment governance and precipitated large-scale institutional change. Among the significant institutional changes emerging from the conference were the transformation of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the creation of a High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF), and the approval of a process for articulating the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the 2030 Agenda. The chapter also provides a brief discussion of more recent UN environmental cooperation, focusing on UNEP, the HLPF, and the SDGs, including progress in combatting climate change and the loss of biodiversity.

This chapter provides a detailed analysis of the state of United Nations environmental cooperation between 1963 and 1972, focusing extensively on the 1972 “Stockholm conference.” It shows how a gradual deterioration of the global environment since the Industrial Revolution produced growing incentives to increase the level of international cooperation in global environmental politics. These incentives lay unrealized for more than a decade, however, until momentum gathered in the lead-up to the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment. The Stockholm conference, which became a landmark event, produced substantial institutional change, including a Declaration, Action Plan, and ultimately the creation of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). The conference, which was originally planned as a largely technical affair, gathered a momentum that was unanticipated by all when it was initially proposed. This momentum is explained by the emergence of a Temporal Focal Point triggered by a series of visible environmental incidents that highlighted long-standing institutional suboptimality. The Stockholm Temporal Focal Point was crystallized by an entrepreneurial conference secretariat led by Maurice Strong.