In 2022, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) virus clade 2.3.4.4b became enzootic and caused mass mortality in Sandwich Tern Thalasseus sandvicensis and other seabird species across north-western Europe. We present data on the characteristics of the spread of the virus between and within breeding colonies and the number of dead adult Sandwich Terns recorded at breeding sites throughout north-western Europe. Within two months of the first reported mortalities, 20,531 adult Sandwich Terns were found dead, which is >17% of the total north-western European breeding population. This is probably an under-representation of total mortality, as many carcasses are likely to have gone unnoticed and unreported. Within affected colonies, almost all chicks died. After the peak of the outbreak, in a colony established by late breeders, 25.7% of tested adults showed immunity to HPAI subtype H5. Removal of carcasses was associated with lower levels of mortality at affected colonies. More research on the sources and modes of transmission, incubation times, effective containment, and immunity is urgently needed to combat this major threat for colonial seabirds.

The epidemiology of H5N1 and H7N9 avian viruses of humans infected in China differs despite both viruses being avian reassortants that have inherited six internal genes from a common ancestor, H9N2. The median age of infected populations is substantially younger for H5N1 virus (26 years) compared with H7N9 virus (63 years). Population susceptibility to infection with seasonal influenza is understood to be influenced by cross-reactive CD8+ T cells directed towards immunogenic peptides derived from internal viral proteins which may provide some level of protection against further influenza infection. Prior exposure to seasonal influenza peptides may influence the age-related infection patterns observed for H5N1 and H7N9 viruses. A comparison of relatedness of immunogenic peptides between historical human strains and the two avian emerged viruses was undertaken for a possible explanation in the differences in age incidence observed. There appeared to be some relationship between past exposure to related peptides and the lower number of H5N1 virus cases in older populations, however the relationship between prior exposure and older populations among H7N9 virus patients was less clear.

Better control of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreaks requires deeper understanding of within-flock virus transmission dynamics. For such fatal diseases, daily mortality provides a proxy for disease incidence. We used the daily mortality data collected during the 2015 H5N2 HPAI outbreak in Minnesota turkey flocks to estimate the within-flock transmission rate parameter (β). The number of birds in Susceptible, Exposed, Infectious and Recovered compartments was inferred from the data and used in a generalised linear mixed model (GLMM) to estimate the parameters. Novel here was the correction of these data for normal mortality before use in the fitting process. We also used mortality threshold to determine HPAI-like mortality to improve the accuracy of estimates from the back-calculation approach. The estimated β was 3.2 (95% confidence interval (CI) 2.3–4.3) per day with a basic reproduction number of 12.8 (95% CI 9.2–17.2). Although flock-level estimates varied, the overall estimate was comparable to those from other studies. Sensitivity analyses demonstrated that the estimated β was highly sensitive to the bird-level latent period, emphasizing the need for its precise estimation. In all, for fatal poultry diseases, the back-calculation approach provides a computationally efficient means to obtain reasonable transmission parameter estimates from mortality data.

In March 2013 the first cases of human avian influenza A(H7N9) were reported to the World Health Organization. Since that time, over 650 cases have been reported. Infections are associated with considerable morbidity and mortality, particularly within certain demographic groups. This rapid increase in cases over a brief time period is alarming and has raised concerns about the pandemic potential of the H7N9 virus. Three major factors influence the pandemic potential of an influenza virus: (1) its ability to cause human disease, (2) the immunity of the population to the virus, and (3) the transmission potential of the virus. This paper reviews what is currently known about each of these factors with respect to avian influenza A(H7N9). Currently, sustained human-to-human transmission of H7N9 has not been reported; however, population immunity to the virus is considered very low, and the virus has significant ability to cause human disease. Several statistical and geographical modelling studies have estimated and predicted the spread of the H7N9 virus in humans and avian species, and some have identified potential risk factors associated with disease transmission. Additionally, assessment tools have been developed to evaluate the pandemic potential of H7N9 and other influenza viruses. These tools could also hypothetically be used to monitor changes in the pandemic potential of a particular virus over time.

Indonesia has reported the most human infections with highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) virus worldwide. We implemented enhanced surveillance in four outpatient clinics and six hospitals for HPAI H5N1 and seasonal influenza viruses in East Jakarta district to assess the public health impact of influenza in Indonesia. Epidemiological and clinical data were collected from outpatients with influenza-like illness (ILI) and hospitalized patients with severe acute respiratory infection (SARI); respiratory specimens were obtained for influenza testing by real-time reverse transcription–polymerase chain reaction. During October 2011–September 2012, 1131/3278 specimens from ILI cases (34·5%) and 276/1787 specimens from SARI cases (15·4%) tested positive for seasonal influenza viruses. The prevalence of influenza virus infections was highest during December–May and the proportion testing positive was 76% for ILI and 36% for SARI during their respective weeks of peak activity. No HPAI H5N1 virus infections were identified, including hundreds of ILI and SARI patients with recent poultry exposures, whereas seasonal influenza was an important contributor to acute respiratory disease in East Jakarta. Overall, 668 (47%) of influenza viruses were influenza B, 384 (27%) were A(H1N1)pdm09, and 359 (25%) were H3. While additional data over multiple years are needed, our findings suggest that seasonal influenza prevention efforts, including influenza vaccination, should target the months preceding the rainy season.

