Describes the early career and political advent of Donald Trump through his election to the presidency in 2016. Explores the weaknesses in system of presidential nomination and election, and of his opponent Hillary Clinton, that made his victory possible. Explores the investigations integral to story of 2016 election: the Clinton email investigation and Crossfire Hurricane, the investigation into Russian election interference and possible Trump campaign collusion with the Russians.

Pentecostalism understands that spiritual and social power without political power is limited in its ability to coerce, and so it contests for power through spiritual warfare and active partisan politics. However, when a “Christian” president lost his re-election bid in 2015, it also pushed some Pentecostals to look beyond their country to the USA and the symbolism of a powerful president associating with Christianity. This chapter thus considers how the Pentecostal power identity takes its desires across the borders of nation-space. Titled, “What Islamic devils?!”: Power Struggles, Race, and Christian Transnationalism, this study provides the historical context to Nigerians’ support for US president Donald Trump by exploring the dynamics of political theology as it crosses the bounds of nationhood. Through an analysis of the nitty-gritty of the politics of the spirituality of Nigerian Pentecostals, the desire to defeat Islam (the other religion that contends power), the local politics of faith as it intermingles with ethnicity identity, this chapter shows how all these various dynamics sustains the power identity that manifests in the adoration of Trump.

Harry J. Elam, Jr. temporally locates his chapter in the “age of Obama,” the period following the election of Barack Obama as the first Black president of the United States. After the 2008 election, he notes a shift in the way that critics and scholars talked about race, particularly Blackness. Quoting art curator Thelma Golden, Elam investigates, through four case studies, whether the “post-black” is “the new black.” He looks at the 2009 Broadway revival of August Wilson’s Joe Turner’s Come and Gone, Branden Jacobs-Jenkins’s Neighbors, Eisa Davis’s Bulrusher, and Fred Ebb and John Kander’s musical The Scottsboro Boys to address race politics, the reemergence of blackface, and the topic of mixed-race identity within the contemporary theatre.

The works of George Saunders and J.D. Vance suggest two paths forward for white American writers in the twenty-first century. While both acknowledge whiteness as foundational to the organization of contemporary society, Vance ignores the privileges that Saunders seeks to interrogate. The elections of both Obama and Trump have profoundly shifted how we talk about race in the United States, and their presidencies have made clear that whiteness can no longer operate as an invisible, presumed position of authority. Amid our often frightening moment of political unrest, we have an opportunity to speak of whiteness as the historical force of domination and exclusion that led to centuries of injustice and which continues to define so much of contemporary American life. Though white writers have not led the way on progressive representations of race in U.S. fiction, they may at last complete the important task of making whiteness visible.

This chapter takes up the “forever war” theme by returning to Iraq just prior to Obama’s troop pullout and to Afghanistan where he inherited a failing war. Coming into the White House, Obama fulfilled his campaign pledge to end Bush’s “dumb war” in Iraq but left the country vulnerable. The violence in the Syrian civil war attracted al Qaeda militants from Iraq. They formed the nucleus of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, the most fearsome terrorist network in the world. ISIS seized land in Syria, invaded Iraq, and announced a caliphate. Obama answered Iraq’s pleas for help. US and allied airpower, along with SOF, turned the tide of battle. The Pentagon again used local allies; this time mostly Kurds who formed the backbone of the Syrian Democratic Forces. The SDF fought ISSI and the Damascus regime to carve out an enclave in Syria. Meanwhile in Afghanistan, Obama endorsed the Pentagon’s surge of troops to nearly 100,000 so as to exit the war as in Iraq. He changed course and stopped U.S. participation in combat roles in 2014. He decreased troops to around 8,000 before leaving office. At first Trump upped the troops and gave his generals greater freedom to act. Then, he, too, scaled them down to 2,500 in Afghanistan and Iraq, while negotiating with the Taliban to leave totally by May 1, 2021.

More than a decade after the Persian Gulf War, the United States went to war against Iraq for the second time. This conflict grew out of fear and distrust of Saddam Hussein’s suspected chemical and nuclear weapons of mass destruction. A highly inaccurate intelligence assessment contributed to the fear of Iraq’s phantom WMD. Except for Britain, the permanent members of the Security Council opposed the war. George W. Bush put together a coalition of the willing to invade Iraq in 2003. The opening, conventional phase of the intervention went well with Baghdad seized in three weeks. But soon the Pentagon faced a raging insurgency in much of the country, which was divided along sectarian lines of the Sunni and Shiite Islamic sects fighting each other while attacking the US and allied forces. The intractable insurgency proved complex and deeply rooted. By 2006, the Pentagon looked as it was headed toward defeat. Three factors contributed to a turnaround in its fortunes. Chief among these was the Awakening movement in which Sunni Arab tribal leaders crossed over to the American side because of their resentment of Salafi-jihadi militants. The Bush White House adopted a finely-tuned counterinsurgency strategy and surged 28,500 more troops into the fray. During the intense fighting, Bush pushed several elections and a constitution to entrench democracy. Gun battles and street bombings greatly subsided by the time Barack Obama withdrew all US combat troops in 2011.

