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To explain how broader sections of the population than the nobility were included in Parliament we need to recapture the original character of representation as obligation. The chapter therefore presents the compellence model of obligation, which is predicated on ruler strength. The model is exemplified by the English case, which is traditionally taken as the paradigm for the alternative and most widely invoked model, which sees representation as the result of bargaining. Magna Carta is the classic historical precedent and it is here shown to depend on royal strength instead. The role of ruler strength and obligation is then further demonstrated by process-tracing the emergence of the English Parliament from the 1220s into the early 1300s. Though bargaining was pervasive, what channelled outcomes in a constitutional direction was the crown's capacity to enforce attandance across social orders. Bargaining was pervasive on the continent as well; what differed in England that the bottom-up requests for rights were preceded and followed by periods of strong royal capacity. The "fiscal fixation" of much social science thus needs to be revised. The institutional and, especially, judicial infrastructure in which state-society bargaining occurs is what shapes ultimate outcomes.
The final chapter in Part III examines more directly the claim that parliaments are a consequence of commercial activity by looking at two cases, which have dominated especially neo-institutionalist accounts due to their thriving wool trades, England and Castile. The main mechanism tying trade to representative institutions is that of capital mobility, which is assumed to endow mercantile groups with bargaining powers. The section on England shows that taxes on mobile capital were not key for representation, as they were not bargained for in Parliament. Indirect taxation was also far less than direct taxation in the critical period of parliamentary emergence. Moreover, bargains that did occur resulted in sectoral privileges, not constitutional gains. In fact, the chapter shows how mercantile interests and the collective action of merchants were endogenous to state capacity. The section on the Castilian Mesta shows how the assumed inefficiencies of this commercial system can be traced to the political weakness highlighted in chapter 5.
A superior bargaining capacity, especially of urban and commercial groups, is considered to be the foundation of representative institutions. However, in large polities like France and Castile, the pre-eminence of urban groups in representative institutions was causally related to the ultimate decline of those institutions and the devolution of the two regimes into "absolutism." The chapter first shows how the French Estates-General lapsed due to the greater weakness of the French crown; "divide et impera" is the preferred strategy of weak kings. "Absolutism" is the outcome, not the goal. French kings could not secure representatives armed with full powers, as local assemblies retained the right of tax approval. It is not that the demands of representation were weaker in France; urban groups often articulated even more radical claims. Absent the nobility, however, they failed to retain bargaining powers. Similar conditions operated in Castile. However, I show that greater early strength of the Castilian crown allowed some institutional layering and functional fusion to occur, which explains why the Castilian Cortes was more long-lasting and continuous than its French counterpart, a puzzle not hitherto explained.
Chapter 3 theorizes border settlement as a bargaining process. Information and commitment problems as the most common obstacles to concluding border delimitation negotiations. Information exchange is facilitated by numerous mechanisms; commitment problems are driven by the value of the territory. Two broad categories of border territory are identified. Territory that contains a power endowment, defined as characteristics of the border capable of affecting state power, and territory that does not. The presence of these power endowments may trigger a commitment problem, making border settlement less likely. We identify alternative explanations for failed border settlement based on information problems. We also integrate expectations from theories of conflict management, with a focus on bilateral negotiations, third party mediation and legal methods. Bilateral negotiations help surmount the challenge of incomplete information, but cannot easily allay the fears underlying commitment problems. Third parties help with either challenge but, when addressing commitment problems, legal methods are more effective than mediation.
Chapter 4 evaluates the hypotheses introduced in Chapter 3. First, we provide descriptions of our variables and justifies a key sampling choice to focus only on contiguous dyads. Second, we implement our research design, presenting the evidence for evaluating the hypotheses. Patterns in the data suggest border settlement is less likely when power endowments are present in the border region, consistent with the expectations of the commitment problem framework. We find mixed support for the information problem hypotheses. Democratic neighbors are more likely than nondemocratic neighbors to settle their borders, allied states are more likely to settle borders than non-allied states, and power relations do not appear to affect settlement. When bargaining over territory that lacks power endowments, conflict management efforts foster border settlement. When power endowments are present, states are significantly less likely to settle their borders, and conflict management proves ineffective. The exception is legal methods, which generally increase the likelihood of settlement when power endowments are present.
In Chapter 9, the concluding chapter, we provide an overview of the main theoretical and empirical contributions. We then lay out what we see as a path forward for future research. This includes but is not limited to a need for additional research into the process by which borders settle. We offer insights into factors that influence the process but more research is needed about how that process unfolds. Second, one implication of this book is that there are multiple paths to rivalry, only one of which is explored here. The path to rivalry for those not competing over borders, or for non-neighbors, demands an alternative theory. Third, we uncover that some rivalries persist even after border settlement, even if their behavior toward each other changes. We do not yet know why these rivalries persist. Fourth, we find evidence consistent with the expectations that conflict management effectiveness vary based on the tools chosen and type of bargaining problem experienced. We discuss the implications of these findings for conflict management research, particularly as it relates to legalized dispute resolution mechanisms.
