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Nouchi is studied from a formal point of view as hybrid or mixed speech. From a sociolinguistic point of view, it is seen as slang or youth language. Hybridity is interpreted as a symbol of the coming together of all the languages of Côte d’Ivoire, like a combination of all the ethnic groups of the nation itself. However, hybridity is mostly approached from a lexical point of view, wherein the authors attempt to analyse the heterogeneous lexicon of Nouchi. Regarding the lexicon, the big distinction with Ivorian French is the massive incorporation of words, or morphemes in the case of hybrid words, of the Niger–Congo languages of the Ivory Coast and others. The questions posed in this chapter are (1) whether Nouchi also employs hybridity in syntax, phonology or spelling; and (2) whether Ivorian French, which acts as the base language, is not already largely hybrid. My hypothesis is that a hybrid language like Nouchi emerges in a social context where the process of hybridisation has already begun by pooling various social resources to build a space welcoming diversity.
Thinkers who saw technological innovation as the way forward now had to accept that there could be no static utopia in the future: society would be in a continual state of change. There was an increased emphasis on thinking about the future rather than the past, since it was less clear that history offered a model by which future developments could be predicted. The hope of creating a planned society was replaced by the notion of the 'technological fix' that dealt with the often unanticipated by-products of innovations pioneered as beneficial. Futurology emerged as a discipline aimed at anticipating developments, although its efforts were often wide of the mark. Enthusiasts predicted a range of possible futures based on different technologies, some involving the move to a completely transhuman phase of life. Science fiction emerged as a genre providing commentary on these scenarios, often recognizing the potential disadvantages.
Paralleling the developments in evolutionary biology, cultural anthropologists abandoned the model in which modern Western culture was the goal of development, recognizing the diversity of cultures around the world. Archaeologists realized that different cultures had been shaped by different technological innovations. Thinkers from a range of backgrounds began to see social evolution in Darwinian terms, as a process driven by occasional innovations that were unpredictable on the basis of any general trend. H. G. Wells popularized a view of history on similar foundations, openly acknowledging the parallel with Darwinism. He and others suggested that the linkage of science and invention that had occurred in the West and led to its dominance was an example of such an unanticipated breakthrough. Counterfactual histories imagined worlds in which the key transformations had come out differently. It was now recognized that the ongoing flood of new technologies was transforming society at an accelerating rate, making it hard to predict the course of future progress.
Cultural diversity is disappearing quickly. Whilst a phylogenetic approach makes explicit the continuous extinction of cultures, and the generation of new ones, cultural evolutionary changes such as the rise of agriculture or more recently colonisation can cause periods of mass cultural extinction. At the current rate, 90% of languages will become extinct or moribund by the end of this century. Unlike biological extinction, cultural extinction does not necessarily involve genetic extinction or even deaths, but results from the disintegration of a social entity and discontinuation of culture-specific behaviours. Here we propose an analytical framework to examine the phenomenon of cultural extinction. When examined over millennia, extinctions of cultural traits or institutions can be studied in a phylogenetic comparative framework that incorporates archaeological data on ancestral states. Over decades or centuries, cultural extinction can be studied in a behavioural ecology framework to investigate how the fitness consequences of cultural behaviours and population dynamics shift individual behaviours away from the traditional norms. Frequency-dependent costs and benefits are key to understanding both the origin and the loss of cultural diversity. We review recent evolutionary studies that have informed cultural extinction processes and discuss avenues of future studies.
