Belgian antitrust enforcement has gradually been strengthened. Applicable provisions are mostly copied from EU law, but national accents remain. Sanctions on natural persons were introduced, and abuse of relative dominance (abuse of economic dependency) was recently prohibited. Some provisions, such as the extension of the scope of EU exemptions to purely national cases, were innovative. Also creative is also the National Competition Authority (NCA)’s hybrid institutional structure, largely separating investigation and fining within one institution. No criminal antitrust sanctions currently exist. Room for improvement remains. The NCA clearly faces budgetary and human resource constraints. The power balance appears to be gradually moving towards the Auditorat. The settlement rate is very high and fines are generally low, weakening the deterrent effect of enforcement. As to private enforcement, there is a long tradition of injunctive relief, although applicants may face a high burden of proof, especially in dominance cases. Belgium duly implemented the EU Damages Directive, introducing the envisaged advantages for claimants but also the hurdles, such as the ‘passing-on defence’.

Introduction

The project of ‘European economic integration’ has never been an end in itself. Economic integration has, on the contrary, always been considered an instrument to attain non-economic goals. Economic rule-making should in that respect facilitate and promote the realisation of non-economic objectives, including the protection of weaker (contract) parties, protection of the environment or prevention of climate change and protection of fundamental social rights.

Finding the right balance between non-economic goals and purely economic objectives in principle remains a matter for political decision-making. Political balancing is nevertheless said to take place within the confines of a European economic constitution framework. This chapter discusses and assesses that framework in the current stage of European integration.