To investigate a cluster of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infections in employees working on 1 floor of a hospital administration building.

Contact tracing was performed to identify potential exposures and all employees were tested for SARS-CoV-2. Whole-genome sequencing was performed to determine the relatedness of SARS-CoV-2 samples from infected personnel and from control cases in the healthcare system with coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) during the same period. Carbon dioxide levels were measured during a workday to assess adequacy of ventilation; readings >800 parts per million (ppm) were considered an indication of suboptimal ventilation. To assess the potential for airborne transmission, DNA-barcoded aerosols were released, and real-time polymerase chain reaction was used to quantify particles recovered from air samples in multiple locations.

Between December 22, 2020, and January 8, 2021, 17 coworkers tested positive for SARS-CoV-2, including 13 symptomatic and 4 asymptomatic individuals. Of the 5 cluster SARS-CoV-2 samples sequenced, 3 were genetically related, but these employees denied higher-risk contacts with one another. None of the sequences from the cluster were genetically related to the 17 control sequences of SARS-CoV-2. Carbon dioxide levels increased during a workday but never exceeded 800 ppm. DNA-barcoded aerosol particles were dispersed from the sites of release to locations throughout the floor; 20% of air samples had >1 log10 particles.

In a hospital administration building outbreak, sequencing of SARS-CoV-2 confirmed transmission among coworkers. Transmission occurred despite the absence of higher-risk exposures and in a setting with adequate ventilation based on monitoring of carbon dioxide levels.

We conducted an investigation after identifying a cluster of 4 serious infections following transrectal ultrasound–guided biopsy of the prostate (TRUBP) during a 2-month period.

veterans Affairs medical center.

Patients with urinary tract infection (UTI) after TRUBP and time-matched controls with no evidence of infection.

The incidence of UTI within 30 days after TRUBP was calculated from 2002 through 2010. We evaluated the correlation between infection with fluoroquinolone-resistant gram-negative bacilli (GNB) and fluoroquinolone resistance in outpatient Escherichia coli urinary isolates and performed a case-control study to determine risk factors for infection with fluoroquinolone-resistant GNB. Processes for TRUBP prophylaxis, procedures, and equipment sterilization were reviewed.

An outbreak of UTI due to fluoroquinolone-resistant E. coli after TRUBP began 2 years before the cluster was identified and was correlated with increasing fluoroquinolone resistance in outpatient E. coli. No deficiencies were identified in equipment processing or biopsy procedures. Fluoroquinolone-resistant E. coli UTI after TRUBP was independently associated with prior infection with fluoroquinolone-resistant GNB (adjusted odds ratio, 20.8; P = .005). A prediction rule including prior UTI, hospitalization in the past year, and previous infection with fluoroquinolone-resistant GNB identified only 17 (49%) of 35 cases.

The outbreak of fluoroquinolone-resistant E. coli infections after TRUBP closely paralleled rising rates of fluoroquinolone resistance among outpatient E. coli isolates. The delayed detection of the outbreak and the absence of sensitive predictors of infection suggest that active surveillance for infection after TRUBP is necessary in the context of increasing fluoroquinolone resistance in the United States.