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The repercussions of the passage and promulgation in Hong Kong of the 2020 National Security Law (NSL) have been global in reach. Hong Kong featured prominently as the Trump Administration in the United States and Beijing teetered on the brink of a new Cold War. The National Security Law marked also a downward spiral in Sino-British relations amidst a wider backlash from, amongst others, the ‘Five Eyes’ alliance nations, comprising the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. This chapter describes the controversy over the 2020 law and the Sino-British exchanges which took place around it, both before and after its passage.
This chapter examines the international controversies surrounding Huawei Technologies, finding that most fears about this private firm are based on misunderstandings of its coevolution within the Chinese business and political environment, as well as unfounded suspicions about its employee ownership structure and alleged Chinese Communist Party control or military links. However, only further reform of the Chinese political ecosystem will help to reduce the international fear and sanctions on the firm.
This paper provides a systemic study of China's policy and legal responses to security-related actions and disputes in the international trade regime. It starts with a brief review of the law and practices relating to the security exceptions under the World Trade Organization to provide an important context for understanding the recent developments of China's approaches to national security. Based on a detailed discussion of China's approaches at international and domestic levels, we argue that China's security strategy has been shifting from being defensive to proactive: internationally by seeking to influence the development of trade rules and practices, and domestically by expanding national security to cover a wide spectrum of economic security interests and developing a comprehensive regulatory framework to protect such interests. The way in which major trading nations are taking the law into their own hands, based on ever-expanding security interests, does not bode well for the future of the multilateral trading system. There is a pressing need for collective action by all governments involved to re-design security-related rules and exceptions to confine the use of security measures to agreed parameters.
This chapter shows how the perceived strategic value of high-tech, value-added sectors, represented by telecommunications services and manufacturing, for national security and the national technology base, interacts with sectoral structures and organizational of institutions, and shapes the Chinese government’s centralized governance. Two decades after accession to the World Trade Organization, the Chinese government has yet to implement many of its market entry and business scope commitments in telecommunications. The state governs telecommunications with centralized coordination by a supraministry of government-owned fixed-line and mobile carriers and privately-owned but government-controlled value-added service providers and equipment makers. The dominant pattern of centralized governance enables the state to achieve its security and developmental goals even while introducing competition and exposing the industry to global economic integration. The cross-time sector and company cases uncover how reregulation and deliberate state interventions in corporate governance and anti-trust followed the market liberalization in the 1990s and 2000s. From the development of network technologies, such as 5G, to semiconductors, Chinese state-owned institutional and firm-level initiatives have strategically courted foreign direct investment and reregulated to gain corporate control or force divestment. Similarly, foreign investment and private capital have developed value-added services; but subsequent reregulation controls information dissemination and sectoral development.
The Strategic Value Framework explicates the dominant sectoral patterns of market governance in China today. Historical process tracing from sectoral origins of labor-intensive textiles and capital-intensive telecommunication in this chapter shows how Chinese state leaders intersubjectively respond to objective economic and political pressures. The perceived strategic value of national security and national technology base took root during foreign interventions and internal upheavals from the Qing dynasty to Chinese Communism and the 1978 Open Door Policy and beyond. The joined imperatives interacting with sectoral structures and organization of institutions shape the central state coordination of predominately state-owned and state controlled economic actors of the centralized governance of strategic sectors with application for national security and contribution to the national technology base, represented by telecommunications. Contrary to open economy politics, this is reenforced after China joins the World Trade Organization and enhances authoritarianism under Xi Jinping. The decentralized governance and private governance characterized by market coordination by local governments and nonstate actors and variegated property rights arrangements of nonstrategic sectors, such as textiles, reveal the limits of regime type and state capitalism explanations. These dominant sectoral patterns have given rise to Chinese-style bifurcated capitalism shaped by techno-security developmentalism in China today.
In a post-9/11 environment, the Department for International Development (DFID) shifted its strategic focus towards an integrationist approach that aligned mainstream development programming with the national security agenda. A key part of those reforms was integrating counterterrorism – directly and indirectly – into DFID's portfolio. Using a feminist institutionalist approach, I examine how discourses about women, development, security, and counterterrorism are reproduced through a ‘development-security-counterterrorism nexus’. Within the nexus, DFID represents a key site for the production, reproduction, and evolution of gendered discursive practices1 about women. I argue that institutional evolution is possible through a process of discursive evolution where certain discourses become more or less engrained or ‘sedimented’2 depending on the presence of alternative ideas and knowledges. The central research question asks how did gender-sensitive development work evolve after 9/11 and what factors influenced and shaped this evolution? The main findings were that as counterterrorism aims, objectives, and methods became more emphasised in UK development programming, a sense of institutional incoherence and poor strategic direction adversely affected how gender-sensitive programming was designed and implemented. Furthermore, I conclude that gendered development policy was largely based on assumptions rather than evidence, which negatively impacted how programmes were implemented.
