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This chapter explores Christian theology’s relationship to the literary and the rhetorical to demonstrate the shifts that theology and biblical studies have made in light of David Jasper’s lament that they have “never really accepted the need” to come to terms with postmodern reflections on textuality.It does so through examining an underlying rhythm, vibration or attunement that Christian theology, literature and rhetoric share, one characterized as kenotic. The appeal to the primordiality of rhythm is well documented in postmodern philosophy, following in the wake of Nietzsche. It has surfaced as a theological category in the work of Erich Pryzwara, and the publication of Raimon Panikkar’s Gifford Lectures. The analysis begins with remarks from Roberto Calasso on rhythm and form in, and as, defining literature. It then explores the ‘kenotic’ nature of the operation of imagination. Some of the most important Christian theologians of the past were trained in rhetoric, and so in examining the imagination in both theological and the literary production, the chapter turns to why rhetoric is important for theological discourse, despite the dangers of ideological persuasion.
This article argues that Virgil's First Eclogue naturalises the power discourse of the future Augustan Principate. Throughout the poem, Virgil not only presents the iuvenis as a libertas-restoring benefactor who is treated as a god by his beneficiaries, but even imagines his elevated status as crucial to maintaining social cohesion and civic stability, and idealises the beneficiaries’ dependence on his efficacious authority. The poem thus produces the grammar of the discourse of authoritarianism, subtly articulating what will eventually become the central tenets of Augustan ideology. I suggest that it is precisely this process of naturalisation which has led readers since antiquity to identify the iuvenis of Virgil's First Eclogue as the future Augustus. However, in this paper I am interested in transcending this question of individual identification to focus instead on how Virgil's poetic anonymisation is no simple pastoral obfuscation, but rather does the hard graft of ‘soft launching’ a new political system.
This chapter considers how certain values may come to shape the law. It explores the institutions, processes and actors that facilitate the emergence of altruistically oriented legal norms. In doing so, the link between ideology and law will become more apparent. The evolution in international law presented in this book is the product of an underlying cosmopolitan altruistic ideology which coexists with a statist individualistic ideology that shape the content of legal rules. A legal system can be influenced by one or more philosophical ideologies, and the international legal system has been and continues to be shaped by different variations of these two major ideologies. As such, cosmopolitan altruism and statist individualism have a dialectic existence in the formation of law and its interpretation. Despite the fundamental differences in the nature and effect of these ideologies, they are capable of having simultaneous normative influence on the behaviour of states and the formation of international law.
To enable new research on local ideology and representation in Canada, we construct a latent measure of the policy ideology of 37,500 Canadian Election Study respondents using 56 policy-relevant questions and then use multilevel regression and poststratification to estimate the average ideological position of each of Canada's 338 federal electoral districts and 250 largest municipalities. We use these local ideology estimates to examine ideological representation in Canadian municipal politics. Combining our municipal ideology estimates with elite survey data from more than 900 Canadian municipal politicians, we find evidence of a strong relationship between mass and elite ideology. This relationship is consistent across differing municipal population sizes and institutional structures. We conclude with additional detail on our publicly available individual and aggregate measures and describe their potential uses for future research on ideology and representation in Canadian politics at all levels.
Ideological behavior has traditionally been viewed as a product of social forces. Nonetheless, an emerging science suggests that ideological worldviews can also be understood in terms of neural and cognitive principles. The article proposes a neurocognitive model of ideological thinking, arguing that ideological worldviews may be manifestations of individuals’ perceptual and cognitive systems. This model makes two claims. First, there are neurocognitive antecedents to ideological thinking: the brain’s low-level neurocognitive dispositions influence its receptivity to ideological doctrines. Second, there are neurocognitive consequences to ideological engagement: strong exposure and adherence to ideological doctrines can shape perceptual and cognitive systems. This article details the neurocognitive model of ideological thinking and synthesizes the empirical evidence in support of its claims. The model postulates that there are bidirectional processes between the brain and the ideological environment, and so it can address the roles of situational and motivational factors in ideologically motivated action. This endeavor highlights that an interdisciplinary neurocognitive approach to ideologies can facilitate biologically informed accounts of the ideological brain and thus reveal who is most susceptible to extreme and authoritarian ideologies. By investigating the relationships between low-level perceptual processes and high-level ideological attitudes, we can develop a better grasp of our collective history as well as the mechanisms that may structure our political futures.
What explains ideological congruence between citizens and political parties? Although the literature on congruence has recently provided some answers to this question, most of these works have focused on the effect of systemic and partisan factors. They have paid less attention to the effect of people’s characteristics on ideological congruence, which is built by the interaction between citizens’ positions on public issues and those of the political parties that represent them. Our general research hypothesis is that party-voter congruence is stronger when parties reduce the uncertainty about their ideological positions and citizens can understand these signals better. Analysis of Latin American data supports this hypothesis, showing that people’s cognitive ability, specifically education and political knowledge, has a positive effect on party-voter ideological congruence. Moreover, this relationship is moderated by parties’ attributes, such as ideological ambiguity and radicalism.
