Chapter 4 examines how the direct linguistic environment of a lexeme affects its interpretation. In keeping with the constructionist approach, this means looking into the interaction between lexemes and the various types of constructions in which they are found. First, examples of coercion are considered. Though semantically triggered, it is argued that such examples are pragmatically resolved and do not require a process distinct from lexically regulated saturation (Leclercq, 2019). The pragmatic roots of coercion are related to the “procedural function” of the “grammatical constructions” involved, two concepts whose definitions are carefully reviewed. It is argued that grammatical constructions serve only to assist the interpretation process. Second, attention is given to more idiomatic constructions in which lexemes are also found. The interpretation of these constructions is said to follow from a parallel, context-sensitive process guided by considerations of relevance that may suspend lexically regulated saturation. Overall, Chapter 4 sheds light on the complex ways in which lexical meaning comes about.

We focus on exogenous and unanticipated shocks, negative or positive, to the supply of any of the four main crucial factors of production: land, labor, physical capital, and human capital. Among the causes of such shocks are plagues, wars, migrations, and new technologies. Supply shocks matter politically because they threaten a sudden change in factors’ relative returns: a loss of labor, absent intervention, raises wages but lowers returns to land and capital; an infusion of human capital lowers skill premia but raises wages and the rents of land and physical capital. Owners of adversely affected factors will attempt to adjust, usually in one of three (increasingly costly) ways: through factor substitution, exit to another sector or region, or adoption of a factor-saving technology. (Hence innovation is usually endogenous but sometimes, by overshooting, can itself occasion a supply shock.) Only where none of these options avail will they resort to the (usually) costliest option of coercion: enslaving labor, seizing land, conscripting capital. What determines how a society adapts, or whether it does so at all, are such objective factors as soil, climate, and proximity to markets.

Should there be a right not to be manipulated? What kind of right? On Kantian grounds, manipulation, lies, and paternalistic coercion are moral wrongs, and for similar reasons; they deprive people of agency, insult their dignity, and fail to respect personal autonomy. On welfarist grounds, manipulation, lies, and paternalistic coercion share a different characteristic; they displace the choices of those whose lives are directly at stake, and who are likely to have epistemic advantages, with the choices of outsiders, who are likely to lack critical information. Kantians and welfarists should be prepared to endorse a (moral) right not to be manipulated, though on very different grounds. The moral prohibition on manipulation, like the moral prohibition on lies, should run against officials and regulators, not only against private institutions. At the same time, the creation of a legal right not to be manipulated raises hard questions, in part because of definitional challenges; there is a serious risk of vagueness and a serious risk of overbreadth. (Lies, as such, are not against the law, and the same is true of unkindness, inconsiderateness, and even cruelty.) With welfarist considerations in mind, it is probably best to start by prohibiting particular practices, while emphasizing that they are forms of manipulation and may not count as fraud. The basic goal should be to build on the claim that in certain cases, manipulation is a form of theft; the law should forbid theft, whether it occurs through force, lies, or manipulation. Some manipulators are thieves.

In the previous chapter, we examined the notion of capacity and legal personality under the Qatari civil and commercial law. In general, article 108 CC conflates capacity and consent by stating that consent (to contract) is only valid in respect of entities that possess capacity under the law. Overall, the law distinguishes between persons with full legal capacity and those with partial or no legal capacity. Persons with limited capacity may contract through a guardian and in limited circumstances not involving a significant financial commitment they are free to contract without guardianship. Entities with full capacity may freely contract in their person.

Chapter 3 summarizes existing theories of election-related violence and introduces a theory of violence as a result of elite misperception. Existing theories rely upon the assumption that politicians choice of violence as an electoral tactic is based on an accurate assessment its relative costs and benefits. The theory of elite misperception, on the other hand, builds on two insights: (1) that voter backlash against violence is substantial and can cost politicians votes and (2) politicians frequently misjudge voter preferences – including with respect to violence – which can lead them to overestimate its benefits as an electoral tactic. The theory points to the difficulties politicians face in accurately assessing the impact of electoral tactics, as well as to the prevalence of cognitive biases that can cause them to misinterpret what information they have. It also highlights the importance of founding elections in determining which electoral tactics – violence included – are considered effective and worthy of emulation. With these insights in mind, the theory explains the incidence and persistence of election-related violence as a result of politicians misperceptions about voter preferences and the effects of violence on voting rather than the objective electoral benefits that violence provides.

