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In the 1980s, the Soviet Union and China resurveyed their border in order to restart their long-stalemated border negotiations. These negotiations resulted in only a partial border settlement: the agreement was signed in 1991. By the end of 1989, nationalities openly expressing their wish to secede from the Soviet Union caused the Soviet government to slow down the negotiation process, and Moscow insisted on setting aside the most contentious sections. China’s nationalities issue had the opposite effect on Zhongnanhai: Chinese leaders wished to settle the entire Sino-Soviet border as quickly as possible. However, once the collapse of the Soviet Union became imminent, the Chinese saw advantages of delaying the negotiations on the disputed sections of the border. They calculated that would allow for China to negotiate with weaker, newly independent countries.
China registered double-digit GDP growth for more than three decades. Recently, the rate has slowed down considerably. The slow growth period, which Chinese policymakers refer to as the 'new-normal', has created enormous curiosity among scholars and policymakers. In particular, scholars often tend to project if China is destined to follow Japan's fate. Insufficient reforms in the banking sector in commensuration with the real economy in Japan resulted in an unprecedented financial catastrophe. Similarly, an asymmetric development between the Chinese banking sector and the real economy is observed. This leads to an interesting question: is China destined to meet Japan's legacy? This Element attempts to answer this question. In so doing, it delves deep into the banking sector reforms of China. The Element concludes that China is not on course to meet an immediate financial chaos, but the country needs further banking reforms to avoid a potential crisis.
This paper uses the perspective of “state-led neoliberal modernization” to explore the collusion of the state and the market in the construction of scientific motherhood and its effect on rural nannies in China. It claims that the state and the market work together to shape rural nannies’ modern subjectivity in the neoliberal economy through the commercial training programme of scientific motherhood. Based on a case study in Shanghai, this paper argues that the training for scientific motherhood attempts to transform rural women into modern care workers through two mechanisms: reconstructing recognition and mobilizing emotion. Rather than passively receiving the training, nannies use their agency to adjust the knowledge and practice of scientific motherhood to suit their complicated working situation. Their strategies include deploying scientific knowledge flexibly and instrumentally, practising self-restraint in limited intimacy, and paying attention to their own familial investment.
The political connection between the state and firms in the context of China's corporate restructuring has been little explored. Using the clientelist framework and unpacking the incentives of both firms and the state, we analyse political connections as repeated patron–client exchanges where the politically connected firms can help the state fulfil its revenue imperative, serving as a failsafe for local authorities to ensure that upper-level tax quotas are met. Leveraging original surveys of the same Chinese firms over an 11-year period and the variations in their post-restructuring board composition, we find that restructured state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with political connections pay more tax than their assessed amount, independent of profits, in exchange for more preferential access to key inputs and policy opportunities controlled by the state. Examining taxes rather than profits also offers a new interpretation for why China continues to favour its remaining SOEs even when they are less profitable.
With the world population rapidly increasing, achieving food security has been a recurring global challenge. Consequently, dependence on agricultural inputs such as fertilisers has continued to grow. The dependency on inorganic fertilizers is especially acute for developing countries. Paradoxically, the major developing economies that need fertilizers to meet their ever-increasing food production requirements are not self-sufficient in the fertilizer sector. In this realm, Potash is a typical case in point. Production and supply of potash has historically been controlled by international export cartels that consist of a limited number of firms. Not very recently, one of the major export cartels underwent further concentration when the Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan merged with Agrium Inc. to form the largest crop nutrient producer in the world - Nutrien. This Chapter discusses the merger and the resultant competition concerns from the perspective of two major import-dependent economies i.e. China and India. It also delineates some limitations of the merger reviews conducted by the respective competition authorities. The objective therein is to address the limitations of the standard ex-post competition analysis and to highlight the political economy issues that affect the state of competition and consumer welfare in markets that are subject to international cartels.
This chapter provides historical context for China’s evolution into a development banker during the 21st century. The People’s Republic of China has been involved with development finance—as both a recipient and donor of foreign aid and other development flows—since its founding in 1949. This chapter describes earlier efforts by researchers to track Chinese-financed development projects around the world. It then outlines basic shifts in China’s approach to development finance over time, and separates China’s approach to development finance into four stages. During the “Early Years” (1949–1959), revolutionary foreign policy under Mao (1960–1977), and the “Reform Era Recalibration” (1978–1998), important building blocks were set in place that help understand the nature of contemporary Chinese development finance. During the fourth and current phase, beginning with the “Going Out” strategy, China’s government has made the transition from an aid donor to a global development banker. The chapter shows how the benefactor-to-banker shift was a product of China’s long history as a development financier. It also provides an historical framework to help readers disentangle novel features of contemporary Chinese development finance from preexisting motivations, institutions, policies, and practices.
