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Legal advisers working in the institutions of the European Union exercise significant power, but very little is known about their work. Notwithstanding the handful of cases where legal matters find their way into the news, legal advice remains invisible in EU policy making. For more than ten years Päivi Leino-Sandberg was a part of the invisible community of EU legal advisers, and participated in the exercise of their power. In this book, she shares her insights about how law and lawyers work in the EU institutions, and what their role and impact is on EU decisions from within the decision-making structure. She draws on interviews with over sixty EU lawyers and policymakers: legal experts who interpret the Treaties within the Institutions, draft legislation and defend the Institutions before the EU Court. Telling the true stories behind key negotiations, this book explores the interplay and tensions between legal requirements and political ambitions.
Agents were crucial to the practice of international trade during the period covered by the book. They facilitated the import and export of goods, fixed shipping contracts, arranged insurance and conducted financial services for banks abroad. Agency patterns for goods changed and by about the middle of the nineteenth century sending goods to merchants abroad for sale on consignment was no longer as common as previously. For marketing reasons distributors of manufactured goods like motor vehicles were described as the ‘agents’ of manufacturers, but they were not true agents in law. Agents also came into their own in various parts of the world as so-called managing agents of plantations, mines and factories, and in the result became the fulcrum of powerful business groups. Through doctrines such as undisclosed principal and reasonable compliance with a principal’s instructions, and through devices such as the commission, del credere and confirming agent, the law went further in meeting commercial need. English law recognised that an agent should not always ‘drop out’ of the picture but should bear some responsibility for the underlying principal–third party contract if a transaction went wrong. The courts glossed over doctrinal difficulties to meet commercial need.
The EU member states engage in budgeting through a set of supranational fiscal procedures outlined in EU treaties and supporting legislation. The EU itself is a suprnational government with its own budget and budgetary institutions, procedures, and programs. It enforces these macrobudgetary rules that significantly constrain the policy decisions of the individual member states.
This chapter examines the nature of trusteeship and the possible actions for breach that can be brought by the beneficiaries. Breach can arise by commission [actively commiting a breach of trust]or by omission [failing to carry out a duty owed by the trustee]. The duties of a trustee arise either under common law or under statute or under the trust instrument. A trustee is liable for any breach of trust that causes a loss to the beneficiaries and must restore the equivalent value. The trustee will only be liable for a breach that caused the loss to the fund and the claimant must establish a causal link. The liability of trustees is joint but the beneficiaries can choose to only sue one trustee but in some cases the court may indemnify a trustee such as where one trustee has acted fraudulently. The beneficiaries may be able to claim interest as well as compensation from the fund. Trustees may be able to rely on an exemption clause which will exonerate them from liability. If there is no exemption clause trustees may be able to rely on other defences such as consent of the beneficiaries or the statutory defence under s.62 Trustee Act 1925.
Current study aimed to assess the possibility of prediction of continuous performance test in primary school children with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, with parents and teacher reports of inattention, hyperactivity and oppositional behavior.
Fifteen school aged children with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder without co-morbid psychiatric disorders were selected from Roozbeh child and adolescent psychiatry clinic. Teachers and parent Conner's questionnaires, Continuous Performance Test and 4 class dictation scores were registered from each subject.
Commission errors were correlated with hyperactivity scale in the parent report (r=-0.50, p< 0.05), and with ADHD score (r=-0.49, p< 0.05). Omission error was correlated with inattention (r=0.66, p< 0.05) and ADHD score (r=0.51, p< 0.05) on teachers report. Reaction time was correlated with oppositional (r=0.51, p< 0.05) subscale in parents Conner's questionnaire. Dictation scores were correlated with inattention on parents report (r=-0.52, p< 0.05) and omission on Continuous Performance Test (r=-0.79, p< 0.05).
Current study reported a significant correlation between neuropsychological tests and questionnaires, in ADHD.
This chapter instills an appreciation for the powerful effects (both positive and negative) of performance pay on employee behavior. It opens with a performance-pay success story, namely a field experiment by Shearer (2004) in which the piece-rate compensation of Canadian tree planters was changed. It then develops some examples of the darker side of performance pay, including the Wells Fargo employees who opened false accounts to meet a quota. Section 9.2 provides visual representations of performance pay in which the pay graph has a positive slope (i.e., it increases when the worker’s performance measure increases), sometimes linearly as with piece-rate pay and sometimes nonlinearly as with bonuses. The chapter emphasizes the incentive and sorting effects associated with performance pay as well as its prevalence. Workers’ attitudes towards risk (of earnings fluctuations) and how risk affects performance pay is covered, along with performance measurement, various drawbacks of performance pay, and how to design performance-pay contracts. Readers will finish the chapter with an understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of performance pay and when it can be effectively used.
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