The period since the 1990s has proved, in an ironic way, the strength of Israel–US relations. In 1991, American president, George H. W. Bush, clashed with Israel, and since 1996, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had strained Israel–US relations in an unprecedented manner. In both cases, the constants that determined the course of the Israel–US relationship, religion, shared values, and history, proved to be stronger than any individual, regardless of their position. The period covered in this chapter was characterized by a close friendship and strategic partnership between the two nations. During those years, the two countries signed several memoranda of understanding which solidified the American commitment to Israel’s security and ensured its qualitative military edge, as well as expanding the cooperation on economic and cultural matters. The military-industrial cooperation as well as security cooperation between the two countries deepened. The growing Israeli attachment to American culture and values was another manifestation of the deepening relations between the two countries. The Israeli economy changed from socialist to neoliberal under the influence of American economic thinking. Neoconservatism spread across Israel’s political and intellectual elites through institutions and people, most notably Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The Israelis adopted many of the characteristics of American culture and economy, bringing their country closer to the United States in form and content. The ties between Israel and the Christian Zionist Evangelicals deepened as well. With the Evangelicals returning to the forefront of American politics since the mid-1970s, they became a major force in the support of Israel, a tendency that was especially encouraged by the right wing in Israel. Evangelical support for Israel has only increased during the 1990s and 2000s.

What Bernard Brodie said about nuclear weapons in 1946 continues to be true: The most important thing about nuclear weapons is that they exist and are terribly powerful. This was true in both the Cold War and the subsequent era. Although the situation has changed a great deal, there are striking continuities, especially in American attitudes and policies. Most obviously, the United States has consistently opposed nuclear proliferation, with only a very few exceptions for its closest friends. Second, the debate within the United States about the role of nuclear weapons has been altered only slightly by the end of the Cold War. The fundamental division between those who see nuclear weapons as having a revolutionary impact on world politics and those who do not continues. Trump’s Nuclear Posture Review makes arguments that are remarkably similar to those made under the Raegan administration. In parallel, the arguments made against Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) systems today are quite similar to those advanced during the Cold War, despite the radically changed conditions. This indicates that ways of thinking about nuclear weapons have become deeply engrained.

This chapter analyses the policy and regulatory developments leading up to the enactment of the Cyber Security Law, including China’s Anti-Terrorism Law and how enforced source code ‘backdoor provisions’ were removed from the final draft of this law to protect China’s innovation policy goals. The discussion of China’s Network Sovereignty push is continued by explaining the significant debate about Network Sovereignty-related ideological thinking in China’s Anti-Terrorism Law. This law is yet another example of how problematic laws are delayed, as further consultation is sought. Comparisons are also made with a similar policy debate on ‘backdoor provisions’ in the United States, to show that the initial Chinese approach was not so different from universal debates, at that time, and ultimately reflects international practice. Similar approaches are now finding more widespread acceptance globally including in Australia and the United Kingdom.

Fierce partisan conflict in the United States is not new. Throughout American history, there have been polarizing struggles over fundamental questions relating to the meaning of the Declaration, the Constitution, and the relationship between the two. These struggles over ideals have become all encompassing when joined to battles over what it means to be an American – conflicts that have become more regular and dangerous with the rise of the administrative state. The idea of a “State” cuts more deeply than suggested by Max Weber’s definition of “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” Beyond the powers of government, the State represents a centralizing ambition (at least for progressive reformers) to cultivate, or impose, a vision of citizenship. In Randolph Bourne’s words, the State is a “concept of power” that comes alive in defense of or in conflict with an ideal of how such foundational values of Americanism as “free and enlightened” are to be interpreted and enforced. The ideal is symbolized not by the Declaration and the Constitution but rather in rallying emblems such as the flag and Uncle Sam.

Pentecostalism understands that spiritual and social power without political power is limited in its ability to coerce, and so it contests for power through spiritual warfare and active partisan politics. However, when a “Christian” president lost his re-election bid in 2015, it also pushed some Pentecostals to look beyond their country to the USA and the symbolism of a powerful president associating with Christianity. This chapter thus considers how the Pentecostal power identity takes its desires across the borders of nation-space. Titled, “What Islamic devils?!”: Power Struggles, Race, and Christian Transnationalism, this study provides the historical context to Nigerians’ support for US president Donald Trump by exploring the dynamics of political theology as it crosses the bounds of nationhood. Through an analysis of the nitty-gritty of the politics of the spirituality of Nigerian Pentecostals, the desire to defeat Islam (the other religion that contends power), the local politics of faith as it intermingles with ethnicity identity, this chapter shows how all these various dynamics sustains the power identity that manifests in the adoration of Trump.

