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Chapter 5 opens for Part II of the book with the task of taxonomy, classifying the emergent post-crisis EU fiscal architecture from the perspective of fiscal federalism theory in order to determine what it demands from the EU legal order to ‘work’. Chapter 5 finds that, from the perspective of fiscal federalism theory, the EU has sunk the cornerstones of a highly centralized model of ‘proto-fiscal union’ that is far more apt to unitary states than any of the other federations touched upon in this book. At its core, the new model supplants a legal pillar of fiscal sovereignty and market discipline (an entrenched ‘no-bailout’ law) with a legal feature of unitary states: centralized financial assistance and legal governance of fiscal policy. Chapter 5 evaluates the demands this places on the European legal order, and provides directions for the remainder of the analysis of Part II.
Hamit Bozarslan, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris,Cengiz Gunes, The Open University, Milton Keynes,Veli Yadirgi, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London
This chapter argues that one of the longest-surviving forms of local, indirect administration that actually predated the Ottomans were the Kurdish emirates. In most parts of the empire, the Ottomans, like the European governments, for example, relied on a system of indirect rule whereby the local magnates recognized the ruler’s suzerainty. The rise of the modern state and the expansion of its institutions diminished the need for what might be called a symbiotic relationship between the imperial centre and the peripheral power-holders like the Kurdish aristocracy. This practice of ending local autonomies, whereby central states abandoned their ‘confederal organization’ during widespread civil wars, allowed them to replace decentralized structures of politics with administratively and territorially cohesive regimes (Maier, 2006: 43). In Ottoman Kurdistan, the process of centralization and replacing the indirect rule of the Kurdish aristocracy with the direct rule of the government appointees was made possible by a parallel development: the making of the Ottoman-Iranian boundaries and the permanent division of Kurdistan that has been evolving for quite some time. The elimination of Kurdish dynasts, who hitherto held power at the borderland, facilitated the making of the boundary even as the making of the boundary facilitated their elimination.
This chapter traces the formation of the first imperial polities on Chinese soil — the Qin and Han dynasties. It starts with the exploration of how the disintegration of the Zhou dynasty (c.1046–255 BCE) triggered the quest for political unity of “All-under-Heaven” as the only means of stemming the ongoing bloodshed and turmoil. This common quest legitimated the unified empire with universalistic pretensions generations before the real unification occurred (in 221 BCE). The first imperial polity, Qin, was highly centralized and committed to territorial expansion. It turned out, however, that this model was unsustainable in the long term. The subsequent Han dynasty experimented with various degrees of expansion and retrenchment, in the process of which a new modus vivendi was reached: the universal superiority of China’s emperor had to be maintained primarily on a symbolic level, whereas in practice, the “inner” and “outer” realm became fully delineated.
The Introduction to our volume starts by delineating changing attitudes towards the word “empire” in Western scholarship from the 20th to the 21st century. It then explains our concept of an empire as an entity with strongly pronounced aspirations to attain universal rule and with clear hegemonic position in its macro-region. We continue with a brief outline of the three waves of the empires’ formation in five Eurasian macro-regions (Near East, South Asia, Europe, East Asia, and the Inner Asian steppe belt). The second half of the Introduction deals with the factors that influenced spatial dimensions of Eurasian empires — from ideological and religious commitment to attaining universal rule to a variety of ecological, military, economic, and administrative considerations that prevented the empires’ leaders from realizing this goal. The multiplicity of these factors suffices to caution against any attempt to create a neat uniform scheme that would explain the empires’ expansion and contraction.
The great budgetary transformation of central Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union demonstrates the critical importance of economic context, political culture, history, and institutions in the recreation of public financial management systems. Since the collapse of the USSR, countries in this region have served as fiscal laboratories that experiment with budgetary reforms. This includes countries like Hungary and Poland that joined the European Union.