Contemporary studies of conflict have adopted approaches that minimize the importance of negotiation during war or treat it as a constant and mechanical activity. This is strongly related to the lack of systematic data that track and illustrate the complex nature of wartime diplomacy. I address these issues by creating and exploring a new daily-level data set of negotiations in all interstate wars from 1816 to the present. I find strong indications that post-1945 wars feature more frequent negotiations and that these negotiations are far less predictive of war termination. Evidence suggests that increased international pressures for peace and stability after World War II, especially emanating from nuclear weapons and international alliances, account for this trend. These original data and insights establish a dynamic research agenda that enables a more policy-relevant study of conflict management, highlights a historical angle to conflict resolution, and speaks to the utility of viewing diplomacy as an essential dimension to understanding war.
This chapter covers a core problem that managers regularly face (i.e., negotiating with current or prospective employees over pay). The topic is usually omitted from compensation texts and is covered in separate courses in business programs. But negotiation over pay is such an integral part of strategic compensation and talent management that it cannot be omitted from a book that aims to train managers to think strategically about pay. For example, talent retention (Chapter 12) requires managers to respond correctly when employees receive outside offers from competitors, which immediately triggers bargaining and negotiation over pay. The chapter opens by stressing the importance of defining your objective. The most important ingredient to successful negotiation is information, so the questions of when and how to reveal and collect information are addressed in depth. Sections 14.4 and 14.5 examine threats and bluffs as negotiating tools, as well as how managers should think about and respond to counteroffers. As discussed in the final section, sometimes employers can gain the upper hand during bargaining by complicating the discussion, whereas other times simplification is better.
Recent work on optimal monetary and fiscal policy in New Keynesian models has tended to focus on policy set by an infinitely lived benevolent policy maker, often with access to a commitment technology. In this paper, we explore deviations from this ideal, by allowing (time-consistent) policy to be set by a process of bargaining between two political players with different weights on elements of the social welfare function. We characterize the (linear) Markov perfect equilibrium and, in a series of numerical examples, we explore the resultant policy response to shocks which cannot be perfectly offset with the available instruments due to their fiscal consequences. We find that, even although the players, on average, have the socially desirable objective function, the process of bargaining implies an outcome which deviates from the time-consistent policy chosen by the benevolent policy maker. Moreover, the range of instruments available mean that policy makers will bargain across the entire policy mix, sometimes implying outcomes which are quite different from those that would be chosen by a single policy maker. These policy outcomes depend crucially on the nature of the conflict and also the level of government debt.
In 1975, the Bourassa government received legal advice that the James Bay Northern Quebec Agreement exceeded provincial jurisdiction. Legal counsel advised the constitutionality of the Agreement be secured through formal constitutional amendment. No such amendment was sought. Based on authorized access to Premier Bourassa’s archived dossier on the Agreement’s negotiation, this article sets out the following: 1) why the provincial government sought to encroach on federal jurisdiction; 2) the strategic means employed to insulate the Agreement from s. 91(24) litigation; and 3) provincial negotiators’ views on how judges would approach the Agreement going forward. This article confirms theoretical expectations about when governments might coordinate to transgress federalism’s division of powers: a high probability that courts would find a transgression occurred, and a high political cost should governments not coordinate on a transgression strategy.
This chapter and Chapter 12 apply many of the principles of effective negotiation from earlier chapters to the workplace context. The workplace is where a lot of our negotiating will be done, and Chapter 12 will look at these negotiations from a business perspective. This chapter focuses on negotiations between management and employee representatives – normally a trade union. These negotiations can be very difficult and the consequences of reaching a deadlock can be very costly for both sides of the negotiation.
The fourth edition of Effective Negotiation provides a practical and thematic approach to negotiation and mediation in professional contexts. Drawing on research and extensive teaching and practical experience, Fells and Sheer describe key elements of negotiations and explain the core tasks involved in reaching an agreement: information exchange, solution-seeking and concession management. This edition features a substantial revision and re-alignment of content, providing discussion of overarching themes and methodologies before moving to focused considerations of the underlying mechanics of negotiation. A new chapter on deadlocks provides detailed analysis of strategically managing and resolving deadlocked negotiations. In addition to the 'Negotiation in Practice' and 'Negotiation Skill Tips' boxes, chapters now include real-world case studies. An accessible, practical and strategic exploration of the complex mechanics and dynamics of negotiation, mediation and dispute resolution, Effective Negotiation remains an essential resource for students and professionals in business and management, law and human resource management.
