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The threat to journalists in zones of armed conflict is a longstanding one. In 2006, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1738 in which it expressed its deep concern at the frequency of acts of violence against journalists in armed conflict. In October 2020, the Human Rights Council adopted a resolution dedicated to the safety of journalists while a UN Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity aims to tackle the challenges facing journalists.
Lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, and intersex persons are at particular risk of being targeted because of their gender or sexual preference. Discrimination against LGBTI persons may be based on sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, or sex characteristics. The chapter looks first at the right to life of LGBTI persons under global standards. This comprises extrajudicial executions by State agents, the failure to exercise due diligence in protecting LGBTI persons, and the imposition of the death penalty for homosexual activity. In nine States, the penal code prescribes the death penalty as a possible judicial sanction for same-sex sexual activity.
This chapter consists of two parts. The first part is an account of the influence that military technological advancements have had on development of the law governing armed conflict. Beginning in the 1860s, it recalls the points at which new weapon technologies have prompted legal responses in the form of treaties, declarations and other instruments. It concludes with the establishment of the International Criminal Court after discussing the two developments of most relevance to the book: the drafting of the Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the latter being the convention under which regulation of autonomous weapons is being debated. The second part discusses the public debate about autonomous weapons beginning with the growth of broad public interest in the early 2000s and the contributions of roboticists, ethicists and other academics. It then covers the involvement of the United Nations and ends by summarising the process by which the regulatory debate in connection with the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons began.
Chapter 4 examines state, federal and other studies that have documented how African Americans were particularly targeted for predatory and subprime lending, even when they qualified for traditional mortgages. It examines the historical links between racism and limited access to traditional mortgage lenders, and how this historical treatment fostered the subprime market. This chapter also explores the critically important question of why African Americans were targeted. No other community was targeted as aggressively as were black Americans. The chapter concludes with a discussion of continued victimization, and why African Americans harmed by predatory lending are not getting the help they need to begin to recover from the wealth drain that has damaged individuals, families, and entire communities.
Individuals often face administrative hurdles in attempting to access health care, public programmes, and other legal statuses and entitlements. These ordeals are the products, directly or indirectly, of institutional and policy design choices. I argue that evaluating whether such ordeals are justifiable or desirable instruments of social policy depends on assessing, beyond their targeting effects, the process-related burdens they impose on those attempting to navigate them and these burdens’ distributive effects. I here examine specifically how ordeals that levy time costs reduce and constrain individuals’ free time, and how such time-cost ordeals may thereby create, deepen and compound disadvantages.
Yet decades into the twenty-first century, the secularist, communitarian, and race-conscious orders’ hold upon America’s judicial institutions now appears increasingly shaky. Growing partisan alignment within America’s foundational struggles binds the fate of these orders closer to the fortunes of the Democratic Party. Republican Party power lends strength to individualist, accommodationist, and color-blind forces. Policy goals that were once likely to receive an unsympathetic hearing – whether white nativism, religious accommodation, or program privatization – are elevated by the Trump presidency. Hence, there is less need for individualists, accommodationists, and color-blind orders to attenuate the connection between the central government and these policy goals. They can pursue them openly. The passage, growth, and legal durability of doubly distanced tax credit scholarships since 2010 have given legal cover for policymakers and advocates to experiment with new forms of voucher program: education savings accounts (ESAs). ESAs are typically less attenuated in policy delivery than tax credit scholarships.
As will become evident through the course of this chapter, development in its human rights context is primarily a value that translates into individual and communal well-being. This well-being may be linked to industrial or other financial development, although the correlation between the two is neither self-evident nor necessary. If this right to well-being is to make a difference in the lives of people, whether in poor or rich nations, it must be susceptible to quantifiable measurement through which one is able to assess its progress and realisation. In the last decade experts have developed a list of detailed indicators which allow us to assess well-being more accurately. At the same time, wealthy nations have abandoned ad hoc unilateral efforts to assist their poorer neighbours to escape perpetual cycles of poverty by entering into institutionalised multilateral commitments to contribute part of their annual earnings to developmental goals. These goals are also vigorously pursued by multilateral development banks, such as the World Bank and the African Development Bank.
