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The transition from a foraging lifestyle to structured political systems is one of the most momentous changes in the history of our species. This chapter reviews the various parameters that changed as a result of the transition to agriculture, including health, wealth, and power structures. There are a considerable number of debates over this transition, as researchers studying health, violence, political and personal power, and gender equity have studied it, with significant political implications in disciplines such as anthropology, economics, political science, and gender studies.
Chapter 8 discusses the processes involved in building and maintaining satisfactory relationships. It covers politeness theory, facework, morality, and how these contribute to relationship homeostasis.
The relationship between Gilles Deleuze and Samuel Beckett has excited many scholars and continues to be of major interest today. This article explores the Deleuzian concept of multiplicity by considering quantitative and qualitative multiplicities in Beckett’s work. In differentiating between these two types, Deleuze and Félix Guattari indicate that extensive or quantitative multiplicities are essentially numerical and can be counted and represented in space. This form of multiplicity is seen in Beckett’s use of various lists of items such as Molloy counting his sucking stones or Watt considering how to dispose of Mr Knott’s food. Qualitative multiplicities, by contrast, cannot be counted because they differ in kind from one another. They are represented in duration and are here observed in the minorization of language in How It Is, among other examples. S. E. Wilmer is Professor Emeritus of Drama at Trinity College in Dublin. His most recent publications include Performing Statelessness in Europe (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018) and (with co-editor Radek Przedpełski) Deleuze, Guattari, and the Art of Multiplicity (Edinburgh University Press, 2020). He is currently co-editing the Palgrave Handbook of Theatre and Migration.
The extent to which value assessments are uniquely deployed in any given geographic setting is variable. Increasingly, markets are seeking insights from external health technology assessments (HTAs) to assist with decisions surrounding the adoption of new technologies. We reviewed the environment, infrastructure, and practice of value assessment in six countries, with a focus on how these elements influence the transferability of value assessments between settings.
We reviewed the diverse settings in which six organizations conducting HTA operate, and explored how differences might affect the transferability of value assessment. We focused attention on Australia’s Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee, China’s National Center for Medicine and HTA, Germany’s Institut für Qualität und Wirtschaftlichkeit im Gesundheitswesen, Japan’s Center for Outcomes Research and Economic Evaluation for Health (Core 2 Health), the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence in England and Wales, and the Institute for Clinical and Economic Review in the United States.
HTA is adopted to address unique objectives for a given health system and is tailored to support local standards and preferences. Some elements of a value assessment, such as evidence on clinical effectiveness, may be more transferable than others. It is challenging to appropriately adjust external assessments to the local context.
Contextual differences influence both the role and application of HTA. These differences limit the transferability of value assessments from one setting to another. De novo appraisals, customized to the local decision context, are the ideal approach to determinations about value.
How did the Gestapo enforce laws governing criticism? Recent historiography highlights denunciation driven policing as well as the overrepresentation of Communists and Jews in cases taken to trial. A system of selective enforcement is well-established fact, but the dynamics remain unclear. Enemies of the People randomly samples two categories of “criminal opinion” to capture the changing decision-making processes behind routine investigation, interrogation, and enforcement practices. Five arguments take shape. First, a conscious policy of selective enforcement based on political reliability as defined by standing within the Nazi people’s community. Second, the system punished subversive motive rather than actions. Third, political police viewed targeted minorities as subversives, privileged minorities as supporters, and carefully investigated “politically colourless” Germans. Fourth, from 1935 to 1944, the Gestapo behaved as an ordinary detective service when investigating individual Germans. Fifth, selective enforcement involved state prosecutors and the Party through five configurations. The violence of revolution and collapse were bookends on a decade of much cooler suppression.
After Stalingrad, the Gestapo only dealt with critics the Party identified as threats. Case load dropped 76 per cent while charges under capital offences rose to a rate of one-in-three. Yet selective enforcement continued. Each institution took on different roles. The Gestapo relied on political officials to warn loyal offenders and identify subversives. The Party singled out repeat offenders when education failed, and case officers rubber-stamped their preliminary investigations. The judiciary could then punish anything that filtered up with lengthy deterrent sentences. New roles shaped new standards and practices. The damning classification of “doubtful attitudes” blurred lines between defeatism and subversion. Distinctions between actions and motive disappeared for repeat offenders. Investigation practices also sharpened as focus narrowed to targeted minorities and opinionmakers. Surveillance and torture were used in any case with the slightest hint of organized resistance. Sentencing practices followed in step. Leftist slogans were once again treason, and Marxists who encouraged surrender risked execution. The dangers multiplied for a select few deemed opponents by the Party.