A large-scale mass vaccination campaign was carried out in Java, Indonesia in an attempt to control outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in backyard flocks and commercial smallholder poultry. Sero-monitoring was conducted in mass vaccination and control areas to assess the proportion of the target population with antibodies against HPAI and Newcastle disease (ND). There were four rounds of vaccination, and samples were collected after each round resulting in a total of 27 293 samples. Sampling was performed irrespective of vaccination status. In the mass vaccination areas, 20–45% of poultry sampled had a positive titre to H5 after each round of vaccination, compared to 2–3% in the control group. In the HPAI + ND vaccination group, 12–25% of the population had positive ND titres, compared to 5–13% in the areas without ND vaccination. The level of seropositivity varied by district, age of the bird, and species (ducks vs. chickens).

The age distribution of influenza A(H5N1) cases reported during 2006–2013 varied substantially between countries. As well as underlying demographic profiles, it is possible that cross-immunity contributed to the age distribution of reported cases: seasonal influenza A(H1N1) and avian influenza A(H5N1) share the same neuraminidase subtype, N1. Using a mechanistic model, we measured the extent to which population age distribution and heterosubtypic cross-immunity could explain the observed age patterns in Cambodia, China, Egypt, Indonesia and Vietnam. Our results support experimental evidence that prior infection with H1N1 confers partial cross-immunity to H5N1, and suggest that more than 50% of spillover events did not lead to reported cases of infection as a result. We also identified age groups that have additional risk factors for influenza A(H5N1) not captured by demography or infection history.

Human infection with the emerging avian influenza A(H7N9) virus in China in 2013 has raised global concerns. We conducted a retrospective descriptive study of 27 confirmed human influenza A(H7N9) cases in Jiangsu Province, to elaborate poultry-related exposures and to provide a more precise estimate of the incubation periods of the illness. The median incubation period was 6 days (range 2–10 days) in cases with single known exposure and was 7·5 days (range 6·5–12·5 days) in cases with exposures on multiple days, difference between the two groups was not significant (Z = −1·895, P = 0·058). The overall median incubation period for all patients was estimated to be 7·5 days (range 2–12·5 days). Our findings further highlight the necessity for public health authorities to extend the period of medical surveillance from 7 days to 10 days.

The purpose of this study was to determine whether pooling avian influenza (AI)-positive swabs with negative swabs has a detrimental effect on the sensitivity of AI real-time reverse transcription–polymerase chain reactions (rRT–PCRs). Cloacal and buccal swabs were sampled daily from 12 turkeys infected with A/goose/England/07(H2N2). For half the turkeys, each swab was mixed with four swabs from known AI-negative turkeys, and for the other half the swabs were tested individually. Bayesian modelling was used to (i) determine whether pooling the positive swabs compromised the cycle threshold (Ct) value obtained from the rRT–PCRs, and (ii) estimate the likelihood of detection of an H2N2 infected turkey flock via rRT–PCR for pooled and individually tested swabs (cloacal and buccal) vs. the number of days post-infection of the flock. Results indicated that there was no significant effect of compromising AI rRT–PCR sensitivity by pooling a weak positive swab with negative swabs on the Ct values which were obtained. Pooled sampling was able to widen the detection window compared to individual sampling, for the same number of rRT–PCR tests. This indicates that pooled sampling would be an effective method of reducing the number of tests to be performed to determine flock status during an AI outbreak and for surveillance.

The domestic poultry population in Vietnam has been vaccinated against highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 since 2005. Since then, outbreaks have continued to occur without a clear understanding of the mechanisms involved. The general objective of this study was to understand the epidemiology of the disease in the context of vaccination and to draw some conclusions about vaccination efficacy in the domestic poultry population of the Red River Delta area. Five cross-sectional surveys to measure the serological and virological prevalence in vaccinated and unvaccinated poultry were performed from the end of 2008 to June 2010. The global seroprevalence was 24% (95% confidence interval 19·9–28·2). Determinants of vaccine immunogenicity were identified separately in chickens and ducks as well as determinants of the seroconversion in unvaccinated birds. The results highlight the difficulties in maintaining good flock immunity in poultry populations using inactivated vaccine in the field with two vaccination rounds per year, and in preventing circulation of virus in co-existing unvaccinated poultry.