Mr. Chief Justice STONE1 delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner, Fred Korematsu, was born in Alameda County, California, and is of Japanese ancestry. He is an American citizen by birth. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1889). That his parents were born in Japan and, with the commencement of war, became formally classified as enemy aliens is of no moment in this case.2 No question has been raised as to petitioner’s loyalty to the United States.
Petitioner was convicted in a federal district court for remaining in San Leandro, California, a “military area,” contrary to Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 of the Commanding General of the Western Command, U.S. Army, which directed that after May 9, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry should be excluded from that area.
To understand how democracy aid works in the Middle East, it is crucial to examine such aid at its origins in Washington, DC. In this chapter, I introduce the actors, institutions, and interests connected to the administration of US democracy aid over the last three decades. The voices and practices of those working on democracy aid seldom feature in most research on such aid. Engaging them illuminates the obstacles and challenges encountered by those working on democracy aid in different capacities within the US government. I trace the evolution of democracy aid from its inception to examine how ideas about democracy emerged, evolved, and were negotiated over time and cast light on the constellation of actors and structures militating against some forms of democracy over others. This chapter incorporates novel new data on the professional histories of nearly 2,000 professionals engaged in democracy promotion to map the influence of individuals in shaping ideas about democracy aid.
How then can we understand the links between climate change and security? I begin with my understanding of security before reviewing the virtues and limits of the research on environmental security to date.
Under what circumstances might climate change lead to negative security outcomes? Over the past fifteen years, a rapidly growing applied field and research community on climate security has emerged. While much progress has been made, we still don't have a clear understanding of why climate change might lead to violent conflict or humanitarian emergencies in some places and not others. Busby develops a novel argument – based on the combination of state capacity, political exclusion, and international assistance – to explain why climate leads to especially bad security outcomes in some places but not others. This argument is then demonstrated through application to case studies from sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. This book will provide an informative resource for students and scholars of international relations and environmental studies, especially those working on security, conflict and climate change, on the emergent practice and study of this topic, and identifies where policy and research should be headed.
In this chapter we present our recommendations for how the policy landscape in the U.S. and other liberal democracies should respond to the opportunities and challenges brought on by quantum information science. These recommendations are informed by the four scenarios of quantum futures combined with the understanding of technology capabilities we discussed in Part I. We begin this chapter by putting our cards on the table and presenting our policy goals. We then explore how to achieve these goals using traditional policy levers: direct investments, education, and law. We conclude with a discussion of national security issues.
The chapter introduces State-owned entities (SOEs) and frames the reminder of the monograph. This chapter also provides the necessary definitions and carves out the monograph's sphere of applications to entities such as state-owned multinational enterprises, state-owned enterprises, national oil companies, sovereign wealth funds, export credit agencies and other types of entities that are State-owned. A short history of the State as an economic actor follows next then the focus turns to some of the traditional concerns associated with SOEs such as unfair competition, national security and resource security. The discussion then moves on to address the human rights dimension of State corporate ownership. Several case studies demonstrate concretely how SOEs become involved in human rights violations. The last section of this chapter provides an overview of human rights in international law, the most fundamental human rights instruments, a general introduction to the 'respect, protect and fulfil' framework, the nature of State's obligations to 'respect, protect and fulfil' human rights and the relationship between international law, human rights and State ownership.
There are limits to this constitutional convergence in East Asia. The three courts in Taiwan, South Korea and Hong Kong will not converge on electoral reform and matters impacting national security. While Taiwan and South Korea are dynamic democracies where competing political parties take turn in office, Hong Kong is a sub-unit of communist China. Therefore, the pursuit of major electoral systemic changes, personnel changes adverse to China’s core interests or challenges that are perceived to undermine national security or sovereignty are simply off-limits to the Hong Kong judiciary.
Artificial intelligence technologies have brought to humanity benefits and challenges. Some AI products can be used to threaten non-trade values including fundamental rights and national security. “Data-sharing policies”, through which governments “feed” data into their AI industry, further raise fair competition concerns. At present, economic sanctions taken by trade powers play an important role in deterring the controversial use of AI policies. In this chapter, it is argued that the WTO law can offer some aid in disciplining AI policies. First, some “data-sharing” mechanisms may be challenged as actionable subsidies under the WTO law. Second, sanctions against AI policies that undermine fundamental rights or national security may not be found inconsistent with WTO law due to, inter alia, the “public morals” exception, the security exception and the “maintenance of international peace and security” exception. Accordingly, it is argued that WTO law can provide some assistance in the disciplining of “data-sharing” mechanisms and AI policies that undermine fundamental rights or national security.
