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The point of departure of this chapter is the EU’s close cooperation with third countries, especially in the neighbourhood, which has erased a number of perceived boundaries between the EU and non-member states. Whereas within the EU, family members are largely considered to be the natural beneficiaries of the free movement of persons with ensuing residence and social rights, it is less clear whether the same undisputed status of a family also applies beyond the EU’s borders. The EU has concluded a number of association agreements with countries in its neighbourhood which comprise, to varying degrees, access to the EU’s internal market including the free movement of workers. The Polydor-doctrine of the Court of Justice of the EU has, however, established that similarly worded provisions in the EU Treaties and cooperation agreements concluded with third countries do not guarantee identical interpretation. With a focus on Turkey, the European Economic Area and the United Kingdom, the chapter analyses the conception of family and related rights in the EU’s cooperation instruments, with an aim to establish the extent to which non-EU families can be considered ‘EU families’.
Chapter 5 turns to westward labor migration from the EU’s newly acceded Central and East European (CEE) states to the EU15 from 2004. Despite the EU’s promise full social inclusion, the migration followed an exclusionary cycle. Focusing on Britain, the chapter shows how migrants’ EU-mandated free entry and social rights provoked a welfare nationalist backlash that was amplified by the tabloid press and reflected in opinion polls and in growing support for the populist, anti-immigrant United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). Relying on government documents, the chapter shows how Britain’s social security bureaucracy progressively rescinded CEE labor migrants’ social rights while the government adopted exclusionary migration reforms, culminating in the 2016 Brexit vote that ended CEE migrants’ entry rights. The Brexit Settlement Scheme preserved residence rights for some on ethnically and economically discriminatory bases. Comparative case studies of CEE migration to Germany, Sweden, and Italy show that each followed the British model ‘part of the way,’ adopting more selective exclusionary policies that discriminated the poorer, younger and less-skilled. The conclusion explains why the EU failed in the effort to extend its egalitarian, inclusionary, European citizenship project eastward.
While the number of international students attending UK universities has been increasing in recent years, the 2021/22 and 2022/23 academic years saw a decline in applications from EU-domiciled students. However, the extent and varying impact of this decline remain to be estimated and disentangled from the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. Using difference-in-differences (DID) in a hierarchical regression framework and Universities and Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS) data, we aim to quantify the decline in the number of student applications post-Brexit. We find evidence of an overall decline of 65% in the 2021 academic year in successful applications from EU students as a result of Brexit. This decline is more pronounced for non-Russell Group institutions, as well as for Health and Life Sciences and Arts and Languages. Furthermore, we explore the spatial heterogeneity of the impact of Brexit across EU countries of origin, observing the greatest effects for Poland and Germany, though this varies depending on institution type and subject. We also show that higher rates of COVID-19 stringency in the country of origin led to greater applications for UK higher education institutions. Our results are important for government and institutional policymakers seeking to understand where losses occur and how international students respond to external shocks and policy changes. Our study quantifies the distinct impacts of Brexit and COVID-19 and offers valuable insights to guide strategic interventions to sustain the UK’s attractiveness as a destination for international students.
From Brexit to the rise of China, the deterioration of the special relationship with the United States and the return of war to Europe in Ukraine, this chapter will explore how the UK’s position in the world has faced both challenges and opportunities over the last fourteen years. The analysis will focus on how different Conservative premierships used or wasted these global changes, and how it has affected UK foreign policy and Britain as a whole (particularly Brexit’s influence on domestic policy and politics).
The fourteen years of Tory rule constitute a stunning missed opportunity to seize on one of Britain’s few internationally renowned assets – its creativity. The government did step in to save organisations from disaster during the pandemic; it did, early on, extend its successful system of tax credits from film and TV to other cultural forms. It did the beat drum for extending demographic opportunities, even if in its actions it did not follow through. What mattered at least as much as specific decisions in this latest Tory era, particularly the latter part under May, Johnson, Truss and Sunak, was the manner of government engagement. Many in the sector are demoralised, having to raise private funds while being disparaged by ministers.
