This chapter examines the main features of the centralised approach in general terms before turning to its clearest illustration, the international law of nuclear energy. The examination of the latter follows two main steps. Firstly, the chapter discusses the ‘dual use’ of nuclear technology, for civil and military purposes, as main historical driver for centralisation. Secondly, it analyses the structure and content of the centralised governance of nuclear energy, paying particular attention to the role of the IAEA. The international law of nuclear energy is presented by reference to the legal balance between nuclear cooperation and safeguards, safety standards (prevention, response and reparation) and environmental protection.

In the absence of delimitation, there are competing sets of sovereignty or sovereign rights of two States over the same area, which also imply exclusivity. This lies at the heart of why possible conflicts may occur between States. Different variants of overlapping claims can occur between States: that is, as regards internal waters, territorial seas, contiguous zones, EEZs, (extended) continental shelves and archipelagic waters. Varying with the type of disputed maritime zone involved, specific international law questions arise. Both claimant coastal States and third States can be affected by the existence of disputed maritime areas. For claimant States, questions arise around the extent to which rights can, and obligations have to, be exercised. For third States, or their nationals, questions arise concerning how to exercise rights that may have been obtained from one claimant State, and what obligations they must observe when acting, or seeking to act, in a disputed area. As State practice exemplifies, where a claimant, or a national of a third State, has undertaken unilateral conduct in a disputed maritime area, for example concerning mineral resources or fisheries, which regularly prompts the other claimant into responding – including, by taking law enforcement measures.

Chapter 9 examines a second necessary extension of the analysis of social influence to a consideration of the effects of designed artefacts in social relations. The chapter starts with an elaboration of the notion of inter-objectivity: designed hardware permeates human social relations as infrastructure, tools, gadgets and instruments. How is different hardware used to implement modalities of social influence? Crowds have historically used barricades to enhance their power. People easily recognise the fait accompli, for example as a wall, installed in a collective effort of construction. Such installations provide boundaries and parameters of attitudes and behaviour afforded by design, but do so without prior consent. Legitimation is achieved post-hoc by cognitive dissonance in analogy to forced-compliance. Resistance to such faits accompli is introduced as a hitherto unrecognised modality of social influence. It functions to evaluate and to redesign hardware and systems in ways that correct the initial designs; resistance potentially innovates on the 'innovation'.