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draws attention to comparisons between California and other states in their provision of immigrant citizenship rights. The authors start with the border dividing California and Arizona, two states that lie on opposite ends of the spectrum with respect to progressive and regressive state citizenship, respectively. And yet, Arizona is not the only exclusionary state with respect to immigrant rights today. Indeed, the authors’ analysis reveals that Alabama is about as exclusionary as Arizona and that states like Georgia and Tennessee are close behind in their exclusionary laws on immigrant state citizenship. In this chapter, the authors situate various states along a continuum from the most inclusive to the most exclusionary with respect to each of five dimensions of citizenship rights. They also conduct a fifty-state quantitative analysis to identify the reasons why some states have proceeded farther than others in the development of progressive state citizenship.
From his arrival in Georgia in 1734 to his death in 1765, the Pietist pastor Johann Martin Boltzius spent more than thirty years on the southernmost frontier of Britain’s North American empire. There he served as leader of Ebenezer, a small community of Protestant refugees from the Catholic territory of Salzburg driven from their homeland on account of their beliefs. In sponsoring Boltzius’s enterprise, his Pietist superiors in Germany had also assigned him missionary duties aimed at Christianizing Georgia’s indigenous population. Conversion of the Native population was only one part of a broader Pietist vision, a global program of spiritual renewal designed to evangelize the world and bring forth the Kingdom of God. Accordingly, Boltzius’s missionary efforts in Georgia also targeted other non-Christian peoples he encountered during his time in the colony. This contribution examines three in particular: (1) the small contingent of German-speaking Jews who had migrated to Georgia in 1733; (2) the colony’s Yuchi people; and (3) the growing population of enslaved Africans who began arriving after 1750 when the colony’s initial ban on the importation of slaves was formally repealed.
This article assesses Russian strategic narratives towards its interventions in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014–16) based on a new database of 50 statements posted on the websites of the Russian Mission to the United Nations and the President of Russia homepage. By looking more broadly at Russian strategic narratives aimed at persuading other global actors and publics abroad and at home, this article identifies how Russia attempted to develop a story that could win global acceptance. This analysis shows that contrary to traditional Russian emphasis on sovereign responsibility and non-intervention, Russia supported claims for self-determination by separatist groups in Georgia and Ukraine. Russia used deception and disinformation in its strategic narratives as it mis-characterized these conflicts using Responsibility to Protect (R2P) language, yet mostly justified its own interventions through references to other sources of international law. Russian strategic narratives focused on delegitimizing the perceived opponents, making the case for the appropriateness of its own actions, and projecting what it proposed as the proper solution to the conflicts. It largely avoided making any references to its own involvement in the Donbas at all. Additionally, Russia’s focus on the protection of co-ethnics and Russian-speakers is reminiscent of interventions in the pre-R2P era.
This article focuses on two Muslim groups, Azeris and Muslim Ajarians, who are differently perceived and treated in post-Soviet Georgia. Georgian ethno-religious nationalism bases Georgianness on an ethnic affiliation to Kartvelian roots and religious adherence to Georgian Orthodoxy, and determines one’s level of inclusion in the nation accordingly; those who do not fulfill these criteria, such as Azeris, are excluded from the nation. Muslim Ajarians, despite being Georgians, also face exclusion from Georgian identity. Based on the concept of ethnodoxy, which is defined as linking of “a group’s ethnic identity to its dominant religion,” this article argues that Muslim Ajarians, who are Georgian Muslims, an unaccepted category in Georgia, receive differential treatment by their Christian fellows, whereas recognition of the religion and ethnicity of Azeris is a factor that comparatively diminishes the pressure on the community. This research demonstrates that the visibility of Muslim Ajarians’ religious practices in the public space and the construction of places of worship is less tolerated than in the case of Azeris, who have no means of becoming “proper Georgians.” The findings of fieldwork in Georgia manifested that, although minorities have various problems in Georgia, Muslim Ajarians are subjected to more differential treatment than Azeris.