Any fair evaluation of the Conservative effect (2010-14) must be cognisant of the context. Tom Egerton’s chapter will place the Conservative premierships in the six external shocks Britain faced, beginning with the Great Financial Crash and the Eurozone Crisis, before the impact of Brexit (and a debate over its external and structural causes), Covid, the Russo-Ukrainian War and the inflation crisis. How did each government succeed or fail in the face of compounding shocks? What opportunities and constraints emerged as a result? Only through an analysis of a decade of poly-crisis, and in the perspective of wider political change, can we make a conclusion on the question of ‘fourteen wasted years’.
International pressures, Brexit and the resurgence of nationalism have created new divides in the regions of the United Kingdom. Brendan O’Leary examines the impact of Conservative policy in Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales, focusing on how prime ministers have handled campaigns and support for Scottish independence, the ruling coalitions in Wales, and also the new post-Brexit framework and demographic pressures in Northern Ireland. The chapter ends with a dire overall evaluation of the condition of the union as a result of Conservative policy.
A sustained period of Conservative government would normally be expected to usher in constitutional stability. But the reverse was largely true for the period 2010-24. During these years constitutional controversies were rarely far from the news, partly thanks to deliberately planned changes, but mostly due to radically shifting conventions and political behaviour. Across the time period, the direction of change was also very far from consistent. The initial coalition years were marked primarily by pressures towards greater constitutional pluralism, though Liberal Democrat reform ambitions were often held back by Cameron’s Conservatives. Later, any prospect of calm under single-party government was soon punctured by the pressures of Brexit. This eventually brought into question almost every aspect of the UK’s constitutional arrangements, and inflicted painful splits within the Conservative Party over questions of governance. In particular, Boris Johnson’s populist approach was characterised by wholesale disregard for constitutional norms, and highlighted vulnerabilities in the UK’s key democratic arrangements which few would previously have anticipated. If one commonality can be discerned across this fourteen-year period of constitutional extremes, it is the largely unconservative nature of policy.
This chapter discusses the entanglement of Brexit with the subsequent pandemic and the war in Ukraine, both of which have been used to muddy Brexit’s economic impact. It first analyses the rhetoric of the Leave campaign and of those politicians advocating for and negotiating Brexit. Those negotiations are bound to continue while politicians are reluctant to acknowledge Brexit as unfinished business. It then contextualizes contemporary fears of unlimited immigration as an echo of postimperial anxieties about British identity. These also feature in literary responses to Brexit which make them condition-of-England novels rather than investigations of wider Anglo-European relations. Forging a dialogue between the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and the fallout from the fourteenth-century bubonic plague suggests that political leadership and economic steer are crucial in determining a country’s recovery. How the pandemic was handled in the UK, paired with the economic impact of Brexit, aggravated the global supply issues caused by the war in Ukraine. This was not an inevitable outcome.
This chapter traces Ireland as a foundational zone of influence and creative disruption in the British imagination. Ireland’s political status has been altered by the Anglo-Irish relationship across centuries, while Britain, in turn, has been shaped by its interaction with the otherness of its closest island neighbour. Twelfth-century texts demonstrate that Ireland has acted as a foil to Britain’s imperial imagination, and it continued to do so throughout the subsequent literary and political history. The chapter discusses depictions of Ireland from Gerald of Wales to Edmund Spenser to William Shakespeare. Then it turns to examine the influence of Irish literature on the British imaginary. The enduring influence of Maria Edgeworth, W. B. Yeats, James Joyce, Elizabeth Bowen, Samuel Beckett, and Seamus Heaney allows Britain to see itself through Irish eyes. Often, they reveal the occlusions and silences that exist within Britain’s self-imaginings. With Brexit shadowing the contemporary relationship between Britain, Ireland, and, of course, Europe, this dialogical Anglo-Irish relationship, whereby Ireland both reflects and distorts Britain’s image, becomes all the more significant.
