How did the concept of an international military become a popular diplomatic option in the twentieth century? Chapter 1 establishes how international organisations, such as the League of Nations and the UN, disrupted the state monopoly on war thus helping to pave the way towards the armed peacekeeping project. It traces post-war debates on the UN’s role in nuclear disarmament and examines the UN leadership’s experiments in intervening directly in conflict contexts. Inspired by the UN’s observer presence in the Israel/Palestine conflict, the first secretary-general, Trygve Lie, proposed the creation of a UN Guard to protect the organisation’s field-based staff. Although the UN Guard failed to achieve meaningful diplomatic support, the idea of an international force - organised, trained, and uniformed by the UN - demonstrated the UN leadership’s aspirations for the organisation to shift into militarism. The chapter concludes by examining the diplomatic negotiations and logistical construction of the UN Command in Korea, examining how the UN leadership’s efforts to involve the organisation in the field were limited during this period by US hegemony and logistical superiority.

In March 2017, the Israeli Knesset (Parliament) passed a law allowing for the denial of entry or residence to foreign nationals who support Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) against the state of Israel or its settlements.1 Proponents of BDS are part of a now global nonviolent movement of civil society (non-state) actors challenging the government of Israel’s policies towards Palestinians. Reflecting that the movement also has supporters within Israel, less than three weeks later it was revealed that Israel’s then Minister of Strategic Affairs, Gilad Erdan, also sought to expand his ministry’s collection of information on activists who support BDS to include Israeli citizens as well as foreigners.2 Governmental development of such a database on citizens was questionable both on grounds of extant Israeli law and the protection of privacy rights. However, this practice stands as a telling example of how the BDS movement has moved to the front line of Israel’s contemporary surveillance efforts.

This chapter explores advance directives in Israel. Specifically, the background behind legislation of the “Dying Patient” Act is articulated, which constitutes the main legal framework for advance directives in Israel, with an emphasis on the role that a combination of religion and politics has played in shaping this law. Then, the main aspects of the law in relation to advance directives are explained, including the (narrow) definition of the “dying patient” and its implications, actions that are forbidden and allowed, with respect to not prolonging the dying patient’s life, how emphasis on advance directives may go both in the direction of prolonging or refraining from prolonging the dying patient’s life, etc. These main legal aspects are also compared to the manner in which they were addressed before the law was enacted. Finally, the chapter shows how the restrictiveness of Israeli regulations for advance directives has actually led to their under-regulation in practice from various facets. This includes practical difficulties in their implementation, the many “shades of grey” in interpreting the law by healthcare providers, as well as legal critique and precedent questioning the Dying Patient Act. Possible cultural influence(s) in the Israeli context are also stressed.

The aim of this chapter is to describe, and offer a critical assessment of, confederal approaches to resolving the conflict in Israel-Palestine. We review why prospects for the conventional two-state solution have declined and what other models have been advanced as alternatives. After placing confederation in historical and theoretical context, we then describe a range of confederal proposals for Israel-Palestine. We conclude by exploring process and institutional design considerations presented by confederation as a framework for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

This chapter examines governance within the framework of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territory – the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. It describes how Israeli delegation of authority over service provision, civilian affairs, and the daily running of the territory to the Palestinian Authority created a situation in which 4.5 million Palestinians are controlled by an authority that disavows responsibility for governance and are governed by authorities that lack the control needed to create decent living conditions. While delegation of responsibility to local authorities, in the context of a belligerent military occupation, was perceived by some as part of a transition to national liberation, a central flaw in that process was the willingness to temporarily bend a cardinal principle of international humanitarian law: aligning responsibility with control. The transfer of responsibility from Israel to Palestinian authorities, without ceding the control needed to exercise that responsibility, created a crisis of accountability, in which both the Israeli and Palestinian authorities abdicate responsibility for Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. That delegation is also helping to perpetuate the occupation by significantly reducing the cost to Israel of maintaining it.

The conclusion synthesizes and reflects upon the case studies and comparative and theoretical contributions in the book. The cases are organized around three categories: first, relatively conventional decentralization initiatives in which reforms were adopted to improve governance; second, contexts in which decentralization has been contemplated as a framework for self-determination for the region’s stateless communities; and finally, decentralization initiatives undertaken in the shadow of conflict and state fragmentation. This concluding chapter develops theoretical insights drawn from the rich terrain for qualitative comparison across these three contexts. It offers reflections on key characteristics of the shared regional context and a typology of factors driving decentralization in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. It argues that an important contribution of the volume lies in identifying a broader array of motivations for, and actors driving, decentralization than currently reflected in the scholarly literature and in parsing the implications for the institutional design of decentralized government. The chapter concludes by distilling patterns from the cases to identify distinct trajectories of decentralization that are evidenced in the MENA region and their entailments.