Latin America has stignificantly improved its budgetary effectiveness during the past thirty years, despite a widespread variation in political, demographic, and income levels. Bureaucratic authoritarian regimes have evolved into contribute to public finance stabilization. Significant problems remain in the financing of such basic services as education and health care. Expenditure control weakenesses remain at the managerial and operational levels of government.
This is the main theory chapter. It develops a new typology of public service reforms: vertical dimension of centralization and horizontal dimension of public versus mixed governance. The chapter analyzes the preferences of different political parties and the Church, and it sets out the methodology and chapter structure.
The local party-state has always been a major source of extrajudicial influence in China. Drawing on interviews with judges, this article examines the impact of Xi Jinping's ambitious judicial centralization reforms, which are aimed at enhancing judicial autonomy by transferring authority over local court personnel and finances from local to provincial level. It finds that the reforms have achieved limited results. Although many appointment and budgetary powers were formally transferred to the provincial level, the local party-state retains considerable influence in both areas owing to its superior manpower, local knowledge and, in the case of developed regions, financial resources. Moreover, the local party-state maintains significant informal influence over the courts, which require many forms of discretionary assistance from various state organs – ranging from appropriating land for new courthouses to providing police protection for remote tribunals – in order to function. This setback highlights the depth and complexity of the courts’ political and economic embeddedness and serves as a reminder of the inherent difficulty of institutionalizing judicial autonomy, however limited, in a large and diverse party-state.
In some polities the exercise of political power is highly concentrated, and in others it is widely dispersed. In Chapter 11, we examine the effects of scale on power concentration, arguing that the degree of horizontal and vertical concentration of power in a polity is affected by the number of people residing within that polity. The larger the polity, the more fragmented its institutional design is likely to be. This is a function of (1) increased heterogeneity, which entails that larger communities are difficult to govern in a concentrated fashion, and (2) lower levels of trust, which call for institutional constraints on the center that cannot be easily overcome. To tackle this vast subject we adopt a variety of country-level indicators of power concentration including subnational regions, federalism, bicameralism, revenue decentralization, capital city size, and checks and balances. We also probe a variety of subnational indicators focused on variation across states and localities within the United States. Most of these analyses support the contention that scale is associated with deconcentrated power.
Hierarchization is a deliberate process to create a vertically nested governance architecture where actors and institutions in a lower rank are bound or otherwise compelled to obey, respond to or contribute to higher-order norms and objectives. Drawing on this definition, we review recent research on hierarchization in earth system governance and the political and legal processes that establish, maintain and legitimize it. Here we present three mutually non-exclusive forms of hierarchization – systematization, centralization and prioritization. Each involves different actors and rationales, mechanisms and strategies, while achieving different purposes with varying governance outcomes. We illustrate our argument with empirical examples including the proposed Global Pact for the Environment, the proposal to establish a world environment organization and the Sustainable Development Goals. We conclude with an assessment of the benefits and drawbacks of hierarchization as an approach to some of the challenges inherent in earth system governance, and offer suggestions for future research.
"Theories of niche construction and near-decomposability, which correspond to competition and decentralization in economic parlance, illuminate how respective networks of authority served parochial purposes, with motivations related to specific challenges: in China, to rule a large territory, and in Europe, to enhance the competitive power of small states in a fragmented landscape. A shift toward outward expansion made European elites less parochial and resulted in an explosive wave of innovation. China’s centralized network enabled periods of unmatched stability and prosperity; but the merit-based bureaucracy stifled innovation, preventing the rise of a merchant class, an independent private sector, and outward expansion, all of which were associated with Europe’s industrialization. China’s inward gaze ensured the paramount political power of bureaucratic elites, resulting in systemic corruption that grew extensively over time, impoverishing the peasantry and causing rebellions, chaos, and conflict – a process that repeated itself throughout China’s history.