Scholarly debate on the role of various contributing factors in cadre promotion yields conflicting evidence for different administrative levels in China, yet rarely has any quantitative evidence been presented for below the county level. This study explores the causal relationship between loyalty, competence and promotion at the township level. Based on an original dataset of local cadre training records, this paper utilizes cadres’ training experience at Party schools and academic institutions to account for loyalty and competence at the local level. Using a rigorous data-preprocessing method – coarsened exact matching (CEM) – this paper explores the causal effects of cadre training on promotion. The empirical results show that Party school training significantly increases the probability of promotion for township-level cadres, while university training contributes to chances of promotion to a lesser but indispensable degree. Moreover, local cadres who are both Party school and university trained enjoy the best chances of promotion.
This chapter introduces the central argument of the book: that China’s 21st- century transition from a “benefactor” to a “banker” has had far-reaching im- pacts in low-income and middle-income countries that are not yet widely understood. Beijing’s growing use of debt rather than aid to bankroll big-ticket infrastructure projects has created new opportunities for developing countries to achieve rapid socioeconomic gains, but it has also introduced major risks, including corruption, conflict, and environmental degradation. Some countries are more effective than others at managing these risks and rewards. This chapter “zooms in” on two countries—Sri Lanka and Tanzania—to illustrate the tension between efficacy and safety confronted by developing countries banking on Chinese development finance. It also provides a roadmap for the rest of the book.
This paper investigates the development of social Darwinism in China from the mid-1890s to 1930 vis-à-vis its ties with social Darwinism in the West, employing a comparative analysis of Spencer, Huxley, and Yan Fu. A form of evolutionism that envisioned a cosmological order based upon strength was transformed into a component of power politics in Republican China, despite unsuccessful political endeavors that illustrated both the triumphs and social malfunctions of evolutionary ideas. From the late 1910s, a new variety of social Darwinism arose alongside the scientific one, reflecting the influence of Kropotkin and de Vries, as Chinese thinkers incorporated non-Anglophone texts. The theories that emerged made sense of the changing Chinese adaptations of evolutionary thinking by contextualizing and modifying them within the intellectual and political dynamics inside China and also in China’s evolving relationship with capitalism and imperialism.
Since the first Trademark Law was enacted in China in 1982, the Chinese intellectual property rights (IPR) system has undergone significant changes in both the design of the legislation and its enforcement. In this article, we analyze the evolution of IPR legislation and enforcement in China. To this end, we illustrate the evolutionary changes of the Chinese IPR system and analyze the changes introduced in four revisions (1992–1993, 2000–2001, 2008–2013, and 2019–2020). Our analysis shows that Patent Law, Trademark Law, and Copyright Law have been substantially enhanced, especially since 2000, when China improved its IPR system to comply with the TRIPS Agreement and join the WTO, and especially the most recent amendments of these three IP Laws. We discuss the number of IPR infringement cases handled by both relevant administrative authorities and courts to analyze IPR enforcement in China. Results indicate that the development of IPR protection enforcement followed the improvement of relevant IPR laws. The two revisions introduced after 2008, changes in the Chinese IPR system, and an increasing number of IPR infringement cases handled by relevant authorities also suggest the willingness of the Chinese government to further enhance its IPR protection.
The household registration (hukou) system has been widely recognized as a key contributory factor to social inequality and tensions in China yet it remains intact despite a series of institutional reforms. What explains the resilience of the system? In this study, we address this puzzle by drawing on policy documents, statistical data and interviews. We argue that the hukou system remains because it is used to protect the beneficiaries of welfare provision and to ensure pivotal groups continue to offer political support. We find that owing to the reforms, a formidable barrier has been erected between the guarded cities and other regions to protect healthcare and education resources from inbound migrant workers. Consequently, the institutional reforms of the hukou system serve as a political contrivance for the survival of the Chinese party-state regime. The findings contribute to emerging literature on China's political control by elaborating political elites’ subtle tactics through various institutions at central and local levels. We expect the new “Great Wall” established under Xi's administration to be an even stronger barrier than before for migrants during the current pandemic and in the future.
