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The coastal region of Guangdong Province, China, is characterized by well-developed dyke swarms. The dykes with widths of decimetres to metres and lengths of tens of metres occur along straight and planar fractures cutting granites or volcanic rocks with Jurassic to Early Cretaceous ages. They show steep attitudes with strikes varying from NNW to NNE and from NE to SE, consistent with a stress regime transition from E–W to N–S extension. Major-element analysis on representative dyke samples reveals a composition range from basaltic to andesitic with a few dacitic outliers. Trace elements of most samples show notable Nb–Ta negative anomalies and Pb positive anomalies on the primitive mantle normalized spidergrams, characteristic of arc-related rocks. Among these, several dacite samples show notable fractionated medium rare earth elements and heavy rare earth elements and high Sr/Y (47–74) and La/Yb (15–21) ratios indicative of adakitic affinity. A few samples lack anomalies in Nb and Ta and have primitive trace-element ratios (e.g. Nb/La and Sr/Nd) or initial ϵNd values resembling ocean island basalt-like rocks. Rare earth element distribution patterns of all samples are right inclined and generally absent of Eu anomalies, which together with other trace-element indexes indicate an origin from heterogeneous mantle sources with depths below the stability field of plagioclase. Radiogenic isotopes, especially those of Nd and Sr (or Nd–Pb), define an array extended from the depleted to enriched mantle (EMII) provenance. LA-ICP-MS dating of zircon obtains ages between 110 and 70 Ma indicating emplacement of these dykes in latest Early to Late Cretaceous time, a time just before initiation of the South China Sea basin. In the context of regional geodynamics, it is proposed that these dykes were formed in a tectonic setting transiting from a Pacific-related back-arc to a passive continental margin pertaining to the development of the South China Sea basin.
This article presents the study of ambiguity as the essence of hybrid warfare to reconcile it with the international political context. It addresses the gaps in the literature in an effort to elucidate the essence of hybrid warfare not as a separate concept, but rather as the symptom of a changing political environment. The analysis of the literature is reinforced by two case studies: the war in eastern Ukraine of 2014 and the South China Sea dispute. Both these case studies express ambiguity in the combination of kinetic and non-kinetic means used to achieve political objectives. The article rests on three pillars that constitute the architecture of the central argument. The first pillar will address the gap in the current literature on hybrid warfare and how the current debate is too concerned with conflict dynamics rather than its political nature. The second pillar will delineate the essence, characteristics, and value of ambiguity in hybrid warfare. The third pillar will address the practice of hybrid warfare as the conduct of war by great powers.
In this chapter Germany’s positions on Antarctica, the law of the sea and on air and space law are examined. Concerning the law of the sea, Germany’s response to the Turkey-Libya memorandum of understanding is criticised as one-sided. Further, Germany’s position on migrant rescue operations in the Mediterranean are addressed and criticised as often vague or inexistent. Regarding the South China Sea dispute, it is asserted that Germany takes a more outspoken and active position while avoiding an open and direct confrontation with China. In light of the increasing importance of the Arctic region, Germany developed new policy guidelines in which more restrictive regulation is advocated. In the last part, air and space law, Germany’s activities in preventing an arms race in outer space are addressed, paying particular attention to United Nations negotiations. Moreover, Germany’s criticism of India over an anti-satellite missile test is evaluated as a call for a legally binding instrument prohibiting the destruction of space objects.
China's maritime militia groups have attracted much scholarly attention in recent years. Systematically funded and trained by the Chinese authorities, the militia groups help advance China's maritime claims but risk both intended and unintended physical clashes at sea. Based on the 2001 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, this study explores the possibility of establishing and recognizing China's state responsibility in relation to the internationally wrongful conduct of its maritime militia. China's maritime militia groups blur the line between fishing boats and naval forces. In essence, they are empowered to perform the critical function of the Chinese government as provided by Chinese internal laws. As shown by emerging evidence, China's maritime militia groups are also instructed, directed, and/or controlled by the Chinese state organs including military authority and party leadership, both central and local. This study finds that the conduct of Chinese maritime militia constitutes the breach of China's international obligations in terms of (1) due regard for other states, (2) maritime safety, (3) marine environment protection and preservation, and/or (4) the overfishing ban.
