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  • 3 - The Stickiness of “Bad” Institutions

  • Edited by Daniel M. Brinks, University of Texas, Austin, Steven Levitsky, Harvard University, Massachusetts, María Victoria Murillo, Columbia University, New York
  • Book:
    The Politics of Institutional Weakness in Latin America
    Published online:
    06 May 2020
    Print publication:
    11 June 2020, pp 61-97

  • Summary

    Most countries in the world operate under authoritarian constitutions. Historically, Latin American countries have been overrepresented in this group. Many of these authoritarian constitutions have proven remarkably sticky. The most long-lived ones not only govern the authoritarian regimes that pen them but subsequently constrain democratic successors long after the end of dictatorship.

    On average, these constitutions are relatively strong as defined in this volume: they achieve their statutory goals and produce outcomes their authors and bequeathers intended them to produce. Historically, their authors and bequeathers have used them to satisfy a narrow set of objectives: secure the safety and welfare of outgoing dictators as well as safeguard the political and economic interests of their core supporters. These constitutions are also consequential, distorting democracy in favor of these former dictators and supporters.

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