Most writers on negotiation (e.g. Cohen 2003; Fisher & Ertel 1995; Lax & Sebenius 2006; Thompson 2005) and most practitioners will acknowledge that good preparation leads to improved negotiation. However, there is little research specifically into how negotiators actually prepare. In one major commercial negotiation (the Tanker Refit case, examined more closely in Chapter 4), one of the parties invested a lot of time in collecting information to try to fully understand the situation they were negotiating about. In another major negotiation (the Telco JV case – see Chapter 12) the negotiators found themselves spending about two hours in preparation for each hour of meeting with the other party. On the other hand a team negotiating a major infrastructure contract spent very little preparation time together prior to their meeting with the potential customer (Lindholst 2015). What the negotiation literature does offer are preparation checklists that give some structure to a negotiator’s preparation (for examples, see Fisher & Ertel 1995; Fleming & Hawes 2017; Lewicki, Barry & Saunders 2015; Thompson 2005). These checklists vary in their advice, but they commonly include the need to set goals for the negotiation, as goals are believed to be an inherent aspect of planning (Futrell 2011; Wilson & Putnam 1990) and central to negotiation success.
The generosity of maternity pay has been shown to be an important factor for mothers’ attachment to the labour market. In the UK, we can observe that the generosity of maternity leaves across universities varies greatly: some universities top up the statutory maternity pay with longer and better paid leaves, others are either less generous or only entitle academic women to the legal minimum. We want to understand why this is the case. Therefore, this article examines both theoretically and empirically how higher education employers decide about the generosity of the offered occupational maternity pay. We use a bargaining approach to model the supply and demand side of generous maternity benefits in universities with different characteristics and test the implications with a generalised negative binomial model. We find that universities’ income does not account for this variation while differences in terms of costs and benefits for employers do. Most importantly, our results show that more research intense universities with a higher previous share of female professors provide more generous maternity pay. We offer a range of explanations for these findings.
In response to Roemer's reformulation of the Marxian concept of exploitation in terms of comparative wealth distributions (1982, 1996), Vrousalis (2013) treats economic exploitation as an explicitly relational phenomenon in which one party takes advantage of the other's economic vulnerability in order to extract a net benefit. This paper offers a critical assessment of Vrousalis's account, prompting a revised formulation that is analysed in the context of a matching and bargaining model. This analysis yields precise representations of Vrousalis's conditions of economic vulnerability and economic exploitation and facilitates comparison to the alternative conceptions of Marx and Roemer.
Criminal violence differs from other conflicts because illegal cartels primarily use violence to eliminate rivals rather than overthrow the state. However, politicians’ ability to influence cartel behavior remains unclear. This article argues that politicians alter the use of violence by setting their jurisdiction’s police enforcement levels, but that cartels can bribe politicians to look the other way. Because cartels are uncertain about politicians’ corruptibility, not every bribe is successful. Following an election, cartels must invest resources into learning politicians’ level of corruption. Cartels only increase their level of violence after successfully bribing political leaders, which implies that local violence levels should increase the longer parties remain in office. The study formalizes this argument and tests its implications using data on homicides and political tenure from Mexico. The results link incumbency to violence and suggest Mexico experiences an additional 948 homicides for each year of increased political tenure after holding an election.
We show that without a few peculiar modeling choices that are not justified by the core assumptions of the theory, selectorate theory neither unambiguously predicts the democratic peace nor that leaders of more inclusive regimes will rely upon the provision of public goods to remain in office, though they may be more likely to provide club goods. We illustrate these claims using relatively simple models that incorporate the core assumptions of their theory, while avoiding modeling choices we believe to be less appropriate. We argue for a revised version of selectorate theory, one that continues to emphasize the importance of the size of the winning coalition, yet we believe it provides a more realistic picture of democratic politics.
International cooperation often requires costly policy adjustments. States may worry, however, that such adjustments weaken their outside options, and thus reduce their bargaining power. How does uncertainty about the effects of policy adjustments on outside options influence the depth of cooperation that states can achieve? My game-theoretic analysis shows that uncertainty about outside options is an obstacle to deep cooperation. If states agree on deep cooperation, they have to compensate vulnerable states with weak outside options for their losses. Under uncertainty, states that are not vulnerable have an incentive to falsely claim that they are vulnerable (i) to avoid a side payment or (ii) to obtain compensation for being vulnerable. The result holds even if the added value of deep cooperation would be large enough to fully compensate the losers. In equilibrium, the more vulnerable state sometimes offers a side payment to the less vulnerable one. More broadly, the analysis reveals a new international cooperation problem and provides a new rationale for costly signaling mechanisms and delegation to international organizations.
Students of international relations have long argued that large and rapid shifts in relative power can lead to war. But then why does the rising state not alleviate the concerns of the declining one by reducing its expected future power, so that a commitment problem never emerges? For example, states often limit their ability to launch preemptive attacks by creating demilitarized zones, or they abandon armament programs to avoid preventive wars. In a model of complete information, I show that shifts in power never lead to war when countries can negotiate over the determinants of their power. If war occurs, then, it must be that negotiations over power are impossible or too costly. I then show how third parties, domestic politics, and problems of fungibility can increase the costs of such negotiations, and hence lead to war, even under complete information.