This chapter examines victory in the war as an object of commemoration in late-Stalinist Moscow with an eye toward the paradoxical features of postwar commemorative culture. In particular, the analysis attempts to square a persistent, all-Soviet variant of the war narrative with the simultaneous public veneration of key events and personalities from the prerevolutionary Russian past. Rather than an ideological symbiosis, which seamlessly linked the war and the celebration of tsarist and other prerevolutionary accomplishments in a patriotic “double axis,” the chapter argues that postwar Soviet patriotism is better understood as an assemblage of disparate and contradictory, and at times highly fragmented, themes and images. Where the celebration of the Russian national past functioned to redirect and contain nationalistic impulses lest they disrupt the hierarchical integrity of the friendship of the peoples, representations of the war as a pan-Soviet event provided an alternative means of social mobilization amid the early Cold War, one that offset appeals to ethnic difference with a vision of a homogeneous Soviet people.
This chapter analyses the operation of criminal procedure in contemporary China from the perspectives of institutional and individual interests. First, the chapter zooms in on the various performance indicators that affect the everyday operation of China’s criminal justice system, with a focus on the distorted use of such indicators. Second, it argues that the pathological use of performance indicators must be understood in the context of the power relations and interactions amongst the main players within the criminal justice system. Incentivising and controlling the individual actors can be thought of as managing an enterprise on the basis of individuals’ interest in pursuing promotion and better remuneration and agencies’ interest in obtaining power, prestige and legitimacy. Ingenious individuals and agencies soon develop techniques for disregarding, bypassing or manipulating performance-related factors to obtain the results they want. The downside of such an interest-driven management approach in the criminal justice arena is that it conflicts with the underlying mission of criminal justice agencies: to serve the interests of justice. Finally, the chapter analyses the current criminal justice practices, identifying the ideological and institutional factors that can explain the distortion and limits of reform.
Scholars of Wallace Stevens have variously represented him as a crafter of poetic utopias, a skeptic of utopian thinking, and a champion of utopian material sufficiency. Mao’s chapter adds to the picture by showing how, in his poetry of the late 1930s and early 1940s, Stevens situates leaders and movements impelled by visions of ideal futures within a conception of political life as an ongoing struggle for dominance between ideas. Reading texts such as “Owl’s Clover,” “The Man with the Blue Guitar,” and “Extracts from Addresses to the Academy of Fine Ideas” in relation to Karl Mannheim’s Ideology and Utopia and Max Lerner’s Ideas Are Weapons, the chapter shows that Stevens’s view of history as an interplay of imagination and reality partook of important currents in interwar intellectual life.
We examine Thomas Piketty's explanations for steady and rising inequality in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the decline of inequality in the half-century after World War I, and the return of high levels of inequality since the 1970s. We specify empirical and conceptual problems with his analysis, which stem from his presentation of causality at a highly general and vague level. That leads him to confuse rather than clarify the causal relations among implacable economic forces, changes in technological innovation and population growth, ideology, and governmental policies and the outcomes that he seeks to explain. We identify social scientists and historians who are able to account for temporal and geographic variations in the political coalitions that propelled egalitarian reforms, and that in their absence cleared the terrain for reactionary anti-egalitarian policies that the rich incited for their narrow benefit. We explain why Piketty's limited conception of ideology is insufficient for explaining how mass opposition to inequality is mobilized. We show that if we want to combine the study of capital in the twenty-first century with that of politics, we need a broader conception of ideology than what Piketty offers, one that will allow us to specify how ideology affects parties, states, voters, and activists.
Scholars of the political left-right divide often see equality as the core issue of contention, with the left seeking greater equality than the right. Though partially agreeing with this consensus, I propose a modified left-right conceptualization that offers three novel contributions. First, while accepting the idea of a single fundamental dimension underlying conflict in global politics, I argue the key issue is not necessarily equality but rather the diffusion or concentration of power within and across nations, communities and individuals. Second, given the inescapable complexity of politics, I argue in favour of distinguishing between those who seek to de-concentrate power and broaden inclusion (the left) from those advocating for a concentration of power (the right) in specific issue domains. Third, I illustrate the utility of this “one dimension, multiple domains” theoretical framework through a comparative analysis of eight contemporary political parties across the domains of economic, foreign and social policy.
This article examines the controversy over Ancient Greek [AG] as a school subject, a controversy that re-emerged in 2016, when SYRIZA was in power. The issue is ideologically charged: classical antiquity has played a fundamental role in shaping modern Greek ethnic identity. The arguments for and against teaching AG as a school subject are analysed and explained in relation to the ideological preferences, strategies and interests of the involved agents. The polarization of the arguments is interpreted within the broader context of the financial crisis, as an attempt by the agents involved to reinforce the left/right divide, which was significantly blurred after the adoption of austerity policies by both the self-proclaimed leftist SYRIZA and the conservative New Democracy parties.
This chapter provides an overview of the Chinese economy during 1850–2000 with both a quantitative profile and a period-by-period narrative on major eras of the late Qing, Republican and communist periods (including both the Mao era and the post-1978 reform period). More specifically, the chapter raises the question not only of why China fell behind, but more importantly why it took so long for China to industrialize after the Industrial Revolution had been well under way elsewhere. To this end, I highlight the importance of institutions and ideology, and their interaction in a feedback loop, as critical elements accounting for the remarkable transformations as well as much inertia during this 150 years of the Chinese response to Western or modernization challenges.
