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In order for kingship to be legitimate, it had to be recognised. Only tyrants and usurpers would claim a royal title. Righteous rulers had their dignity thrust upon them. Yet a process of recognition also carried risks: the ability to award or confirm a royal title carried with it a responsibility to ensure that only those suitable of so elevated a dignity received it. Confirming tyrants cast into doubt one’s own legitimacy. Failing to come to the defence of a ruler one had recognised signalled that one lacked judgment, power or authority. Building on biblical, classical and patristic models, awarding royal titles meant that one was responsible for the conduct of the king. Yet that created a tension, given that kings were supposed to be beholden to nobody but God – one could not be a king unless one held power greater than that of a mere prince, but if one allowed others to intervene in the affairs of one's own realm, that power was called into question. Chapter 4 explores how high medieval observers engaged with these issues. It does so in relation to recognition both external (from popes, emperors or neighbours) and internal (from subjects and erstwhile peers).
The concluding chapter of Saving the International Justice Regime identifies how scholars, activists, stakeholders, and supporter states can help to save the international justice regime. It identifies three main ways to bolster international justice: (1) managing public opinion by engaging in targeted and effective self-marketing campaigns as a way to make their case to a broader audience; (2) improving the rule of law and the functioning of the tribunals as judicial institutions; and (3) reaffirming the fundamental norm(s) of criminal accountability and human rights. The chapter concludes with a discussion of a future research agenda based on the definition, typology, and theoretical framework set out earlier in the book.
Excessive use of force by the police or other law enforcement officials may have lethal outcomes. This chapter describes the core law enforcement principles of necessity and proportionality which govern all use of force in law enforcement. Specific consideration is given to the restrictions imposed on the use of firearms and related ammunition and firing modes. Consideration of less-lethal weapons in law enforcement benefits from the expertise of Dr Abi Dymond of Exeter University. The human rights principles of legality, precaution, and accountability for the use of force are also addressed.
In this chapter I apply the view of psychopathy developed in Chapter 2, to the account of moral responsibility as responsiveness to reasons developed in Chapter 1. I begin by considering the question of what reactive attitudes, if any, we should hold towards psychopaths, engaging with arguments by Piers Benn and Patricia Greenspan. I then turn to the question of whether psychopaths are responsive to reasons. I argue that evidence of psychopaths’ reasoning impairments, including those suggested by the famous ‘moral/conventional distinction’ experiments carried out by James Blair, may be enough to call into question the reasons-responsiveness of some psychopaths, but that other, even ‘hard-core’ psychopaths, may not exhibit such deficiencies. However, I argue that these psychopaths, though not oblivious to reasons, may be impervious to them, that is, unable to recognise them as reasons which bear on their own choices. I then argue that the specific reasons to which these psychopaths are impervious are reasons stemming from the rights, interests and concerns of other people, and that they are impervious to them because they are unable to see other people as sources of value.
The aim of the chapter is to develop an understanding of what moral responsibility is, so that this can, in later chapters, be applied to the case of the psychopath. I begin by distinguishing moral responsibility from other senses of responsibility, including causal, virtue, and obligation responsibility, and elucidate the various connections between these senses. I then consider the relationship between moral responsibility, praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, and the range of phenomena for which it is possible to be morally responsible. Next, I proceed to consider two major theories of moral responsibility: the Strawsonian ‘reactive attitudes’ account and the ‘reasons-responsiveness’ account. I consider the advantages and disadvantages of these, and their ability to account for a range of cases. Finally, I argue for an account adapted from R. Jay Wallace’s version of reasons-responsiveness.
The American administrative state has, of late, been under siege, attacked on two fronts. The war on one front is somewhat parochial – a pitched battle over US constitutional law. It is waged largely by conservative movement lawyers who view the modern administrative state as an affront to the constitutional separation of powers.
The war on the other front has much greater transnational relevance. This second fight pits defenders of modern bureaucratic governance against those who see public administration as hopelessly inefficient, rigid, and unaccountable. This latter group of critics present themselves as more or less comfortable with the constitutionality of the administrative state – and thus claim to raise only technocratic objections.
The corporation is the most complex, adaptive, and resilient model of organizing economic activity in history. In an era of globalization, the transnational corporation has significant power over society. While its rights are specified through private ordering, and choice of jurisdictional home, in the event of conflict of laws, the corporation's duties and responsibilities remain contested. Notwithstanding the argument in institutional economics that all transactions take place within governance and legal frameworks, underpinned by a 'non-calculative social contract,' the terms are notoriously difficult to define or enforce. They are made more so if regulatory dynamics preclude litigation to a judicial conclusion. This Element situates the corporation – its culture, governance, responsibility, and accountability – within a broader discourse of duty. In doing so, it addresses the problem of the corporation for society and the corporation's problem in aligning its governance to changing community expectations of obligation.
