This Chapter focuses on governmental use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) to evade the law of state responsibility, using offering as a case study of Russia’s deployment of a shadowy corporation known as the Wagner Group as a case study. The cChapter then suggests ways in which we might rethink the law of state responsibility in order to respond to the increasing threat of this sort of hybrid warfare. Drawing from scholarship on global legal pluralism, the cChapter argues for a less formalist and more functionalist analysis of the law of state responsibility. I I n the context of hybrid war, formalist conceptions of the state allow governments such as Russia to skirt state responsibility solely because there may be no formal contract between Russia and a PMSC such as the Wagner Group. One possible response then is to reinterpret Article 8 of the Articles of State Responsibility so that it looks at the real functional ties between a state actor and a PMSC, along with the “governmentality” of the function the PMSC performs.

The doctrine of attribution in international law has been defined, in large part, by the International Law Commission’s (ILC) provisions on attribution of conduct in the Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA). It is uncontroversial to note that despite the influence of the ILC’s rules on attribution, the regime of international responsibility remains underdeveloped. In addition to being underinclusive, the rules of attribution in ARSIWA are beginning to appear outdated. The central question, therefore, is whether the rules of attribution in ARSIWA are flexible enough to accommodate two disparate trends. On the one hand, we have witnessed an outsourcing of public functions to private actors in areas such as immigration, prison management, and education, whereby privatization has reduced state control and, consequently, potential state responsibility. On the other hand, there is a marked centralization of power in SOEs, some of which are now playing a global role as investors. This chapter assesses whether the default rules on attribution are flexible enough to manage both ends of the spectrum of state activity, which will be a crucial issue for regulators going forward.