Mandatory human rights due diligence (HRDD) laws in the European Union (EU) – both enacted and in the making – seem to be a promising tool to harden soft international standards in the business and human rights (BHR) field, the most prominent of these being the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). This article develops a two-layered critique of mandatory HRDD laws. It problematizes the very concept of HRDD as articulated by the UNGPs. I will argue that due to various conceptual, operational and structural limitations, HRDD alone will not bring the desired changes for rightsholders, because this process does not address various asymmetries of power between corporations and affected communities. The second layer of critique concerns the content of mandatory HRDD laws enacted in France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Norway and Germany. Assessing these laws vis-à-vis six preconditions required to protect effectively people and the planet from business-related harms, it is clear that these mandatory HRDD laws are half-hearted attempts to tame business-related human rights abuses and hold the relevant corporate actors accountable. In addition to developing more ambitious mandatory HRDD laws in future, states should employ a range of additional regulatory tools that pay greater attention to achieving outcomes, drawing red lines in certain situations, and promoting access to remedy and corporate accountability.

The third pillar of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) is often considered the ‘forgotten pillar’,1 especially when compared with the first pillar, where some of the ‘governance gaps’ the State must address in order to comply with its duty to protect under international human rights law are developed with some level of detail. The same happens in relation to the second pillar, which proposes a practical approach for the proactive involvement of companies in the identification and management of the risks their activities and business relationships may produce on human rights.2 However, the third pillar is not necessarily ‘forgotten’, as it is based on one of the core rights of the international human rights regime. In this regard, not only are the various elements and procedures for access to justice developed within each country’s domestic law and within the international legal system, but they have also been subject to detailed studies by the international and regional human rights community.3 However, it is the least proactive pillar of the UN framework on business and human rights, and the one that faces the greatest challenges in terms of making a specific, substantive contribution in light of the vast existence of civil, criminal, administrative and constitutional proceedings in domestic jurisdictions.

This article intends to explore how the production of collective memory within transitional justice processes could be considered as a feasible avenue to advance the instrumentalization of the Access to Remedy Pillar of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). This account considers that collective memory is a fundamental component of transitional justice as the attainment of both victims reparation and national reconciliation require the emergence of a shared historical narrative that fixes an explanation as to the implications of violence on the trajectory of the affected society. Hence the current Colombian transitional justice project, and particularly certain social dialogue activities conducted by its Truth Commission (hereafter the Commission), are presented as an embryonic and non-exhaustive case study that serves as the starting point of further research on the matter.

On 5 November 2015, the Fundão Dam collapsed, causing the most devastating tailings dam disaster to date. The dam was operated by Samarco S.A., a joint venture by Vale, Brazil’s biggest mining company, and BHP Billiton, the world’s largest mining company.1 Its tailings travelled down the Doce River for ca 700 kilometres until they reached the ocean, affecting 42 municipalities, two states, and thousands of communities along the way. The disaster caused myriad social, environmental and economic impacts: nineteen individuals were killed, and thousands endured physical or psychological harm; water resources and the soil were polluted; habitats were irreversibly destroyed; and the local economy suffered long-lasting damage. Traditional and indigenous communities were especially harmed, as their historical, social, religious and cultural relationships with their land led to even more profound harms.2

On 23 July 2018, when the villagers gathered around the porch to wrap up the day with a good chat, one of the five auxiliary dams of the Xe-Pian Xe-Namnoy hydropower dam in Attapeu province, the southeastern state of Laos, collapsed. Four days before the collapse, reports of cracks and subsidence started to come through. It should have been enough to prompt evacuation warning issuance by the Xe-Pian Xe-Namnoy Power Co. Ltd (PNPC), a consortium of South Korean companies SK Engineering and Construction (SK E&C) and Korea Western Power Company (KOWEPO), Thailand-based RATCH Group, and Lao Holding State Enterprise (LHSE). PNPC has a Concession Agreement with the Laos government ‘to plan, design, finance, construct, own, operate and maintain’ the Xe-Pian Xe-Namnoy hydropower dam. The warning was issued, but it came too late.

Australia's offshore detention regime has been the subject of numerous attempts to seek accountability for harm caused to detainees using legal and other avenues in Australia. This Article examines recent strategic litigation actions against the Australian government and the corporate contractors engaged in offshore detention, including: Kamasaee v. Commonwealth; AUB19 v. Commonwealth; and actions seeking injunctions requiring the Australian government to airlift detainees to Australia for medical treatment. While these actions have vindicated the rights of those in offshore detention in specific ways, and in some instances facilitated compensation for harms caused while in detention, none have proved capable of challenging the underlying basis of the offshore detention regime, nor of providing a foreseeable end to the detention, whether by facilitating credible prospects for resettlement, or by other means. The Article provides an account of the achievements and limitations of these claims and concludes that although certain features of the Australian jurisdiction make it possible to pursue transnational claims, and thus potentially provide remedy for those who have suffered wrongs in Australia's offshore detention regime, such claims need to be pursued with the utmost care and with careful consideration of the complexities of the Australian political and legal environment.

This article proposes a model of treaty-based veil piercing for civil liability claims by victims of human rights harm inflicted by businesses. The primary inspiration for this model comes from investment treaty provisions dealing with corporate investors. Our examination of investment law for this purpose exposes the double standard in the treatment of the corporate veil between these two remedy regimes, and offers a way to address this. The test we propose for lifting the veil in order to allow victims to claim against the parent company in a corporate group is one of ‘legal control’. It aims to capture cases where the parent did not necessarily take an active role in the subsidiary's business, but it is still treated as being in control of the subsidiary by virtue of its direct or indirect ownership or ability to appoint management.