This article examines the path of global constitutionalism and its encounter with cultural diversity in Africa. It situates the phenomenon of global constitutionalism in the late nineteenth century and traces some of its tectonic transformations since the inauguration of the liberal international order. Besides referring to the processes of and calls for the constitutionalization of the international legal regime and the emergence of global constitutional law, global constitutionalism played a constitutive role for constitutionalism in Africa. As constitutionalism in Africa is configured within a biosphere of global constitutionalism and cultural diversity, their dynamic interplay leads to the emergence of jurisgenerative constitutionalism, which is procedurally and normatively open to accommodate a plural conception of rights, justice and values. As a result, what is constitutionally permissible and what is not cannot simply be determined by an attachment to either global constitutionalism or cultural diversity. Rather, it is the interaction of global constitutionalism and cultural diversity in time and place that dictates what the constitutional practice or outcome should look like. By taking the women’s rights jurisprudence related to customary and Islamic laws and the phenomenon of Shariacracy as themes of analysis, and Nigeria as a case study, this article explores how the emergence of jurisgenerative constitutionalism mediates global constitutionalism and cultural diversity in Africa. By bringing in the African experience, the article sheds some light on the range of theoretical and practical possibilities available to the emerging field of global constitutionalism.
This article deals with the question of whether regional cultural competence centers foster the diversity of cultural expressions and how the objectives of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) Convention on Cultural Diversity are implemented. By introducing the Convention on Cultural Diversity, the conditions of regional cultural policy governance, and the idea of regional cultural competence centers, a framework for evaluation is outlined. The evaluation of four regional cultural competence centers in the Swiss Central Region shows that fostering cultural diversity is complex and has many different approaches and effects. The final discussion concludes that principles such as “interculturality,” “freedom,” and “access for all” under the Convention on Cultural Diversity can promote a diversity of cultural expressions but that these criteria have to be set from outside—for example, by public funding institutions—so that regional actors implement them.
In this epilogue, we reflect on the prospects for advancing interdisciplinarity in the sciences of culture, mind, and brain. Neuroscience is increasingly applied to address questions of central concern to the social sciences. Social sciences, in turn, can contribute to neuroscience research in a variety of ways, including: (1) the study of social factors that influence the brain across the lifespan; (2) the context-sensitive translation of neuroscience research into applications in clinical and other social settings; (3) critical social analyses of cultural, conceptual, and institutional framing and constraints on neuroscience research, knowledge production, and applications; and (4) integration of each of these approaches in an ecosocial view of the brain in its social-cultural niche. Obstacles to interdisciplinarity stem from institutional structures, methodological strategies, epistemic commitments, and divergent ontologies. We describe strategies to surmount these obstacles, including: (1) institutionally, creating spaces for collaborative work, supporting interdisciplinary career tracks, and ensuring sustained funding; (2) conceptually, borrowing models and metaphors across disciplines, establishing boundary objects of common interest, using system diagrams to locate diverse levels and processes in the same model; and (3) methodologically, establishing convergent validity through mixed and hybrid methods, and creating shared databases and pipelines to facilitate integration of multiple perspectives.
Jürgen Bolten explores intercultural competence as a form of general ‘action competence’, which is implemented in intercultural, i.e. uncertain contexts. In the context of increasing social mobility at nearly all levels and in most professions, intercultural competence is highlighted as more relevant today than ever before. However, that relevance correlates with a ‘rethinking’ of the concept, within which intercultural competence research has to expand its own horizons by integrating the hitherto still dominant focus on national cultural diversity into the much more complex field of micro-cultural diversity.
This chapter explores the emergence of black and Asian British writing as it began to become institutionalised: in school curricula, universities and higher education, as well as on the lists of educational and mainstream publishing houses. Examining the material conditions impacting on the recognition of this writing across Britain’s arts and educational cultures, it focuses on the second half of the twentieth century, especially the turbulent political period from the late 1970s onwards, to the present day. Though evidence of this history remains uneven, it is important to view the institutionalisation alongside specific political, cultural, and material contexts, in particular the policies of anti-racism, multiculturalism, and cultural diversity as well as government-driven enquiries like the crucial investigation into structural racial inequalities following the Stephen Lawrence murder in the 1999 Macpherson Report. Examining the political and educational initiatives behind arts funding, the chapter highlights how the growing interest in postcolonial studies since the 1990s has also created a wider market for black and Asian British writing, both for publishers and on university courses.
