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This chapter provides one of the first accounts of Cavendish’s theory of the passions in her later works of natural philosophy, mainly the Philosophical and Physical Opinions (1663) and her Grounds of Natural Philosophy (1668). We argue that reading Cavendish’s philosophy in light of a Stoic-inspired model of causation highlights what is most original and distinctive about her theory of the passions. We analyze Cavendish’s ideas against the backdrop of her theories of occasional and principal causes, and highlight significant differences between Cavendish’s philosophy and the then-popular Cartesian account of the passions. We also examine how her philosophical ideas are put into practice in her dramatic work, “The Unnatural Tragedy” (1662). We maintain that the dramatic genre enables Cavendish to demonstrate how sociable passions might be communicated through sympathy, and unsociable passions discouraged through antipathy. In light of both the theoretical and practical aspects of her philosophy, we conclude that Cavendish stands as a significant innovator among theorists of the passions in the mid-seventeenth century.
Negligence liability is a fairer way to allocate responsibility for accidental infringement of IP rights. The chapter considers and rebuts four arguments that seek to defend the morality of strict liability in IP: the causation argument, the property argument, the fault argument, and the reciprocity argument. Because owners and users bilaterally cause accidents, legal responsibility ought not to fall unilaterally on one party as a categorical matter.
French state liability is based on different rules and principles from French private law. There are two broad areas of liability: fault and no-fault. Fault liability is based principally on faute de service, the direct fault of the public service, not vicarious liability for the acts of state employees. Fault involves a failure to fulfil a mission, rather than moral culpability. It includes unlawful acts. No-fault liability includes liability for exceptional risks, assisting the public service and for bearing exceptional burdens for the public benefit. The chapter concludes by examining the way state liability is limited by the interpretation of causation and by the measure of damages. On the whole, categories of recognised harm are very broad.
Markus (2021) argues that the causal modelling frameworks of Pearl and Rubin are not ‘strongly equivalent’, in the sense of saying ‘the same thing in different ways’. Here I rebut Markus’ arguments against strong equivalence. The differences between the frameworks are best illuminated not by appeal to their causal semantics, but rather reflect pragmatic modelling choices.
This chapter shows that a lack of self-consciously literary excess in Kipling’s prose was sometimes mistaken for the absence of style. Yet there is a control in Kipling’s writing that a careful and sensitive reading can access. The chapter considers a particular habit of punctuation in Kipling: the use of a semicolon followed by a strictly superfluous ‘and’. This mark of punctuation advertises the writtenness of the prose and so signals the presence of a knowing narrator, whilst also raising questions about causation and consequence.
Stories are typically represented as a set of events and temporal or causal relations among events. In the metro map model of storylines, participants are represented as histories and events as interactions between participant histories. The metro map model calls for a decomposition of events into what each participant does (or what happens to each participant), as well as the interactions among participants. Such a decompositional model of events has been developed in linguistic semantics. Here, we describe this decompositional model of events and how it can be combined with a metro map model of storylines.
Stories are a pervasive phenomenon of human life. They also represent a cognitive tool to understand and make sense of the world and of its happenings. In this contribution we describe a narratology-based framework for modeling stories as a combination of different data structures and to automatically extract them from news articles. We introduce a distinction among three data structures (timelines, causelines, and storylines) that capture different narratological dimensions, respectively chronological ordering, causal connections, and plot structure. We developed the Circumstantial Event Ontology (CEO) for modeling (implicit) circumstantial relations as well as explicit causal relations and create two benchmark corpora: ECB+/CEO, for causelines, and the Event Storyline Corpus (ESC), for storylines. To test our framework and the difficulty in automatically extract causelines and storylines, we develop a series of reasonable baseline systems
A crucial aspect of understanding and reconstructing narratives is identifying the underlying causal chains, which explain why certain things happened and make a coherent story. To build such causal chains, we need to identify causal links between events in the story, which may be expressed explicitly as well as understood implicitly using commonsense knowledge.