In 1943, Georgia’s constitution was amended to lower the voting age to eighteen, making it the first—and for twelve years, the only—state in the Union to establish a voting-age requirement below twenty-one. Despite being widely considered at the time by several national and state political actors, Georgia’s reform represents an important and unappreciated historical puzzle. First, few would regard mid-twentieth-century Georgia as being even modestly progressive, especially regarding voting rights. Second, there is no evidence that an organized group lobbied for the reform. Further, there is no reason why lowering the voting age was inherently unique to Georgia qua Georgia. Instead, this study offers a detailed historical analysis highlighting the dedication of its young governor, and argues that Ellis Arnall’s political entrepreneurialism coupled with growing intraparty factionalism in Georgian politics and strategic timing facilitated this rare instance of electoral progressivism in the Deep South.
Georgia switched to nonpartisan judicial elections in 1983. The change did not reflect an effort by Democrats to protect Democratic judges from increasing Republican strength. Instead the change was part of a general overhaul of the state constitution, including modernizing the court system. The committee charged with redrafting the judicial article of the constitution briefly considered, but then dismissed, the idea of adopting some form of the Missouri Plan. There was a minor indication of partisanship in one vote on the change when a Democrat offered an amendment to delete the phrase “on a nonpartisan basis,” which would have left the choice of partisan or nonpartisan elections as a matter of ordinary legislation; a slight majority of Democrats voted in favor of the deletion, but almost all of the small number of Republicans in the House voted against the deletion. The revised constitution, including the changes to judicial elections, was overwhelmingly approved by the voters in 1983.
Of the eleven ex-Confederate states, the large majority saw Lily-Whites take control of the state party sometime in the late-Nineteenth or early-Twentieth Century. There were, however, three exceptions to this rule: South Carolina, Georgia, and Mississippi. While each of these states eventually saw some form of Lily-Whiteism gain control, the Black-and-Tan organizations managed to hang onto power longer than elsewhere in the South. South Carolina’s Black-and-Tans machine finally fell apart at the 1940 national convention. Georgia began to see a clear decline in black delegates in 1952. And, finally, the Mississippi GOP remained under Black-and-Tan control up to the 1960 national convention. Why did these three state organizations buck the trend? The histories presented in this chapter show that the party organization’s survival in each state relied upon on the ability of individual party leaders to withstand a series of major challenges to their control in the 1920s. Each of the leaders in these state parties – “Tieless Joe” Tolbert in South Carolina, Walter H. Johnson and Ben Davis in Georgia, and Perry Howard in Mississippi – faced considerable opposition, both locally and from national leaders like Harding and Hoover. Yet each leader managed to survive these challenges – at least for a while – through strategic choices, some element of luck, and (in the cases of Johnson, Davis, and Howard) support from black Republicans outside of the South.
Using two case studies, I explore how variation in the political institutions of Georgia and Ukraine across time influenced their changing relationship with Russia since independence. Why have some leaders of these states — sometimes even the same leader at different times — accepted differing levels of Russian authority and control? Changing levels of contestation and rent-seeking explain this variation. I also show that resistance to hierarchy contributed to violent conflict when the dominant state’s demands were rejected.
This chapter explores the relationship between elites and the masses. Even in authoritarian regimes, elites depend on their ability to mobilize support and resources from society to guarantee their political survival. For this reason, the support of society is a potential constraint on elite choices. I show that individuals who perceive high levels of corruption are more supportive of elites surrendering sovereignty. This finding buttresses the idea that rent-seeking and contestation contribute to higher levels of hierarchy. The chapter uses survey data from Georgia and Ukraine to illustrate the point.
Exploiting subnational variation in four Georgian regions — Adjara, Abkahzia, Javakheti, and Kvemo-Kartli — this chapter demonstrates how nonstate actors and local powerbrokers can act as a constraint on the central government and thus increase the level of external hierarchy. The chapter also shows that local actors are influenced by similar considerations to the central government. Higher levels of contestation and rent-seeking lead local elites and ethnic political entrepreneurs to support external control over sovereignty. This chapter not only contributes to the literature on international hierarchy but also shows how external actors may influence state-building and interethnic political relationships.
