The 2015 Paris Agreement, complementing the United Nations Framework Con-vention on Climate Change, showcases an impressive consensus on climatological rhetoric. Thereby, it will contribute certainly neither to achieving its overall objectives on temperature nor to redressing any of the resulting “loss [or] damage” yet possibly to continuing the worldwide dialogue on the environment or on ecological entitle-ments. This chapter will dissect and categorize these. It will conclude that the fram-ers essentially kept the conversation going, nationally and internationally encourag-ing the establishment, the adjudicatory branch, and the public to resume the concep-tual or practical advancement on the topic.

Beyond generally reflecting on the core concept that titles this Chapter, the succeeding sections will study in turn the rights to a hearing in Mexico and to an ample defense, coupled with a cross-examination, in Brazil. They will do so not in the abstract but rather by evaluating how these entitlements play out concretely and by pinpointing a prominent and possibly pivotal lawsuit. The discussion will employ common-law-style names to denote the focal opinion in each instance: (1) Melgar Castillejos v. President of the Republic and (2) Villarinho v. Brazilian Union of Composers.

In the Mexican controversy, the federal judges at all levels aggressively developed due process in a manner that parallels major developments north of the border. Remarkably, they applied it, beyond its original criminal realm of application, to the subsequently salient sphere of civil and pretrial adjudication. In the second dispute, their colleagues from Brazil transported the guaranty to a terrain thus far unknown or in fact off-limits in the United States: that of the purely private sector. In all, these precedents seem to signal that the time might have arrived for the direction of transcontinental influences to shift northward, at least occasionally.

During the continent’s colonization, the monarchical mandate directed specifical-ly for the colonies seemingly strove to safeguard the natives and to shield them from exploitation. It purported to conserve their customs, traditions, or institutions, pro-vided that they accepted the empire’s sovereignty and religion. Apparently, this well-intentioned disposition mostly came to naught. The imperial emissaries inexorably devastated countless cultures and civilizations.

Ostensibly, the winds of independence brought with them a dissimilar, liberal approach to aboriginal affairs. They carried it to constitutional, statutory, and regu-latory standards. It amounted to granting the victimized collectivity’s members civil and political liberty equivalent to that of their fellow citizens. Reflecting France’s rev-olutionary ideology, the fresh regimen welcomed each one of them individually into the republic yet none of their respective subgroups.

Worldwide, a clamor against the underlying proceduralist paradigm seems to have resounded relatively recently. Partly, it may have cropped up internally as a re-sult of the politicized and militarized mobilization of native communities along Mexi-can, Ecuadorian, or Bolivian latitudes and beyond. However, transnational factors, like the advent of a third generation of collective entitlements for minorities in the context of the human-rights revolution, may have played a role too.

While women may have partly profited from the relatively recent rights-revolution in Latin America, the pregnant sisters among them have seemingly had to sit in the back of the bus or stay off altogether. Even modest progress on abortion entitlements has ostensibly come at a high price and slow pace, perchance thanks to the opposition of an alliance of age-old and up-and-coming religious congregations. On a positive note, though, the struggle for emancipation on this front seems to be moving forward.

