To send content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about sending content to .
To send content items to your Kindle, first ensure firstname.lastname@example.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about sending to your Kindle.
Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Democracies and dictatorships differ in terms of their time horizons. Governments in democracies know that the political system will continue after they leave office, whereas autocrats see the survival of the regime and of the government as being identical. This makes democrats more interested in international legal commitments, which constrain the state even after the government is gone. Further, democracies are subject to greater demands for transparency. Authoritarians, in contrast, are more risk averse. Drawing on these differences, the chapter develops a distinction between prodemocratic international law, pro-authoritarian international law, and regime-neutral international law.
International law can facilitate democratic governance by preserving the norms of reciprocity that make democracy work. It can do so by articulating norms and standards, facilitating the creation of public goods, supporting domestic institutional structures, coordinating reputational sanctions and, on occasion, legitimating external intervention. These tools are limited but can function when political incentives are aligned.
This chapter provides some concrete suggestions for how democracies should proceed in the so-called post-liberal era. The future of prodemocratic international law will depend on democracies leveraging collateral areas of international law to advance liberalism. This involves an essentially defensive liberalism.
Cosmpolitanism and sovereigntism are two views of international law, with competing perspectives on the appropriateness of external intervention to protect democracy. Contrasting developments in the Gambia with those in neighboring Equatorial Guinea, this chapter defines terms, lays out what is at stake, and counsels against simplistic views that democratization is inevitable or even advisable in all places.
The first chapter of the book outlines the status of the right to life under international law. It concludes that the right to life is both a customary rule and a general principle of law while the prohibition on arbitrary deprivation of life is a peremptory norm of international law (jus cogens).
In De jure belli ac pacis, Grotius constructs international law with the vocabulary of private law. For this purpose, he uses distinctions from the Institutes of Justinian and the Digest, but redefines key concepts of Roman law, such as natural law or law of nations (jus gentium). In doing so, he uses a method that is typical for humanist jurisprudence. On the one hand, he describes history, on the other hand, he renews the traditional system of law and adapts the law to the needs of his own day and age.
This chapter analyzes the role of states in framing the scope and applicability of human rights protections. The limited perspective of the sovereign has constructed an ostensibly universal system that prioritizes the state power while erasing migrants’ interests. Migrants are of course protected by basic international human rights that attach to all people regardless of migration status. Yet, when it comes to rights that would impinge on the sovereign’s ability to control its borders, such as the right to enter, the right to safe transit, and even the right to remain, international law falls silent. This flaw at the conceptual core of human rights contributes to contemporary migration-related challenges and demands radical rethinking. In the face of widespread anti-immigrant sentiment, it is hard to imagine states ceding power to protect migrants. Nevertheless, a new human rights treaty focused on migrants rather than states could open up political space in interesting ways. Though not law in the traditional sense, the process could convene a variety of groups from civil society to corporations to diaspora to transnational families. A representative catalogue of migrants’ rights could help frame the debate, persuade the public, and focus activist energies in lobbying states for change.
Chapter 1 serves as an introduction to the book. It sets the scene by providing fundamental background information on the issues explored in the book. It then situates the present study within the existing literature. In so doing, it identifies the novel research questions, methodology, and contribution to debates in international law and beyond. It introduces key concepts that will be further discussed in the book, notably the idea of ‘new wars’ and its relationship to the environment. Further, it outlines two theories that provide the foundations and inform the critique developed in the book. The first is Rob Nixon’s concept of slow violence and the second is the notion of structural violence, taken from Johan Galtung and adapted to the present issues. Lastly, it offers an overview of arguments made in subsequent chapters.
Grotius’ two major treatises on the law of nations - De jure praedae and De jure belli ac pacis - both had the discussion of the just war doctrine as the backbone to their structure and argument. Whereas the older treatise was construed to argue the justice and legality of the taking of a Portuguese ship in East Indian waters, the more mature work aimed at a systematic exposition of the laws regulating the starting, waging and ending of war. Grotius offered a novel reading of the just war doctrine by rewriting it into the key of his general legal theory and his doctrine of natural rights as subjective rights under commutative justice. This chapter analyses Grotius' reframing of the just war doctrine and his re-systematisation of late-medieval and Renaissance legacies of theologians, canonists and civilians into a new doctrine of jus ad bellum, also giving some attention to its effect for the legal proces of peace-making.
Grotius lived through a time of great upheaval in Europe as well as in his country of birth, the Dutch Republic. The religious, political and constitutional convulsions that struck the Republic destroyed Grotius' career but, also, in combination with fundamental changes in the intellectual outlook of early seventeenth-century Europe, formed his views of God, nature, society, politics and law. This chapter introduces the extraordinary polymath Grotius from the perspective of this background and offers a map to the five parts of this volume, and their respective chapters.
