How does international law protect human rights?  We trace the development of human rights, focusing on the international response to the atrocities of World War II and the rapid pace of human rights conventions.  We demonstrate how the signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights started a wave of other conventions designed to codify the treatment to which every human is entitled.  Not every state can achieve the wide array of protections these documents outline, but the UN has established methods for reporting violations that provide some minor satisfaction. The last half of the chapter is devoted to a discussion of regional human rights mechanisms, focusing on the European, Inter-American, and African systems and noting their jurisdictional differences. Finally, the development of mechanisms to respond to genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity are detailed, including the criminal tribunals set up for specific atrocities and the International Criminal Court.

This chapter studies the role of the EU and EU Member States in relation to disasters and land-use planning. The work analyzes how land-use planning can evaluate and manage risks to avoid disasters, paying special attention to European use of the precautionary principle. The analysis uses especially, but not only, the example of the Spanish legal system, taking into account its inclusion in the more general EU legal system. The study also considers private and public liability in relation to disasters, underlining how, in recent years, EU law and European caselaw have created a common framework based on the right to good administration. The study includes a reference to the famous case decided by the Dutch Supreme Court at the end of 2019 ordering the Government to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in accordance with the duty of due diligence or due care. Finally, this chapter explores possible consequences of maladministration when taking planning decisions in relation to possible public liability, using two real Spanish cases as specific examples.

The fourth chapter deals with the ECJ’s present role in the EU’s political system and how its procedural and organisational law might need to be adapted to better reflect it. The chapter first explains how in recent years, notably through the Treaty of Lisbon, the ECJ’s mandate has been modified. It argues that the Court is no longer only concerned with ensuring the autonomy and effectiveness of EU law, but that it is also a democratic organ of the EU polity, whose decisions need to be responsive to EU citizens. To ensure democratic responsiveness, the chapter argues, the ECJ’s procedural and organisational law needs to be further developed. The chapter makes concrete proposals by applying the Treaty on European Union’s democratic principles to the ECJ’s procedural and organisational law. It discusses, among other things, the role of the European Parliament in selecting ECJ members the place of NGOs and civil society in ECJ proceedings, the interaction between the Advocate General and the judges, the composition of the ECJ’s chambers and the mechanism for case assignment and make suggestions how to better reflect the concern for the ECJ’s democratic responsiveness.

This chapter situates the human rights of irregular migrants within the legal frames of reference chosen for this study. This chapter contrasts the principle of sovereignty in international law with the universal personal scope of application of human rights. The tension between the two foundational principles is a major root cause of the oscillation of international and European case law on the rights of irregular migrants between sovereigntist and human-centred tendencies. The trend is also visible in relation to migrants’ entitlement and enjoyment of social rights.

This chapter investigates how the challenging questions and tensions caused by migrants and their universalist claims for inclusion, have been approached and resolved in liberal democracies. By regarding the development of populism as a real and dangerous political phenomenon that has significant traction, the chapter asks whether populism adds something new to this approach and resolution. More specifically, does populism add some distinctiveness that we should be more sensitive to? With reference to the requirement that the state has to provide justifications for measures that affect individuals, the chapter asks how the tensions between exclusion versus inclusion and particularism versus cosmopolitanism, have been adjusted. It concludes that the adjustment has been in favour of exclusion and particularism. The concern that arises is that populism might further shape this adjustment to the point where the balance is completely tipped in favour of exclusion and statism. This raises general concerns about the nature of the community and its organizing liberal values.

This chapter interrogates European law as actively contributing to the undermining of migrants’ rights, since its inception. It claims that European case law in the area of migration is a continuation of a pre-existing characteristic: the tendency to privilege the interests of European states over those of migrants and of Europeans with transnational ties. The chapter thus examines the hypothesis that current-day migrants, being people from former European colonies, are subjected to a split form of legality that was perfected at the end of the colonial era. The legal system maintains the pretence of equality before the law while at the same time relegating colonial subjects to sub-standard legal protection by either excluding them from the application of human rights standards altogether or by lowering these standards. In addition to these two elements, a third legal governance technique with its origins in colonialism is the use of emergency powers themselves. Coloniality thus remains a structuring element of human rights law as it responds to migration. Naming and exposing this colonial structure may be helpful to the extent that it makes a legal and political critique possible, in addition to helping actors to navigate the field.

This chapter proposes a theoretical framework in which the absence or the presence of cross-fertilization depends on how a court and its judges strike the balance between the potential persuasive value of external citations and the potential concerns about deference that may arise from grounding decisions in external sources. It then tests observable implications from this theoretical perspective using a new data set of European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) references to international court rulings and international legal materials. The findings generally support the theoretical framework. The ECtHR mentions external international law sources in 15 per cent of the judgments that engage in some form of new legal interpretation, but most of these references are to Council of Europe (CoE) documents or institutions, which are typically not controversial from a deference perspective. By contrast, the ECtHR cites international court judgments in only 3 per cent of its judgments and does so even more rarely in violation findings, which raise more deference concerns. The conclusion discusses the implications for other courts.

Chapter 4 focuses on protection from refuge claims made in the European context. It examines cases in which refugees use human rights law to challenge a European externalisation practice or request or resist a transfer made pursuant to the European Union’s Dublin System. Such claims are made before the European Court of Human Rights or domestic adjudicative decision-making bodies under the European Convention of Human Rights. They are also made before United Nations treaty bodies using international human rights law. I argue that in initial and early European protection from refuge claims, decision-makers identified common aspects of refugeehood and used human rights to engage with the functions and nature of refuge. There was an understanding that refuge is a remedy that must address present, future and past vicissitudes of displacement but decision-makers now search for the ‘good’ or ‘peculiarly vulnerable’ refugee. This has resulted in decision-makers approaching refuge as a scarce commodity and one stripped down to the barest minimum of protections. In searching for the exceptional refugee, most decision-makers approach questions of gender, age and disability in a nominal manner.

This Chapter provides an illustration of the trends and dynamics discussed in the previous chapters through a comprehensive and contextualised examination of the specific, but paradigmatic, Greek debt crisis, arguing that, in this case as well, both the responses devised by national and supranational institutions, and their scrutiny by some human rights monitoring bodies in particular, seem to reflect an increasingly neoliberalised conception of human rights and of the debt-ESR relationship