Are psychopaths morally responsible? Should we argue with them? Remonstrate with them, blame them, sometimes even praise them? Is it worth trying to change them, or should we just try to prevent them from causing harm? In this book, Jim Baxter aims to find serious answers to these deep philosophical questions, drawing on contemporary insights from psychiatry, psychology, neuroscience and law. Moral Responsibility and the Psychopath is the first sustained, book-length philosophical work on this important and fascinating topic, and will be of deep interest and importance to researchers in these fields – not to mention anyone who has had to interact with a psychopath in their everyday life.
Democratic backsliding and its effects are gaining momentum within Public Administration research as populist parties start to implement their political agendas. Despite the increasing relevance of the topic, the local government is seldom mentioned. This gap is especially relevant as many populist parties govern at first and even only at the local level, playing a crucial role in shaping local politics, public services, and administrative reform. This chapter explores the strategies and the impact of technocratic populism on the public administration in three European cities. It investigates how technocratic populist parties and leaders in cities interact with bureaucracy and combine different strategies of democratic backsliding: centralizing of administrative structures, disciplining the bureaucracy, and controlling societal participation. It also examines the role of ICT tools and innovations within the populist strategies. The empirical analysis showed that technocratic populists employ, with varying success, strategies to transform public administration. However, there are also considerable differences among cases that point to heterogeneity within this populist category.
Leadership and governance in Malaysia have been key to success in the planning and implementation of health services and their outcomes and in the shifts and corrections needed. Health is the responsibility of the federal government, but some areas are under the authority of state governments. The chapter illustrates how Malaysia adopted a holistic approach to health policies by embedding them in the context of national development policies. The ministry of health (MoH) is the major provider of health services. Health professionals in the MoH demonstrated leadership by advising on health priorities and taking responsibility for the formulation/implementation of intervention programmes and regulating the private health sector. They have achieved substantial balanced health development with greater equity. Analysis of the role of the MoH illustrates several essential elements of leadership. The MoH is also engaged in international health collaboration, both as a receiver of mostly technical advice from international organisations and as a giver of support to other developing countries.
How does representative government function when public administration can reshape democracy? The traditional narrative of public administration balances the accountability of managers, a problem of control, with the need for effective administration, a problem of capability. The discretion modern governments give to administrators allows them to make tradeoffs among democratic values. This book challenges the traditional view with its argument that the democratic values of administration should complement the democratic values of the representative government within which they operate. Control, capability and value reinforcement can render public administration into democracy administered. This book offers a novel framework for empirically and normatively understanding how democratic values have, and should be, reinforced by public administration. Bertelli's theoretical framework provides a guide for managers and reformers alike to chart a path toward democracy administered.
Chapter 2 counters each of the policy arguments that have been mounted against the criminalisation of State acts of aggression, including arguments relating to uncertainties surrounding the prohibition of the use of force; that acts of aggression are too complex an episode for adjudication by a criminal tribunal; that the criminalisation of aggression will politicise the ICC; that there is a risk of a fragmentation of relevant rules of international law caused by differing decisions of the ICC, the UN Security Council, and the International Court of Justice; and claims that the criminalisation of acts of aggression will have a chilling effect on States’ willingness to use force when they should (namely, to prevent atrocity crimes). The dissection of such arguments demonstrates that each objection is misguided and sets out the case in favour of criminalisation. The chapter also assesses the geopolitical significance of the crime, considering the extent to which the criminalisation of the unlawful use of force represents a shift in the balance between power and law. Finally, the chapter examines the likely impact of the crime of aggression on the rules of the jus ad bellum.
It seems easy to assert that every human being is entitled to food security. Besides article 11 of the International Covenant on Social and Economic Rights (ICESCR), a plethora of international documents contain authoritative statements to this effect. Yet, the evolution of right to food (RTF) into a justiciable right at the national level has been met with several challenges. Even in cases where this right has been guaranteed in the constitution, one has to admit that there are neither efficient mechanisms to ensure its effective operationalisation nor clear steps to be followed by the state for its fulfilment. In the case of South Africa, the RTF is generally recognised as a fundamental right. Nevertheless, over the last two decades this right has not been translated into a well-defined entitlement with corresponding state responsibility. The chapter concludes by recommending that in light of the prevalent food insecurity at the household and individual levels, it is imperative that (quasi)judicial bodies adopt a creative interpretation of the Constitution and relevant international instruments to hold the state accountable for breaching section 27 of the Constitution and the ICESCR.
Humanity is at a crossroads in addressing biodiversity loss. Several assessments have reported on the weak compliance with the Aichi Biodiversity Targets by the parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). To address this lack of compliance, the challenges in implementing and enforcing CBD obligations must be understood. Key implementation challenges of the CBD are identified through a content analysis of policy documents, multi-stakeholder interviews, and participant observation at the recent CBD Conference of the Parties. Building on this analysis, the article explores the extent to which the review mechanisms of international human rights law, with their various strategies for eliciting compliance, can help to improve CBD mechanisms. The findings of this article reveal insights that the CBD can draw from international human rights law to address these compliance challenges, such as facilitating the participation of civil society organizations to provide specific input, and engaging independent biodiversity experts to assess implementation. The article concludes that insights from human rights review mechanisms are useful for improving the emerging peer review mechanism of the CBD, which is important for strengthening accountability within the post-2020 global biodiversity framework.