Why do political actors willingly give up sovereignty to another state, or choose to resist, sometimes to the point of violence? Jesse Dillon Savage demonstrates the role that domestic politics plays in the formation of international hierarchies, and shows that when there are high levels of rent-seeking and political competition within the subordinate state, elites within this state become more prepared to accept hierarchy. In such an environment, members of society at large are also more likely to support the surrender of sovereignty. Empirically rich, the book adopts a comparative historical approach with an emphasis on Russian attempts to establish hierarchy in post-Soviet space, particularly in Georgia and Ukraine. This emphasis on post-Soviet hierarchy is complemented by a cross-national statistical study of hierarchy in the post WWII era, and three historical case studies examining European informal empire in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Considers how George W. Bush rescued the catastrophe of post-invasion Iraq with his Surge. Analyzes key events of second Bush term, his freedom agenda, and wider counterterrorism efforts. Argues that Bush continued with a foreign policy approach made in the Cold War, in which Russian power remained a central concern. Details how Bush resembled his Cold War predecessors in his Russia policy, especially during the Russo-Georgia War. Examines successes and failures of Bush Jr.’s foreign policy, with a special focus on his approach to China. Argues that Bush’s foreign toward India was a considerable success.
The article is a comparative inquiry into the roles of Ilia Chavchavadze (1837–1907) and Taras Shevchenko (1818–1861) as national poets and anti-tsarist intellectuals within the context of their respective national traditions (in Georgia and Ukraine). During the period of their activity (19th and the beginning of 20th century), both Ukraine and Georgia were under tsarist imperial rule (albeit the two poets lived in different periods of Russian imperial history). Through their major works, each called for their communities to awaken and revolt against oppression, rejected social apathy caused by tsarist subjugation, and raised awareness about the historical past of their nations. By comparing the works and activities of the two poets and examining their impact on national mobilization in tsarist Ukraine and Georgia, this article argues that (lyric) poetry rather than prose (novel) constituted the agency of common national imagining. It was lyric and not epic poetry or novel, this article shows, that laid the foundation of nationalist mobilization as it framed the revolt of the “I” against colonialism as a revolt of the “I” against an oppressive society under which the cultural grounds for common imagining had been constructed.
This chapter focuses on the case of the Georgian-Russian War of 2008. It concentrates on the question of which warnings were communicated by whom within the European Union system and how were they perceived in terms of notice, acceptance and mobilisation to act by the EU’s member states as the key decision-makers. It considers not only warnings in relation to South Ossetia, but also those from a few months earlier related to Georgia’s other separatist region of Abkhazia that were in fact to some extent successful. Rather than a classic case of warning failure, the analysis shows considerable variation in impact among member states and between the cases of Abkhazia as compared with South Ossetia. It is argued that these differences are due to the relatively low level of diagnostic difficulty in making knowledge claims, differences in receptivity among member states due to threat perceptions and policy preferences, and source credibility given warners’ respective track records as well as suspicions of national biases. The case confirms that many factors work interdependently in producing different outcomes for warnings over time and highlights that warnings should be considered an integral part of evolving and historically contingent discourses on foreign policy.
The European human rights system has long been seen as one of the greatest European achievements, with its European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) as the world's leading human rights court. Current turbulent times, however, pose serious challenges to the European system, which is increasingly being contested by the deepening ‘implementation crisis’. The absolute obligation of member states of the Council of Europe (CoE) to abide by ECtHR judgments under Article 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights has been increasingly compromised by the selective approach of states, often resulting in minimal, dilatory, lengthy or even contested compliance with ECtHR judgments. As the implementation backlog has grown largely after the accession to the CoE of the newly emerged states, as aspiring democracies, in the late 1990s and early 2000s following the collapse of the Soviet Union, this article analyses the compliance behaviour of these states by looking at the South Caucasus states: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The research findings suggest that partial compliance is a very likely form of compliance in the South Caucasus states as democratising states, and that some of the factors that explain such behaviour discussed in the article may be distinctive of states that joined the CoE as emerging democracies after the collapse of the Soviet Union. These states continue to display various vulnerabilities in the areas of human rights, the rule of law and democracy. This, in turn, has serious implications for the whole European human rights system and its ability to ensure that states’ commitments to the CoE are duly respected in the longer term.