RJ demonstrates how the IRI instrumentalized rural development to consolidate power at home and project influence abroad. This book serves as a corrective and supplement to scholarly works that focus on the IRI’s consolidation and resilience mostly, if not entirely, in terms of repression, particularly in urban areas. Strategically and ideationally, RJ served as a soft-power mechanism that helped the IRI further bring provinces and villages into the political, economic, and sociocultural fold, and expand the state’s footprint in other parts of the Muslim and developing world. RJ’s organizational trajectory mirrored the IRI’s broader evolution during the last four decades. RJ sheds light on four important aspects of the IRI: first, the political and social changes and continuities that have transpired in Iran before the revolution until today; second, the ambiguity and reciprocity of the IRI’s state-society relations, and the agency or ability of its revolutionary activists to not simply follow and support leaders and officials, but also to influence and challenge them; third, the processes and outcomes behind the IRI’s centralization, consolidation, and state-building; and fourth and finally, the merits and shortcomings of the IRI’s bureaucratic institutionalization, and the opportunities and constraints of its associational life.
Chapter 5 “Disillusionment and Mobility (1983–2001)” argues that rational-legal administration did not exhaust the list of mezzo or organizational outcomes that resulted from RJ’s institutionalization. RJ’s rational-legal administration encountered six limitations that exposed and exacerbated the organization’s preexisting deficiencies, the IRI’s structural shortcomings, the shah’s neo-patrimonial legacies, and bureaucracy’s inherent flaws. These limitations included heightened centralization, intensified careerism, parliamentary entanglements, emerging corporatization, persistent redundancies, and dual executives. On a micro or individual level, these limitations and the inefficiency and stagnancy that they created caused some former RJ members to experience fatigue, apathy, and disillusionment. At the same time, RJ’s bureaucratization enabled other former members, particularly those who had lobbied for the organization to become a ministry, to experience political and social mobility as government officials, civil servants, and corporate executives – the very individuals whom former RJ members had initially despised as revolutionary activists in light of their anti-bureaucratic and anti-materialistic worldview.
Conflicting narratives exist about Ottoman cultural practices. On the one hand, the Empire is lauded for its tolerance of cultural difference, with the famed ‘millet system’ upheld as a model of institutionalized cultural recognition. This sits side by side, however, with another view, of an order ruled by repressive Islamists. This chapter observes that widely different interpretations of Ottoman attitudes to diversity are possible because the empire was not static in this regard over the course of its more than six-hundred-year-old history. As with the modern international order, Ottoman history is marked by successive diversity regimes, in which a generally ‘latitudinarian’ approach to the management of diversity was punctuated by notable periods of cultural closure and repression. The chapter focuses on two such periods in the ‘long’ sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. In both periods, the shift to greater cultural intolerance and repression was propelled by institutional trends towards greater state centralization, interpolity completion involving external actors with ties to internal groups, and a governing (or legitimating) ideology viewing heterogeneity as a threat. In the sixteenth century it was heterodox Muslim communities that were targeted, with the empire thoroughly 'Sunnitised'. In the nineteenth century, by contrast, it was non-Muslim communities that bore the brunt of oppression, culminating most notably in the Armenian genocide of 1915.
Significant variation in the institutions and efficiency of public bureaucracies across countries and regions are observed. These differences could be partially responsible for divergence in the effectiveness of policy implementation, corruption levels, and economic development. Do imperial legacies contribute to the observed variation in the organization of public administrations? Historical foreign rule and colonization have been shown to have lasting effects on legal systems, political institutions, and trade in former controlled territories. Imperial legacies could also explain variations in the performance of public administrations. The author uses the case of Poland to investigate the long-term effects of foreign rule on bureaucratic systems. Historically, Poland was split between three imperial powers with very different public administrations: Prussia, Austria, and Russia. Statistical analyses of original data collected through a survey of more than 650 Polish public administrations suggest that some present-day differences in the organization and efficiency of bureaucracies are due to imperial legacies.
