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The increase in pension eligibility ages in Australia, as elsewhere, throws into relief the consequences of gender inequality in employment. Because of career histories in lower paid and more insecure employment, a higher percentage of women than men are dependent on the age pension rather than on superannuation or savings and investments, and so will be disproportionately affected by deferred access. Yet, fewer women than men hold the types of ‘good jobs’ that will sustain them into an older age. Women are more likely to be sequestered in precarious employment, with reduced job quality and a greater potential for premature workforce exit. This article counterposes macro-level data drawn from national cross-sectional labour force statistics and the longitudinal Household Income and Labour Dynamics Australia survey, with case study analysis, based on interviews with 38 women in midlife insecure jobs, in order to identify the types of life course and labour market barriers that contribute to women’s reliance on the pension and the systemic disadvantage that will render them particularly vulnerable to any further erosion of this safety net. The analysis moves between this empirical evidence and a discussion, drawing on the theoretical literature, of the failure in equal opportunity endeavours over recent decades and what this means for later life workforce participation for women.
These books, different in style and content but united in purpose and major conclusions, analyse events from 2007 to 2010 to ascertain why the economic disaster happened and what must be done to put the United States economy (on which both books focus) on a more secure footing, and prevent any recurrence of the extended crisis of those years. Both target the increasing influence of market liberalism over the last 30 years, and the institutions of capitalist economies which they have encouraged. Taylor focuses more on the regulation of the international financial sector, and Palley on labour market policy. They agree that both need to be addressed if the United States economy is to be restored to health. Both argue that growing income inequality in the US must be reversed before the US economy can significantly improve. Finally, they stress the interrelationship between political ideology and economic explanation, and argue that value free positive economics is a myth.
An earlier ‘conversation’ with Professor J.W. Nevile was published in Essays in Economics, in Honour of Professor J.W. Nevile: Presented to Him on His Retirement. We now bring the story up to date covering the period roughly between Nevile’s appointment as Emeritus Professor at the University of New South Wales in 1993 to the present.
This article disputes recent studies that find no relationship between homicides and vigilantism. Using a unique panel dataset that controls for time and region, this study shows that the relationship exists. The evidence is consistent with the theory of low-capacity states: high homicide rates indicate unchecked criminal enclaves that further corrode trust in police. The territorial gaps in the central state’s presence that O’Donnell once called “brown areas” cost people their lives. Vigilantes react through defensive movements in which ordinary people substitute for the police to fill a security gap. The panel results also indicate that wealth inequality matters. Business people reportedly finance the vigilante organizations, which helps them to sustain collective action over time. Together with income inequality, Mexico’s low-capacity state facilitated an armed vigilante movement between 2012 and 2015.
The relationship between social policy and inequality has often been contentious in Latin America. In this context, this article analysed the relationship between social spending and income inequality in the region in the short, medium, and long run. For this purpose, data on sixteen Latin American countries in the period 1990-2017 were gathered and analysed through a panel data study. The results showed that, in line with the findings at a global level, increased levels of overall social spending are indeed associated with reduced levels of income inequality in this region. However, each one of the four main areas of social spending were observed to have different effects on income inequality. Additionally, the results showed that, despite the reforms and the increases in budgets, the social protection and social services systems still have problems reaching those at the bottom of the income distribution in the region.
In recent decades, there has been an institutional shift in the literature on authoritarian regimes, with scholars investigating the role of political institutions, such as elections and political parties, in shaping regime stability and economic performance. However, scant attention has been devoted to the effect of political institutions on policy outcomes, and more specifically, on income inequality. This paper adds to this debate and sheds light on the role of formal and informal institutions, on the one hand, and state capacity, on the other, in influencing levels of income inequality in autocracies. We argue that, while the presence of elections and multiparty competition creates more favourable conditions for the adoption of redistributive policies, state capacity increases the likelihood of successfully implemented policy decisions aimed at reducing the level of inequality. Our empirical analysis rests on a time-series cross-sectional dataset, which includes around 100 countries from 1972 to 2014. The findings indicate that both political institutions and a higher level of state capacity lead to lower levels of income inequality in authoritarian contexts.
This study examines the degree of educational assortative mating, its evolution, and its relationship with income inequality in Thailand using national labor force survey data from 1985 to 2016. Since the 1990s, Thailand shows a trend of decreasing educational homogamy, but there is evidence of continuing educational hypergamy in Thai households. Using the semiparametric decomposition method of DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996), the study finds that educational assortative mating has affected changes in household income inequality over time. Furthermore, there exists a negative relationship between income inequality and marital sorting with same education, which contradicts evidence found in developed countries.
