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Hugo Grotius is considered one of the paradigmatic figures in international relations theory. His thought is often contrasted with that of Thomas Hobbes, who is portrayed as the standard bearer of political realism, and the universalist orientation of Immanuel Kant. The centre piece of the so-called Grotian tradition is the theory of international society, which accommodates the claims of independent states without granting them absolute justification. The pursuit of advantage is subject to common standards that oblige rather than merely counsel moderation and restraint. The chapter proceeds in three parts. Part one examines the legal and political narratives that account for the emergence of the Grotian tradition. Part two examines revisionist scholarship that considers Grotius’ thought in the context of relations between Europeans and non-European ‘others’. Neither the standard nor the revisionist narrative provides an adequate account of obligation, without which the theory of international society collapses in confusion. Part three responds to this problem by exploring a part of Grotius’ thought that has been excised from international relations theory: theology. This illuminates an account of obligation that rescues the Grotian tradition from the coarse world of moral scepticism and power politics.
The search for biosignatures is likely to generate controversial results, with no single biosignature being clear proof of the presence of life. Bayesian statistical frameworks have been suggested as a tool for testing the effect that a new observation has on our belief in the presence of life on another planet. We test this approach here using the tentative discovery of phosphine on Venus as an example of a possible detection of a biosignature on an otherwise well-characterized planet. We report on a survey of astrobiologists' views on the likelihood of life on Enceladus, Europa, Mars, Titan and Venus before the announcement of the detection of phosphine in Venus' atmosphere (the Bayesian Prior Probability) and after the announcement (the Posterior Probability). Survey results show that respondents have a general view on the likelihood of life on any world, independent of the relative ranking of specific bodies, and that there is a distinct ‘fans of icy moons’ sub-community. The announcement of the potential presence of phosphine on Venus resulted in the community showing a small but significant increase in its confidence that there was life on Venus; nevertheless the community still considers Venus to be the least likely abode of life among the five targets considered, last after Titan. We derive a Bayesian formulation that explicitly includes both the uncertainty in the interpretation of the signal as well as uncertainty in whether phosphine on Venus could have been produced by life. We show that although the community has shown rational restraint about a highly unexpected and still tentative detection, their changing expectations do not fit a Bayesian model.
Few studies have examined burnout in psychosocial oncology clinicians. The aim of this systematic review was to summarize what is known about the prevalence and severity of burnout in psychosocial clinicians who work in oncology settings and the factors that are believed to contribute or protect against it.
Articles on burnout (including compassion fatigue and secondary trauma) in psychosocial oncology clinicians were identified by searching PubMed/MEDLINE, EMBASE, PsycINFO, the Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied Health Literature, and the Web of Science Core Collection.
Thirty-eight articles were reviewed at the full-text level, and of those, nine met study inclusion criteria. All were published between 2004 and 2018 and included data from 678 psychosocial clinicians. Quality assessment revealed relatively low risk of bias and high methodological quality. Study composition and sample size varied greatly, and the majority of clinicians were aged between 40 and 59 years. Across studies, 10 different measures were used to assess burnout, secondary traumatic stress, and compassion fatigue, in addition to factors that might impact burnout, including work engagement, meaning, and moral distress. When compared with other medical professionals, psychosocial oncology clinicians endorsed lower levels of burnout.
Significance of results
This systematic review suggests that psychosocial clinicians are not at increased risk of burnout compared with other health care professionals working in oncology or in mental health. Although the data are quite limited, several factors appear to be associated with less burnout in psychosocial clinicians, including exposure to patient recovery, discussing traumas, less moral distress, and finding meaning in their work. More research using standardized measures of burnout with larger samples of clinicians is needed to examine both prevalence rates and how the experience of burnout changes over time. By virtue of their training, psychosocial clinicians are well placed to support each other and their nursing and medical colleagues.
Skin is the parchment upon which identity is written; class, race, ethnicity, and gender are all legible upon the human surface. Removing skin tears away identity, and leaves a blank slate upon whichlaw, punishment, sanctity, or monstrosity can be inscribed; whether as an act of penal brutality, as a comic device, or as a sign of spiritual sacrifice, it leaves a lasting impression about the qualities and nature of humanity. Flaying often functioned as an imaginative resource for medieval and early modern artists and writers, even though it seems to have been rarely practiced in reality. From images of Saint Bartholomew holding his skin in his arms, to scenes of execution in Havelok the Dane, to laws that prescribed it as a punishment for treason, this volume explores the ideaand the reality of skin removal - flaying - in the Middle Ages. It interrogates the connection between reality and imagination in depictions of literal skin removal, rather than figurative or theoretical interpretations of flaying, and offers a multilayered view of medieval and early modern perceptions of flaying and its representations in European culture. Its two parts consider practice and representation, capturing the evolution of flaying as both an idea and a practice in the premodern world.