Federal agencies invest taxpayer dollars every year in conservation programs that are focused on improving a suite of ecosystem services produced on private lands. A better understanding of the public benefits generated by federal conservation programs could help improve governmental efficiency and economic welfare by providing science-based evidence for use in policy decision-making regarding targeting of federal conservation investments. Of specific concern here are conservation investments made by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). While previous research has shown that efficiency gains are possible using cost-benefit analysis for targeting conservation investments, agency-wide implementation of this approach by policy makers has been constrained by the limited availability of location-specific information regarding conservation benefits. Cost-effective opportunities for integrating location-specific ecosystem service valuation research with USDA conservation decision-making include: (1) institutionalizing funding of comparable studies suitable for benefit transfer, (2) utilizing non-traditional data sources for research complementing benefit transfer, and (3) creating a state-of-the-art program for developing and communicating research in ecosystem service valuation exemplifying the highest standards of scientific conduct.
What should be the role of law in response to the spread of artificial intelligence in war? Fuelled by both public and private investment, military technology is accelerating towards increasingly autonomous weapons, as well as the merging of humans and machines. Contrary to much of the contemporary debate, this is not a paradigm change; it is the intensification of a central feature in the relationship between technology and war: double elevation, above one’s enemy and above oneself. Elevation above one’s enemy aspires to spatial, moral, and civilizational distance. Elevation above oneself reflects a belief in rational improvement that sees humanity as the cause of inhumanity and de-humanization as our best chance for humanization. The distance of double elevation is served by the mechanization of judgement. To the extent that judgement is seen as reducible to algorithm, law becomes the handmaiden of mechanization. In response, neither a focus on questions of compatibility nor a call for a ‘ban on killer robots’ help in articulating a meaningful role for law. Instead, I argue that we should turn to a long-standing philosophical critique of artificial intelligence, which highlights not the threat of omniscience, but that of impoverished intelligence. Therefore, if there is to be a meaningful role for law in resisting double elevation, it should be law encompassing subjectivity, emotion and imagination, law irreducible to algorithm, a law of war that appreciates situated judgement in the wielding of violence for the collective.
This chapter sets out the importance of a children’s rights focused inquiry into the human rights obligation of business enterprises by drawing insights from various disciplines, including philosophy, psychology, sociology and medical sciences. It sets out childhood as a stage of rapid development, the disproportionate and different effects of harms during childhood and children’s rights as a remedy to children’s invisibility, lack of public voice and consultation. The characteristics of a children’s rights focus for businesses as human rights duty-bearers are sketched out and linked to the so-called general principles of children’s rights.
Micronutrient deficiencies are widespread and disproportionately affect women and children in low- and middle-income countries (LMIC). Among various interventions, food fortification and supplementation with micronutrients have been proven to be cost-effective. The aim of the present paper is to review existing literature to assess risks of excessive intake in LMIC to then highlight programmatic changes required to maximise benefits of micronutrient interventions while minimising risks of adverse effects. While very few LMIC have national food consumption surveys that can inform fortification programmes, many more are implementing mandatory fortification programmes. The risks of inadequate micronutrient intakes were common, but risks of excessive intakes were also present for iodine, vitamin A, folic acid and iron. Excessive salt consumption, high concentrations of iodine in ground-water and excessive levels of iodisation were linked with excessive iodine intake. For vitamin A, overlapping interventions were the main risk for excessive intake; whereas for iron, contamination with iron from soil and screw-wares of millers and high iron concentration in drinking-water increased the risk of excessive intake, which could be further exacerbated with fortification. Before implementing micronutrient interventions, adherence to the basic principles of documenting evidence confirming that the deficiency in question exists and that fortification will correct this deficiency is needed. This can be supported with dietary intake assessments and biochemical screening that help diagnose nutrient deficiencies. Targeting micronutrient interventions, although programmatically challenging, should be considered whenever possible. Moreover, closer monitoring of appropriate fortification of foods and overlapping interventions is needed.
