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Chapter 9, Where and how to place (June 8 - June 13) the question of the placement of the government loan comes front and center. Since the second BIS loan to ANB is conditional upon the placement of the bond loan, the National Bank is increasingly under pressure and the money supply has increased as it has rediscounted for the Credit Anstalt. The CA has no more solid collateral and ANB is losing foreign exchange at an increasing rate. Meantime, Hungary is also suffering from capital flight and the nervousness over contagion and the psychology of the crisis is increasing. The conflicts between the Austrian government and the central banks increases and information is still very hard to come by, all of which contributes to the uncertainty of the situation.
The early seventeenth century was a period of economic crisis throughout Eurasia. Finance was developed enough for heads of state to raise and equip massive armies, but not developed enough to pay these armies regularly. Within the context of the Mansfeld Regiment’s financial problems, this chapter describes mutiny, desertion, female labor, and the challenges of finding small change during a financial crisis. The Mansfeld Regiment’s operations depended on a network of military finance in central Europe and northern Italy which was broadly ramifying but imperfect and disorganized. The loan that was supposed to support this regiment was delayed; by the time the money arrived, the regiment’s superiors may simply have forgotten about them. The Mansfeld Regiment collapsed two years later.
Did the threat of war trigger the extraction-coercion cycle? In this chapter I use a panel of Latin America from 1830 to 1913 to test the effects of looming international threats on domestic taxation and internal conflict. It is believed that due to the availability of foreign loans and taxable imports, states in the region did not have to engage in extraction from the local population, nor did they have to coerce individuals to comply with such policies. I summarize this argument in the form of testable hypotheses and point to factors—naval blockades and sovereign debt defaults—that might have hindered access to such external resources. I then focus on militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) and how they affected revenues, tariff levels, foreign loans, civil wars, coups, etc. My analyses show MIDs had a negative effect on tariffs and revenue and diminished the likelihood of a new loan—all results that contest the established conventional wisdom. Conversely, MIDs are associated to currency depreciation—a domestic-oriented inflationary tax—and domestic conflict—in particular, civil wars and coups. The chapter shows war did trigger the extraction-coercion cycle.
In a series of academic publications, Edward Nelson has contended that from the 1950s until the late 1970s, UK policymakers failed to recognise the primacy of monetary policy in controlling inflation. He argues that the highwater mark of monetary policy neglect occurred in the 1970s. This thesis has been rejected by Duncan Needham who has explored several experiments with monetary policy from the late 1960s and challenged the assertion that the authorities neglected monetary policy during the 1970s. Drawing on evidence from the archives and other sources, this article documents how the UK authorities wrestled with monetary policy following the 1967 devaluation of sterling. Excessive broad money growth during the early 1970s was followed by the highest level of peacetime inflation by 1975. The article shows that despite the experiments with monetary policy, a nonmonetary view of inflation dominated the mindset of policymakers during the first half of the 1970s. In the second half of the 1970s there was a change in emphasis and monetary policy became more prominent in economic policymaking, particularly when money supply targets were introduced. Despite this, the nonmonetary view of inflation dominated the decision processes of policymakers during the 1970s.
This paper develops a monetary R&D-driven endogenous growth model featuring endogenous innovation scales and the price-marginal cost markup. To endogenize the step size of quality improvement, we propose a tradeoff mechanism between the risk of innovation failure and the benefit of innovation success in R&D firms. Several findings emerge from the analysis. First, a rise in the nominal interest rate decreases economic growth; however, its relationship with social welfare is ambiguous. Second, either strengthening patent protection or raising the professional knowledge of R&D firms leads to an ambiguous effect on economic growth. Third, the Friedman rule of a zero nominal interest rate fails to be optimal in view of the social welfare maximum. Finally, our numerical analysis indicates that the extent of patent protection and the level of an R&D firm’s professional knowledge play a crucial role in determining the optimal interest rate.