Policymakers are liable to ‘treasure what is measured’ and overlook phenomena that are not. In an era of increased reliance on administrative data, existing policies also often determine what is measured in the first place. We explore this two-way interaction between measurement and policy in the context of the investment incomes and capital gains that are missing from the UK’s official income statistics. We show that these ‘missing incomes’ change the established picture of economic inequality over the past decade, revealing rising top income shares during the period of austerity. The underestimation of these forms of income in official statistics has hidden the impact of tax policies that disproportionately benefit the wealthiest. We urge a renewed focus on how policy affects and is affected by measurement.
In the past decades, two features of the American political economy have been at the heart of policy and political debates – growing income inequality and growing regional inequality. The period since the 1980s witnessed a dramatic reversal in the postwar fall in inequality, with a rising of share of income earned by the wealthiest Americans (Piketty and Saez 2003). Before taxes and transfers, the incomes of the top 1 percent of Americans now constitute over 20 percent of total income, with close to half of all income earned by the top 10 percent of earners.
Released in 1984, Steven E. Rhoads' classic was considered by many to be among the best introductions to the economic way of thinking and its applications. This anniversary edition has been updated to account for political and economic developments - from the greater interest in redistributing income and the ascendancy of behaviorism to the Trump presidency. Rhoads explores opportunity cost, marginalism, and economic incentives and explains why mainstream economists - even those well to the left - still value free markets. He critiques economics for its unbalanced emphasis on narrow self-interest as controlling motive and route to happiness, highlighting philosophers and positive psychologists' findings that happiness is far more dependent on friends and family than on income or wealth. This thought-provoking tour of the economist's mind is a must read for our times, providing a clear, lively, non-technical insight into how economists think and why they shouldn't be ignored.
African attitudes to income inequality have hardly been studied. As a result, we may have been missing a crucial part of the answer to the question why Africa is so unequal. This paper presents evidence that, across all self-identified class categories, African respondents in 16 African states, representative of all the regions of the continent, are on average considerably more tolerant of inequality than respondents from 43 comparable developing and transition countries. The aim of the paper is to try and explain these differences. It concludes that (a) a modified version of Albert Hirschman's notion of the ‘tunnel effect’ and (b) religious devotedness in the African context provide explanations for the observed variation between African respondents and their counterparts elsewhere. Experienced inequality, in contrast to overall income distribution, influences the tunnel effect more widely than economic growth. Religious belief shapes inequality tolerance in Africa more than the observance of religious practices.
This chapter asks why support for redistribution has not intensified as income inequality in the United States has grown. I review recent literature on this question, including empirical evidence from within as well as beyond the United States, and focusing primarily on research that asks how correct information about inequality affects support for redistribution. First, I consider whether a lack of correct information about inequality is to blame. While citizens commonly underestimate both wealth and income inequality, recent evidence suggests that eliminating such underestimation (by providing citizens with correct information) may not significantly change attitudes toward redistribution. Recent experiments that inform participants about the true extent of inequality have produced inconsistent results with several null findings. Reviewing these findings, I suggest that if information effects exist, they are likely to be conditional on context. Variables that may make information about inequality more consequential for normative attitudes include (a) whether information about the respondent’s own position in the income distribution is included, (b) whether economic mobility is implicated, and (c) whether inequality is seen as changeable. Research is ongoing in each of these areas. More broadly, it seems clear that ideas surrounding the fairness of inequality and the deservingness of social groups are important determinants of support for redistribution, and that these ideas probably matter more than facts about income inequality. The chapter concludes by considering whether Americans are exceptional in how they react to income inequality. While Americans exhibit relatively high confidence in meritocracy, I argue that the dynamics through which we should understand support for redistribution are fundamentally the same in the United States as they are in other industrialized countries.
This chapter concludes the book by reflecting on its broader implications. It delineates the politics behind credit regimes and reflects on the underlying political coalitions and dynamics behind credit markets’ complementary and substitutive relationships with welfare states. It then discusses how credit markets amplify old and create new forms of social exclusion and inequality through discrimination, credit scoring, or differential credit access. As credit markets have grown more influential and increasingly determine life chances, equal and fair access to credit is now a prerequisite for full participation and inclusion in labor markets, housing markets, as well as educational opportunities and wealth-building trajectories. The chapter ends by discussing potential ways in which credit markets and welfare states can work together, not against each other, to ensure a fairer and more equal distribution of social risks and opportunities.
Latin America made considerable progress in living standards between 1870 and 2010 amid rapid modernization and structural change. However, despite these remarkable advances, the income gap between the region and the industrial leaders remains significant. This chapter assesses the long-term performance of Latin America relative to the developed world and discusses the key transformations in Latin America. Excess volatility, poor productivity and high inequality remain essential to explaining why the region has been unable to converge with the industrialized core through advances in human capital, R&D, and infrastructure investment. In order to improve future prospects in standards of living and catching up, the region would need to adopt a development model that delivers sustained and inclusive economic growth. Key elements of this model are a higher rate of investment, a proactive industrial policy, tighter intra-regional integration, and greater redistribution to finance a better quality of education and inclusive social services.