dated conception of international law that refuses to die lies at the heart of today’s global refugee crisis. It posits states as sovereignly impervious and self-contained units and as the only apposite actors on the world stage. Efforts to incentivize countries generally to welcome more people seeking refuge and specifically to adopt fair standards of entry crash against this still entrenched outlook. Activists and practitioners must simultaneously debunk the prevailing standpoint and, against all odds, construct an alternative. The latter desperately needs definition and elaboration. As a whole, it must re-imagine the planet as inclusive of the traditionally excluded: such as nongovernmental organizations; non-organized groups; societal communities; persons of all races, ethnicities, genders, and religions; animals; plants; minerals; and so forth. As a most elemental part of this narrative, self-determining and solely partially sovereign nations may neither do as they please within or at their borders nor expect to be left alone in so doing. Instead, they must honor their responsibilities to a wide array of private and public parties, both at home and abroad, while acting autonomously and resisting heteronomy or domination.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the Civil War and Reconstruction had become sites of significant narrative contests that were carried out in scores of novels and in hundreds of stories published in popular magazines. These writings are arguably central to any understanding of American literary history but usually are represented by only a few canonical Civil War novels, such as Stephen Crane’s Red Badge of Courage (1895), Thomas Nelson Page’s Red Rock (1898), and Thomas Dixon Jr.’s The Clansman: A Historical Romance of the Ku Klux Klan (1905). Well before the moonlight and magnolia school of Civil War fiction exerted its death grip on the postwar literary imagination, however, an earlier contest waged that sought to set the terms of the debate. Rebecca Harding Davis, Louisa May Alcott, William Wells Brown, and Frances Ellen Watkins Harper each sought a narrative capable of accounting for the uncertainties and possibilities of this political moment. This essay traces their attempts to imagine a different future, one that broke with the nation’s history of continued abrogation of the principles laid out in the Declaration of Independence.

Chapter 4 considers the human rights relevant to research using linked data without consent; how these rights come into tension with each other and other relevant interests; and how these tensions should be considered and resolved. It notes the emphasis placed in the West on civil and political rights, such as the right to privacy, and the lack of attention to economic, social, and cultural rights, such as the right to health, and how this has resulted in an unbalanced approach to the regulation of research.

This chapter deals with Germany’s position on individuals, human rights and international criminal responsibility. It is in seven parts: position of individuals; human rights; international refugee law; nationality and statelessness; international terrorism; international health law; and international criminal law. The second part covers the Federal Constitutional Court rejecting the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ interpretation of the CRPD; Germany’s criticism of Brunei’s Sharia Penal Code as violating human rights and of Saudi Arabia for violating the CRC; Germany’s concern over possible human rights abuses in Xinjiang, China; the German Federal Government adopting its thirteenth human rights report; and candidates nominated by Germany for human rights bodies. The fourth part discusses an amendment to the Nationality Act depriving members of terrorist militias with dual nationality of their German citizenship. The seventh part deals with the resignation of the German judge from the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals; Germany requesting Lebanon to extradite a Syrian official; German charges brought against Syrian officials for crimes against humanity and against a member of ‘Islamic State’ for war crimes; rulings on war crimes against property; and Germany’s view on possible crimes against humanity and war crimes and genocide in Myanmar.

After the discussion of the powers of the Security Council in the previous chapter, this chapter considers some of the limitations on these powers, real or imagined. In particular, it examines limits deriving from the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations and the norms of jus cogens. Then, it explores some checks and balances on the actions of the Council. Ultimately, our response is that states do not have the right to do this, and would be acting unlawfully if they purported to exercise such a right. But they do, of course, have the ultimate option as a matter of policy of simply disregarding binding obligations imposed by the Council, with all the consequences, political and legal, that might flow from such a course of action. That is why the Council needs to exercise self-restraint and use its undoubted powers responsibly and only where it really is necessary to do so in order to ensure prompt and effective action to maintain international peace and security. This is the most effective check on the Council’s power.

Chapter 8 concludes the book by proposing ways to improve decision-making in relation to sharing linked data for research. It considers improvements in a number of areas: the decision-making framework of interests, values, and rights; the decision-making criteria and conditions; the decision makers who are best placed to make each decision; and the decision-making process. The chapter sets out the interests, values and rights that should frame decisions in this sphere, not all of which are currently represented in decision-making frameworks. It provides a list of decision-making criteria and considerations that should be taken into consideration by the relevant decision makers. The chapter distinguishes between ethical decisions, which should be made by ethics committees and governance decisions, which should be made data custodians. Finally, the chapter makes recommendations for a decision-making process that will be efficient, transparent, accountable and collaborative. This process is designed to lead to better decisions and to ensure that both the decision-making process and the decisions themselves develop and sustain the social licence needed to support the important enterprise of research using linked data.