Calls for a return to a traditional method of lawmaking known as “regular order” have proliferated as unorthodox lawmaking has grown more dominant in Congress. Proponents claim regular order enhances deliberation on legislation. This chapter examines deliberation under one form of regular order: open rules permitting unlimited amending in the House of Representatives. We find evidence of substantial minority influence on the inputs and outputs of the appropriations process. Regular order gives the minority party members the opportunity to present and win adoption of their policy proposals. Our evidence also shows that ideological extremists play an outsized role in debate. They offer more amendments than other members, and their amendments tend to win less support and face defeat more often than moderates. The paradox of regular order is that it simultaneously offers the opportunity for bipartisan deliberation over legislation while exposing the majority party to problems that may make its management of the floor more difficult.
Danish energy policy has reached a phase where the effects of the paradigmatic change from stored fossil fuels to very large shares of fluctuating renewable energy requires fundamentally new technical, political and economic solutions. Two archetypal technical scenarios are the locally and regionally integrated Smart Energy System scenario and a centralized export/import transmission line scenario. In analyzing the competition between these scenarios we applied a social anthropological method of GOING CLOSE to the situation of the actors and the ecological, technological and institutional context. We concluded that a smart energy scenario that can integrate large amounts of fluctuating wind power is optimal, but that the transmission line scenario has the politically strongest supporters and consequently, an advantage for being implemented. With respect to institutional factors, our conclusion is that if a country should be able to change its path against the will of politically strong actors, it is a must to have innovative democracy where the parliament, educational institutions and other institutions are independent of these political actors. In the present phase of the transition to 100% renewable energy we recommend concrete and specific institutional changes both at the EU and national levels.
Scholars and observers worry that Congress has lost its capacity to perform its functions in the American political system. Drawing on an array of data on Congress’s activities and processes along with in-depth interviews with long-serving lawmakers and high-level staffers, we take stock of how changes to internal processes have affected Congress’s institutional capacities. In doing so, we make two interrelated arguments. First, we argue that Congress can take transformative action whether the legislative process is centralized and leadership-led or whether it is decentralized and committee-led. Second, we argue that Congress is better able than in previous eras to engage in conflict-clarifying representation in order to express and educate the public on the positions of the parties. We conclude that changes to congressional processes in recent years should be viewed as adaptations to the challenges of contemporary lawmaking. These adaptations help preserve Congress’s institutional capacity, but they have undoubtedly had negative consequences for open deliberation and individual member input into legislation.
In this chapter, we discuss the evolution of the field of ‘ethics of nuclear energy’, regarding its past, present and future. We will first review the history of this field in the previous four decades, focusing on new and emerging challenges of nuclear energy production and waste disposal, in light of several important developments. Four of the most pressing ethical challenges will be further reviewed in the chapter. First, what is a morally ‘acceptable’ nuclear energy production method, if we consider the existing and possible new technologies? Second, provided a new tendency to consider nuclear waste disposal with several countries, what would be the new ethical and governance challenges of these multinational collaborations? Third, how should we deal with the (safety) challenges of the new geographic distribution of nuclear energy, tilting towards emerging economies with less experience with nuclear technology? Fourth, nuclear energy projects engender highly emotional controversies. Neither ignoring the emotions of the public nor taking them as a reason to prohibit or restrict a technology – we call them technocratic populist pitfalls respectively – seem to be able to guide responsible policy making.
This article investigates the role of colonial pressure on state centralization and its relationship to subsequent development by analyzing the influence of Western colonial threats on Siam’s internal political reform. Unlike other countries in the region, Siam remained independent by adopting geographical administrative boundaries and incorporating its traditional governance structures into a new, centralized governance system. The authors find that the order in which areas were integrated into the centralized system depended on the interaction between precentralization political structures and proximity to British and French territorial claims. The authors show that areas centralized early in the process had higher levels of infrastructure investment and public goods provision at the time the centralization process was completed in 1915 than those centralized later in the process. They also show that early centralization during the Western colonial era continued to be strongly associated with higher levels of public goods provision and economic development, and that this relationship persists today.