This chapter introduces the book and its main arguments. It first discusses the International Relations debate over China’s rise, and its limitations. The debate is polarised between those depicting China as a revisionist actor, or as supporting the status quo. The debate is at an impasse because evidence exists on both sides. What is needed is a framework that can account for both sorts of behaviour. This requires rejecting the assumption that China is a monolithic actor pursuing a coherent grand strategy. In reality, since the late 1970s, the Chinese party-state has become fragmented, decentralised and internationalised, greatly expanding the range of actors involved in China’s foreign affairs. Because these actors are only loosely coordinated within a Chinese-style regulatory state, this produces a wide range of international outcomes that do not necessarily reflect top leaders’ intentions. The chapter also outlines the structure and contents of the rest of the book.
This chapter presents the book’s first case study: the South China Sea (SCS). Typically, the SCS is seen as a geopolitical struggle for sovereignty and territory, prompting military tensions and power balancing, and as a major security flashpoint that could spark World War III. This chapter shows that Chinese conduct in the SCS is shaped less by a detailed strategy determined in Beijing and more by struggles for power and resources within the transformed Chinese party-state. Reflecting the model described in Chapter One, Chinese conduct is only loosely guided by the poorly-defined nine-dash line and an injunction to balance the maintenance of stability and the protection of maritime rights, which are often contradictory objectives. This has created wide latitude for maritime actors – including the navy, coastguard agencies, the national oil companies and the Hainan provincial government and associated fishing interests – to promote their sectional interests, with often very negative consequences for China’s wider diplomatic objectives. Xi Jinping’s efforts to rein in competing actors has only partially succeeded. Although China’s position in the SCS has overall strengthened, it has done so in a rather unplanned manner and consequently at considerable cost.
This chapter elaborates the theoretical and methodological approach used in this book. Guided by Gramscian state theory, we trace the post-1978 rise of a powerful, though divided, cadre-capitalist class, and the associated, uneven and contested fragmentation, decentralisation and internationalisation of China’s party-state. We then elaborate a theoretical model capable of explaining how policymaking and implementation work under these changed conditions: the Chinese-style regulatory state. In this model, rather than making detailed, binding decisions and strategies, top leaders try to loosely steer and coordinate a plethora of actors towards favoured ends. But other actors can influence, interpret and even ignore these policy frameworks. Chinese behaviours thus represent an ongoing struggle within the fractured party-state. Outcomes are further shaped by socio-political dynamics within the other countries in which Chinese actors operate. The chapter also explains our method and case selection, and canvasses and rejects some predictable objections to our argument: that China’s state transformation is nothing new, and that recentralisation under Xi Jinping has made the state transformation argument outdated.
Is China's rise a threat to international order? Fractured China shows that it depends on what one means by 'China', for China is not the monolithic, unitary actor that many assume. Forty years of state transformation – the fragmentation, decentralisation and internationalisation of party-state apparatuses – have profoundly changed how its foreign policy is made and implemented. Today, Chinese behaviour abroad is often not the product of a coherent grand strategy, but results from a sometimes-chaotic struggle for power and resources among contending politico-business interests, within a surprisingly permissive Chinese-style regulatory state. Presenting a path-breaking new analytical framework, Fractured China transforms the central debate in International Relations and provides new tools for scholars and policymakers seeking to understand and respond to twenty-first century rising powers. Drawing on extensive fieldwork in China and Southeast Asia, it includes three major case studies – the South China Sea, non-traditional security cooperation, and development financing–to demonstrate the framework's explanatory power.
Chapter 8 focuses on State practice, with an emphasis on acts taken unilaterally by States in disputed maritime areas, due to which a conflict has arisen in bilateral relations. To provide the most complete picture of acts undertaken unilaterally in disputed waters, examples have been collected from two types of disputes: first, where disputes to title to territory underlie the disputed maritime areas; and, second, where overlapping claims to maritime zones exist. Unilateral conduct in disputed maritime areas is not exclusively concentrated to certain parts of the world. Varying extents of conflicts are created in State practice when activities under the authority of the coastal State – including concessioning, seismic work, exploratory drilling, exploitation, marine scientific research and fisheries activities – are undertaken unilaterally in a disputed maritime area. Reacting to such a unilateral act is often seen as vital by a claimant State, and these reactions can take various forms, including law enforcement. Acting in response might be a double-edged sword, however, as this reaction can sometimes set in motion a spiral of action and reaction, whereby each State feels obligated to react to the other’s act, so as to defend their sovereign rights and interests.
