The first punctual question arising is how, in its (single) constitutional being, a body such as the Union combines its constituent roots in the original founding authorities (the states) with those, autonomous, in its own institutions. These are the ECJ for interpretation; the political institutions for practice and convention. In other words, what is the actual relationship, under the urge of change, between the states as treaty masters and the European Council, the Council, the Parliament and the Court? Secondly, there is the question as to how these shared constituent roots reflect not on constitutional change but on the day-to-day legislative and executive functioning of the Union's body politic. The coming constitutional settlement on the euro's financial support mechanism will not only consist of a new treaty. It will also take the form of secondary legislation and case-law. A third, most fundamental, question is how this ever-unfinished constitutional situation, imperfect by definition, will ultimately allow the development of a sound relationship between the authorities and the people, a relationship which is at the heart of any constitutional settlement. The last question (for now) sends us back to the one put in a previous editorial (in issue 1 of this year). It is: how to account for this incomplete and urged situation in a single and coherent constitutional reading?