It has been shown that progressive income taxation may stabilize an otherwise standard representative-agent real business cycle model with an indeterminate steady state against aggregate fluctuations caused by agents’ animal spirits. By contrast, within an identical model that allows for sustained economic growth, progressive taxation could lead to equilibrium indeterminacy and sunspot-driven fluctuations. In the context of household heterogeneity that gives rise to income and asset inequality, the fiscal authority has (at least) two options of setting the baseline level of taxable income: (i) the economy-wide average level of income and (ii) the economy’s steady-state level of per capita income. I show that the adoption of a fiscal rule (i) invalidates the effects that a progressive tax can exert on the model’s local stability properties. Progressive income taxation thus no longer operates as an automatic stabilizer that mitigates belief-driven cyclical fluctuations in a no-growth economy, nor as an automatic destabilizer that leads to local indeterminacy in a sustained-growth economy. If a tax policy rule (ii) is instead adopted, then the existing literature’s findings of the (de)stabilizing roles of progressive taxation are robust to the inclusion of household heterogeneity.
In the preface, we set the stage for the rest of the book. Corporations have a tremendous amount of power and play a major role in a number of contemporary issues, including income inequality, global warming, and the financial crisis. The principal theory of corporate governance – shareholder primacy – is well entrenched in law and practice, but its intellectual foundations are falling apart. Academic groups are split into different camps advocating for more or less shareholder empowerment. The traditional, law and economics arguments for the core governance feature – the exclusive shareholder franchise – have been revealed to rest on faulty assumptions and flawed reasoning. And both corporate governance theorists and corporate and economic luminaries are openly questioning the stability of shareholder primacy as a continuing regulatory norm. There are, however, a dearth of alternative approaches, so shareholder primacy lumbers on toward the point of crisis. It is time to assess where we are and offer a new way forward.
In this concluding chapter, we note some of the societal problems associated with corporations, such as income inequality, and explore the relationship between those problems and the fact that shareholders have ultimate control of corporate decision-making. We then catalog the ways in which the theoretical underpinnings of this arrangement – shareholder primacy – appear to be in decline and the accompanying law and economics arguments in favor of the exclusive shareholder franchise have fallen apart. The chapter, and the book, conclude with some thoughts about how incorporating employees into firm governance is the best path forward.
This study examines how state government responses to economic crisis, in the form of unexpected changes in state fiscal policy, influence income inequality. State governments are vital actors in times of fiscal stress as nearly every state must make difficult policy decisions related to taxes and spending to address budget deficits, both of which are policies that shape the income gap. Focusing on periods of fiscal stress is important for the study of state inequality as those with fewer resources are the most likely to experience the consequences of their state’s fiscal response during these times. Using time-series cross-sectional data, this research demonstrates that income inequality increases when states respond to economic crisis by relying on unexpected spending cuts. These effects tend to persist even after initial economic downturns. In addition, one individual-level implication of the aggregate relationship between state policy responses and inequality—that people will be worse off financially when their states emphasize budget cuts in response to economic decline—is assessed using several post–Great Recession surveys. The findings have implications for the future of inequality in the United States and provide potential paths for state fiscal reform.
The level of disposable income inequality in Israel has increased noticeably since the mid-1980s, and today it is above most developed countries. In contrast, market income inequality, which hit a record level in 2002, has reversed its course since then and has shown a sharp decline in subsequent years, and it is now below the OECD average. This chapter offers tentative explanations for the inverted U-shape evolution of market income inequality in Israel in the last twenty-five years, which is distinctive in view of most developed countries℉ experience. In addition, this chapter addresses the unique combination of income inequality in Israel which has one of the highest levels of disposable income inequality but is ranked below the OECD average measure of market income inequality.
Over two decades ago, Korpi and Palme (1998) published one of the most influential papers in the history of social policy discipline, in which they put forward a “paradox of redistribution”: the more countries target welfare resources exclusively at the poor, the less redistribution is actually achieved and the less income inequality and poverty are reduced. The current paper provides a state-of-the-art review of empirical research into that paradox. More specifically, we break down the paradox into seven core assumptions, which together form a causal chain running from institutional design to redistributive outcomes. For each causal assumption, we offer a comprehensive and critical review of the relevant empirical literature, also including a broader range of studies that do not aim to address Korpi and Palme’s paradox per se, but are nevertheless informative about it.