This paper identifies several ways in which “measurement matters” in detecting quantity-theoretic linkages between money growth and inflation in recent data from the Euro Area, United Kingdom, and USA. Elaborating on the “Barnett critique,” it uses Divisia aggregates in place of their simple-sum counterparts to gauge the effects that monetary expansion or contraction is having on inflationary pressures. It also uses one-sided time series filtering techniques to track, in real time, slowly shifting trends in velocity and real economic growth that would otherwise weaken the statistical money growth-inflation relationship. Finally, it documents how measures of inflation based on GDP were distorted severely, especially in the EA and UK, during the 2020 economic closures. Using measures based on consumption instead, estimates from the P-star model confirm that changes in money growth have strong predictive power for subsequent movements in inflation.
The 1922 Rand Rebellion was the only instance of worker protest in the twentieth century in which a modern state used tanks and military airplanes, as well as mounted infantry, to suppress striking workers. These circumstances were unprecedented in their own time and for most of the century. The compressed and intensely violent rebellion of twenty thousand white mineworkers in South Africa’s gold mines had several overlapping features. Within a matter of days—from 6 to 12 March—it went from a general strike to a racial pogrom and insurrection against the government of Prime Minister Jan Smuts. Throughout all these twists and turns, the battle standard remained, “Workers of the world unite and fight for a White South Africa!” Race and violence were integral features of South Africa’s industrial history, but they do not explain the moments when discrete groups of people chose to use them as weapons or bargaining tools. At the close of the First World War, for instance, South Africa’s white mine workers demanded a more comprehensive distribution of the privileges of white supremacy, but in a manner that was both violent and contentious. Consequently, South Africa’s immediate postwar period became one of the most violent moments in its history.
This chapter tackles two additional activities of the pollster as fortune teller. The first is the assessment and prediction of government approval ratings. As we have already seen in Chapter 8, approval ratings are extremely important in predicting elections. There is both an art and science to the analysis of such measures. Here, we want to lay out an analytical framework which will allow pollsters to assess both structural and policy factors related to approval ratings and then how to utilize multiple methods to triangulate future outcomes. We will focus on the Biden administration circa August 2022. Ultimately, a fairly large component of a pollster’s workload is the continual assessment of government initiatives and their convergence (or not) with what people want.
The second is a discussion of more context-based analysis. The pollster has an important role in helping decision-makers understand the bigger picture. Here, broader demographic and social trends help gird such analysis.
Any fair evaluation of the Conservative effect (2010-14) must be cognisant of the context. Tom Egerton’s chapter will place the Conservative premierships in the six external shocks Britain faced, beginning with the Great Financial Crash and the Eurozone Crisis, before the impact of Brexit (and a debate over its external and structural causes), Covid, the Russo-Ukrainian War and the inflation crisis. How did each government succeed or fail in the face of compounding shocks? What opportunities and constraints emerged as a result? Only through an analysis of a decade of poly-crisis, and in the perspective of wider political change, can we make a conclusion on the question of ‘fourteen wasted years’.
Paul Johnson began his relationship with the series with his analysis of Conservative economic policy in The Coalition Effect and will return, with his team, to his conclusions then, analysing not just the first period of austerity but also how Conservative economic policy has evolved through the post-referendum premierships of Theresa May, Boris Johnson, Liz Truss and Rishi Sunak.
The Robertson–Walker metrics are presented as the simplest candidates for the models of our observed Universe. The Friedmann solutions of the Einstein equations (which follow when a R–W metric is taken as an ansatz), with and without the cosmological constant, are derived and discussed in detail. The Milne–McCrea Newtonian analogues of the Friedmann models are derived. Horizons in the R–W models are discussed following the classical Rindler paper. The conceptual basis of the inflationary models is critically reviewed.
