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Although lay participation has long been a feature of scientific research, the past decades have seen an explosion in the number of citizen science projects. Simultaneously, the number of low-cost network connected devices collectively known as Internet of Things devices has proliferated. The increased use of Internet of Things devices in citizen science exists has coincided with a reconsideration of the right to science under international law. Specifically, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights both recognise a right to benefit and participate in the scientific process. Whilst it is unclear whether this right protects participation by citizen scientists, it provides a useful framework to help chart the ethical issues raised by citizen science. In this chapter, we first describe the origins and boundaries of the right to science, as well as its relevance to citizen science. We then use the findings of a scoping review to examine three main ethical and legal issues for using Internet of Things devices in citizen science.
In this chapter, we sketch out a preliminary account of the normative questions raised by an emerging form of human-machine interaction that we call the “hybrid mind.” By hybrid mind, we consider the direct coupling of the human cognitive system with an artificial cognitive system, so that cognitive processes of the two systems are functionally integrated through bi-directional interactions and mutually adapt to each other. This inquiry is provoked by the development of novel technologies such as closed-loop or adaptive neuroprostheses that can consist of implanted or external components and establish a direct communication pathway between the human brain and an external computing device. This communication pathway is typically mediated and facilitated by artificially intelligent components such as machine learning algorithms. This development represents only the latest step in the evolution of human beings and their technologies, a process that has necessitated a parallel evolution in our moral concepts and practices over time. Our objective as ethicists and legal scholars is to propose a concept of this hybrid mind as an interesting unit of analysis.
Human beings are technical beings. Their lives cannot be accomplished without technique. At the end of modernity, the symbiosis between science and technique has become so tight that we can now speak of technoscience that gives us more power and responsibility than simple traditional techniques, as in the case of the new biotechnologies. In this chapter we offer a critical reflection on the two major anthropotechnical proposals, that is, the bio-project and the info-project and present arguments and criteria crucial to human rights development and their relevance for an adequate technological humanism. More concretely, we carry out a philosophical analysis of the importance of responsibility for safeguarding the duties of future generations and a non-dualistic anthropology. We also highlight the relevance of societal responsibility, care and solidarity in making the impossible detachment of human beings from technology an opportunity to develop a fruitful debate on human rights based on a deeper understanding of human beings’ relational nature.
The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted that leveraging medical big data can help to better predict and control outbreaks from the outset. However, there are still challenges to overcome in the 21st century to efficiently use medical big data, promote innovation and public health activities and adequately protect individuals’ privacy. The metaphor that property is a “bundle of sticks” applies equally to medical big data. Understanding medical big data in this way raises a number of questions, including: Who has the right to make money off its buying and selling, or is it inalienable? When does medical big data become sufficiently stripped of identifiers that the rights of an individual concerning the data disappear? How have different regimes such as the General Data Protection Regulation in Europe and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act in the US answered these questions differently? In this chapter, we will discuss three topics: (1) privacy and data sharing, (2) informed consent, and (3) ownership.
Includes some aspects of Diogenes of Babylon’s philosophy, but focusses on the impact of the Academic Carneades on Stoicism from Antipater of Tarsus onwards. Extensive coverage of Panaetius of Rhodes and his students, including Hecaton. Balances the contributions of both innovative thinkers and more conservative Stoics.
Returns to Cassirer’s notion of function to argue that it continuously informs his conception of philosophy. Cassirer first develops this notion in his 1910 work Substance and Function: the mathematical idea of a function connects disparate elements under a variable rule, establishing a unity through diversity (8.1). Subsequently, his early historical writings (1906‒1919) invoke the idea of a functional unity in order to explain the continuity and progress in the history of thought while simultaneously acknowledging the legitimacy of each historical epoch (8.2). Cassirer’s mature, systematic, writings (1923‒1942) reconcile the unity of human culture and the synchronic diversity of our cultural domains by means of the same idea (8.3). Finally, the ethical reflections that we find in Cassirer’s latest writings (1935‒1946) are also rooted in this ‘functional conception of philosophy’ (8.4).
Selections from the full range of Seneca’s philosophical works, including extensive material from the Natural Questions, On Benefits and the Letters to Lucilius as well as the ‘Dialogues’, esp. On Anger.
The chapter is devoted to the work of Posidonius in all its aspects and argues that he created a second major synthesis of Stoic thought, expanding the school’s attention to the sciences and history while making innovations in logic, physics and ethics. Argues that Posidonius was a more conservative Stoic than is often thought.
The chapter aims at investigating the way Galen constructs his philosophical theories in dialogue with his predecessors, both by adhering and by opposing to their doctrines. For this purpose, it focuses on a certain part of his epistemology, namely his account of sense perception and, in particular, his theory of vision. I argue that Galen’s perceptual theory starts from material he finds in the Platonic dialogues, but revises it significantly either in order to reply to objections raised by Plato’s opponents or in order to rebut unfortunate, at least to his mind, adaptations of the Platonic inheritance. Indeed, in his attempt to defend Plato’s views on sense perception, Galen does not recoil from borrowing whatever seems to him valuable from rival philosophical schools, and it is this enriched reworking of the Platonic theory that he adopts as his own philosophical stance. To fully reconstruct and comprehend Galen’s method in his general theory of sense perception and in his theory of vision, I draw my evidence from what Galen tells us about these topics in his extant works, and especially in the seventh book of his treatise On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato.