This chapter reviews research efforts on the automated extraction of such event causality from natural language text. It starts with a brief review of existing causal models in psychology and psycholinguistics as a building block for understanding causation. These models are useful tools for guiding the annotation process to build corpora annotated with causal pairs. I then outline existing annotated resources, which are used to build and evaluate automated causality extraction systems. Furthermore, circumstantial events surrounding the causal complex are rarely expressed with language as they are part of common sense knowledge. Therefore, discovering causal common sense is also important to fill the gaps in the causal chains, and I discuss existing work in this line of research.
The impact of ‘bad’ science on judicial decision-making is a thorny aspect of the relationship between science and law. This study employs doctrinal and empirical analysis to explore two Italian judgments that asserted a causal link between childhood vaccines and autism. Using a combination of actor–network theory and legal pragmatism, we uncovered a network of actors and institutions internal and external to the legal system enabling these impactful decisions that went on to contribute to a crisis in vaccination coverage in Italy. These include trial strategies, resources, communication practices between arms of government, awareness and responsiveness of institutional actors, and institutional mechanisms governing the integration of scientific expertise into the legal process. By forensically analysing how a ‘zombie idea’ received a patent of legitimacy in the Italian context, this study provides useful lessons for legal systems grappling with complex and contested public health matters.
Substance (substantia, zelfstandigheid)’ is a key term of Spinoza’s philosophy. Like almost all of Spinoza’s philosophical vocabulary, Spinoza did not invent this term, which has a long history that can be traced back at least to Aristotle. Yet, Spinoza radicalized the traditional notion of substance and made a very powerful use of it by demonstrating – or at least attempting to demonstrate – that there is only one, unique substance – God (or Nature) – and that all other things are merely modes or states of God. In the first section, I examine Spinoza’s definitions of "substance" and "God" at the opening of the Ethics. In the second section, I study the properties of the fundamental binary relations pertaining to Spinoza’s substance: inherence, conception, and causation. The third section is dedicated to a clarification of Spinoza’s claim that God, the unique substance, is absolutely infinite. The fourth section studies the nature of Spinoza’s monism. It will discuss and criticize the interesting yet controversial views of Martial Gueroult, about the plurality of substances in the beginning of the Ethics and evaluate Spinoza’s kind of ontological monism. The fifth and final section explains the nature, reality, and manner of existence of modes.
Spinoza’s philosophy of mind has been subject to widely divergent interpretations. What explains this lack of consensus? The principal reason is that Spinoza’s notion of an attribute and its relation to his substance monism is poorly understood. This chapter begins by setting out some interpretative difficulties regarding Spinoza’s notion of an attribute in general. It will then explain Spinoza’s conception of the attributes of thought and extension in particular. Next, it will explain how Spinoza argues for the structural similarity of the mental and physical realms from his claim that the mind and the body are one and the same thing conceived under different attributes. This will require developing a new interpretation of Spinoza’s notion of attribute. This interpretation will both explain why his philosophy of mind has been subject to such contradictory interpretations as well as solve a host of interpretative difficulties that have long vexed commentators. The chapter will conclude by explaining how Spinoza’s denial of mind-body causal explanation is compatible with his assertion of mind-body identity.
Recent arguments concerning the nature of causation in evolutionary theory, now often known as the debate between the 'causalist' and 'statisticalist' positions, have involved answers to a variety of independent questions – definitions of key evolutionary concepts like natural selection, fitness, and genetic drift; causation in multi-level systems; or the nature of evolutionary explanations, among others. This Element offers a way to disentangle one set of these questions surrounding the causal structure of natural selection. Doing so allows us to clearly reconstruct the approach that some of these major competing interpretations of evolutionary theory have to this causal structure, highlighting particular features of philosophical interest within each. Further, those features concern problems not exclusive to the philosophy of biology. Connections between them and, in two case studies, contemporary metaphysics and philosophy of physics demonstrate the potential value of broader collaboration in the understanding of evolution.