Does International Humanitarian Law (IHL) impose a duty of care on the attacker? From a moral point of view, should it? This article argues that the legal situation is contestable, and the moral value of a legal duty of care in attack is ambivalent. This is because a duty of care is both a condition for and an obstacle to the ‘individualization of war’. The individualization of war denotes an observable multi-dimensional norm shift in international relations. Norms for the regulation of war that focus on the interests, rights, and duties of the individual have gained in importance compared to those that focus on the interests, rights, and duties of the state. As the individual, not the state, is the ultimate locus of moral value, this norm shift in international relations, and the corresponding developments in international law, are morally desirable. When it comes to IHL, the goal of protecting the interests of the individual creates strong reasons both for and against imposing a legal duty of care on the attacker. The enquiry into whether IHL does and should impose a legal duty of care therefore reveals that the extent to which war can be individualized is limited.
This article utilizes an original household survey of two regency-level elections in Indonesia to explore campaign targeting. It uses a list experiment to show that direct survey questions about accepting transfers from campaigns elicit honest responses from respondents in Indonesia. Although the relationship between income and whether a respondent accepted transfers from political campaigns decreases over the entire distribution of income, it increases initially, producing a curvilinear relationship between income and accepting transfers from campaigns. This article argues that the poorest voters face barriers to being targeted by campaigns. However, these barriers recede as they become relatively richer, at which point a negative relationship is found due to diminishing marginal utility of accepting these transfers. Finally, in-kind transfers, as opposed to cash transfers, target low-income voters more effectively.
Implementing the principles of international humanitarian law (IHL) represents a real challenge if the protection of civilians in today's urban armed conflicts remains a priority for armed forces. The application of the principle of distinction comes up against the difficulties of obtaining intelligence, in particular in the absence of troops on the ground. The minimalization of collateral damage requires putting in place very precise targeting procedures, and even the adoption of tactics designed to draw out traditional combat from cities. In terms of precautionary measures in attack or against the effects of an attack, these must be adapted to the context of urban combat. Nevertheless, IHL remains an essential instrument that must be analyzed and translated into action in a practical manner in order to conduct military operations that are at the same time effective and legally permissible.
The Gotovina case presented the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) with a unique opportunity to adjudicate on issues connected with the law of targeting and international humanitarian law (IHL) in a criminal context. This opportunity was especially important given the fact that legal issues arising out of complex, intense combat situations have only rarely been adjudicated. Although Gotovina was not formally charged with carrying out unlawful attacks on civilians, attacks by Croatia on four towns over the course of ‘Operation Storm’ were the focus of the proceedings. This led both Trial and Appeal Chambers to deal with issues related to the law of targeting such as classification of military objectives, proportionality, and the intent behind an attack. This article argues that the judges failed to take full advantage of the opportunity to discuss these issues. They failed consistently to articulate the legal reasoning behind their findings; they failed to explain the branch of law on which any of their substantive determinations were based; and, perhaps most importantly, they did not explain the relationship between IHL and criminal law and how IHL is to be applied in a courtroom.
The use of “drones” has grown exponentially over the past decade, giving rise to a host of legal and other issues. Internationally, it is the utilization of armed drones by States for the extraterritorial targeting of persons that has generated significant debate. This article attempts to outline some aspects of the relevant legal framework, with a focus on the international law applicable to drone strikes in situations of armed conflict. It briefly addresses the jus ad bellum and then centres on the jus in bello, addressing, in turn, questions related to when there is an armed conflict, what the rules on targeting are, who may be targeted and where persons may be targeted.
The nature of armed conflict has changed dramatically in recent decades. In particular, it is increasingly the case that hostilities now occur alongside ‘everyday’ situations. This has led to a pressing need to determine when a ‘conduct of hostilities’ model (governed by international humanitarian law – IHL) applies and when a ‘law enforcement’ model (governed by international human rights law – IHRL) applies. This, in turn, raises the question of whether these two legal regimes are incompatible or whether they might be applied in parallel. It is on this question that the current article focuses, examining it at the level of principle. Whilst most accounts of the principles underlying these two areas of law focus on humanitarian considerations, few have compared the role played by necessity in each. This article seeks to address this omission. It demonstrates that considerations of necessity play a prominent role in both IHL and IHRL, albeit with differing consequences. It then applies this necessity-based analysis to suggest a principled basis for rationalising the relationship between IHL and IHRL, demonstrating how this approach would operate in practice. It is shown that, by emphasising the role of necessity in IHL and IHRL, an approach can be adopted that reconciles the two in a manner that is sympathetic to their object and purpose.