This final chapter looks closely at the Nineteenth Party Congress in 2017. This was a remarkable congress; there had not been such extensive personnel change since Deng Xiaoping took over from Hua Guofeng. Of greatest significance was the personalization of power as Xi elevated two allies to the Politburo who had never served on the Central Committee, as well as four other allies who were promoted from the alternate list of the Central Committee. China had generally avoided such “helicopter promotions” since the Maoist period, but here they were again, underlining the lack of institutionalization and the inability of party institutions to constrain Xi. At the same time, we have seen a renewed emphasis on ideology, combined with nationalism, as Xi has sought to reinvigorate Leninism. Can such a reinvigorated Leninism successfully fight the pathologies looked at in Chapter 4?
The rise of Xi Jinping presents a stark contrast to the early periods of Jiang Zemin’s and Hu Jintao’s rule. Like Jiang and Hu, Xi was given a weak hand to play. But unlike Jiang and Hu, Xi launched a campaign against corruption that strengthened his power enormously. At the same time, he stressed the threat of “peaceful evolution,” which had brought down the Soviet Union, and underlay the “color revolutions” in Central Asia. This campaign saw a tightening of control over ideology. Xi also undertook an extensive reform of the military. Although this reform facilitated operational matters, it enabled Xi to gain personal control over the military (PLA).
Political issues that had been consciously ignored or downplayed in Stoppard’s earlier work emerge strongly in the later plays. Topics like ideology formation and the philosophical frameworks of political commitment form the explicit subject of his epic Coast of Utopia trilogy, which traces Russian thought in the century before that country’s Communist revolution and lie underneath much of Leopoldstadt as well.
The introduction to the book presents the context, scope, normative framework, core arguments, and the general structure of the book. It identifies gaps in existing literature on statehood and minority rights and explains the way the book addresses those gaps. The introduction especially elaborates the background of case studies and their relevance for the book. My unique approach to the case studies that goes beyond the vulnerability framework and instead focuses on the ways minorities are marginalised through the ideological operation of postcolonial states, is also discussed in this part. To support my analysis throughout the book, I have relied mainly on primary materials and archival sources, whenever possible. The research is also informed by a series of interviews with national and international organisations working in Bangladesh. My analysis is influenced by critical, postcolonial, and TWAIL (Third World Approaches to International Law) scholarship. Although the historical context is South Asia and the specific focus is on colonial India and present-day Bangladesh and Myanmar, many of the arguments, observations, and findings of the book should be equally relevant to other postcolonial states. The normative and pragmatic significance of the book beyond the Rohingya or the CHT crisis lies in this fact.
Chapter two examines how postcolonial states respond to ethno-nationalism in general and minorities in particular. I argue that nationalist ruling elites conceive of the postcolonial state itself as an ‘ideology’, claiming that the unified national state, its liberal constitutional structure, and the developmental agenda will end the troublesome ethnic parochialism and, therefore, solve the problem of minorities. The ideological making of the postcolonial state not only obscures and glosses over the real reasons for the problem, but also shift attention to issues that help maintain asymmetric power relations. To substantiate this argument, I first explain John Thompson’s notion of ‘ideology’ as a set of ways in which ideas and meanings help create and sustain relations of domination. I then develop my argument that the ideology of the postcolonial state functions in three different forms: the postcolonial ‘national’, ‘liberal’, and ‘developmental’ state. Working through these three ideologies, the postcolonial state demands the submission of the minority cause to the greater ‘national’, ‘liberal’, and ‘developmental’ interests of the state, thereby legitimising the oppression of minorities. I demonstrate these ideological functions of the postcolonial state with historical examples: the discourse used in Indian Constituency Assembly debates to discuss minority rights.
The article offers a methodological reflection on the practical work of reading race in Russian literary texts, especially from the nineteenth century. It makes four key arguments. First, “racialization,” in the sense of an interactive process, is a more productive lens than an essentially static concept of race. Second, race is not only, and not always, a question of perception or meaning-making, but also ideology. Third, the concept of race typically engages notions of class, gender, and sexuality, an intersectionality that merits particular attention. Fourth, critiquing race can be productively furthered by paying attention to anxieties and insecurities that underlie racial hierarchies and biases, which can be revealed through readings against the grain. As we cast new light on Russia's engagement with race, it is essential that the culture of the Russian nineteen-century become part of this reappraisal.
This chapter establishes a basis for the book's meta-narrative in a present-day context, highlighting the importance of intellectual property - particularly patents - for the foundation of Facebook. The chapter emphasizes the weaving together of formality and substantive rationality in contemporary patents, which are theorized as instruments of legal power. By showing how patents were important in the founding of Facebook, the chapter emphasizes the role that instruments of legal power - like patents - can play in linking people together into social groups, classes, and networks. Michael Mann's IEMP model for social power helps us to understand the dynamics of exclusivity, as seen in contemporary intellectual property, particularly in patents.