Chinese foreign relations and foreign trade during the Cultural Revolution’s radical phase (1966–1969) were different than during the period from 1970 to 1976. The radicals’ control of the Foreign Ministry affected the Chinese missions in Switzerland between 1966 and 1969. Because of Switzerland’s function as the Chinese headquarters in Western Europe, Swiss diplomats were among the few foreigners who remained relatively unaffected by Red Guard measures and other events in Beijing. Although diplomatic tensions occurred between Switzerland and China, these did not lead to a rupture of official relations. This preferential treatment changed during the period from 1970 to 1976, when Switzerland lost importance because China established relations with the majority of the Western nations. The anti-capitalist and anti-Western fervour of the Red Guards did not stop trade between China and Switzerland completely. In fact, Sino-Swiss trade continued – albeit haltingly – during the radical phase of the Cultural Revolution. The improvement of political relations between China and Western European countries, however, also increased Western European interest in the Chinese market. The last part of the chapter, therefore, discusses how the Swiss government and Swiss companies tried to stave off this competition in the early to mid-1970s.
Many existing studies lack a comprehensive picture of the social exclusion statuses and health outcomes of empty nesters and those empty nesters living alone or with a spouse only. Cross-sectional analysis was conducted on representative national data from the 2014 China Longitudinal Aging Social Survey, focusing on respondents aged 60 and above (N = 7,923). Four dimensions of social exclusion (social relationships, subjective feeling of being excluded, social activities and financial products) and three health outcomes (self-reported health (SRH), activities of daily living (ADLs) and depression), were considered. Results show that ‘empty nest’ older people were more likely to be excluded from social relationships and to experience subjective feelings of being excluded, and were less likely to participate in social activities than non-empty nesters. Empty nesters were significantly less likely to report fair SRH and ADL difficulties than non-empty nesters, but they were more likely to report having depression than non-empty nesters. Among ‘empty nest’ older people, empty nesters who were living alone were associated with higher levels of being excluded from social relationships and to experience subjective feelings of being excluded than those who were living with a spouse only. Future research could focus on the development of age-friendly communities which act as health interventions to address relevant situations of social exclusion and depression among empty nesters.
From the 1950s to at least the 1970s, China established and operated a variety of intelligence networks from Switzerland. The chapter relies on thousands of files by the Federal Police as well as Chinese memoirs, biographies, commemorative volumes of former agents, and publications on the history of Chinese intelligence to discuss different forms of intelligence activities carried out by Chinese diplomats in Switzerland. Showing just how intertwined Chinese foreign policy and intelligence were, the chapter argues that diplomatic staff were so often also active as intelligence agents that it could be argued that the Chinese used a hybrid form of diplomat–agent in Switzerland. Some of the national, international, and transnational intelligence networks that the Chinese operated from Switzerland show that Switzerland functioned as a Chinese intelligence hub in Cold War Europe. These include a network of UN officials, ethnic Chinese students and scientists, Chinese restaurants, and Chinese Indonesians. The chapter also describes the Swiss Federal Police’s counterintelligence measures as a reaction to the Chinese intelligence activities. The chapter begins with a discussion of the development of Communist Chinese intelligence in the 1930s and 1940s in order to show how this contributed to Chinese intelligence activities in Europe.
China’s use of Switzerland changed as a result of the Sino-Soviet split, as China tried to compensate for the loss of assistance from the Soviet Union and its allies by increasing its relations with Western Europe. The Swiss missions in Switzerland were important for China’s efforts to increase its presence in Latin America and Africa in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The case of nine Chinese who were arrested in Brazil in 1964 is used to demonstrate how China’s missions in Switzerland contributed to China’s global presence, and how the Swiss government and Swiss businesses were affected by Chinese actions abroad. Swiss support for Tibet and Tibetan refugees is discussed to show that the Swiss government also took advantage of the importance that Switzerland played for China, and managed to get away with actions that China did not tolerate from other nations. The chapter also discusses the effects that the Great Leap Forward had on Chinese and Swiss bilateral trade relations from 1958 to 1965, how Swiss companies and government officials tried to increase trade, and how the Sino-Soviet split led China to increase the scope of its network of embargo goods dealers that it operated out of Bern.