Disputes where title over high-tide features or mainland territory is disputed are not uncommon in the international legal landscape. Two sets of overlapping claims are created in disputes in which the issues of dispute to title and disputed waters are combined: one set that pertains to the land territory as such, and the other to the maritime zones the land territory is entitled to. Sovereignty claims by States to a high-tide feature or land territory are almost invariably followed by making claims to the maritime zones that they are entitled to, thereby creating a second layer of overlapping claims that relate to the adjacent waters. But what are the rights and obligations of States in disputed waters located off disputed land territory? This chapter establishes the implications that follow from that there is a combination of the elements of sovereignty and the claiming of maritime zones from the same basepoints of a disputed land territory, for identifying the applicable legal framework in disputed waters off its coast. For example, the applicability of Articles 74(3) and 83(3) LOSC is limited in cases where claims are measured from the same disputed land territory, creating disputed waters in the process.
This paper examines the use of a specific international legal fiction. It is claimed that a legal fiction was confirmed by the Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration (2016). The paper asks whether this is an effective legal fiction. The paper will argue that this is not so, pointing to the difficulties that the fiction necessarily creates. From this example, lessons may be learned of the phenomenon of legal fictions of international law generally, and, crucially, of their effectiveness.
Provisional arrangements are a legal tool that provides states with an option for utilising fisheries and offshore hydrocarbon resources in a mutually acceptable way where they are unable to reach a maritime boundary agreement. The aim of this chapter is threefold: to illustrate that such arrangements are effective in preventing violent escalation of maritime disputes, to examine how provisional arrangements operate in practice, and to examine what legal issues may arise in reaching such arrangements. First, the chapter highlights several practical examples of incidents in and outside areas covered by provisional arrangements. It then argues that the obligation to negotiate and the obligation of restraint under Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea are complementary and interrelated. Finally, the chapter examines the legal aspects of politically sensitive issues involved in negotiating provisional arrangements: the definition of the area for provisional arrangements and the question of excluding prejudice by the arrangement to the parties’ claims.
This research report traces the history of route books (genglubu) from their chance discovery in 1974. It assesses the credibility of these practical nautical guide books as historical sources employed by official agencies in mainland China to claim permanent Chinese occupation of islands in the South China Sea. The route books of Hainan fishermen have a rather short history, having been laid down in writing only in the early 20th century. As contemporary practical nautical guides, they complement the established order of pre-modern Chinese texts used in official publications to describe the South China Sea as historical Chinese territory.
Radiocarbon (14C) generated by the thermonuclear tests in the late 1950s to early 1960s has been used as a tracer to study atmospheric and oceanic circulations, carbon exchange between different reservoirs, and fossil fuel emissions. Here we report the first measurements of 14C in atmospheric CO2 of maritime air collected over the South China Sea (SCS) during July 2014. We also present 14C of the dissolved inorganic carbon (DIC) in the sea surface water in the same region. Most of the Δ14C values of the atmospheric CO2 vary in the range of 15.6±1.6‰– 22.0±1.6‰, indicating that the central SCS maritime air is well-mixed and consistent with the clean background air in the Northern Hemisphere. The 14C values of the DIC (DI14C) in the surface seawater vary between 28.3±2.5‰ and 40.6±2.7‰, mainly due to the lateral mixing between the SCS and western Pacific. The average surface seawater DI14C is 15.4 ± 5.1‰ higher than that of the maritime air 14CO2. The reversal of the sea–air Δ14C gradient occurred at ∼2000, marking the start of the upper ocean transferring bomb 14C back to the atmosphere in the SCS.
Most analyses of China's foreign and security policies treat China as a unitary actor, assuming a cohesive grand strategy articulated by Beijing. I challenge this conventional wisdom, showing how Chinese provinces can affect the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. This contributes to existing research on the role of subnational actors in China, which has focused on how they shape domestic and economic policies. Using Hainan and Yunnan as case studies, I identify three mechanisms of provincial influence – trailblazing, carpetbagging, and resisting – and illustrate them with examples of key provincial policies. This analysis provides a more nuanced argument than is commonly found in international relations for the motivations behind evolving and increasingly activist Chinese foreign policy. It also has important policy implications for understanding and responding to Chinese behaviour, in the South China Sea and beyond.
China’s broad geopolitical strategy and positioning for global influence includes its averred legal position in relation to its sovereignty and jurisdiction in the South China Sea. A response to this legal position was the Philippines’ initiation of arbitral proceedings constituted under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Despite the non-participation of China in these proceedings, the arbitral decision of 2016 clarified a number of legal provisions pertinent to the ongoing territorial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea. This decision impacted directly on China’s assertion of sovereign and jurisdictional historical title or rights, which, in part, relies on evidence obtained from underwater cultural heritage and the associated maritime archaeology. This article critically evaluates China’s maritime archaeology program and its policy with respect to underwater cultural heritage in light of the 2016 arbitral decision and the underlying international law of the sea. While recognizing that China’s policy is not inconsistent with its broader heritage policy, and its national approach to the protection of underwater cultural heritage, this article argues that this cannot be used to support China’s South China Sea claims and is not only misplaced, such as to pose a risk to the archaeological record, but also inconstant with international developments in the form of the 2001 United Nations Convention of the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage.