This chapter provides a foundation for the case made for ecological security by exploring the contours and limitations of existing discourses of climate security. After first examining the evolution of debates linking environmental change – and more directly climate change – to security, the chapter goes on to outline the contours and limitations of three key discourses of climate security: national security, international security and human security. These discourses emphasize the preservation of the nation state from external threat (national security), the preservation of the norms and rules of an international society (international security) and the protection of vulnerable human communities (human security). In the case of outlining the contours of each discourse, the chapter notes how the referent object is defined, who constitutes an agent of security, what means are envisaged to advance or protect security and the nature of the threat posed by climate change itself. In noting their respective limitations, the book provides a foundation for the elaboration and defence of ecological security.
The COVID-19 pandemic is broadly impacting global supply chains with enterprises being prevented from producing and shipping raw inputs, semi-finished articles and end products, and governments adopting and maintain exporting restrictions on ventilators, masks, gloves, personal protective equipment and relevant inputs. The pandemic amplifies and accelerates the decoupling of US–China economic relations, reflecting US President Trump’s maxim 'economic security is national security' and delivered by a US–China trade war with numerous trade measures, including sanctions against Huawei. The attachment to economic security reflects a reversal of economic globalisation which used to posit economic interdependence as a safeguard for national security, but there is now a theory that overdependence is a threat to national security. In this context, there is a need for fresh look at the law and politics on export restrictions and sombre thought on the restructure of the global supply chain. Three key elements will be of critical importance in the post-COVID-19 world: ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’, economic security and the decoupling of the US–China economy.
With the internationalisation of production processes and multiplication of jurisdictions involved in these processes, global supply chains can be easily interrupted through weakest links. The fragmentation of production processes and internationalisation of supply chains complicate coordination and risk management, which necessitate a fresh look of the governance mechanism. Competition law plays a critical role in ensuring supply is not disrupted through anti-competitive practices, such as export-cartel and abuse of dominant power in horizontal and vertical agreements. In linking export restrictions to investment law and policies, two types of investment are most relevant: resource-seeking and strategic asset-seeking investments. The interaction of export restrictions and investment law and policies can be observed from two perspectives: producers v. consumers; outbound v. inbound. A country imposing export restrictions on resources or strategic assets, such as critical components, may use trade and investment measuresm) simultaneously to prevent foreign countries or enterprises from accessing them.
International law does not address intelligence activities explicitly, and many scholars assume that international law has no effect on the practice of intelligence. Yet, international courts and bodies have recently started to hold states to account for internationally wrongful acts resulting from intelligence cooperation. This chapter analyses the effects of recent instances of state accountability on state decision-making, using a modified rational choice model accounting for the boundedness of state rationality. It shows that these instances of state accountability have changed the payoffs and costs of intelligence cooperation. States must now take into account the risk of accountability, and considerations of international legality may now outweigh domestic considerations. The chapter therefore argues that recent instances of state accountability before international courts and bodies have constrained states’ freedom in intelligence cooperation, thereby serving their national security interests. Existing research shows that respect for the rule of law is necessary to an effective fight against national security threats, and that measures violating human rights or undermining the rule of law are counter-productive. Hence, the chapter further argues that these recent instances of state accountability increase states’ respect for the international rule of law, leading them to protect their national security more effectively.
This paper reviews the World Trade Organization (WTO) Panel Report Russia – Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit of April 2019. It constitutes the first attempt to disentangle the legal and political aspects related to the invoked essential security interests from the economic considerations underlying the measures imposed on the transit through Russia of goods exported from Ukraine to the Republic of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. One the one hand, the panel's interpretation of Article XXI of the GATT denies Members unilateral determination over security exceptions. It further enables a pathway for future WTO panels to review possible abuses of security exceptions – a growing concern due to the rising complexity of transnational economic relations. On the other hand, our economic analysis suggests a stricter assessment of Russia's transit restrictions was necessary. In particular, it argues that the panel adopted a circular assessment when considering the plausibility of whether Russia implemented its measures for the protection of its essential security interests at a time of emergency in international relations. Ultimately, although the panel's focus on finding a diplomatic and legal path forward failed economic scrutiny a legal assessment argues that the panel's findings fit the legal design of Article XXI:b of the GATT.