This chapter concludes Culture and Order in World Politics. It summarizes the book’s central claims, and it considers two implications. It begins by explaining the contribution that the book can make beyond the discipline of international relations, and what it offers for the fields of anthropology, sociology, history, and law, in particular. It then considers the implications of the book’s argument for thinking about contemporary problems of international order.
Using the international recognition of Israel and Pakistan as case studies, the chapter probes the terms of recognizability in the modern liberal order, asking how religion became a recognizable criterion for sovereign statehood. It digs below the workings of the post-1945 diversity regime, arguing that, epistemologically, religion came to be knowable within the dominant frame of ‘nation’, but in the process it would become increasingly hollowed out and emptied of content, while simultaneously be tied to the thick, essential idea of collective belonging. Viewing the recognitions of Israel and Pakistan in the contexts of their imperial pasts, and analysing the two international commissions that shaped their statehood, the chapter shows how emerging modes of cultural recognition built on and sedimented very particular versions of 'religion' and funnelled certain aspects of social, political, and cultural life into coherent, representable, and recognizable forms of religious difference. By looking in detail at the epistemological politics of cultural diversity, the chapter exposes the costs that come with the diversity regimes’ recognition of cultural difference.
The liberal international order of states has engendered a global order of transnational and supranational agents, institutions, and practices, generating a nascent global polity. This polity is animated by social purposes, including peace and security, economic growth, global health, and the rights and well-being of individuals. It also champions a distinctive diversity regime, centred on the moral primacy of the individual. Focusing on six components of the emerging global polity, the chapter describes both the institutional lineaments and the cultural core of the global polity-in-formation, including its distinctive diversity regime. Ethnic, religious, and other forms of cultural difference are legitimated, but only so long as they do not compromise the fundamental equality and autonomy of the persons who stand as global citizens. The global polity is also in fundamental tension with the liberal order, ultimately challenging basic principles of the nation state: sovereignty, citizenship rights, and national boundaries.
This chapter explores how liberal internationalism, the order’s animating 'regime of thought and action', has addressed the question of cultural diversity. It argues that liberal internationalism evinces no simple or singular theory about cultural diversity, and that since the nineteenth century four different approaches are apparent, combining, at distinct moments in time, to form what we see here as distinctive liberal diversity regimes. These approaches are to build a liberal order on the pluralism of Westphalian sovereignty; to confine issues of culture within domestic civil societies; to foster ideas of modernization that would in time erase global cultural differences; and to construct institutions of 'exclusion,' manifest in political hierarchies and, at the extreme, formal empire. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, civilizational and racial prejudices informed how these approaches were interwoven, but by the end of the Cold War these had been replaced with more universalistic conceptions of human rights, multiculturalism, and civic nationalism. It was at this very moment, however, that the now-globalized liberal international order revealed its limits.
Discriminating between alternative cultural forms, when for example, determining the conditions under which international legal subjectivity is recognized to some human groupings – states – but not to others – indigenous peoples – international law structures cultural diversity. Structuring cultural diversity in the international order, international law, however, does not operate in a cultural vacuum. Its own social institutions discipline diversity in international legal thought and practice, structuring international legal culture. This chapter explores the use of ideas and images about universality and about Western particularity in international legal argumentation to show the multiplicity of conflicting and heterogeneous meanings and practices that constitute international legal culture.
UNESCO’s world heritage regime was founded in 1972 to identify and protect cultural and natural sites of 'outstanding universal value,' which constitute humanity’s common heritage. The identification and proper valuation of these sites, it was hoped, would interpellate a common humanity and foster identification with this humanity, thereby contributing to peaceful global relations. This chapter argues that the world heritage regime is a diversity regime that curates the world’s cultural diversity as part of world order-making. In turn, the changes in the world order since the regime’s establishment have resulted in challenges to the regime’s governance of culture based on a universal value and through scientific-technical evaluation by international experts. These challenges have resulted in increased resistance to international experts, the demand for the inclusion of local experts, and in two (competing) conceptions of credibility as scientific-technical adjudication and as representativity.