The pro-Brexit campaign leading up to the 2016 referendum in the UK and in its aftermath was accompanied and driven by a narrative that was hostile to immigration and its cultural implications. Language played a role, with Leave campaigners criticising the presence of multiple languages in UK society and government agencies embarking on an 'English first' campaign that linked community languages to lack of integration and social incoherence. At the same time some arguments in support of foreign language learning embraced the Brexit narrative claiming that language skills will help post-Brexit Britain gain global influence. The chapter surveys different strands of UK language policy and concludes with an assessment of latest Census figures on language pointing to the increase in multilingualism.
Cities are contact zones characterised by conviviality of cultures. They have been described as the ideal setting for multilingual utopias, where institutional spaces emerge that cultivate multilingualism. In the context of globalisation and super-diversity, cities can redefine themselves as post-national spaces. Neoliberalism embraces diversity for its profitablity value; it is opposed by notions of the right to the city and local citizenship. Critical social and sociolinguistic theory embraces definitions of identity, community and language that recognise the dynamics of multiple components in individuals' repertoires of features and networks of practice. Traditional notions of identity, belonging, commuity and language give way to an appreciation of the fluidity of forms of belonging and networking practice. Diasporas are understood as translocal networks of practice with multiple expressions of belonging. Manchester as an early industrial city offers an interesting setting to observe the evolution of diaspora communities and their alignment with fluid language practices.
The Brexit debate has been accompanied by a rise in hostile attitudes to multilingualism. However, cities can provide an important counter-weight to political polarisation by forging civic identities that embrace diversity. In this timely book, Yaron Matras describes the emergence of a city language narrative that embraces and celebrates multilingualism and helps forge a civic identity. He critiques linguaphobic discourses at a national level that regard multilingualism as deficient citizenship. Drawing on his research in Manchester, he examines the 'multilingual utopia', looking at multilingual spaces across sectors in the city that support access, heritage, skills and celebration. The book explores the tensions between decolonial approaches that inspire activism for social justice and equality, and the neoliberal enterprise that appropriates diversity for reputational and profitability purposes, prompting critical reflection on calls for civic university engagement. It is essential reading for anyone concerned about ways to protect cultural pluralism in our society.
In the wake of Brexit, how has the framing of the EU and independence evolved among regionalist parties in the devolved regions of the UK? The effects of a multilevel structure such as the EU on regionalist parties has been examined, yet European disintegration is novel and thus yet to be fully explored. Has the framing of the EU by these parties shifted, and if so, how? In this article, I analyze 19 regionalist party manifestos between 2011 and 2022 through the lens of rational choice and discursive institutionalism to examine the effects of Brexit on the framing of the EU. At a rhetorical level, these parties have engaged in the subsuming of the EU, rhetorically tying their independence or enhanced autonomy to Brexit. Sinn Féin, Scottish Nationalist Party, and Plaid Cymru have used the critical juncture of Brexit to incorporate the EU into their regionalist rhetoric. By examining the effects of European disintegration on regionalist political parties, we can better understand the role that current events play in the fluidity of party positions as presented in manifestos.
Wealth provides self-insurance against financial risk, reducing risk aversion. We apply this insurance mechanism to electoral behaviour, arguing that a voter who desires a change to the status quo and who is wealthy is more likely to vote for change than a voter who lacks the same self-insurance. We apply this argument to the case of Brexit in the UK, which has been widely characterized as a vote by the ‘economically left-behind’. Our results show that individuals who lacked wealth are less likely to support leaving the EU, explaining why so many Brexit voters were wealthy, in terms of their property wealth. We corroborate our theory using two panel surveys, accounting for unobserved individual-level heterogeneity, and by using a survey experiment. The findings have implications for the potential broader role of wealth-as-insurance in electoral behaviour and for understanding the Brexit case.
