Crisis research focuses primarily on how response structures should be organized. There are ongoing debates about the required degree of flexibility in the response structure and what role emergent groups should have. A shared assumption in this research is that organization and structure are synonymous with order in a crisis and enable a rapid, coordinated response. Disorganization, by extension, is criticized for crisis response failures. This view ignores the risk of over-organization and crisis response rigidity. In uncertain crises, disorganizing might produce a looser, less ordered structure that facilitates a novel, adaptive response. The dilemma for frontline responders revolves around the need for both organizing and disorganizing during crises. It is worthwhile noting that different types and phases of the crisis demand different forms of reorganizing. The reorganizing process, through disorganizing and organizing, needs to be ongoing throughout the duration of the crisis situation to ensure that crisis demands and organizational response structures evolve synchronously.

Social workers will often say that they use systems theories in their practice. People are inextricably linked to their environments, and theories that call on systems of experience and interaction tend to make logical and practical sense to workers in daily practice. Systems theories help us to think about these interactions between people and their social and physical environments, and they also help us to understand how change can occur through the use of ecosystem interventions.In this chapter, we will explore the development of systems theory and how some key thinkers in the systems theory approach have informed social work practice. An examination of some of the key systemic thinkers and their understandings of systems theories will serve to illustrate how these theories have evolved, and how they have shaped practice in different and significant ways. Finally we will explore contemporary systemic adaptations, and in particular, how a broader systems analysis informs service navigation.

This chapter bridges the gap between the disappearance of the Hellenistic artists’ associations in the first century bc and the emergence of the ecumenical synods at the end of that century. It begins with a discussion of the first attestations of the ecumenical synods. The ecumenical athletes’ association is first attested in a letter by Mark Antony from the 40s or 30s bc. The first clear evidence of the ecumenical synod of artists dates only from the reign of Claudius (AD 41-54), but there are indications that the artists were already banding together on a transregional scale in the 30s bc. Next, this chapter seeks to explain the emergence of the synods by looking at the broader context of Mediterranean integration. It argues that the synods’ emergence was connected to the development of an 'international' festival network, which was in turn made possible by the Roman unification of the Mediterranean. Moreover, it appears that the Roman takeover in the east created the right conditions for the establishment of associations that transcended the polis framework. Especially the province of Asia seems to have provided fertile soil for experimenting with new organisational forms.

Chaos and complexity are related concepts that help explain patterns in nature, and the inherent limitations we face in trying to interpret them. This chapter is a relatively straightforward examination of these two fields, but it applies them specifically to the biological sciences, demonstrating the constraints on prediction and inference in biological systems, especially evolutionary systems, based on chaos theory. Complexity theory explains how nature can create complex functioning systems, whether they are anatomical or behavioral, and reveals how we can get something as complex as the eye, or consciousness, as an emergent property of a complex system following simple biological or physical rules. The ways in which emergent properties can be contrasted to engineered solutions are emphasized.

Building on previous chapters’ conclusions, this chapter posits various organizational levels of intentionality and speculates as to how they interconnect through powers-based processes and biological evolutionary developments. These levels of intentionality form an intentionality continuum. The Intentionality Continuum Thesis holds that intentionality is not a local phenomenon, present only in creatures with minds, but a global phenomenon present in fundamental physical phenomena, biological cells, plants, animals and humans, and human societies. So the continuum of intentionality in nature runs from the physical intentionality of fundamental powers to the complex, higher-level psychological powers of organisms as well as social groups. This might require emergent powers, a possibility that is defended and the account of which is inspired by the fusion theory of emergent properties advanced by Paul Humphreys. Given the panintentionality implied by the Intentionality Continuum Thesis, along with some other defensible assumptions, a reasonable though certainly tentative case can be made for pantheism. The chapter, and the book, conclude by identifying open questions.

This chapter explores the metaphysics of systems of powers, which contain no qualities and have at least two powers in a dynamic relation. In order to account for the reality of higher-level properties in the macro world and everyday experience, whether they are powers or qualities, powers must work together. This chapter first delineates different kinds of multilevel systems of properties, specifying how powers and qualities might be related across different systems. Then, building on the idea of powers holism introduced in Chapter 6, this chapter characterizes what it means for powers to form a unified system. Next, the possibility of ontologically emergent properties, particularly qualities, appearing out of a system of powers, is explored. But this assumes that there are genuine qualities, whereas this chapter ultimately suggests that what appear to be genuine qualities are quasi-qualities.

Since initial experiments with nitrous oxide and ether in the nineteenth century, general anaesthesia has been near synonymous with inhaled agents. However, total intravenous anaesthesia may offer advantages in certain circumstances. Total intravenous anaesthesia can be defined as the induction and maintenance of general anaesthesia using agents given solely intravenously and in the absence of all inhalational agents including nitrous oxide. It may be necessary when volatile anaesthesia is contraindicated or infeasible or may be chosen for other benefits. This chapter provides an overview of the benefits and disadvantages of total intravenous anaesthesia, as well as describing the equipment and care required to use it safely.

With this chapter, we sketch a picture of a future process-oriented praxis. We describe what is required to instigate a theoretical shift toward a process commitment, and what that shift might look like for the psychological praxis. To flesh this out, we conceptualize psychological science as a complex dynamic system whose behaviour is currently dominated by a substance-oriented attractor state. We describe the dynamic mechanisms that serve to integrate the layers of practices into a living, breathing praxis. And we describe how the current praxis might be perturbed, such that a new process-oriented praxis might emerge.

An overview of the foundational aspects of complex dynamic systems is provided. This chapter serves as a reference for applications of complex dynamic systems concepts and methods to concrete topics. This chapter argues that complex dynamic systems is an ideal candidate for realizing a process approach in psychology, without it necessarily being a monolithic framework.

With this chapter, we contrast the mainstream explanatory practices with forms of causality that are processual: complex causality. Complex dynamic systems are used as a framework, incorporating principles such as emergence, self-organization, circular causality, and perturbations. With this alternative, processes themselves are seen as causes, making causality a moving and dynamic phenomenon. We conclude with descriptions of various concrete causal models that can be used to help researchers understand causality via processes.