We explain the fundamentals of PLC network management and security. We describe how privacy and security are guaranteed in PLC. We introduce guidelines for configuring security keys in commercial PLC devices. Finally, we discuss potential issues with PLC security and compare PLC with Wi-Fi from a physical-layer and security-protocols perspective.

In this chapter, we summarize the content of our book and we discuss current limitations of PLC technology. Buidling on these limitations, we highlight new research areas for residential and enterprise PLC networks.

Chapter 14 presents a new interpretation of the peacemaking and reordering process that unfolded at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. It argues that it was not only the most complex process of its kind in history but also, at the core, a process that was dominated by the struggle to negotiate the underpinnings and ground-rules of a new Atlantic order – which in turn had far-reaching global repercussions. Taking into account the unprecedented multiplicity of governmental and non-governmental actors who tried to influence this process in and beyond Paris it sheds new light on how the peace negotiations ultimately came to be shaped by the interests, concepts and strategies of those who led and represented the most powerful states after the war: Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau – and their main advisers. And it opens up new perspectives on why the first truly modern peacemaking process remained in crucial respects incomplete. It shows that while the principal “peacemakers” began to learn how to forge complex compromises under the challenging conditions of 1919 what they ultimately managed to negotiate could not lay firm and legitimate foundations for a sustainable Atlantic, and global, peace order.

Chapter 9 provides the most comprehensive appraisal yet not just of the unparalleled range of pressing problems but also of the underlying structural and systemic challenges that the principal peacemakers confronted in the aftermath of the Great War. In particular, it throws into relief that by the end of 1918 not only eastern Europe had to be fundamentally reorganised after the collapse of the eastern empires and, crucially, the cardinal German question had to be settled in a new way but also, and above all, the need had arisen to create, for the first time, a functioning Atlantic order that included both the old and new European states and the newly pivotal American power. At the same time, it argues that the war had radically changed the international, national and transnational conditions in which a peace settlement had to be negotiated and cardinal decisions about the shape of the postwar order had to be made. And it shows that the unprecedented catastrophe had given rise to unprecedentedly far-reaching – and conflicting – expectations on all sides of a “peace to end all wars” that was to be forged and compensate the different societies and populations for the unprecedented sacrifices they had made.

Chapter 21 offers a new, Atlantic interpretation of the peace of Versailles and the reconfigured international order that emerged in 1919. In contrast to previous assessments, especially the long dominant view that the settlement represented the best possible outcome, it argues that what the “peacemakers” managed to negotiate could only lay a frail groundwork for lasting peace and a sustainable world order of democratic states. It emphasises that the peace architecture of 1919 remained truncated in crucial respects – particularly because it neither integrated the Weimar Republic nor provided effective mechanisms to come to terms with the German question, the dramatic consequences of the Great War and the broader structural and systemic challenges of the “long” 20th century. It illuminates that this was especially due to the fact that the overburdened key decision-makers of Paris confronted one novel, overriding challenge they could only meet in a very limited manner: to forge sustainable transatlantic compromises that reconciled very disparate aims and conceptions – and to create a robust, integrative and thus also more legitimate transatlantic superstructure of security and stabilisation. Finally, it highlights that the learning processes the war had engendered did not reach far enough to permit more far-reaching advances.

Chapter 13 reappraises the difficult attempts made by those who sought to break with Wilhelminian power politics and develop both a western-orientated peace agenda and a new, progressive foreign policy on behalf of the defeated German state and, eventually, the fledgling Weimar Republic. It argues that while the core aim of the new protagonists, the social democratic leaders Friedrich Ebert and Philipp Scheidemann and the new republic’s first foreign minister Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau, was to negotiate a lenient Wilsonian “peace of justice” they also came to develop forward-looking Atlanticist policies designed to integrate a republican Germany into a reconfigured Atlantic order – and the League of Nations. It elucidates the prevalent maxims and assumptions of the new German peace agenda that was elaborated after the armistice. And it examines how far the new German key actors had drawn more far-reaching lessons from the war and Germany’s catastrophic yet only partially acknowledged defeat – and how far the new priorities and conceptions they advanced went beyond tactical considerations and could actually contribute to the creation of a peace-enforcing Atlantic order after the Great War.