This article tackles the tricky legal issues associated with autonomy and automation in attack. Having clarified the meanings of these notions, the implications of the rules of weapons law for such technologies are assessed. More challenging issues seem, however, to be raised by the law of targeting, and in particular by the evaluative assessments that are required of attackers, for example in relation to the precautions in attack prescribed by Additional Protocol I. How these rules can sensibly be applied when machines are undertaking such decision-making is therefore addressed. Human Rights Watch has called for a comprehensive ban on autonomous attack technologies and the appropriateness of such a proposal at the present stage of technological development is therefore assessed. The article then seeks to draw conclusions.
Promoted as a means of fueling markets and encouraging economic growth or recovery, cash transfers have become a popular approach to international assistance. The literature recognizes potential problems such as insecurity, corruption, misuse, gender inequality, market inflation, and ineffective targeting. We carried out population and beneficiary surveys in 1997 to evaluate the targeting of cash transfers in Bosnia soon after the end of the conflict.
The population survey visited a random sample of clusters from population registers in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Republika Srpska (RS). A directly administered questionnaire asked households whether they received any cash handouts from the Municipal Welfare Office in the last year, and, if so, for what purpose, the amount, and how they used the money. We calculated coverage and inclusion and exclusion errors of the program. The field team also identified cash transfers beneficiaries from official lists of the program and attempted to contact a random sample of them to ask about their experience.
It was not possible to confirm receipts of cash in one third of the sample of 840 named beneficiaries; 19% could not be traced and 17% of those found denied receiving any cash. In the general population survey of 7182 households, coverage rates with cash assistance (11% in BiH, 3% in RS) were at least 44% lower than those declared by the distribution agencies, with considerable variation between cantons. Exclusion errors were high: 83% of those eligible according to the program's income criterion did not receive any cash. Although sufficient cash was dispensed to reach every United Nations High Commission for Refugees priority 1 (most needy) household, only 13% of these households (278/2125) admitted receiving any cash. Inclusion errors were also high: 60% of all of those who received cash were not in the priority 1 category and 46% were not eligible according to the program's income criterion. Extrapolating from the population survey findings, we could only account for a maximum of US$4 million received by households in BiH and RS up to May 1997, of the US$16 million dispersed by the program up to that time.
Targeting of the cash transfers program was poor, with large inclusion and exclusion errors. Much of the disbursed cash apparently did not reach the intended beneficiaries and could not be accounted for. Agencies on the ground did not have the necessary skills to handle the disbursements or to train national organizations to do so. (Disaster Med Public Health Prepardness. 2013;7:232-240)
This text is an inquiry into how the international community is understood in and through international law. My prism for this inquiry shall be the principle of proportionality in international humanitarian law, relating expected civilian losses to anticipated military advantage. To properly understand proportionality, I have to revert to the structure of analogical thinking in the thomistic tradition. Proportionality presupposes a third element to which civilian losses and military advantage can be related. In a first reading, I develop how this tradition of thought might explain the difficulties contemporary IHL doctrine has in understanding proportionality. If military commanders misconceive the third element as the sovereignty of their own state, they will invariably apply the proportionality principle in a paternalistic manner. This would obviate the most rudimentary idea of equality among states and do away with the common of an international community. In a second reading, I shall explore whether this third element could instead be thought of as a demos, while retaining the existing framework of analogical thinking. My argument is that this secularizing replacement is possible. Practically, its consequence would be a radical change in the task of the responsible military commander determining proportionality. That commander would now need to rethink civilians endangered by an attack as a demos whose potentiality must be preserved.