The Gestapo gradually wrested enforcement authority from the courts between 1935 and 1939. A conflict over jurisdiction played out in national journals as the political police asserted a mandate of prevention. At first, case officers reported findings to prosecutors without commentary. After Himmler became Chief of German Police in June 1936, the Gestapo routinely withheld cases with insufficient evidence to convict and even dropped charges against a few remarkably loyal offenders in extraordinary circumstances. Enforcement authority remained with prosecutors in most cases. The Party and the Ministry of Justice exercised joint discretion built into the law to target highly public offences, recidivists, and political opponents presumed to be subversives. But the Gestapo increasingly encroached by prescribing a desired outcome in the case summary. Political police used these “recommendations,” backed by the power of protective custody, to gradually assert control over enforcement decisions by the judiciary. By 1939, the Gestapo determined who deserved to be punished based on their character, while the courts determined who could be punished based on available evidence.
The means of detection determined investigation and interrogation practices. Conspiratorial networks and targeted minorities were vulnerable to surveillance and infiltration in ways that society was not. Distinct groups with organized structures could be mapped to uncover organized resistance. Policing criticism was sisyphean by comparison. Blanket surveillance was neither realistic nor desirable. Practically, general suspicion threatened popular support. Ideologically, the police were to cooperate with racial comrades. Faced with limited resources and an impossible task, the Gestapo relied on Germans to denounce opponents in their midst. The Party played an integral role to this end. On the one hand, it screened accusations and channeled reports to the Gestapo. On the other, its officials reported a fifth of critics and encouraged others to do the same. These intermediaries dismissed minor offences, yet the Gestapo ultimately relied on denouncers with mixed motives. Highly questionable evidence documented potentially serious incidents. The Gestapo investigated critics thoroughly and cautiously as a result.
The Gestapo balanced the scales of justice with the weights of people’s community from 1939 to 1942. Political police resolved twice as many cases while state prosecutors’ workload, but not conviction rates, dropped by a third. The Gestapo evaluated “political reliability” based on a range of socio-political behaviours distinguishing upstanding “racial comrades,” who embodied the values of people’s community, from subversive opponents who either rejected Nazism or embraced alien ideologies. Supporters might complain, but they sincerely apologized, cooperated, and usually conformed. Subversives advocated alternatives. At best, repeat offenders were simply chronic complainers. Private exchanges might be overlooked, but repeated public criticism was intolerable. Hinting toward a change of government was utterly unforgivable. Supporters who acted in “momentary weakness” received “psychological understanding” and educational warnings. Subversives who called for regime change, swayed other against Nazism, or were connected to targeted minorities faced the courts. Himmler’s mandate “to create and uphold the desired order” of a people’s community was finally being realized.
This chapter begins with existing explanations for rights informality: weak state capacity, left-wing ideology, and competing state goals. It then develops a theory for understanding why governments that distribute land often withhold property rights, presiding over widespread rural property informality for long periods, and why other governments grant more secure property rights over land. Authoritarian regimes tend to redistribute land from large landowners to peasants but withhold property rights. Democracies often grant property rights to beneficiaries of previous land reforms but do not redistribute additional property. This difference is driven by how political regimes empower or disempower landed elites and peasants, differences in institutional powers, and constraints that political elites face, and the incentives of incumbency and political competition. Democracies are better at channeling popular demands into policy. But policies can also be blocked by the powerful in a legislature. Finally, foreign pressure during economic crisis can force a country to turn to international financial institutions for help. Privatization and greater security of property rights can be a condition for support.
Conflict and Social Control in Late Antiquity examines how the cultivation and application of violence across a range of ‘small worlds’ contributed to the making of society in the late Roman period. From households and families to schoolrooms and monasteries, chapters address the different roles that violence played in maintaining and reinforcing the social order, even during a period of intense religious and political change. Elites adopted a range of approaches – formal and informal, legal and illegal, private and public – to keep subordinates in their place. Especially important were the efforts of social elites to inculcate in their followers the idea that the social order was natural rather than contingent, and therefore should not be challenged but rather perpetuated. Chapters focus on written sources from the fourth and fifth centuries, mainly on Christian authors. Collectively, they show that rather than seeking to transform the fortunes of those who were most vulnerable in society (slaves, women, children), such writers drew creatively on pre-existing discursive traditions, in the process reproducing and (occasionally) attempting to mitigate the plight of the downtrodden.
Social Control in Late Antiquity: The Violence of Small Worlds explores the small-scale communities of late antiquity – households, monasteries, and schools – where power was a question of personal relationships. When fathers, husbands, teachers, abbots, and slave-owners asserted their own will, they saw themselves as maintaining the social order, and expected law and government to reinforce their rule. Naturally, the members of these communities had their own ideas, and teaching them to 'obey their betters' was not always a straightforward business. Drawing on a wide variety of sources from across the late Roman Mediterranean, from law codes and inscriptions to monastic rules and hagiography, the book considers the sometimes conflicting identities of women, slaves, and children, and documents how they found opportunities for agency and recognition within a system built on the unremitting assertion of the rights of the powerful.