A solely legalistic analysis of China’s South China Sea claims has given way to speculation regarding their exact nature. Scholars and the tribunal in Philippines v China have collectively described China’s position as “ambiguous” and “vague.” For others, China’s regulatory framework sets dangerous new precedents in the areas of effective occupation, historic rights, and exclusive economic zones. This article seeks to nuance these assessments. Contextualizing China’s framework within a broader geopolitical project reveals a China exploiting historic legal precedents in a manner reminiscent of imperial America. This should cast doubt on those too quick to see China as a rule-breaking new power eager to upset international norms. Rather, China’s “Caribbean” is a microcosm for a new great power coming into its own following an existing model.
Ambassador Ong Keng Yong is the Executive Deputy Chairman of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at the Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. Concurrently, he is Ambassador-at-Large at the Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs, non-resident High Commissioner to Pakistan and non-resident Ambassador to Iran. He also serves as Chairman of the Singapore International Foundation. Mr Ong served as Secretary-General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, based in Jakarta, Indonesia, from January 2003 to January 2008. In this interview, the Ambassador reflects on some issues of particular concern with regard to war and security at sea in the region of Southeast and East Asia.
China's growing assertiveness in strengthening its territorial and sovereignty claims in the South China Sea has arguably intensified friction and deepened tension between the rival claimant States. In sharp contrast to the strong reactions of its fellow ASEAN claimants, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, Malaysia traditionally has been less critical and more inclined to downplay China's perceived emotive actions. This subtle foreign policy orientation is likely to remain unchanged in the immediate future. Malaysian leaders are aware of the need to continue adopting a more cautious but pragmatic approach to counter China's increasingly aggressive actions in the Spratly Islands. Because of the significant economic and political benefits derived from its close relationships with China, Malaysia's policy preference is aimed to avoid jeopardizing such relations. However, the growing presence of Chinese military vessels in Malaysia's waters in recent years has forced the latter to reassess its foreign policy approach, which might include adopting a more assertive stance towards China. Set against this backdrop, this article aims to give an exploratory insight into Malaysia's external behaviour and actions in response to China's recent growing aggressiveness in the South China Sea. To this end, the aim of this article is achieved through a twofold approach. First, it examines Malaysia's overlapping claims to maritime features and waters with China, with the focus on the Spratly Islands group. Lastly, the article provides an explorative insight of Malaysia's rationalist stance, particularly under the current administration of Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak, in response to China's aggressiveness. It also examines the motivations, intentions, and basis of this external posture.
Admirers of ASEAN are impressed with the fact that it continues to exist and that an outright war has never broken out between its members. Also often praised is the value to the region of promoting cooperation through the consensual process known as the ‘ASEAN Way’. If ASEAN is a talk shop, these observers say, talking is at least better than fighting. ASEAN's increasingly numerous and vocal critics reply that by valuing process more than product, consensus over accomplishment, the organization is failing to respond to urgent real-world challenges in Asia. Not least among such challenges is Chinese expansion in the South China Sea (SCS) and the stated intention of incoming US president Donald Trump to pull his country out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Only four ASEAN members have claims in the SCS and only four are in the TPP, but the sea's and the treaty's futures matter for the rest of the region as well. The fact of Chinese advancement and the risk of American disengagement are endangering the autonomy and relevance of ASEAN, not to mention the repercussions of Sino-American escalation. Already weakened by internal dissensus, the group's ability to negotiate as a group with China on maritime security has been blocked by Beijing's insistence on bilateral talks. Chinese material largesse has coopted Cambodia into vetoing any ASEAN agreement to restrain, moderate, or even question China's designs on the heartwater of Southeast Asia. The ASEAN Way is being used against ASEAN itself. Heightened uncertainty as to America's future role in and commitment to the region further heightens security concern. In its 50th anniversary year, Southeast Asians would do well to think outside the increasingly marginalised, internally divided, and procedurally restricted box that ASEAN has become. Three ideas already in circulation illustrate the kind of creativity that ASEAN will need if it is to sustain its acknowledged historical success in fashioning an independent political and economic identity for Southeast Asia.