To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure firstname.lastname@example.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
The dissertation introduces new sequent-calculi for free first- and second-order logic, and a hyper-sequent calculus for modal logics K, D, T, B, S4, and S5; to attain the calculi for the stronger modal logics, only external structural rules need to be added to the calculus for K, while operational and internal structural rules remain the same. Completeness and cut-elimination are proved for all calculi presented.
Philosophically, the dissertation develops an inferentialist, or proof-theoretic, theory of meaning. It takes as a starting point that the sense of a sentence is determined by the rules governing its use. In particular, there are two features of the use of a sentence that jointly determine its sense, the conditions under which it is coherent to assert that sentence and the conditions under which it is coherent to deny that sentence. The dissertation develops a theory of quantification as marking coherent ways a language can be expanded and modality as the means by which we can reflect on the norms governing the assertion and denial conditions of our language. If the view of quantification that is argued for is correct, then there is no tension between second-order quantification and nominalism. In particular, the ontological commitments one can incur through the use of a quantifier depend wholly on the ontological commitments one can incur through the use of atomic sentences. The dissertation concludes by applying the developed theory of meaning to the metaphysical issue of necessitism and contingentism. Two objections to a logic of contingentism are raised and addressed. The resulting logic is shown to meet all the requirement that the dissertation lays out for a theory of meaning for quantifiers and modal operators.
In the present paper we use the theory of exact completions to study categorical properties of small setoids in Martin-Löf type theory and, more generally, of models of the Constructive Elementary Theory of the Category of Sets, in terms of properties of their subcategories of choice objects (i.e., objects satisfying the axiom of choice). Because of these intended applications, we deal with categories that lack equalisers and just have weak ones, but whose objects can be regarded as collections of global elements. In this context, we study the internal logic of the categories involved, and employ this analysis to give a sufficient condition for the local cartesian closure of an exact completion. Finally, we apply this result to show when an exact completion produces a model of CETCS.
Gödel’s ontological proof is by now well known based on the 1970 version, written in Gödel’s own hand, and Scott’s version of the proof. In this article new manuscript sources found in Gödel’s Nachlass are presented. Three versions of Gödel’s ontological proof have been transcribed, and completed from context as true to Gödel’s notes as possible. The discussion in this article is based on these new sources and reveals Gödel’s early intentions of a liberal comprehension principle for the higher order modal logic, an explicit use of second-order Barcan schemas, as well as seemingly defining a rigidity condition for the system. None of these aspects occurs explicitly in the later 1970 version, and therefore they have long been in focus of the debate on Gödel’s ontological proof.
Higher inductive types are a class of type-forming rules, introduced to provide basic (and not-so-basic) homotopy-theoretic constructions in a type-theoretic style. They have proven very fruitful for the “synthetic” development of homotopy theory within type theory, as well as in formalising ordinary set-level mathematics in type theory. In this paper, we construct models of a wide range of higher inductive types in a fairly wide range of settings.
We introduce the notion of cell monad with parameters: a semantically-defined scheme for specifying homotopically well-behaved notions of structure. We then show that any suitable model category has weakly stable typal initial algebras for any cell monad with parameters. When combined with the local universes construction to obtain strict stability, this specialises to give models of specific higher inductive types, including spheres, the torus, pushout types, truncations, the James construction and general localisations.
Our results apply in any sufficiently nice Quillen model category, including any right proper, simplicially locally cartesian closed, simplicial Cisinski model category (such as simplicial sets) and any locally presentable locally cartesian closed category (such as sets) with its trivial model structure. In particular, any locally presentable locally cartesian closed (∞, 1)-category is presented by some model category to which our results apply.
A multiset consists of elements, but the notion of a multiset is distinguished from that of a set by carrying information of how many times each element occurs in a given multiset. In this work we will investigate the notion of iterative multisets, where multisets are iteratively built up from other multisets, in the context Martin–Löf Type Theory, in the presence of Voevodsky’s Univalence Axiom.
In his 1978 paper, “the type theoretic interpretation of constructive set theory” Aczel introduced a model of constructive set theory in type theory, using a W-type quantifying over a universe, and an inductively defined equivalence relation on it. Our investigation takes this W-type and instead considers the identity type on it, which can be computed from the univalence axiom. Our thesis is that this gives a model of multisets. In order to demonstrate this, we adapt axioms of constructive set theory to multisets, and show that they hold for our model.