Larissa Tracy is Associate Professor, Longwood University.
Contributors: Frederika Bain, Peter Dent, Kelly DeVries, Valerie Gramling, Perry Neil Harrison, Jack Hartnell, Emily Leverett, Michael Livingston, Sherry C.M. Lindquist, Asa Mittman, Mary Rambaran-Olm, William Sayers, Christina Sciacca, Susan Small, Larissa Tracy, Renée Ward
Many studies have demonstrated short-term behavioural responses by whales and dolphins in the presence of vessels, but the population-level implications of such changes are poorly understood (Lusseau, 2003, 2004; Bejder et al., 2006a; Lusseau & Bejder, 2007). One means for developing such an understanding is to use a modelling framework such as the Population Consequences of Acoustic Disturbance (PCAD) model. PCAD identifies four levels at which data can be collected, and allows for estimates of modelling parameters at one level to be based on measured data at another level (National Research Council, 2005).
The first level contains short-term behavioural responses, such as those that have been the typical focus of studies on effects of whale-watching. Effects vary within and between species, and include changes in respiration patterns, surface active behaviours, swimming velocity, vocal behaviour, activity state, inter-individual spacing, wake riding, approach and avoidance, and displacement from habitat. Collisions may result in injury or death (Wells & Scott, 1997; Laist et al., 2001). More detailed reviews of vessel effects can be found in Lien (2001) and Ritter (2003).
The conundrum of finding a ‘definition’ for life can be side-stepped by asking how people actually identify examples of life, and using this as the basis for life detection strategies. I illustrate how astrobiologists actually select things that are living from things that are not living with a simple exercise, and use this as the starting point to develop four characteristics that underlie their decisions: highly distinctive structure (physical or chemical), dynamic behaviour (physical or chemical), multiple instances of life forming a ‘natural group’ and that the structural and dynamic characteristics of the group are independent of the details of the substrate on which life is growing. I show that these all derive the role of a code in the dynamic maintenance and propagation of life. I argue that evolution is neither a useful nor a practical way of identifying life. I conclude with some specific ways that these general categories of the observable properties of life can be detected.
This article takes up Louise Arbour's claim that the doctrine of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ is grounded in existing obligations of international law, specifically those pertaining to the prevention and punishment of genocide. In doing so, it argues that the aspirations of the R2P project cannot be sustained by the idea of ‘responsibility’ alone. The article proceeds in arguing that the coherence of R2P depends on an unacknowledged and unarticulated theory of obligation that connects notions of culpability, blame, and accountability with the kind of preventive, punitive, and restorative action that Arbour and others advocate. Two theories of obligation are then offered, one natural the other conventional, which make this connection explicit. But the ensuing clarity comes at a cost: the naturalist account escapes the ‘real’ world to redeem the intrinsic dignity of all men and women, while the conventionalist account remains firmly tethered to the ‘real’ world in redeeming whatever dignity can be had by way of an agreement. The article concludes by arguing that the advocate of the responsibility to protect can have one or the other, but not both.
This article takes as its starting point the failure of the so-called normative
wing of the English School to theorise the foundational determinants of value
from which international society derives its normative character. In other
words, they have not adequately thought through ‘the law behind the
law’; that is, the underlying basis of obligation in international
life. Thus, English School theorists are able to describe and to explain various
norms but they cannot make sense of the reasons why any of these norms should be
regarded as obligatory. Failure in this regard is attributable in large part to
the way in which pluralist and solidarist conceptions of international life are
typically understood as representing conflicting moral claims. This article
seeks to move beyond these seemingly incommensurable claims, and the debate to
which they give their names, by putting forward an account of obligation that
reconciles the unity of human community and the freedom of international society
in a single, intellectually coherent argument. The article concludes by arguing
that a normative version of English School theory formulated in this way opens
space for thinking through much of what still confounds the English School,
including the normative character of political economy, the existence of a
rational order of values, and the ever elusive meaning of world society.