This chapter draws attention to the centrality of gender in liberal cultural diversity regimes. It shows that the construction of nations and other cultural groups centrally relies on gender: by helping to generate a sense of familiarity among national/cultural strangers; by serving as a means by which cultural boundaries are drawn between the national/cultural Self and foreign Others; and by assigning women the primary role in the intergenerational transmission of national or ethnic culture. The chapter then challenges claims about a major cultural cleavage on gender equality between 'the West' and 'Islam' by drawing attention to the rise of a transnational constellation of self-identified Western actors that mobilize against gender equality in the name of 'Western' or 'European' civilization. Gender has undeniably become central in mobilizing actors against liberalism. The chapter helps illustrate the editors’ argument that diversity regimes always create social hierarchies, in this case gender hierarchy.
This chapter sets out the central argument of Culture and Order in World Politics. It provides definitions of cultural diversity and international order, and makes the case for an expansive conception of the latter. It then revisits four key propositions from Reus-Smit’s On Cultural Diversity (2018), on which this volume builds. It goes on to detail four elaborations of these propositions, informed by the analyses provided in contributors’ chapters. These concern the productive power of diversity regimes, the connection between cultural diversity and legitimacy crises, the complex relationship between political centralization and intolerance, and the plural and multiscalar nature of diversity regimes.
The chapter examines the relationship between cultural diversity and the institutions of international society. It is concerned with the the impact of cultural diversity on the institutions of international society, with the capacity of those institutions to allow cultural diversity to play out in the least disruptive manner possible, and with finding space for the promotion of just claims for cultural recognition. It suggests, firstly, that the institutions of the supposedly pluralist international society have never provided a religiously and culturally neutral set of institutions able to mediate claims of difference and conflicting values. Second, the chapter questions the traditional pluralist emphasis on the nation-state, highlighting the hybrid character of the dominant units, and shows how empires instituted empire-specific diversity regimes that were subsequently disrupted by geopolitical conflict and competition. Finally, it explores the tensions between the deepening of global governance on the one hand and the more recent reassertion of demands for harder sovereignty, often as an explicit container for cultural or civilizational difference.
Conflicting narratives exist about Ottoman cultural practices. On the one hand, the Empire is lauded for its tolerance of cultural difference, with the famed ‘millet system’ upheld as a model of institutionalized cultural recognition. This sits side by side, however, with another view, of an order ruled by repressive Islamists. This chapter observes that widely different interpretations of Ottoman attitudes to diversity are possible because the empire was not static in this regard over the course of its more than six-hundred-year-old history. As with the modern international order, Ottoman history is marked by successive diversity regimes, in which a generally ‘latitudinarian’ approach to the management of diversity was punctuated by notable periods of cultural closure and repression. The chapter focuses on two such periods in the ‘long’ sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. In both periods, the shift to greater cultural intolerance and repression was propelled by institutional trends towards greater state centralization, interpolity completion involving external actors with ties to internal groups, and a governing (or legitimating) ideology viewing heterogeneity as a threat. In the sixteenth century it was heterodox Muslim communities that were targeted, with the empire thoroughly 'Sunnitised'. In the nineteenth century, by contrast, it was non-Muslim communities that bore the brunt of oppression, culminating most notably in the Armenian genocide of 1915.
This chapter introduces the book, Culture and Order in World Politics. After explaining the problems with current perspectives on cultural diversity and international order, it stresses the importance of interdisciplinary dialogue, and the book’s ambition to move debate forward through an engagement between international relations, anthropology, sociology, history, and international law. It summarizes the main arguments of the book, explains its organization, and overviews the contributions of the contributors’ chapters.