All aspects of law possess scaler elements, but critiques from the ‘politics of scale’, a concept well established in political geography, remain rare in legal analysis. Brexit, especially as regards Northern Ireland, provides a key opportunity to consider scaler analysis both in a descriptive and theoretical sense. Scale deepens our understanding of how law co-constitutes multiple scales but also highlights where a flat understanding of law tied to vertical jurisdictional frames foils attempts to garner a full understanding of its operation. Northern Ireland, a legal and political space that from one perspective lends itself to an apparently clear-cut vertical description of legal scales, actually presents a rich space where networked, rhetorical and nodular scales and structures continuously (re)contest scaled solutions. The Brexit outcome of what used to be known as the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland and is now known as the Windsor Framework – and specifically how the Framework is intended to operate in practice – provides an opportunity to not only understand Northern Ireland within a scale and law frame, but also to highlight the shortcomings of law's traditional scaler approach and what lessons may be learned when analysing or engaging with the intersection of law and politics in similar future situations.
This chapter considers relations between the European Union and other European States. The European Economic Area establishes something close to a single market, with non-EU States transposing swathes of EU law into their national law. A customs union with Turkey in non-agricultural goods requires Turkey to align its laws with EU laws relating to external trade and free movement of goods. A hybrid regime exists with the United Kingdom. Northern Ireland aligns its external trade and free movement of goods law with EU law. A free trade agreement exists for the rest of the United Kingdom which abolishes tariffs on movement of goods but allows regulatory barriers. A free trade agreement also operates with Ukraine under which it aligns its laws with EU law in free movement of goods, most of free movement for services, environmental, labour and competition law. A limited free trade agreement exists with Switzerland, alongside a number of agreements in which Switzerland aligns its laws with EU law in return for access to the EU market or territory. The chapter also considers the ‘Brussels effect’ under which non-EU States and industries voluntarily adopt EU law to access the EU market.
In this article Anne O'Connor and Joanna Morris of Thomson Reuters set the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023 (REUL Act 2023) within its broader historical context, summarise provisions likely to be of interest to the legal information community, and explain how and why the REUL Act 2023 has given rise to legal uncertainty.
The exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union (EU) single market and customs union has adversely affected trade prospects of many developing economies that depended on the UK market for their exports. This paper investigates the impact of Brexit on African countries' exports to the UK. The comparison is based upon trade between the set of African countries which export most to the UK and the EU. It provides a quantitative assessment of the trade effect through the use of descriptive analysis and empirical estimations by employing the difference-in-difference (DID) estimation approach. The descriptive analysis finds that the share of African exports sent to the UK has declined since the Brexit announcement in 2016. The empirical estimations using the DID approach also demonstrate a drop of 20–30% in African countries exports to the UK relative to the EU-27 in this period. These results hold to a battery of robustness checks, including the use of an alternative estimation approach, varying sample size, and the use of alternative counterfactuals. We further show that the trade flows started to drop immediately after the announcement of the Brexit referendum in 2015 but the main drop came after the Brexit referendum results became evident. These findings imply the need for policy intervention and support for African countries to revitalize their trade flows and alleviate the unintended effects of this trade shock.
A new legal order has arisen in the United Kingdom (‘UK’) following that country's withdrawal from the European Union (‘EU’). Nowhere are these changes more evident than in the complex rules that have emerged in the fields of freedom of movement and the right to work. In evaluating the new legal landscape, this Article has two overarching aims. The first is to assess the level of protection granted to the right to work and associated free movement rights within EU and UK law, including the terms of the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement. The second aim is to examine the extent to which those right to work rules are reflective of the status of the right to work as a fundamental social right. It is argued that Brexit unmoors the right to work from EU free movement rules, thereby undermining the normative value of that right, while exacerbating flaws in domestic rules governing access to employment for both national and migrant workers.