One classical version of cosmological argument, defended famously by Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, deduces the existence of a First Cause from the existence of a particular sort of causal series: one that is ‘essentially ordered’. This argument has received renewed defence in recent work by Feser (2013), Cohoe (2013), and Kerr (2015). I agree with these philosophers that the argument is sound. I believe, however, that the standard defence given of the ECA in these philosophers can be complemented by a formulation that appeals to the powers theory of possibility. This approach to possibility has been defended in recent years by, for example, Pruss (2002), Jacobs (2010), and Vetter (2015). In this article, I show how this modal theory allows us to defend the ECA in a way that is dialectically advantageous as well as clarifying.
A determination of injury for purposes of Article VI of GATT 1994 shall be based on positive evidence and involve an objective examination of both (a) the volume of the dumped imports and the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the domestic market for like products, and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of such products.
By what criteria should theories or explanations be judged to be good, over and above the requirement or at least the ambition for them to be true or correct? We may invoke appropriateness, relevance, economy, clarity, comprehensiveness, generality, parsimony, simplicity, elegance, even beauty, but what views did earlier investigators entertain on the subject? We have already seen that one group of ancient Greek theorists developed a model of axiomatic-deductive demonstration designed to bolster claims that a sequence of argument could yield results that are not only true but incontrovertible.
Many powers-realists assume that the powers of objects are identical with the dispositions of objects and, hence, that ‘power’ and ‘disposition’ are interchangeable. In this article, I aim to disentangle dispositions from powers with the goal of getting a better sense of how powers and dispositions relate to one another. I present and defend a modest realism about dispositions built upon a standard strong realism about powers. I argue that each correct disposition-ascription we can make of an object is made true by the manifestations towards which a given power or collection of powers of the object is directed.
This chapter discusses the relation between causation and moral responsibility. We generally hold adult human beings morally responsible for their actions, yet those action are also events in the natural world, enmeshed in causal chains that extend backwards in time long before the agent’s birth. If the causes in those chains necessitate their effects, it would appear that we must either give up the view that humans are morally responsible for their actions, or embrace the paradoxical view that humans are morally responsible for actions necessitated by events over which they have no control. Tuozzo argues that Aristotle’s causal theory avoids this dilemma by recognising two distinct types of causal chain or nexus. In one of these, the links between cause and effect are indeed necessary, from beginning to end. But chains of this sort are necessarily finite, with a definite beginning and end. Each of these necessary, finite causal chains are also enmeshed in a different sort of causal nexus, one that does extend indefinitely into the past. But this sort of indefinite causal chain is possible only because it contains links that are not necessitated. This enables Aristotle to account for moral responsibility by locating the necessitating cause of a human action in the agent herself. Nonetheless, Tuozzo concludes, Aristotle’s theory does have the paradoxical implication that, although the state of the world at a given time does not necessitate all subsequent events, a complete description of it would, in principle, allow all subsequent events – including human actions – to be predicted.
The foundation of W. Matthews Grant's project in Free Will and God's Universal Causality is his Non-Occasionalist version of Divine Universal Causality (NODUC), which affirms the traditional concurrentist idea that God and secondary causes cooperate non-superfluously in such a way that they both produce the entire effect. Grant defends NODUC's concurrentist account by responding to ‘The Metaphysical Objection’, which alleges that concurrentism places an inconsistent set of demands upon secondary causes. I argue that Grant's responses to that objection are unconvincing, and thus, he fails to demonstrate that NODUC is a stable foundation for the rest of his project.
It is familiar that, in Phaedo 95e ff., Plato argues that causation requires Forms and that Forms are causes. According to the standard and mainstream view, Plato’s argument for this view relies on the view that Forms are self-predicative (i.e., the Form of F is itself F) and that the cause transmits its character to the effect. The chapter demonstrates that Plato’s argument depends on neither of these views. It shows that what the argument relies on is the view that, first, Forms are essences (i.e,. the Form of F is what it is to be F), and, secondly, causation/explanation is uniform (i.e., same cause if, and only if, same effect).
Chpater 4 argues that an account of causation in terms of quasi-inertial processes and interferences handles problematic cases of pre-emption and overdetermination better than rival accounts. It also explains why and how the causal relations fail to be transitive.