This article is about the experiences of three Chinese men who were involved in smuggling between India and China during the Second World War. Chen Mengzhao's rise as a leading figure in India-China smuggling in Calcutta uncovers the hidden links between the black markets in India and China during the Second World War. Gao Wenjie disguised himself as a Chinese army officer and utilized this fake identity to facilitate his smuggling business. Wang Li-an was sent to Calcutta to undertake smuggling for a Chinese government department. In telling these stories, this article argues that most smuggling in modern India and China was undertaken in transnational contexts that resulted in transnational effects. Ironically, the Nationalist government's state-building project to contain India-China smuggling ended by facilitating it. This project was further perceived by the British authorities as a Chinese conspiracy against India's sovereignty. The misunderstanding between the Chinese and British authorities led to the end of Chinese immigration to India in 1945. Overall, this article provides a new perspective to make sense of the tensions between the Chinese, Indian, and British governments during the Second World War.
China’s policies and measures could also be thought of as a continuation of those in the Cold War period, and that an analysis of Sino-Swiss relations in the Cold War can help our understanding of China’s relations with Western nations today.
To investigate the spiritual care needs and associated influencing factors among elderly inpatients with stroke, and to examine the correlations among spiritual care needs, spiritual well-being, self-perceived burden, self-transcendence, and social support.
A cross-sectional quantitative design was implemented, and the STROBE Checklist was used as the foundation of the study. A convenience sample of 458 elderly inpatients with stroke was selected from three hospitals in China. The sociodemographic characteristics questionnaire, the Nurse Spiritual Therapeutics Scale, the Functional Assessment of Chronic Illness Therapy—Spiritual Well-being, the Self-Perceived Burden Scale, the Chinese Self-Transcendence Scale, and the Perceived Social Support Scale were used. Descriptive statistics, correlation, Student's t-test, ANOVA, non-parametric, and multiple linear regression analyses were used to analyze the data.
The total score of spiritual care needs was 29.82 ± 7.65. Spiritual care needs were positively correlated with spiritual well-being (r = 0.709, p < 0.01), self-transcendence (r = 0.710, p < 0.01), and social support (r = 0.691, p < 0.01), whereas being negatively correlated with self-perceived burden (r = −0.587, p < 0.01). Religious beliefs, educational level, residence place, disease course, spiritual well-being, self-perceived burden, self-transcendence, and social support were found to be the main influencing factors.
Significance of results
The spiritual care needs were prevalent and moderate. It is suggested that nurses should enhance spiritual care knowledge and competence, take targeted spiritual care measures according to inpatients’ individual personality traits or characteristics and differences of patients, reduce their self-perceived burden and improve their spiritual well-being, self-transcendence and social support in multiple ways and levels, so as to meet their spiritual care needs to the greatest extent and enhance their spiritual comfort.
China is now the lender of first resort for much of the developing world, but Beijing has fueled speculation among policymakers, scholars, and journalists by shrouding its grant-giving and lending activities in secrecy. Introducing a systematic and transparent method of tracking Chinese development projects around the world, this book explains Beijing's motives and analyzes the intended and unintended effects of its overseas investments. Whereas China almost exclusively provided aid during the twentieth century, its twenty-first century transition from 'benefactor' to 'banker' has had far-reaching impacts in low-income and middle-income countries that are not widely understood. Its use of debt rather than aid to bankroll big-ticket infrastructure projects creates new opportunities for developing countries to achieve rapid socio-economic gains, but it has also introduced major risks, such as corruption, political capture, and conflict. This book will be of interest to policymakers, students and scholars of international political economy, Chinese politics and foreign policy, economic development, and international relations.
Introduced to China and Japan in the late nineteenth century, detective fiction was understood to be a critical modern genre that embodied rationality and science, which were key concepts within the larger context of modernization and westernization. But prior to their encounter with Western detective fiction, China and Japan had enjoyed a long crime fiction tradition, most notably in the form of court case fiction involving famous judges and magistrates. Sharing some characteristics with Western counterparts but deviating from them in many others, the court case fiction tradition played an important role in the reception of Western detective fiction and helped shape the culturally specific inflections of the genre’s development in these countries. By focusing on key works and major trends from as early as the third century to the turn of the twenty-first, this chapter examines the long history of Asian crime fiction and, in so doing, recontextualizes the Asian reception of a Western genre within this long history to challenge the Eurocentric understanding of crime fiction as a literary genre.