Drawing on the diary of Heinrich Krone, Chapter 1 opens by exploring social and cultural changes in West Germany at the end of Konrad Adenauer’s long ascendancy. The Christian Democratic milieu was losing its lock on politics, and the successes of German integration into Atlantic and European communities gave rise to new questions about whether NATO or the EEC had precedence; how German unity could be pursued in the face of détente; and what relationships were possible with the Soviet bloc. Adenauer’s choice was to intensify relations with de Gaulle’s France, with the 1963 Elysée Treaty defining the partnership between France and West Germany as a Cold War bulwark against détente and the USSR. This approach was challenged and significantly modified by the chancellor’s critics in the Bundestag, who feared alienating the United States and pushed for Ludwig Erhard to replace Adenauer. Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder pushed for a “policy of movement,” intended to represent the cause of German unity more forcefully. Controversies over military aid, relations with Israel, and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty showed that Adenauer’s long delay in resigning had left a vacuum of leadership.

If West Germany had one unique asset, it was the bedrock stability of its currency, the Deutsche Mark. Chapter 4 introduces the principal defenders of German stability – the economy and finance ministries, the Bundesbank, and the Council of Economic Experts. In fall 1965, Chancellor Erhard identified the maintenance of price stability as the foundation of German policy – with enormous repercussions for foreign relations. In 1965-66, development aid programs, restitution to Israel, and offset purchases from the United States would all be scaled back in order to keep Bonn’s budget balanced and avoid stimulating inflation. German monetary experts worked closely with U.S. officials to uphold the Bretton Woods monetary system; but Lyndon Johnson was furious that Erhard had broken his offset pledges, particularly since West Germany remained reluctant to send personnel to Vietnam. In spring 1966, Erhard’s cabinet tried to unthaw relations with the USSR by issuing a “peace note” calling for mutual renunciation-of-force declarations; but the Soviet bloc rejected the approach as inadequate. When West Germany slipped into recession, Erhard’s coalition collapsed in failure.

Turning to the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, Chapter 10 explores the challenges Bonn faced amidst the turmoil of the early 1970s. Tightened budgets, occasioned by worries about inflation, hampered efforts by aid minister Erhard Eppler to follow through on Brandt’s promises of expanding development aid to the Global South. Karl Schiller insisted that trade, not aid, was the better path forward. Bonn’s liberal, free-trade approach drew criticism from African leaders, as West Germany invested heavily in apartheid South Africa; Brandt’s government did, however, enact tighter restrictions on weapons exports outside NATO. German officials frowned upon Global South demands for a more balanced world trading order, but they played a mediating role at UNCTAD III, a global trade and development conference in Santiago, Chile. Confronted with a rash of kidnappings in Latin America and Palestinian terrorism on German soil, Brandt’s government opted repeatedly to appease the hostage-takers rather than prosecute them. This passive response contributed to the disaster at the Munich Olympics in 1972, when Israeli athletes were captured and murdered.

World War II memories constitute the backdrop of Chapter 3. The Auschwitz Trials presented a daily reminder of German crimes; and a stretch of 20-year anniversaries from D-Day to V-E Day provided numerous occasions to invoke the “politics of the past” in putting pressure on Erhard’s Germany. The USSR, Britain, and France all aimed to forestall the MLF project, blocking West German access to nuclear weapons. France also won significant concessions on EEC agricultural policy from Bonn, thanks to de Gaulle’s ability to mobilize “Gaullists” in the CDU/CSU against the chancellor. In the face of intense Israeli pressure, Erhard’s panicky decisionmaking created a Middle East debacle in spring 1965; Bonn canceled its tank deliveries but established diplomatic ties with Tel Aviv, prompting ten Arab states to break relations. West German leaders felt increasingly isolated. Even U.S. opinion wearied of West German rigidity, particularly when German cabinet ministers seemed to contest the territorial status quo in Poland or Czechoslovakia. Real interest in promoting German unity was waning among all of Bonn’s allies; Bonn was at an impasse.

Chapter 2 outlines Ludwig Erhard’s efforts to position West Germany as a Cold War partner to the United States, as pledged during a visit to Lyndon Johnson’s ranch in December 1963. Defense minister Kai-Uwe von Hassel strongly advocated German participation in a NATO multilateral nuclear force (MLF); and he and Erhard signed off on a $1.35 billion offset agreement calling for massive purchases of U.S. weapons. They also agreed to a secret scheme to funnel surplus U.S.-built M-48 tanks to Israel. The Bundestag refused to sanction German deployments overseas, however – whether peacekeeping in Cyprus or a field hospital to Vietnam. “Gaullists” within Erhard’s CDU/CSU party, notably Franz Josef Strauss, complained about Erhard’s neglect of France, and his decision to placate Johnson by refusing a trade mission to China. Motion toward German unity remained stalled; Erhard’s idea of “buying off” the USSR with massive economic aid went nowhere, as did Gerhard Schröder’s policy of “small steps” toward the East. A holiday pass arrangement allowing visits across the Berlin Wall, arranged by Mayor Willy Brandt, offered the strongest evidence for Germans’ sense of belonging together.