The fifth chapter marks the turn from descriptive to normative ethics – thus, what ethical ideas should guide moral actions. This half of the book does not set out a detailed ethical theory but advocates a general criterion for setting ethical parameters and adjudicating among ethical–narrative prototypes. That criterion is an effortful generalization of empathy. The particular stress on empathy derives from the basic definition of ethics, presented at the beginning of the book. This chapter draws on current cognitive and affective science to outline an account of human emotion and empathy. This account differs from common views of empathy in several ways. Most obviously, it does not construe empathy as sharing the same emotion as a target. Rather, empathy is a scalar concept that refers, fundamentally, to experiencing the same emotional valence as a target. That positive or negative empathic feeling is based on one’s own experiences, which may be more or less similar to those of the target.
The authors explain in this work a new approach to observing and controlling linear systems whose inputs and outputs are not fixed in advance. They cover a class of linear time-invariant state/signal system that is general enough to include most of the standard classes of linear time-invariant dynamical systems, but simple enough that it is easy to understand the fundamental principles. They begin by explaining the basic theory of finite-dimensional and bounded systems in a way suitable for graduate courses in systems theory and control. They then proceed to the more advanced infinite-dimensional setting, opening up new ways for researchers to study distributed parameter systems, including linear port-Hamiltonian systems and boundary triplets. They include the general non-passive part of the theory in continuous and discrete time, and provide a short introduction to the passive situation. Numerous examples from circuit theory are used to illustrate the theory.
Case management skills are critical to the effective, efficient and ethical delivery of clinical psychological services. The chapter will outline how case management involves the combination of practice-based evidence with management and documentation tasks. We outline the key management and documentation tasks associated with specific phases of the treatment process, framing them in a context of generating practice-based evidence. We illustrate good record keeping, maintainance of confidentiality, treatment planning, treatment implementation (including suicide risk assessment) and treatment termination.
Clinical psychology trainees embarking on a professional career are faced with the prospect of work that, daily, has ethical questions and challenges to respond to people from varied cultures and social groups. The chapter describes how to provide a culturally-sensitive clinical psychology practice. It evaluates the current evidence-base antecedences guiding practice. The chapter suggests how Structured Problem Solving can be applied to help acquire greater skills in engaging with people from different cultures and groups (e.g., the elderly). The same Structured Problem Solving approach is then applied to ethical decision-making and illustrated with a discussion on confidentiality and dual relationships. The chapter outlines how these approaches may help the clinical psychologist respect the humanity of their clients in all facets of their engagement.
Clinical psychologists, even those who work in solo practices, are part of a larger health care delivery system. The chapter frames the evidence-based practice of a clinical psychologist in the broader context by outlining the evolving parameters of service delivery and how the field is aiming to provide integrated, patient-centred care that is committed to accountability. It is apparent that clinical psychology’s commitment to accountable practice adds value to integrated care and psychologists bring specific skills to the health care system. The chapter outlines the specific skills that clinical psychologists need to provide effective interventions expeditiously, be good team players, understand their medical colleagues, articulate their distinctiveness, be accountable for outcomes and to attend to ethical issues.
Recent interest in the evolution of the social contract is extended by providing a throughly naturalistic, evolutionary account of the biological underpinnings of a social contract theory of morality. This social contract theory of morality (contractevolism) provides an evolutionary justification of the primacy of a moral principle of maximisation of the opportunities for evolutionary reproductive success (ERS), where maximising opportunities does not entail an obligation on individuals to choose to maximise their ERS. From that primary principle, the moral principles of inclusion, individual sovereignty (liberty) and equality can be derived. The implications of these principles, within contractevolism, are explored through an examination of patriarchy, individual sovereignty and copulatory choices, and overpopulation and extinction. Contractevolism is grounded in evolutionary dynamics that resulted in humans and human societies. The most important behavioural consequences of evolution to contractevolism are reciprocity, cooperation, empathy, and the most important cognitive consequences are reason and behavioural modification.
Here I speak in favor of the view that life's meaning can be found in the pursuit of pleasure. I first present an argument for this view that is grounded in a traditional concept of meaning. To help ease remaining concerns about accepting it, I then draw attention to four things the view does not imply: (1) that we have a reason to take hedonistic theories of meaning seriously; (2) that meaning can be found in the deeply immoral, the deeply ignorant, or the deeply repulsive pursuit of pleasure; (3) that there is a significantly easier route to meaning than the pursuit of morality, the pursuit of knowledge, or the pursuit of art; and (4) that meaning can be found in pursuits that involve only baser aspects of human nature.
It is common to criticize certain comments as ‘unhelpful’. This criticism is richer than it might first appear. In this paper, I sketch an account of conversational helpfulness and unhelpfulness, the reasons why they matter, and the utility of calling out comments as helpful or unhelpful. First, some unhelpful comments are or easily could be demoralizing for proponents of projects, and criticizing them as such can diminish, deflect, or defend against that demoralization. Second, some unhelpful comments redirect or derail conversations away from their projects and criticizing comments as unhelpful can steer conversations back. Third, some unhelpful comments are made out of a lack of epistemic effort and criticizing them as such can help maintain epistemic standards, standards of respect for other people and their projects, and can ensure that such comments do not receive more attention and consideration than they deserve.
This chapter examines the link between the legitimacy of international commercial courts and the ethics of their judges. It starts from the premise that the professional ethics of judges are not only a matter of their personal and professional integrity. Instead, the chapter argues, the international and cross-cultural context of international commercial courts may affect what is considered appropriate for a judge. To demonstrate this argument, the chapter analyses ethical rules regarding ex parte communication between judges and parties or their lawyers, and the cultural differences among legal systems. It concludes by calling on the host States to commit energy and resources to develop separate codes of conduct for the judges presiding in the international commercial courts that they have created.