The final chapter brings together the main findings and arguments of the book, identifies its broader implications, and formulates some ideas for future research. Building upon insights from political ecology, it suggests that a useful way forward is through reframing questions away from assuming fatalistic relationships between nature and conflict, and starting to ask questions that illuminate the broader social/political/economic dynamics involved. By considering how different environmental injustices play a role in shaping contemporary conflicts, international law scholarship may also expose and challenge the utilitarian/instrumental view of nature that underpins the field. If environmental ‘scarcity’ and ‘abundance’ are not external factors leading to conflict, but the outcomes of socio-economic processes, often linked to historical grievances and unequal power relations, entirely different notions of justice, peace, and security are needed.
Recent studies have observed that, in Grotius’ legal doctrine, the intellectual ambition to create a universal rule of law (natural law) coexists with a distinctly ‘modern’ use of the vocabulary of individual rights (natural rights). In this chapter, it is argued that a more careful reading of Grotius’ engagement with the Aristotelian tradition might cast new light on this traditional dichotomy, and expand understanding of Grotius’ theory of justice. Famously, Grotius relies on the Aristotelian notion of virtue ethics to introduce the concept of aptitude, which designs a more generic account of merit and moral fitness rather than a strict, enforceable legal claim. Far from being discarded as a ‘minor’ or ‘deficient’ source of right, aptitude plays a fundamental role in this context. Through his reading and translating of the Aristotelian commentator, Michael of Ephesus, it shows how Grotius’ thin conception of right as aptitude and fitness provides his natural law doctrine with a heuristic requirement for right reason.
Democracies and authoritarian regimes have different approaches to international law, grounded in their different forms of government. As the balance of power between democracies and non-democracies shifts, it will have consequences for international legal order. Human rights may face severe challenges in years ahead, but citizens of democratic countries may still benefit from international legal cooperation in other areas. Ranging across several continents, this volume surveys the state of democracy-enhancing international law, and provides ideas for a way forward in the face of rising authoritarianism.
The Cambridge Companion to Grotius offers a comprehensive overview of Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) for students, teachers, and general readers, while its chapters also draw upon and contribute to recent specialised discussions of Grotius' oeuvre and its later reception. Contributors to this volume cover the width and breadth of Grotius' work and thought, ranging from his literary work, including his historical, theological and political writing, to his seminal legal interventions. While giving these various fields a separate treatment, the book also delves into the underlying conceptions and outlooks that formed Grotius' intellectual map of the world as he understood it, and as he wanted it to become, giving a new political and religious context to his forays into international and domestic law.
This article explains the extent to which Indonesia has international obligations to comply with the non-refoulement principle in the absence of ratification of the 1951 Refugee Convention. While Presidential Regulation No. 125 of 2016 concerning the Treatment of Refugees provides the general impression that Indonesia respects the non-refoulement principle, there is no specific text within Indonesian law and policy that regulates the matter. This article argues that Indonesia is legally bound by non-refoulement obligations under international human rights treaties to which it is a party, as well as under customary international law. It examines the extent of Indonesia’s non-refoulement obligations under the Convention Against Torture, the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and customary international law. It concludes that the Presidential Regulation was a missed opportunity for Indonesia to reinforce its non-refoulement obligations, as illustrated by the recent treatment of Rohingya asylum seekers near Aceh.
At issue in the SNC-Lavalin scandal was a new tool of corporate criminal law: remediation agreements. Introduced in 2018, remediation agreements allow corporate diversion and create an alternative to the prosecution of corporations suspected of criminal wrongdoing. This article examines why the federal government adopted and chose this particular new tool. Drawing on a wide-ranging documentary record, I argue that this reform was the product of transnational lawmaking and the ongoing influence of Canada's international commitments to prohibit and punish foreign bribery. The article shows how international criticism of Canada's lacklustre anti–foreign bribery enforcement record catalyzed cross-national policy diffusion and learning from other states. This led Canada to adopt corporate diversion, which promised greater enforcement, and also led Canada to adopt a form of the practice with legislative and judicial limits that narrowed the chances of any company—including SNC-Lavalin—of obtaining a remediation agreement.
Coup leaders often purport to restore constitutional order. During Burkina Faso's 2014 ‘insurrection', however, Blaise Compaoré's opponents advanced detailed (international) legal arguments that significantly constrained their subsequent conduct. Theirs was to be a legal revolution. This article situates this stance within Burkina Faso's distinctive history of urban protest, whilst emphasising under-analysed international sources for the insurrection. ‘Insurgent’ lawyers, it argues, used international instruments to reinvigorate longstanding activist attempts to reconcile constitutional rights with a language of popular justice promoted by the revolutionary regime of Thomas Sankara (1983–7). After the insurrection, however, their emphasis on legality was used by Compaoré's supporters to expose the transitional authorities’ double-standards. Meanwhile, insurgent lawyers working for the transition had to work hard to reconcile (international) legal justifications for the insurrection with the expedient politics needed to defend the new dispensation.
This concluding chapter reflects on the findings of the study and suggests what they mean for the future of altruism in international law. In particular, it assesses the threats to altruism in our world and proposes several developments that would help to safeguard the fragile promise of altruism in international law.