This chapter argues that restrictions of migrants’ rights should be analyzed in a broader pattern, in light of democratic decay as it coincides with restrictive policies towards asylum seekers. In the event of a populist party taking over all the state institutions, as happened in Poland, migrants' rights cannot be considered in separation from the protection of human rights in general. Analyzing the Polish experience, it becomes apparent that the breakdown of the constitutional rights system results in a decrease in migrants' rights protection just as it does for other social groups. When it comes to the potential and limits of legal resilience in the migration context, the chapter claims that there is no such thing as inherent resistance of the law. The law cannot defend itself, since it is a tool of the ruling politicians. This means that a change in the approach to migration law in Poland is inevitably combined with a change in those who hold power. Therefore, what we are dealing with is not primarily a legal, but rather a political problem, which may be overcome not by legal means (the law itself), but by the will of the people expressed at elections.

This chapter analyzes the lasting impact of the 2017/2019 government coalition in Austria on the state of refugee rights. It investigates to what extent the migration policies and legal initiatives by the ÖVP-FPÖ government feature elements of democratic decay and populism. The chapter evaluates what constitutional law has done, can do and could do to keep in check, prevent and remedy such restrictions. It examines, in particular, how human rights guaranteed by the Austrian Constitution and interpreted by the Constitutional Court could provide relief. It is further suggested that a strong legal culture and support for the constitution are vital. In Austria this support is ensured by the most fundamental principles of constitutional law, which provides for a strong arsenal of legal resilience.

This chapter aims to analyse the evolving technological and legal intersection between content and data in the algorithmic society. The shift from parallel track to overlapping layers of these two fields contributes to examining platform powers and understand the role of European digital constitutionalism. The first part examines the points of convergence and divergence between the legal regimes introduced by the e-Commerce Directive and the Data Protection Directive. In the second part, two examples shows how the relationship between the two systems has evolved, looking in particular at how technological convergence has led to overlapping layers between the the fields of content and data which were conceived on parallel tracks. The third part examines the role of European digital constitutionalism with a specific focus on three paths of legal convergence.

Chapter 1 immerses the reader into the Za'atari refugee camp. Situated in Jordan just seven and a half miles south of the Syrian border, the camp – a two-square-mile rectangle divided into twelve districts – is nestled in the very heart of the Middle East. Here, in the desert heat, a community was born in the swell of crisis. The reader is immediately introduced to the book's three featured Syrian women entrepreneurs – Yasmina, Asma, and Malak – in their elements. Yasmina, a salon and wedding dress shop owner, is relaxing in the salon with her family as her client celebrates a beautiful wedding a couple of districts away. Asma, a social entrepreneur and teacher, is reading a story to a group of children – including three of her own – in her trailer, which she has converted into a magical hideout for the children. Malak, an artist, is putting the finishing touches on a series of drawings for an event at a youth center that is meant to encourage the girls in Za'atari to push against the harmful practice of child marriage.

This chapter underlines how, in the field of data, European digital constitutionalism would not suggest introducing new safeguards but providing a teleological interpretation of the GDPR unveiling its constitutional dimension. The first part of this chapter focuses on the rise and consolidation of data protection in the European framework. The second part addresses the rise of the big data environment and the constitutional challenges introduced by automated decision-making technologies. The third part focuses on the GDPR underlining the opportunities and challenges of European data protection law concerning artificial intelligence. This part aims to highlight to what extent the system of the GDPR can ensure the protection of the right to privacy and data protection in relation to artificial intelligence technologies. The fourth part underlines the constitutional values underpinning the GDPR to provide a constitutional interpretation of how European data protection law, as one of the more mature expression of European digital constitutionalism, can mitigate the rise of unaccountable powers in the algorithmic society.