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Nearly all contemporary conflicts are driven in part by political marginalization. This political marginalization amplifies the consequences of economic and cultural marginalization. To craft a durable peace, the parties to peace negotiations often spend considerable time and effort crafting power-sharing arrangements that balance the pull of some parties for greater diffusion and devolution of political power with the pull of other parties to maintain a degree of political centralization, for the sake of efficiency and effectiveness, and to preserve their prior political privileges. This chapter explores the puzzle of whether and how to create a vertical power-sharing arrangement that leads to a durable peace. It reviews the peace processes related to conflicts in Bosnia, Colombia, Indonesia/Aceh, Iraq, Macedonia, Nepal, the Philippines/Mindanao, South Africa, Sudan, and Yemen to understand how parties have grappled with the thorny set of conundrums, including the choice of state structure; the allocation of legislative and executive powers among the levels of government; the degree of political, administrative, and/or fiscal decision-making authority to be devolved; and the timeline for implementing any agreed plan for decentralization.
According to its advocates, legal titling promises to improve investment (both public and private) and prospects for political order. A persistent puzzle is why its actual impact is often ambiguous or even harmful. Our theory suggests the answer lies in the qualities relating to government: when the state enjoys a monopoly on coercion and administrative capacity, when political decision makers face constraints, and when there are inclusive institutions linking communities to the state, legal titling can improve economic and political well-being. Since these political preconditions for successful legal titling are likely to be absent in conflict-affected states, it is unlikely that legal titling will be effective in such states. The evidence from Afghanistan supports our theory. The legal-titling projects in the country have not worked well, for the reasons just listed. Yet community-based recording of landownership – donor-assisted, community-initiated programs that partner with communities, not the state, to document who owns what land, buildings, and commons – have improved household land-tenure security. These community-based programs illustrate how working with customary governance institutions improves the impact of development assistance.
The dimensions of funding and healthcare provision are combined with each other. From the intersection of these two dimensions, four families of healthcare systems stand out: two large ones (each containing a dozen countries) and two smaller ones. The two larger families reflect the traditional contrast between "Bismarck" systems and "Beveridge" systems. One of the two largest families is, in fact, made up of the Social Health Insurance countries in that all these countries have a separate provision system. The other larger family is made up of integrated universalist systems (NHS countries). The two smaller families are made up, respectively, of countries that have a separated universalist system and countries that adopt the mandatory residence insurance model. The latter all have a separated delivery system. From the four families just outlined, three countries are excluded: Greece, Israel and the United States can be considered as “outliers.”
The purpose of this chapter is to reflect on the main trajectories of change that have characterized the health systems of OECD countries in the last three decades, from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the present day. For this purpose, it is possible to identify five major "reform themes" which traveled transversally through countries generating processes of emulation and policy transfer. The five major reform themes are as follows: (1) stimulation of greater competition; (2) promotion of integration (both in terms of financing and provision); (3) decentralization; (4) strengthening the rights of the patient; (5) extension of insurance coverage. For most of these five themes it is possible to identify a reform that has acted as a forerunner, which other countries have subsequently been inspired by and followed.
Objective: The purpose of this chapter is to describe Oriéntame’s training program for abortion and post-abortion service provision in Colombia. We cover how it has evolved through time and experience, and how it has contributed to decrease access barriers to services and to normalize the provision of legal abortion after its partial decriminalization. Methods: Using Oriéntame’s training program as a case study, we described its ethical, theoretical and practical components. These components were imparted within a human rights framework, and are rooted in a comprehensive understanding of the concept of health in order to fully implement the law. Conclusion: Oriéntame’s training program has served to expand knowledge about abortion. It has also emerged as an effective strategy to increase access to services and to articulate different institutions to decrease access barriers.
Why are some communities able to come together to improve their collective lot while others are not? This book offers a novel answer to this question by looking at variation in local government performance in decentralized West Africa: local actors are better able to cooperate around basic service delivery when their formal jurisdictional boundaries overlap with informal social institutions, or norms of appropriate comportment in the public sphere demarcated by group boundaries. In this introductory chapter, I lay out the main contours of my theory as well as the implications that the argument holds for key debates in Comparative Politics, including the use of narratives as a lens into actors’ political strategies, the social identities we prioritize in our research, prospects for state-building in sub-Saharan Africa, and our understanding of how historical legacies shape contemporary development outcomes.