Early detection of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in its natural reservoirs is a prerequisite for preventing disease spread to humans. The risk of introduction of H5N1 HPAI was assessed in order to design a risk-based surveillance system in Spain. Areas at highest risk for H5N1 HPAI followed a northeast–southwest direction, with two significant clusters located in the north and the southwest of the country. Most (83%) of the veterinary units (VUs) obtained fewer samples than would have been expected if samples had been collected using a risk-based design. In October 2009, a HPAI outbreak was reported for the first time in a Spanish layer farm located in a VU at high risk for HPAI, but no samples were collected. This risk-based surveillance approach will increase the cost-effectiveness of HPAI surveillance in Spain and can be easily extended to and adopted by other countries and regions throughout the world.

In recent years the control of low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) viruses of the H5 and H7 subtypes has increasingly become a concern. We evaluated the measures (stamping out, controlled marketing, emergency and preventive vaccination, farm density reduction and restocking in homogenous areas) implemented to control the LPAI epidemics that occurred in Italy between 2000 and 2005, using a combination of spatial and space–time analyses and estimates of the basic reproduction ratio (R0). Clustering of infected farms decreased over the years, indicating the effectiveness of the control strategies implemented. Controlled marketing [relative risk (RR) 0·46, 95% confidence interval (CI) 0·27–0·80], emergency (RR 0·47, 95% CI 0·39–0·57) and preventive vaccination (RR 0·19, 95% CI 0·09–0·41) were the most effective measures, yet R0<1 was only for preventive vaccination. Our results are useful for identifying the most effective measures for reducing the risk of the spread of LPAI and optimizing the allocation of resources.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) subtype H5N1 remains a public health threat as long as it circulates in wild and domestic birds. Information on the transmissibility of H5N1 HPAI from wild birds is needed for evidence-based public health advice. We investigated if transmission of H5N1 HPAI had taken place in people that had unprotected contact with infected wild mute swans during an incident at the Abbotsbury Swannery in Dorset, England. Thirteen people who had been exposed to infected swans were contacted and actively followed up for symptoms. Serology was taken after 30 days. We did not find evidence of transmission of H5N1 HPAI to humans during the incident. The incident provided a rare opportunity to study the transmissibility of the virus from wild birds to humans.

The epidemiology, symptomology, and viral aetiology of endemic influenza remain largely uncharacterized in Cambodia. In December 2006, we established passive hospital-based surveillance to identify the causes of acute undifferentiated fever in patients seeking healthcare. Fever was defined as tympanic membrane temperature >38°C. From December 2006 to December 2008, 4233 patients were screened for influenza virus by real-time reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (rRT–PCR). Of these patients, 1151 (27·2%) were positive for influenza. Cough (68·8% vs. 50·5%, P<0·0001) and sore throat (55·0% vs. 41·9%, P<0·0001) were more often associated with laboratory-confirmed influenza-infected patients compared to influenza-negative enrollees. A clear influenza season was evident between July and December with a peak during the rainy season. Influenza A and B viruses were identified in 768 (66·3%) and 388 (33·7%) of the influenza-positive population (n=1153), respectively. In December 2008, passive surveillance identified infection of the avian influenza virus H5N1 in a 19-year-old farmer from Kandal province who subsequently recovered. From a subset of diagnostic samples submitted in 2007, 15 A(H1N1), seven A(H3N2) and seven B viruses were isolated. The predominant subtype tested was influenza A(H1N1), with the majority antigenically related to the A/Solomon Island/03/2006 vaccine strain. The influenza A(H3N2) isolates and influenza B viruses analysed were closely related to A/Brisbane/10/2007 or B/Ohio/01/2005 (B/Victoria/2/87-lineage) vaccine strains, respectively. Phylogenetic analysis of the HA1 region of the HA gene of influenza A(H1N1) viruses demonstrated that the Cambodian isolates belonged to clade 2C along with representative H1N1 viruses circulating in SE Asia at the time. These viruses remained sensitive to oseltamivir. In total, our data suggest that viral influenza infections contribute to nearly one-fifth of acute febrile illnesses and demonstrate the importance of influenza surveillance in Cambodia.

The daily progression of the 2006 (January–June) Nigerian avian influenza (AI H5N1) epidemic was assessed in relation to both spatial variables and the generation interval of the invading virus. Proximity to the highway network appeared to promote epidemic dispersal: from the first AI generation interval onwards >20% of all cases were located at <5 km from the nearest major road. Fifty-seven per cent of all cases were located ⩽31 km from three highway intersections. Findings suggest that the spatial features of emerging infections could be key in their control. When the spatial location of a transmission factor is well known, such as that of the highway network, and a substantial percentage of cases (e.g. >20%) are near that factor, early interventions focusing on transmission factors, such as road blocks that prevent poultry trade, may be more efficacious than interventions applied only to the susceptible population.