Barack Obama entered the presidency with a clear plan for engaging Iran. Rather than building on past rhetoric and emphasizing Iran’s "misbehavior," he opted for a new approach. In a speech marking Iran’s new year, he praised Iran’s rich history, then reached out directly to the country's new president, Hassan Rouhani. The approach did not show immediate results, but the two countries, along with European powers, Russia, and China, began to negotiate over Iran’s nuclear program – a key issue for the relationship since the 1990s. The P5+1 talks (and secret US–Iran meetings) slowly began to turn the tide. The JCPOA finally came into being, representing a significant diplomatic achievement. Through it would prove to be short-lived, the Iran deal demonstrated that progress could be achieved. After forty years of near-constant enmity, the two countries appeared to be on the verge of détente. When Donald Trump unilaterally pulled the US out of the deal, these hopes were again dashed. But lessons from the negotiations remain for future policymakers hoping to resolve this most confounding of global issues.

Chapter 10 provides an overview of all our findings and offers additional avenues of research. We also discuss the many policy implications and political ramifications of group empathy, including what happens when it is lacking in specific contexts. In doing so, we consider the rise of ethnonationalist, far-right politics in the United States and many other parts of the world, and we discuss whether group empathy may counteract xenophobic, exclusionary appeals of populist leaders. The eight-year span of our data collection covers a stark transformation of the American policy landscape as the United States transitioned from Barack Obama’s presidency to Donald Trump’s. This allows us to contemplate how levels of group empathy might have shifted over time within and across racial/ethnic groups in the United States. We further consider how to cultivate group empathy at the societal level, in order to improve intergroup relations and social justice, and how to envision the role of educational experiences such as community engagement in these efforts.

This brief coda examines the curious case of Marilynne Robinson, one of the most decorated living American novelists who seems like she would easily be aligned with American conservatism, but is not, for reasons that are intertwined with the perceived anti-intellectualism of the political Right. In short, Robinson epitomizes the prevailing, though flawed, assumption within the literary field that the cultural capital associated with highbrow literature is inevitably aligned with progressive liberalism.

This chapter explores the foreign policy discourse of the old Anglosphere coalition during the second phase of the crisis and civil war in Syria. First, the chapter analyses Obama’s warning of a ‘red line’ over chemical weapons use. Second, it explores the route out of the rhetorical entrapment enacted by this phrase. Third, it maps out the discursive debates on war and peace that divided the international community and ran through the Anglosphere in 2012 and 2013. The analysis of this second phase establishes the context in which Islamic State would shoot to prominence at the start of 2014, altering the nature of the crisis and civil war, as well as the language and calculations of Anglosphere states.

Chapter 4 examines the tone of presidential discussions of Supreme Court cases, focusing on why presidents discuss cases in positive, negative, and neutral lights. We argue that presidents alter the tone of their remarks about the Court’s decisions in an effort to build public support for their presidencies, shape how the public views the constitutional issues at play, and influence the implementation of the Court’s decisions in the bureaucracy and in Congress. For example, a president happy with the Court’s decision can praise the decision and assure the country that he will take all steps necessary to ensure it is implemented. Conversely, a president displeased with a decision can criticize that decision and encourage Congress to take action to alter or reverse the decision, thus signaling that the fight over the case has not ended. Consistent with our theoretical expectations, we find that presidents criticize cases they disagree with ideologically; those that declare laws unconstitutional; and those decided by minimum winning coalitions. Conversely, presidents tend to praise salient Supreme Court decisions that support their preferred ideological positions.

Chapter 7 examines the relationship between presidential discussions of Supreme Court decisions and public opinion in two ways. First, we investigate whether presidents can influence the public’s views of the Supreme Court and its decisions through their public remarks. Second, we analyze whether presidents lead or follow public attitudes when they take positions on the Court’s cases. Using an original survey experiment, we find that presidents can shape public support for the Court’s decisions in low-salience issue areas, but they have a hard time molding public opinion in high-salience cases, such as immigration. We further find that presidents tend to take positions on the Court’s decisions that are congruent with public opinion on the issue areas featured in those cases, indicating that presidents are democratically responsive actors.

Our introductory chapter has several goals. First, we introduce the topic, identifying the popular conception that presidents discuss Supreme Court decisions in an effort to influence case outcomes. Second, we develop our theoretical argument, which begins with the well-grounded assumption that presidents pursue three primary goals while in office: good public policy, reelection, and historical achievement. In turn, presidents use their legitimate power and authority to realize these goals. Third, we preview the central motivation of the book: understanding why presidents discuss Supreme Court decisions in their public rhetoric and the impact of those statements. This includes examining whether presidents use their remarks to influence cases pending before the Court, or whether presidents comment on Supreme Court cases after they have been handed down in an effort to promote their reelection, policy goals, and historical legacies, as well as affect the implementation of the decisions and the public’s understanding of the Constitution. This chapter also presents survey data on Americans’ attitudes toward presidential discussions of Supreme Court decisions, and a discussion of the original database used throughout the book.

Considers the strong realism of Obama and how his efforts to avoid the Syrian Civil War were like those of George H. W. Bush in Yugoslavia. Examines pros and cons of his nuclear deal with Iran and his failure to contain Russian power in Ukraine and Syria, an impotence he shares with several of his Cold War and post–Cold War predecessors. Assesses the Obama foreign policy legacy and how far it explains the rise of Donald Trump.