Chapter 3 introduces Senegal’s decentralization reforms in depth, specifying the transfer of authority over basic social services to the local state in 1996. Because it is possible that the very process of delimiting decentralized units allowed more coherent communities to select into shared administrative divisions, I have to take into account the possibility that institutional congruence was not simply an outcome of the precolonial past, but available to any group able to influence boundary construction. Accordingly, the chapter details the politics of subnational boundary creation from the colonial onward. Employing archival and interview data, I demonstrate that decentralization and boundary delimitation were largely top-down processes, suggesting that the emergence of institutional congruence was not driven by endogenous, bottom-up demand.
Why are some communities able to come together to improve their collective lot while others are not? Looking at variation in local government performance in decentralized West Africa, this book advances a novel answer to this question: communities are better able to coordinate around basic service delivery when their formal jurisdictional boundaries overlap with informal social institutions, or norms. This book identifies the precolonial past as the driver of striking subnational variation in the present because these social institutions only encompass the many villages of the local state in areas that were once home to precolonial polities. Drawing on a multi-method research design, the book develops and tests a theory of institutional congruence to document how the past shapes contemporary elite approaches to redistribution within the local state. Where precolonial kingdoms left behind collective identities and dense social networks, local elites find it easier to cooperate following decentralization.
Decentralization of the energy sector means the breaking-up of the sector and its vertically integrated enterprises and/or global cartels by separating its distinct functions (extraction, transmission and sale), thereby allowing for increased competition in the market. This chapter uses two case studies to illustrate the challenges the decentralization of largely vertically integrated energy markets poses for international trade law, including international trade law’s inability to deal comprehensively with the production quota practices of global energy cartels such as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The chapter then studies regional energy market decentralization policies (in this case the European internal market), focusing on the panel report in EU – Energy Package, and considers which WTO rules facilitate such policies and which constrain them.
The purpose of this chapter is threefold: (1) It explains energy as a concept that has transformed over the years and explains the difference between primary, secondary, renewable and non-renewable energy resources. In so doing, it refers to UN Statistics Division/International Energy Agency sources. (2) It explains how the rules of international trade law are relevant to the energy sector and when these rules become applicable to trade in energy; and (3) It explores the major changes energy markets have undergone in recent decades, focusing on decarbonization, decentralization and energy security.
“Democracy and its Limits” examines the problems of government and governance in Nigeria, one of the most populous yet least popular conglomerates of democracy (with additional reference to other parts of Africa). Nigeria returned to civilian democracy in 1999, but it was an elite exercise, and the governance has been disappointing. There has been much violence, religious and ethnic conflict, rising poverty, and blatant looting of public funds by the same people entrusted with the funds meant for the development of the nation. This discourse studies how the change in the state has a hidden context, while the critique of governance is regarded as like that of democracy. Despite the propaganda about its advantages and the near-global consensus about its values, democracy is riddled with a lot of contradictions that limit its functional value to a majority of the citizenry. It is expected that political modernity would cause an evolution of political culture and lead to the appearance of viable, resilient institutions that would produce stable politics. However, this study posits that democratic mechanisms can only be effective when the citizenry gives more attention to institutional development and nation building that can endure and function, and not to the politicians, elites, or the military.
“Federalism and Its Fault Lines” uncovers the various definitions of federalism and explores how the different federal models work by observing some of the countries that follow it. It answers questions such as: Is federalism as a model of governance the best option for Nigeria? How are people being affected by Nigeria’s current model of federalism? In what ways can the system be improved or transformed to better serve the people of Nigeria? And finally, what components of federalist structures in other countries should Nigeria grasp onto? The chapter takes a closer look at Nigeria’s practice of federalism, the history behind it, and what it lacks today in comparison to other countries. While the political history of Nigeria and the USA are at variance, the need for checks and balances through power division is among the cues the Nigerian federal system can adopt because properly instituted federalism practiced with a properly crafted constitution that effectively spells out ways of performing democracy are ways through which human life can be enhanced in Nigeria. Also, the devolution of power helps to create more capable power holds and engender more growth through healthy competitions.
The growth of economic informality, the transformation of left party-union linkages, and the rise of political decentralization in Latin America have all empowered local “brokers" who are linked to national political parties but also substantially autonomous and often opportunistic. The leaders of left parties in the region – even parties that are externally mobilized or that advance programmatic platforms promoting greater inclusion of popular sectors – have often needed to negotiate with such actors to secure power and implement policies. In this chapter, we consider the resources that intermediaries offer to parties but also the challenges that broker-mediated incorporation poses for left parties. We then use new evidence from Brazil – n particular, from the experience of the externally mobilized, programmatic Workers’ Party (PT) – to show the necessity but also the fragility of alliances with such actors. We assess possible implications of the reliance on brokers for the sustainability of the “inclusionary turn" in Latin America.
