To send content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about sending content to .
To send content items to your Kindle, first ensure email@example.com
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about sending to your Kindle.
Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
This chapter chronicles an unnoticed aspect of the intellectual history of the “contractarian” paradigm, the descriptive claim that firms are best characterized as nexus of contracts. Although the paradigm’s rise in the 1980s in the corporate world is well known, little has been said about its success in rewriting both theory and doctrine in charitable and not-for-profit law. The contract paradigm has reshaped the questions that not-for-profit scholarship attempts to answers, and it is tightly linked to developments in not-for-profit doctrine and practice. Key examples include the growth of donor standing—the notion that not-for-profits have a fiduciary duty to their donors, and that donors may bring suit for breaches—and the growing obsession with “donor intent” throughout the not-for-profit sphere. I contrast contractarianism with an institutionalist “public trust” conception of charities, which was the prevailing intellectual paradigm for most of the 20th century.
This chapter explores the issue of how decision-making about the distribution of benefits should itself be distributed across generations. It outlines that under the existing rules, there are gaps in the ability of the present generation to change the rate of accumulation or distribute retained assets, even if they think that to do so would increase public benefit. Thus, the chapter investigates potential normative bases for reforming the decision-making balance between past, present and future decision-makers so as to determine the additional circumstances in which the present generation ought to be able to alter accumulation. It does so by reference to cy-près reform discussions and to principles of intergenerational justice. The chapter then identifies potential ways in which the existing rules might be reformed to better accord with these normative bases, drawing on examples from the United Kingdom and the United States. The potential reforms include broader cy-près and administrative scheme grounds and greater discretion for charity controllers to amend administrative machinery and purposes, but coupled with a period of protection for donor intent.
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.