Chapter 16 focuses on a comprehensive analysis of how the principal negotiators of the victorious powers sought to come to terms with the two most vital and indeed intricately interconnected questions of the entire peacemaking process: the challenge of establishing a new security architecture to stabilise the Atlantic world and make it “safe for democracy”; and the challenge of agreeing on the fundamental terms of the German settlement and how to deal with the pivotal problem of what shape and what status was to have in the postwar order. It reappraises how the protagonists came to forge a hybrid system of collective security that combined the novel guarantees of the League of Nations, temporary territorial guarantees, far-reaching disarmament of the defeated power and, crucially, specific security agreements under which Britain and the United States pledged to come to France’s aid in the case of unprovoked German aggression. And it offers a new interpretation both of the challenges of fortifying these elements into a new international concert system that could effectively secure the fledgling Atlantic peace and of the challenges of negotiating terms of a German settlement that could gain legitimacy not only among the victors but also on the part of the vanquished.

Chapter 12 reassesses the peace conceptions and reordering and security policies of Clemenceau and the other authors of the French programme for the Paris Peace Conference. It argues that while their key aim undoubtedly was to secure France against what they saw as the critical threat of renewed German aggression they came to pursue new, essentially transatlantic strategies to this end, which came to concentrate on efforts to establish, in cooperation with Britain and the United States, a new Atlantic alliance and security community. It illuminates the underlying assumptions and rationales of the ambitious French agenda, showing that it too was significantly reorientated between the armistice and Versailles. Finally, it explores how far Clemenceau, his main adviser André Tardieu and other French policymakers had drawn constructive lessons and consequences from the catastrophe of the war – and how far their aims and strategies, which focused on containing and initially isolating postwar Germany, indeed opened up realistic perspectives of securing peace and creating a durable Atlantic and global order.

Government’s task is to achieve the common good. If it takes a long time markets will not do it: banks do not lend beyond the payback time horizon. For better and worse, government acts as the risk taker of last resort. Laissez-faire arose out of the Victorian fossil fuel windfall. But rich societies see beyond the private horizons of business. After WW1 they set to safeguard security by means of infrastructure, healthcare, education, housing, and social insurance. Government authority, alone or in partnership with business, is prone to corruption. The antidote is an independent, expert, and honest civil service. In 1980 politics moved in the opposite direction, imposing business norms and seeking to impose a corporate model on government activity. An opportunistic public–private partnership is no match for pressing social challenges, nor is the academic delusion of self-sufficient free markets. In the face of private impatience, government acts as a commitment agent for society.

How then can we understand the links between climate change and security? I begin with my understanding of security before reviewing the virtues and limits of the research on environmental security to date.

This chapter is largely devoted to commenting on the other contributions to the volume. An attempt is made to evaluate the arguments and criticisms brought to bear by each contributor on the project of defining civil liberty not as absence of interference but rather in neo-Roman terms as absence of more general conditions of subjection and dependence. The chapter opens with an exposition of the neo-Roman theory, focusing on its articulation in Roman and common law traditions of thinking about the law of persons and related arguments about ‘fundamental’ rights and liberties. The chapter next defends the distinctiveness and coherence of the neo Roman approach against a number of objection that have been raised against it. The chapter ends by reflecting on how the re-appropriation and development of a neo-Roman perspective might help us to think more fruitfully about some current threats to privacy and democracy as well as individual liberty. This concluding section focuses particularly on threats stemming from increasing surveillance and other silent exercises of power.

This chapter provides an overview of cloud computing technology. The explanation includes an overview of the differences between traditional outsourcing and cloud computing and how server virtualization makes cloud computing possible. The chapter also identifies the major players in the provision of cloud computing services and the primary cloud computing service and deployment models. The chapter evaluates central security concerns and risks including loss of availability and risks to data portability.

The need to rebuild the security infrastructure in a postconflict state is of paramount importance for ensuring a durable peace. This chapter examines the complicated tradeoffs parties face sharing and/or reestablishing the monopoly of force, including when sharing force with the international community; the questions of the consent of the state, and often the consent of the nonstate parties; the nature and configuration of the international forces, including the command structure of the international forces; and the mandate of those forces. The chapter also analyzes cases during which the state seeks to integrate nonstate armed actors into the national forces, when parties are faced with the questions of how best to provide for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of nonstate forces, coupled with security sector reform for the national forces. The chapter additionally examines the questions that arise when the state seeks to restore limited control over the monopoly of force by permitting nonstate actors to come under the umbrella command of the national forces, including to what extent to promote some degree of integration among special units of the state and nonstate forces, as well as a timeline for the eventual integration of forces.