This article argues that weak local governments increase levels of taxation by “borrowing” institutional capacity from certain types of businesses. While many businesses lobby against taxation, businesses that are locally owned, nationally connected, and logistically complex build robust associations that support taxation. These types of businesses benefit from improvements in public infrastructure, so they empower their associations to monitor members’ tax compliance and to pressure officials to uphold their spending commitments. The article demonstrates the necessity of business support for taxation in the absence of state capacity by comparing two Philippine cities that differ in their ability to tax despite a number of similarities between them. The case studies show that tax increases co-varied with business support, and that business support waxed and waned depending on over-time variation in the capability of business associations to discourage tax evasion and to enforce official commitments to spend on infrastructure.
Many reforms of education governance throughout the postwar decades have been heavily contested politically. Since around the 1980s, governments in several advanced Western countries have reformed their education systems by increasing private provision, school choice, decentralization, and competition; by lowering or increasing the number of educational tracks available in secondary education; and by reorienting the role of vocational education and training in the education system. Yet, to date we possess insufficient knowledge of the extent to which such reforms are actually in line with individual preferences. This chapter studies individual preferences toward education governance for four educational sectors (early childhood education and care, schools, vocational education and training, and higher education) along three dimensions of education governance. On average, our findings reveal a strong support of public opinion for a publicly dominated, comprehensive model of education provision, coupled with a high degree of choice for students and parents. Yet, for most issues, preferences toward education governance are highly contested between individuals of different ideological orientations and partisan constituencies. Conflicting preferences at the individual level reflect the oftentimes high degree of partisan conflict on many reform issues in the governance of education.
What causes stark differences in living standards between subnational units? What can countries do to lessen such variations? This article argues that there is an aspect of national policy frameworks that impacts subnational provision of social services: the sensitivity of policy to the particularities of place. Place-sensitive policies make adaptations to the way social services are organized and provided across a country, so that they are better equipped to deal with the different characteristics of places and better support their well-being. When policies are place-sensitive, subnational provision is facilitated in poor, rural, and marginal locations in a country. In contrast, place-blind policies employ a one-size-fits-all approach that excludes people in vulnerable areas and aggravates inequalities in social service provision and social outcomes. By studying the Colombian case, this article demonstrates that a key placeblind feature of its healthcare model disproportionately affects small localities.
Decentralization has triggered widespread use of the subnational comparative method in the study of Latin American politics. Simultaneously, it has created challenges for this method that deserve careful attention. While subnational governments after decentralization can often be treated as potentially autonomous policy jurisdictions, their autonomy is also subject to new constraints and incursions, which may limit scholars’ ability to treat them as relatively independent units. By taking stock of the vibrant literature that has emerged in recent years, this article explores three major challenges that complicate the use of the subnational comparative method. Two are vertical in nature: how to theorize national causes of subnational variation, and how the varied linkages between subnational governments and transnational actors can be conceptualized in work that compares subnational units. The third challenge is horizontal, referring to interactions between governments at the same subnational level that can either enhance or subvert autonomy.
Access to quality healthcare varies across the national territory inside Latin American countries, with some subnational units enjoying higher-quality care than others. Such territorial inequality is consequential, as residents of particular regions face shorter life spans and an increased risk of preventable disease. This article analyzes trajectories of territorial healthcare inequality across time in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. The data reveal a large decline in Brazil, a moderate decline in Mexico, and low levels of change followed by a moderate decline in Argentina. The article argues that two factors account for these distinct trajectories: the nature of the coalition that pushed health decentralization forward and the existence of mechanisms for central government oversight and management.
In some polities the exercise of political power is highly concentrated, and in others it is widely dispersed. In Chapter 11, we examine the effects of scale on power concentration, arguing that the degree of horizontal and vertical concentration of power in a polity is affected by the number of people residing within that polity. The larger the polity, the more fragmented its institutional design is likely to be. This is a function of (1) increased heterogeneity, which entails that larger communities are difficult to govern in a concentrated fashion, and (2) lower levels of trust, which call for institutional constraints on the center that cannot be easily overcome. To tackle this vast subject we adopt a variety of country-level indicators of power concentration including subnational regions, federalism, bicameralism, revenue decentralization, capital city size, and checks and balances. We also probe a variety of subnational indicators focused on variation across states and localities within the United States. Most of these analyses support the contention that scale is associated with deconcentrated power.
Since the beginning of the 1980s the five Nordic countries: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden have gone through a process of decentralization. This process has taken place at a different pace and according to slightly varying decentralization models, but in all five of the countries the reduction in capacity of psychiatric hospitals has leveled out, whereas the establishing of decentralized treatment functions are not yet sufficiently developed. Furthermore, all five countries focus on rehabilitation of the most severe mentally ill. Examples of different models from the Nordic countries are mentioned.