The book concludes that accumulation rules do not clearly incorporate a normative basis for determining an intergenerational allocation of benefits and so should be reformed to require regard to principles of intergenerational justice. Further, while the present generation is able, in some circumstances, to disregard spending restrictions and ongoing accumulation requirements, it is asserted that current charity controllers should have greater ability to disregard accumulation restrictions or requirements so as to adopt different principles of intergenerational justice, or to pursue the same principles of intergenerational justice, but in a more efficient way. Finally, the book argues that there is a range of legal restraints that seek to reduce the agency costs from accumulation and that the critical issue is the ability of regulators to work cooperatively to fill in gaps.
The legal approach to regulating data-driven personalisation has relied heavily on extending and reusing legal categories and concepts – in particular, the idea of privacy of personal information and the legitimating role of consent in permitting the use of personal information – that were originally devised to deal with a very different problem. This chapter argues that this approach is fundamentally flawed for two reasons. Firstly, data-driven personalisation – unlike the traditional core of privacy – is deeply enmeshed in contractual relationships, and both the gathering and the use of data are mediated by contractual terms. As this chapter shows, the result is that ‘privacy’ and ‘consent’ do not provide an adequate evaluative framework to model or mitigate the deleterious impact of data-driven personalisation on individuals. Secondly, consent derives its normative force from the presumption that it is necessarily autonomy-enhancing. As this chapter shows, however, data-driven personalisation has a strong derelationalising effect which erodes rather than enhances the data subject’s autonomy, calling into question the assumptions underpinning privacy-based approaches. The chapter concludes by arguing that dealing with these problems requires adopting a new, more substantive approach, which works to explicitly restrict the processes, structures, and purposes through which and for which personalisation is used.
Chapter 3 focuses on relationships and accountability and looks at the role of colonial rule in contributing to continuing state fragility in Africa today. This chapter also considers colonialism from the perspective of internal and external relationships. The implications of colonial governance and legal structures for accountability and recourse in instances of harm are also discussed.
This chapter analyzes how competing notions of conditionality – primarily tensions between efficiency and solidarity – have played out in debates and discourses on development aid since the 1960s in one Scandinavian country and a small, yet highly profiled donor – Sweden. Repeated and shifting demands for accountability and transparency serve as a probe into the complex, competing, and often fluctuating aims, goals, and motives of international development aid. The chapter argues that current debates on “the end of aid” are informed by a historical and unresolved tension between “unconditional solidarity” on the one hand and “conditional efficiency” on the other: Demands for openness elucidate competing aims of aid, indicating a paradox in the transparency paradigm in contemporary development aid discourse, whereby efficient aid – as manifested in economic growth – eventually leads to the end of aid while its alleged inefficiency – as evidenced in social inequality – ensures its continued legitimacy.
International law does not address intelligence activities explicitly, and many scholars assume that international law has no effect on the practice of intelligence. Yet, international courts and bodies have recently started to hold states to account for internationally wrongful acts resulting from intelligence cooperation. This chapter analyses the effects of recent instances of state accountability on state decision-making, using a modified rational choice model accounting for the boundedness of state rationality. It shows that these instances of state accountability have changed the payoffs and costs of intelligence cooperation. States must now take into account the risk of accountability, and considerations of international legality may now outweigh domestic considerations. The chapter therefore argues that recent instances of state accountability before international courts and bodies have constrained states’ freedom in intelligence cooperation, thereby serving their national security interests. Existing research shows that respect for the rule of law is necessary to an effective fight against national security threats, and that measures violating human rights or undermining the rule of law are counter-productive. Hence, the chapter further argues that these recent instances of state accountability increase states’ respect for the international rule of law, leading them to protect their national security more effectively.
Predictive technologies have become an inseparable part of counterterrorism decision-making. In the past decades, the United Nations Security Council has advanced and legitimized this reliance on predictive technologies, including the substandard levels of certainty and proof they entail, justifying opaque predictive epistemology in counter-terrorism decision-making both within and outside the SC sanction regime. Based on an interdisciplinary scholarship on law, science, and technology, as well as empirical observations from concrete battlefield operations, this chapter identifies three problems stemming from the reliance on predictive technologies in counter-terrorism decision-making. First, the outputs of predictive technologies - often perceived as objective, complete, and neutral - mask the subjective and speculative elements involved in their production. Second, the combination of predictive technologies and opaque epistemology embraces uncertainty as the baseline for knowledge, resulting in a transition from juridical to administrative decision-making process. Third, erroneous decisions often remain unaccounted for, as technology systems are being blamed for mistaken, technology-assisted, human decisions. The chapter develops concrete recommendations to mitigate these problems, and advises the SC to consider the effects of its legitimation of opaque evidentiary standards in the context of the sanctions regime, on the justification of these problematic norms in the context of counter-terrorism battlefield operations.