This chapter considers self-help remedies, which involve the plaintiff making good her own rights without the intervention of the judiciary. The focus of this book is on remedies that are awarded pursuant to a judicial order. However, an exclusive consideration of judicial remedies would ignore the fact that most disputes are settled outside the courts and that most parties prefer non-judicial settlements. It may be queried whether self-help remedies are really remedies in the strict sense of the word. They do not involve a court order; instead, the court gives permission to a plaintiff to act in a particular way. Nevertheless, in a broader sense, the plaintiff is allowed to redress her grievance by vindicating her own rights. By allowing a plaintiff to redress her rights in this way, the law affirms and reinforces the importance of certain interests. As noted in Ch 13, Varuhas has observed that the interests protected by vindicatory awards are often associated with the torts actionable per se.

In a tort action, if the plaintiff’s claims are successful and no relevant defences are available to the defendant, the plaintiff will be entitled to an order or award by the court for an appropriate remedy. Such judicial remedies include:

• damages

• injunctions

• declarations.

In addition, self-help remedies are available and include:

• eviction of trespassers and re-entry of land

• self-defence

• abatement

• apology.

  The focus of this chapter will be on judicial remedies, especially damages.

While the focus of this casebook is on remedies that are awarded pursuant to a judicial order, most disputes are settled outside court. Of course, self-help remedies are not remedies in the strict sense of the word, because they do not involve court orders; rather the court gives the plaintiff permission to act in a particular way. It could be said that the plaintiff is vindicating her own rights. However, courts prefer to ensure that ‘self-help’ is exercised reasonably.

The author examines the impact of blockchain and smart contracts on the legal profession. After all, the lawyer is entitled to draft smart contracts. For a few years now, in information technology, the lawyer has promoted the writing of so-called agile contracts in connection with projects run by “agileȁ methods. However, the smart contract, whether described as a contract or simple algorithm, challenges the lawyer by its philosophy (“code is law”) and by its writers who are no longer jurists but developers. He discusses whether this technology will be “killing off” the legal profession. Before over-hastily assuming this apocalyptic demise of the lawyer, the author suggests to think about the role and the status of the lawyer in his general mission of advice and defense, and considers whether information technology can be a substitute for the lawyer or simply a new tool that could be used.