In Chapter 2, we briefly discuss causes and consequences of inflation to lay the foundation for a detailed analysis of the relation between monetary policy and other policy fields
Chapter 7 takes an Olsonian perspective. We ask the question of what drove central bank balance sheet policies in democracies. This development is understood from the perspective of Mancur Olson’s ground-breaking theory of the ‘rise and decline of nations’ which accounts for the increasing difficulty to reform as distributional coalitions impose the ‘slavery of the rent-seeking society’ (as the former chief economist of the GATT, Jan Tumlir, so appropriately put it) on democratic societies. In light of these considerations, the factual degree of central bank independence might lower than it appears at first glance.
Central bank independence has become one of the most widely accepted tenets of modern monetary policy. According to this view, the main role of independent central banks is to maintain price stability through the adjustment of short-term interest rates. Reconsidering Central Bank Independence argues that the global financial crisis has undermined confidence in this view as central banks increasingly have to address concerns other than price stability, such as financial stability, the need for output recovery and other broader policy goals. Large balance-sheet expansion by central banks followed the global financial crisis, which overlapped considerably with the financial policy of their respective governments. Exploring the consequences of this shift to a more diverse set of policy challenges, this book calls for a return to the consensus role for central banks and analyses what this might mean for their future independence.
There is an uncomfortably large gulf between academic research and what policy economists use to understand the economy. A Practical Guide to Macroeconomics shows how economists at policy institutions approach important real-world questions and explains why existing academic work – theoretical and empirical – has little to offer them. It argues that this disconnect between theory and practice is problematic for policymaking and the economics profession and looks at what's needed to make academic research more relevant for policy. The book also covers topics related to economic measurement and provides a compact overview of US macroeconomic statistics that will help researchers use these data in a better-informed way.
We examine financial literacy in Germany and its relevance for financial wellbeing. Using data from the Panel on Household Finances collected in 2021, we show that about 62% of German households answer the Big Three financial literacy questions correctly. Those with lower education, who are out of the labor force, women, and those living in East Germany have lower levels of financial literacy. Identifying groups with lower financial literacy and developing strategies to reach them and enhance their abilities should therefore be an integral part of the German national financial literacy strategy. Financial literacy is linked to financial wellbeing: we document that those with higher financial literacy have a higher stock market participation rate and are less likely to report financial difficulties.
We provide new evidence about US monetary policy using a model that: (i) estimates time-varying monetary policy weights without relying on stylized theoretical assumptions; (ii) allows for endogenous breakdowns in the relationship between interest rates, inflation, and output; and (iii) generates a unique measure of monetary policy activism that accounts for economic instability. The joint incorporation of endogenous time-varying uncertainty about the monetary policy parameters and the stability of the relationship between interest rates, inflation, and output materially reduces the probability of determinate monetary policy. The average probability of determinacy over the period post-1982 to 1997 is below 60% (hence well below seminal estimates of determinacy probabilities that are close to unity). Post-1990, the average probability of determinacy is 75%, falling to approximately 60% when we allow for typical levels of trend inflation.
The Economic Freedom of the World report measures five dimensions of economic freedom, one of them being Sound Money. Compared to where it had been in decades for most of the West, inflation skyrocketed in 2021. Yet the indicator which measures inflation in the most recent year barely budged due to how it is specified and parameterized. This paper explores potential improvements on the methodology, although ultimately only modest improvements are achieved over simply changing the value of inflation that corresponds to zero (the lowest index score) in the simplest linear specification.
We test the neutrality of nominal interest rates taking advantage of recent advances in quantitative financial history using the Schmelzing (2022) global nominal interest rate and inflation rate series (across eight centuries), for France, Germany, Holland, Italy, Japan, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the USA. We pay attention to the integration and cointegration properties of the variables and use the bivariate autoregressive methodology proposed by King and Watson (1997). We argue that meaningful long-run neutrality tests can be performed only for three countries—Japan, Spain, and the United Kingdom—and we find no evidence consistent with the neutrality of nominal interest rates.