Volume 1 of The Cambridge History of Global Migrations documents the lives and experiences of everyday people through the lens of human movement and mobility from 1400 to 1800. Focusing on the most important typologies of preindustrial global migrations, this volume reveals how these movements transformed global paths of mobility, the impacts of which we still see in societies today. Case studies include those that arose from the demand for free, forced, and unfree labor, long- and short-distance trade, rural/urban displacement, religious mobility, and the rise of the number of refugees worldwide. With thirty chapters from leading experts in the field, this authoritative volume is an essential and detailed study of how migration shaped the nature of global human interactions before the age of modern globalization.

Chapter 4 evaluates the overall relationship between violence and election outcomes, finding that violence provides no benefit, on average, to the parties that use it. In some cases, it may even undermine the candidacies of the politicians associated with it. In particular, an analysis of the relationship between the incidence of violence prior to elections in Kenyas first two multiparty elections in the 1990s and constituency-level election outcomes for the ruling KANU party (the primary instigator of the violence) finds no relationship between the incidence of violence and KANU vote share or the likelihood that their parliamentary candidates won election. Second, an analysis of the subsequent electoral performance of candidates allegedly involved in the large outbreak of violence in 2007/08 finds that these candidates lost their reelection bids at a much higher rate than the average incumbent. Several lost in rather unusual ways, including by losing their party primaries, losing to minority ethnic group candidates, or losing the general election after securing the nomination of the locally dominant party.

This chapter analyzes the effects of violence – via coercion and persuasion – on voting. Existing research provides some evidence that violence can be used to prevent voters from turning out to vote. However, an analysis of the relationship between violence and turnout in Kenyan elections in the 1990s finds no relationship between violence on the one hand, and the aggregate level of voter registration or turnout on the other, suggesting that the relationship between violence, turn-out and electoral geography may be less straightforward than previously thought. On persuasion, the analysis finds consistent evidence of a large and broad-based voter backlash against violence, including among the coethnic voters that politicians rely on to win elections. Furthermore, while antagonistic ethnic rhetoric does appear to increase the likelihood of violence breaking out, it is not a useful strategy for mobilizing coethnic support. These results suggest that voter backlash against violence and violent rhetoric may undermine the efficacy of violence as an electoral tactic, and they help explain why violence is not associated with better outcomes for candidates in real elections.

Whether patriotism has a valuable part to play in the educational system of a democratic society is now a highly contentious matter. This chapter argues that it does, principally because such a society is a kind of cooperative practice that requires its members to enact, enforce, and – in most cases – obey the laws that govern their self-governing polity. Democracies rely on rules, and especially the rule of law, to provide the reasonably clear expectations necessary to coordinate public activities and to overcome collective-action problems. By encouraging citizens to set aside personal advantage and play a cooperative part in democratic life, patriotism contributes to the public spirit essential to democracy. For that reason, promoting patriotic attitudes is a worthy aim of democratic education.

Although the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties devotes nine articles to invalidity of treaties, cases rarely arise in practice. Circumstances covered by the Convention include violation of internal law, error, fraud, corruption, coercion and violation of a peremptory norm of international law (jus cogens). Article 46 of the Convention covers the first of these, providing that a state may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound has been expressed in violation of its internal law unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of fundamental importance. The chapter examines the meaning of the key terms of this provision and possible cases in which this might arise. In the context of coercion, the chapter looks at treaties which might be concluded by the threat or use of force, peace treaties and unequal treaties. The scope of peremptory norms (jus cogens) is also discussed, together with the consequences of invalidity.

Chapter 4 considers power as essential to understanding who is legally liable and who is socially and politically responsible, for addressing historical-structural injustices. The chapter outlines competing conceptions of power, preferring and applying political scientist Mark Haugaard’s four-dimensional conception of power to address the complexities of historical-structural injustices, namely power as agency, structure, epistemic, and ontological power. The chapter then examines the role of national and religious myths as justification narratives that maintain existing distributions and structures of power and construct limitations in addressing the past in transitional justice. As a result, it argues that changes in the distribution of power are central to addressing historical-structural injustices, which have coalesced to form national and religious myths that support the existing distributions of power and modern national and religious identities.