In 2017, archaeological survey recorded more than 160 Late Bronze–Iron Age cyclopean fortification complexes in the historical Javakheti region, Georgia. The author relates different types of cyclopean complexes mentioned in Urartian written sources to the sites found in Javakheti.
Between 1822 and 1857, eight Southern states barred the ingress of all free black maritime workers. According to lawmakers, they carried a 'moral contagion' of abolitionism and black autonomy that could be transmitted to local slaves. Those seamen who arrived in Southern ports in violation of the laws faced incarceration, corporal punishment, an incipient form of convict leasing, and even punitive enslavement. The sailors, their captains, abolitionists, and British diplomatic agents protested this treatment. They wrote letters, published tracts, cajoled elected officials, pleaded with Southern officials, and litigated in state and federal courts. By deploying a progressive and sweeping notion of national citizenship - one that guaranteed a number of rights against state regulation - they exposed the ambiguity and potential power of national citizenship as a legal category. Ultimately, the Fourteenth Amendment recognized the robust understanding of citizenship championed by Antebellum free people of color, by people afflicted with 'moral contagion'.
In March 2017, Georgian citizens were able to travel visa-free to the Schengen Area. This development was highly significant to Georgia, whose narrative of “belonging to Europe” has long contrasted with the travel restrictions for Georgian citizens, who were previously required to undergo complicated consular procedures. However, this was far from being a routine bilateral negotiation. Visa disparities mirrored the contractual asymmetry between Tbilisi and Brussels. This article focuses on how Georgia calibrated its political discourse vis-à-vis the European Union. After outlining both the symbolic and political relevance of visa liberalization, this work assesses the Georgian political rhetoric at different times: in 2005, when Georgia unilaterally lifted visa requirements for Western visitors, and in 2015 and 2016, when visa liberalization was widely expected. The article’s theoretical framework and the final conclusions are relevant to the study of visa regimes and the external relations of small states.
Alignment with Europe has been a popular foreign policy objective among post-socialist nations. In the Republic of Georgia, discourse surrounding the country's Euro-Atlantic orientation surged in the decade after the 2003 Rose Revolution. While such discourse has been examined in the context of political reforms and national security goals, this article foregrounds how it was incorporated into alterations of the built environment. Focusing on the urban transformations of the city of Batumi after the rise to power of the United National Movement government, it demonstrates how architecture served as a tool for selectively rewriting Georgia's contemporary European identity. This article concentrates on two parallel initiatives to transform Batumi into a contemporary European city: the reconstruction of portions of the Old City and the new development along the seaside boulevard. Using evidence collected through qualitative methods, it further highlights the contradictions that emerged during this process of redevelopment and rebranding, as the state balanced initiatives for new development with other post-revolutionary state-building objectives, such as political reform and tourism-market production. Accordingly, it unpacks the various national and international politico-economic forces at play in the process of developing Batumi into the image of a contemporary European city.
Tularemia has sustained seroprevalence in Eurasia, with estimates as high as 15% in endemic regions. The purpose of this report is to characterise the current epidemiology of Francisella tularensis subspecies holarctica in Georgia. Three surveillance activities are summarised: (1) acute infections captured in Georgia's notifiable disease surveillance system, (2) infectious disease seroprevalence study of military volunteers, and (3) a study of seroprevalence and risk factors in endemic regions. Descriptive analyses of demographic, exposure and clinical factors were conducted for the surveillance studies; bivariate analyses were computed to identify risk factors of seropositivity using likelihood ratio χ2 tests or Fisher's exact tests. Of the 19 incident cases reported between 2014 and August 2017, 10 were confirmed and nine met the presumptive definition; the estimated annual incidence was 0.12/100 000. The first cases of tularemia in Western Georgia were reported. Seroprevalences of antibodies for F. tularensis were 2.0% for military volunteers and 5.0% for residents in endemic regions. Exposures correlated with seropositivity included work with hay and contact with multiple types of animals. Seroprevalence studies conducted periodically may enhance our understanding of tularemia in countries with dramatically underestimated incidence rates.