Social order in the Navy was produced vertically through formal institutions and professional practices that usually assured good governance. It was also produced horizontally through informal mechanisms that knitted seamen to one another, provided leadership and enabled cooperation. This social order could be fragile, however. Poor governance fomented grievances and incidents of misrule focused existing grievances on commanders. As grievances mounted, the informal groups that gave coherence to seamen’s lives provide a basis for protest. The challenge for seamen was coordinating a response and attaining the solidarity necessary to achieve their collective goals.
Mutiny tells us much about threats to social order and the exercise of command. Attaining social order in so large and complex an enterprise as the Royal Navy was no small feat. Inspired by now-classic explorations of social order at sea, our study explains how order was attained in the Navy and why it sometimes broke down. In addition to correcting many misperceptions about mutiny that traditional approaches have fostered, our book explores why people commit to participate in dangerous collective action, exploring the roles of grievances, coordination, leadership and dynamic mobilization processes.
Perceived threats to established social order can influence the willingness of those in authority to inflict punishments as well as the severity of those punishments. This chapter analyzes the case of summary punishment by flogging in the Royal Navy. Eighteenth-century reforms were intended to rationalize and normalize flogging and limit its severity. However, naval commanders saw the established order under attack after 1789 and, emphasizing moral offenses, imposed tighter discipline on their crews. Our analysis shows that greater penal severity is associated with several factors, including a period effect associated with the onset of the revolutionary age. Our findings are consistent with research that suggests that disorder influences the willingness to punish.
What is crime? What is deviance? Who is a criminal? Who are deviants? Understanding the terms crime, deviance and norms is an essential starting point for anyone wishing to engage with the wide range of explanations available for the causes, and by extension the responses developed by societies to address behaviours categorised as ‘criminal’ or ‘deviant’. In this chapter we will explore the following assertions: that crime and deviance are social constructs; that explanations for crime and deviance are best understood as theories; and that ‘social control’ that is, responses to behaviours categorised as criminal or deviant, are politicised. Those behaviours that end up receiving ‘punishment’ or social disapproval are not always the behaviours that cause the greatest ‘harm’ to societies.
The Age of Sail has long fascinated readers, writers, and the general public. Herman Melville, Joseph Conrad, Jack London et al. treated ships at sea as microcosms; Petri dishes in which larger themes of authority, conflict and order emerge. In this fascinating book, Pfaff and Hechter explore mutiny as a manifestation of collective action and contentious politics. The authors use narrative evidence and statistical analysis to trace the processes by which governance failed, social order decayed, and seamen mobilized. Their findings highlight the complexities of governance, showing that it was not mere deprivation, but how seamen interpreted that deprivation, which stoked the grievances that motivated rebellion. Using the Age of Sail as a lens to examine topics still relevant today - what motivates people to rebel against deprivation and poor governance - The Genesis of Rebellion: Governance, Grievance, and Mutiny in the Age of Sail helps us understand the emergence of populism and rejection of the establishment.
Since 1978, we have observed the steady development of institutions, mechanisms and processes of dispute resolution in China. In the last ten years or so, we then noted frequent issuance of new rules and measures as well as revision of existing laws, the promotion of mediation as the preferred method for resolving disputes and, more recently, the promotion of an integrated dispute-resolution system as a national strategy for comprehensive social control (as well as for resolving disputes), in the name of reforming and strengthening ‘the Mechanism for Pluralist Dispute Resolution’. Careful examination of these latest developments suggests that fundamental changes are taking place that may potentially alter the course of the development of the Chinese dispute-resolution system. These developments are the focus of this paper with an aim to ascertain the nature of the developments and their future direction or directions.
This chapter discusses the impact of collective culpability after the Korean War from a microhistocial perspective. It situates the proliferation of this technology of societal control within the broader Cold War global politics and offers a critical review of Michel Foucault’s thoughts on modern disciplinary technology.
This article investigates the history of the Progressive Era effort to develop new techniques and technologies of control over American business and corporations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A revolution in Progressive economic regulation was rooted in the intellectual work of the so-called institutional economists—particularly in the context of what economists and lawyers like Richard Ely, John Commons, and Walton Hamilton ultimately talked about as the movement for the “social control” of business, with distinct emphasis on the legal and regulatory “foundations” of modern capitalism. With increased attention to dynamics rather than statics, the real social economy rather than ideal rational actors, and historical and institutional rather than theoretical and abstract renderings of business, industry, and the market, the institutionalists were directly concerned with problems of control, particularly those mechanisms of control available through law, politics, the state, and new technologies of legislative and administrative regulation.