To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure firstname.lastname@example.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Latvia’s far right has had a great deal of political influence since the late 1980s, when nativist movements played a key role in mobilizing political opposition to Soviet power. Far-right parties have been in 16 of the 22 government coalitions in Latvia between 1993 and 2023. Since 2010, the National Alliance (NA), a merger between an established far-right party and a more youthful political party, has come to dominate Latvia’s far right and has been a part of every government coalition from 2011-2023. This article begins with a discussion of Europeanization, the Europeanization of political parties, and the qualitative methodology used in the article to examine the impact of Latvia’s membership in the European Union on NA’s international links and program. The article then outlines the development and influence of Latvia’s far-right. The following sections examine links between Latvia’s far right and Europe’s far right and the impact of Europe on NA’s ideology and program. It finds little evidence of Europeanization of Latvia’s far right. Latvia’s far right is more hawkish toward Russia than the West European right and also enjoys greater domestic influence and respectability. “New nativist” anti-immigration and cultural Marxism themes have lower salience in Latvia where Russian-speakers are perceived as a bigger and more immediate threat than Muslims or “Woke” activists.
This chapter looks at the migrants not as objects of the state’s integration measures but as political subjects making claims in demonstrations, migrant associations, the parliament, and media outlets. It discusses how the government defused much of the returnees’ protest, initially perceived as a serious menace, through a pervasive rhetoric of national integration and the framing of migrant mobilization as a form of "apolitical politics." It further asks how migrants built their own associations, to what degree they were bound up with the political right, and why they ultimately proved to be politically weak and short-lived. In short, the chapter looks at how the voices of the returnees, while distinctly present directly after their arrival, were coopted, absorbed, and covered up by the emerging institutions of Portugal’s representative democracy, the kind of concessions the political class was ready to make along the way, and some of the legacies of this process.
This chapter supplements the previous one and focuses on side-switchers to the far right as well. Here, the case studies that are presented come from intellectual defectors from the extreme left to the extreme right. Those side-switchers, all of them from Germany originally, have rarely committed extremist crimes, even though they provided significant legitimacy and intellectual standing for the far-right environment. In many cases, they have transported key strategies, ideas, and concepts to the extreme right and helped this milieu to build its own intellectual current. The convictions of all those presented in the case studies have shifted from far or extreme left in the beginning to supporting various forms of extreme-right ideology at a later stage their lives. Key motives in the narratives of those defectors are anti-Semitism, feelings of betrayal and loss of status in the far left, personal conflicts, and fierce anti-establishment or anti-democratic opposition.
Chapter 10 provides an overview of all our findings and offers additional avenues of research. We also discuss the many policy implications and political ramifications of group empathy, including what happens when it is lacking in specific contexts. In doing so, we consider the rise of ethnonationalist, far-right politics in the United States and many other parts of the world, and we discuss whether group empathy may counteract xenophobic, exclusionary appeals of populist leaders. The eight-year span of our data collection covers a stark transformation of the American policy landscape as the United States transitioned from Barack Obama’s presidency to Donald Trump’s. This allows us to contemplate how levels of group empathy might have shifted over time within and across racial/ethnic groups in the United States. We further consider how to cultivate group empathy at the societal level, in order to improve intergroup relations and social justice, and how to envision the role of educational experiences such as community engagement in these efforts.
Although the notion of “populism” goes back to Roman/Greek antiquity, the twenty-first century has seen a surge in both the success of such movements and academic interest in them, especially their rhetorics, discourse and politics. In engaging with populism, discourse studies has interfaced with political and social sciences and struggled to find a conceptually sound and empirically grounded definition, while avoiding an overly broad use of the term. In this, the field is far from homogenous, but it offers many insightful approaches to studying contemporary populist politics. A specific point of interest (and contention) is the interrelationships among rhetorical strategies, discourse-analytical concepts relating populism to hegemony or society (such as interdiscursivity, recontextualization and normalization) and the agenda of populist politics. Behind this looms the larger question of the status of populism itself. While some scholars regard populism as an ideology, others call it a movement or syndrome. While some argue that it is both a form and a content, others maintain that it is only a style or, rather, that it combines specific forms with specific contents. In terms of evaluation, some argue that (at least contemporary) populism is a danger to democracy or, more specifically, to liberal democracy, while others see it as an integral part of any democracy or even a positive force. Central among the traits identified in populist politics is its divisiveness and appeal to “the people”: It divides society into two homogenous and antagonistic camps, the “pure people” versus the “corrupt elite.” At the same time, it is antipluralist in claiming that it alone represents the true will of the people, claiming to raise that will over all else. This often links to a larger opposition constructed by populist politics: “national” versus “international” interests. Beyond such commonalities, populist politics, their rhetorics and discourse differ strikingly across the globe and across political affiliations. Empirical discourse studies engage with the specifics of the rhetorics employed by populist politics and how they relate to discourses within the respective contexts.
This article explores the rise of the Azov movement and explains the process through the political opportunity structure theory. We argue that a loosely coherent winning coalition of the post-Euromaidan ruling elites enabled Azov’s participation in conventional politics. As a result, Azov launched the ongoing institutionalization process which is largely responsible for Azov’s success as compared to other far-right movements. We show that two movement entrepreneurs’ profiles, namely political activist and radical, dominated the Azov leadership structure and managed to promote their strategic vision on cooperation with state officials effectively combined with contentious action. We find that political activist entrepreneurs tend to push institutionalization alongside particular institutionalization axes, namely adaptability, reification, and systemness, whereas radical entrepreneurs are responsible for Azov’s transformation into an intense policy demander.
This article discusses the political success of the far-right Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik). Jobbik is usually depicted as owing its success to anti-Roma and anti-establishment sentiment, mobilized with the help of a paramilitary organization, the Hungarian Guard. With the examples of the party programs, the speeches of Jobbik leaders during marches of the Hungarian Guard, and the press releases of the party between 2008 and 2010, this article shows how Jobbik not only attempts to mobilize anti-Roma sentiment, but also tries to present itself as a party taking considerable interest in the economic issues of poverty and inequality triggered by capitalism. It also suggests that the party's success might in fact also be due to this focus on the economy, as well as due to increasing efforts on behalf of the party leadership to differentiate their positions from those of the main center-right party, Fidesz. This could explain how even though authorities banned the Hungarian Guard in July 2009, Jobbik nevertheless doubled its number of voters in the parliamentary elections of April 2010 (and achieved a further increase in absolute vote numbers in 2014) as compared to its electoral outcome in the European Parliament elections of June 2009.
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.